L’estoppel ou l’interdiction de se contredire au détriment d’autrui consacre un principe connu dans les sources de la common law : le principe de cohérence. Cette règle n’existait pas en droit judiciaire privé français. Son introduction en procédure civile et en matière d’arbitrage s’est faite de manière progressive. À cela, il convient de constater qu’il existe, dans notre ordonnancement judiciaire, des institutions jurisprudentielles et légales qui sanctionnent déjà des attitudes procédurales contradictoires. Leur existence se retrouve dans le code de procédure civile, mais aussi dans de nombreuses décisions de la Cour de cassation. En droit positif, l’estoppel ne serait ainsi pas la seule règle sanctionnant l’incohérence procédurale.Déjà étudié sous l’angle contractuel, le principe de cohérence n’avait encore jamais été analysé sous son angle processuel. Tout d’abord, cette thèse conduit à se pencher sur la recherche d’une définition du principe de cohérence, pour ensuite s’attacher à la pertinence de son introduction dans notre droit interne. / The estoppel or prohibition to contradict himself embodies a principle known in the sources of the common law: the principle of coherence. This rule does not exist in French private judicial law. Its introduction in civil procedure and in arbitration procedure is made gradually.To this, it must be noted that there is already, in our judicial right, jurisprudential and legal institutions who condemn the inconsistency of an attitude in front of the adversary. Their existence is found in the Code of Civil Procedure, and in some decisions of the Court of Cassation. In positive law, estoppel would not be the only rule sanctioning procedural incoherence.Already studied under the contractual perspective, the principle of coherence had never been analyzed under its procedural angle. First, this thesis led to consider looking for a definition of the principle of coherence, then focus on the relevance of its introduction into French judicial law.

In classical international law, States alone were the makers and subjects of the law. Times have changed. Contemporary international law admits, not only States as its subjects but also individuals and international organisations; it controls not just the needs of States but also the needs of individuals as it continues to venture into areas which, in the classical era, were exclusively reserved to domestic law. The fact that international law now applies to entities other than States is no longer a subject of controversy both in theory and practice. On the contrary, the question relating to whether international law could originate from a source other than through the consent of States in the positivist sense of the law has remained a question of controversy. The question has been made more complex by the multiplicity of international institutions created by States and vested with authority to perform the functions entrusted to them under international law. The functions they perform influence the behaviours and expectations of both States and individuals; but the powers they exercise belong to the States which delegated the powers. Since the powers are delegated by States, it should follow that the powers be confined by the very fact of delegation to the functions for which the powers had been granted. Such powers cannot be used for any other purpose, perhaps. With this in mind, the question sought to be answered in this work is whether the powers granted to International Court of Justice to “decide disputes” – article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court) – implicates the power of judicial lawmaking. In other words, whether rules and principles arising from the decisions of the Court can be properly referred to as rules and principles of international law. The question becomes quite intriguing when placed within the context of article 38(1)(d) and article 59 of the Statute of the Court on the one hand, and the practice of the Court and of the States appearing before it on the other hand. Articles 38(1)(d) provides: “subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” By article 59: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”. Notwithstanding the language of the above provisions, it is shown in this work that like judges in municipal law, judges in the ICJ lay down rules and principles having legal implications for the decisions in subsequent cases as well as for the conduct of States, in general, regarding areas within the degrees of the settled case-law of the Court. It is accordingly argued that to the extent that rules and principles in the decisions of the Court are relevant as rules and principles of international law (in subsequent decisions of the Court) to the determination of international law rights and obligations of States, judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d) are a source of international law. This is notwithstanding the unhelpful language of paragraph (d) and the influence of article 59. Concerning article 59, the writer argues that the article has no bearing on the authority of judicial decisions in article 38(1)(d); its real function being to protect the legal rights and interests of States from a decision given in a case to which they were not parties.

This thesis aims to describe a phenomenon of judicial law-making in 21st century. The thesis is concerned with two main issues, specifically the binding effect of prior judicial decisions and the boundaries of judicial authority in law-making. The thesis begins with a description of essential terms and it focuses especially on a type of judicial decisions-making, which results in not following plain and clear language of the applicable statute. A judge is not free in his choice when to avoid the language of the statute. He is limited by values embedded in law by legislator, which he cannot exceed and extend. Therefore this activity is deemed to be a method of selecting an applicable legal norm, not creation of new law. The thesis further explains when not following plain and clear language of the applicable statute can be in reasonable cases justifiable. This part is followed by specific parts dealing with the particular forms of the judicial law-making within the bounds of two legal systems - common law and civil law. In the conclusion the paper draws a comparison between the judicial law- making in mentioned legal systems. The thesis concludes that there is a difference between the systems in the concept of bindingness of prior judicial decisions. Yet, both systems reach the stability of court...

Le recours collectif est un moyen de procédure qui permet à une personne d'agir en demande pour le compte des membres d'un groupe dont elle fait partie. Cette procédure peut être introduite contre plus qu'un seul défendeur. On distingue deux types de recours collectifs contre plusieurs défendeurs. Il y a d'abord les recours collectifs où tous les membres du groupe ont un recours personnel contre tous les défendeurs. Il y a aussi les recours collectifs où les membres du groupe font valoir une même cause d'action à l'encontre de plusieurs défendeurs qui auraient eu un comportement fautif similaire à l'égard de l'un ou l'autre des membres du groupe. La recevabilité de ce dernier type de recours collectifs a été remise en question. Le requérant n'aurait pas l'intérêt suffisant pour ester en justice contre les défendeurs qui ne lui ont pas causé préjudice. Il ne saurait non plus satisfaire aux exigences du Code de procédure civile concernant l'autorisation du recours collectif. Or, il appert des règles mises en place en matière de recours collectif que le requérant fait valoir non seulement ses propres droits personnels, mais aussi tous ceux des membres du groupe. Ainsi, on ne peut lui reprocher l'absence d'intérêt juridique ou de cause d'action dans la mesure où il y a, pour chacun des défendeurs, au moins un membre du groupe avec un intérêt suffisant ou une cause d'action à son encontre. Les autres exigences du Code de procédure civile ne font pas, en soi, obstacle à l'autorisation d'un recours collectif contre plusieurs défendeurs. / A class action is a procedure which enables one person to sue without a mandate on behalf of aU members of a group of which he or she is a member. This procedure can be used to sue more than just one defendant. There are two different types of class actions against multiple defendants. In the frrst type, aU members have a cause of action against all defendants. There are also class actions where aU members plead an identical cause of action against multiple defendants whom wrongfuUy and similarly acted toward one of the members. The admissibility of this latter type of class actions against multiple defendants has been questioned. The petitioner would not have a sufficient legal interest to bring an action against the defendants whom did not cause him or her any prejudice. He or she would not be able to satisfy the requirements of the Code of civil procedure regarding class actions. However, it appears from the mIes that govem class actions that the petitioner pleads not only his or her personal cause of action, but also pleads the cause of action of aU group members. Thus, the petitioner cannot be reproached for not having a legal interest or a cause of action against aU defendants insofar that there is, for each defendant, at least one member of the group whom has a legal interest or a cause of action against him or her. The other requirements of the Code ofcivil procedure do not bar the authorization to institute a class action against multiple defendants.

Le recours collectif est un moyen de procédure qui permet à une personne d'agir en demande pour le compte des membres d'un groupe dont elle fait partie. Cette procédure peut être introduite contre plus qu'un seul défendeur. On distingue deux types de recours collectifs contre plusieurs défendeurs. Il y a d'abord les recours collectifs où tous les membres du groupe ont un recours personnel contre tous les défendeurs. Il y a aussi les recours collectifs où les membres du groupe font valoir une même cause d'action à l'encontre de plusieurs défendeurs qui auraient eu un comportement fautif similaire à l'égard de l'un ou l'autre des membres du groupe. La recevabilité de ce dernier type de recours collectifs a été remise en question. Le requérant n'aurait pas l'intérêt suffisant pour ester en justice contre les défendeurs qui ne lui ont pas causé préjudice. Il ne saurait non plus satisfaire aux exigences du Code de procédure civile concernant l'autorisation du recours collectif. Or, il appert des règles mises en place en matière de recours collectif que le requérant fait valoir non seulement ses propres droits personnels, mais aussi tous ceux des membres du groupe. Ainsi, on ne peut lui reprocher l'absence d'intérêt juridique ou de cause d'action dans la mesure où il y a, pour chacun des défendeurs, au moins un membre du groupe avec un intérêt suffisant ou une cause d'action à son encontre. Les autres exigences du Code de procédure civile ne font pas, en soi, obstacle à l'autorisation d'un recours collectif contre plusieurs défendeurs. / A class action is a procedure which enables one person to sue without a mandate on behalf of aU members of a group of which he or she is a member. This procedure can be used to sue more than just one defendant. There are two different types of class actions against multiple defendants. In the frrst type, aU members have a cause of action against all defendants. There are also class actions where aU members plead an identical cause of action against multiple defendants whom wrongfuUy and similarly acted toward one of the members. The admissibility of this latter type of class actions against multiple defendants has been questioned. The petitioner would not have a sufficient legal interest to bring an action against the defendants whom did not cause him or her any prejudice. He or she would not be able to satisfy the requirements of the Code of civil procedure regarding class actions. However, it appears from the mIes that govem class actions that the petitioner pleads not only his or her personal cause of action, but also pleads the cause of action of aU group members. Thus, the petitioner cannot be reproached for not having a legal interest or a cause of action against aU defendants insofar that there is, for each defendant, at least one member of the group whom has a legal interest or a cause of action against him or her. The other requirements of the Code ofcivil procedure do not bar the authorization to institute a class action against multiple defendants. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maître en droit". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline. Commentaires du jury : "Le jury vous encourage à publier".

La question de la procédure en droit international privé parait de prime abord simple à résoudre tant la compétence de la loi du for est empreinte d’évidence. C’est sous l’angle des méthodes du droit international privé – et particulièrement la méthode conflictuelle et la méthode des règles matérielles – dans le cadre de l’action de l’Union européenne que la réflexion a été développée. La place de cette dernière dans les sources des deux premières justifie cette position. L’évidence de la règle énoncée ci-dessus s’est rapidement fait ressentir. Elle a pu faire douter de la pertinence du recours à la méthode conflictuelle pour résoudre les difficultés que l’institution régionale entend annihiler dans les litiges comportant un élément d’extranéité. Mais les difficultés de définition de la catégorie procédure retiennent tout aussi rapidement l’attention. Il apparait ainsi un premier champ d’action de l’Union, déjà exploré certes, mais devant être complété. Toutefois, l’édification de l’espace judiciaire européen – car là est l’objectif poursuivi – semble nécessiter, de l’aveu même des autorités européennes, d’endiguer les disparités procédurales. Ce sont les règles matérielles elles-mêmes qui paraissent, souvent, poser question dans les litiges transfrontières en rendant difficile, notamment, la libre circulation des décisions. C’est donc vers cette seconde méthode du droit international privé que l’Union européenne a dû se tourner. La vocation à agir de l’Union ayant été établie, et un rapide état des lieux de l’acquis ayant été dressé, il a pu être recherché les règles matérielles qui semblaient nécessaires. Au-delà de celles-ci, la méthode conflictuelle assure la complétude du système. / The issue of procedure in private international law seems simple, at first glance, to solve as the jurisdiction of the law of the forum is imbued with evidence. This is from the perspective of private international law methods - especially the conflict method and method of the substantive rules - as part of the action of the European Union that reflection has been developed. The position of the last in the first two sources justifies this position. The evidence of the rule above quickly felt. It conducts to douter the relevance of the use of conflict method to solve the difficulties that regional institution intends to annihilate in disputes involving a foreign element. But the difficulties of definition of the category procedure quickly hold the attention also. It thus appears a first field of action of the Union, already explored, but must be completed. However, the construction of the European judicial area – because there is the objective - seems to require, by the admission of the European authorities, contain procedural disparities. These are the substantive rules themselves that appear often ask questions in cross-border disputes by making it dificult in particular the free movement of judgments. So it is to this second method of private international law that the European Union had to turn. The vocation of the Union to act having been established, and a quick inventory of the achievement have been drawn up, it could be sought substantive rules that seemed necessary. Beyond these, the conflict method ensures the completeness of the system.

En procédure civile, la connaissance des actes du procès par les parties est essentielle ; des garanties importantes y sont attachées, à commencer par le respect du principe du contradictoire. Une difficulté se pose, toutefois : il est malaisé de déterminer si une partie a eu connaissance de l’acte qui lui a été communiqué. Toute la question est alors de savoir comment le droit s’accommode de cette difficulté. À cette fin, deux modèles contraires peuvent être dégagés. Dans le premier, formaliste, il est fait le choix de favoriser la connaissance des actes du procès par les parties en amont, pour pouvoir se désintéresser de leur connaissance effective en aval, tous les moyens ayant été mis en oeuvre pour y parvenir. Dans le second, réaliste, on se désintéresse de la façon dont les actes du procès sont portés à la connaissance des parties, mais, par la suite, on prête beaucoup d’intérêt à la connaissance que les parties en ont réellement eue. L’étude révèle que le droit du procès civil reposait initialement sur un modèle à dominante formaliste, mais que ce modèle a évolué, particulièrement au cours des dix dernières années. Sous l’influence des soucis contemporains de rationalisation des coûts de la justice et de protection accrue des droits fondamentaux des parties, le formalisme du droit du procès civil s’est tempéré. Faudrait-il qu’il le soit davantage ? Ce travail ne plaide ni pour la subversion du modèle classique, ni pour son rétablissement. Plutôt, c’est une évolution nuancée du droit qui est suggérée, proposant d’exalter le formalisme lorsque la sécurité juridique l’exige, sans renoncer à tirer profit de règles l’atténuant quand cela s’impose. / In civil law procedures, the parties’ knowledge of the acts of the trial is essential; it guarantees that certain principles, such as the adversarial principle, will be respected. However, a difficulty arises: it is hard to determine whether a party has in fact become aware of the act which was communicated to him. The question is to determine whether the law can accept such a difficulty. To this end, two divergent models can be provided. In the formalistic one, the choice is made to favor the knowledge of the acts of the trial beforehand, in order to be able to become disinterested in their actual knowledge afterwards, all the means having been implemented to carry this out. In the realistic one, the way in which the acts of the trial are brought to the parties' attention is neglected, but thereafter, there is a resurgent focus on the knowledge the parties have genuinely had. The study reveals that the law of civil trial was initially based on a predominantly formalistic model, but this model has evolved, especially during the last decade. Under the influence of contemporary concerns in order to rationalize justice costs and increase the protection of the parties' fundamental rights, the formalism of civil lawsuit has been tempered. Should it be even more moderate? This work neither pleads for the subversion of the classical model nor for its reinstatement. Instead, it is a nuanced evolution of the law which is suggested. It suggests to promote formalism when legal certainty requires it, without sacrificing the benefit of lightening the rules when it is necessary.

L'accès d'une société à un prétoire est source de nombreuses problématiques procédurales. Cela étant, ces dernières n'étant pas suffisamment considérées par le législateur ou idéalement compilées au sein d'une codification spécifique, elles demeurent la cause de légitimes tourments pratiques. Les interrogations sont alors nombreuses : elles portent sur les droits susceptibles d’être invoqués devant le juge, par ou contre la société, sa capacité à jouir de l'action en justice, le pouvoir ou la qualité de ceux qui prétendent être à même de l’incarner à la barre ; la juridiction compétente pour connaître du litige qui l'intéresse ; la gestion du temps procédural en adéquation avec le rythme de la vie sociale ; l’élaboration et la communication des actes de procédure établis en son nom ou à son intention ; la garantie d'exécution des décisions rendues en sa présence. Le risque appréhendé est l’échec procédural. À l’origine de la difficulté : toute l'ambiguïté existentielle et fonctionnelle de ce justiciable atypique qu'est la société. L’on aurait pu a priori douter que le droit procédural parvienne à s’adapter aux singularités du justiciable sociétaire. Il suffisait, pour laisser place à quelques humbles mais utiles certitudes en la matière, de procéder à un rassemblement cohérent de tout ce qui constitue la substance du droit procédural sociétaire, suivant un axe de lecture le rendant compréhensible. Et c'est ce que s'efforce de réaliser la présente thèse, au gré des difficultés pratiques qu'elle traite et auxquelles elle suggère les solutions susceptibles de convenir / Going to court for a company involves many procedural issues. Since those issues are not sufficiently taken into account by legislators or ideally part of a compilation within a specific form of codification, they may be held responsible for inevitable practical difficulties. Many questions arise : concerning rights likely to be brought up before a judge by a company or against a company ; its ability to benefit from an action ; the power or quality of those who claim to represent the company before a judge, the competence of a court to hear the case at hand ; managing procedural time in line with the pace of corporate life ; drafting and communicating the procedural acts issued in the company’s name or for the company ; ensuring the court rulings taken in the company’s presence be enforced. The obvious risk is procedural failure. The difficulty stems from the existential and functional ambiguities of this a-typical company. At first sight, procedural does not seem to be able to adapt to the nature of the claimant company. In order to leave room for some humble but useful certainties in this area, one must coherently gather all that constitutes the substance of companies’ procedural law, based on an interpretation that will make it understandable. That is the aim of the present dissertation while dealing with practical difficulties and suggesting suitable solutions. “The Claimant Company” is a plea for the recognition of the governing law in disputes between companies, which deserves to be part and parcel of the many implications of jurisprudence

The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable. The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed. This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face value might seems to be encroaching into the courts’ independence and authority. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)

Una adecuada interpretación del principio de legalidad ofrece buenas razones para admitir la analogía in bonam partem en el Derecho penal aunque de un modo limitado. Incluso cuando el juez mediante ésta excluye o limita el ejercicio del ius puniendi, el aplicador del Derecho penal debe seguir apegado a la ley. De este modo, la analogía in bonam partem debe ser vista como un mecanismo excepcional de integración del Derecho penal frente a inconsistencias axiológicas no previstas ni deseadas por el legislador. Estas excepcionales facultades creadoras reconocidas al juez tienen lugar frente a concretas instituciones jurídico-penales y dentro de un determinado marco argumentativo. En este sentido, la analogía in bonam partem es un medio para crear supralegalmente causas de justificación, causas de exculpación y atenuantes, mientras que no para crear excusas absolutorias. Igualmente, el juez puede crear Derecho solamente a partir de la analogía legis o la analogía institutionis, sin resultar posible acudir a la analogía iuris. / An adequate interpretation of the legality principle offers sound reasons to accept analogy in bonam partem in Criminal Law, though only in a limited way. Even when the judge excludes or limits the ius puniendi through the use of analogy, she should still be strictly subjected to the norm. Therefore the analogy in bonam partem must be seen as an exceptional mechanism of Criminal Law's Integration in the presence of axiological inconsistencies that the Parliament didn't foresee and didn't want. These exceptional law-making powers awarded to the judge refer to specific Criminal law institutions and in a specific argumentative framework. In this sense, analogy in bonam partem is an instrument to supra-legally create justifications, excuses, and mitigating circumstances, but not other types of punishment excluding institutions. In the same manner, the judge can create new Criminal Law only through legis Analogy and institutionis Analogy but not through iuris Analogy.