This thesis explores the doctrine of judicial notice, particularly as it applies in the context of anti-poverty litigation. I invoke a theory of judgment which centres valid judgment on the practice of an "enlarged mentality." I argue for an interpretation of judicial notice that can assist judges to approach their task in this way. First, judicial notice should be animated by the fundamental principles of the legal system. including equality. Second, judicial notice must be attentive to the different kinds of "facts" that could be subject to notice, and the criteria for notice that are appropriate in each case. Third. judicial notice requires an active posture on behalf of judges, which finds support in legal norms about impartiality and the duty to give reasons. Finally, judicial notice requires judges to be actively attentive to the content of their own common sense.

During the 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda were swept by wars accompanied by serious violations of international humanitarian law. Grave and severe crimes wiped away lives and destroyed properties. The United Nations Security Council determined that the violations committed constituted threats to international peace and security, declaring itself empowered to take action. It established international ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda with the mandate of prosecuting individuals responsible for those crimes as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Investigating the tribunals’ effectiveness enables one to assess whether they achieved the anticipated outcomes based on the tribunals’ mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems. The research relies on naturalism and positivism to put the tribunals in a moral and ethical perspective. By examining how the tribunals were established, their objectives, the investigation and prosecution processes, the reliance on guilty plea and judicial notice and the imputation of criminal responsibility by applying joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines; the study argues that prosecution has not been an effective tool as contemplated by the Security Council. An analytical and comparative review of various domestic and international legal resources helped to provide an insightful approach for an effective prosecution of international crimes. Credible, legitimate and legal judicial institutions in which professional judges and prosecutors discharge their function independently, impartially and are accountable may achieve justice for the victims of international crimes. Ad hoc tribunals failed to thoroughly investigate and assume the dual role of prosecution. They conveniently used legal procedural tools that fit petty domestic crimes; unfortunately demeaning the magnitude of international crimes of concern. Criminal responsibility was mostly imputed without properly scrutinising the legality, extent, actual participation and guilty mind of the alleged perpetrators. Effectiveness should be a value assessment. Imposed and overburdened ad hoc tribunals are inappropriate and should be abandoned. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LLD

L'utilisation de l'expérience comme un mode de détermination des faits, c'est-à-dire comme un élément qui comble les lacunes dans l'ensemble des éléments de preuve dans le procès civil, est un thème quelque peu tabou. La doctrine est souvent basée sur la prémisse voulant que le décideur rende une décision uniquement en vertu des éléments de preuve et qu'il doit absolument s'abstenir d'insérer aux constatations quoi que ce soit qui n'est pas présent dans les éléments de preuve. Cette vision est éloignée de la réalité juridique. Dans la première partie, nous allons aborder les principes procéduraux qui empêchent l'utilisation de l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits. Ce sont le principe de la reconstruction de l'événement du passé, le principe de l'abstraction des connaissances acquises hors du procès et le principe de l'exclusion de la preuve par ouï-dire. Ensuite, nous portons notre attention sur les différents types d'expérience, c'est-à-dire l'expérience profane, divisible en bon sens et sens commun, et l'expérience scientifique, ainsi sur leurs modes de fonctionnement dans le procès civil. La première partie se termine par une brève confrontation des différents types d'expérience avec les principes procéduraux. La deuxième partie est consacré à l'analyse de l'expérience dans trois instruments juridiques: la connaissance d'office, la présomption de fait et le témoignage d'expert. Nous nous intéressons principalement à vérifier si l'expérience fonctionne à l'intérieur de ces instruments juridiques comme mode de détermination des faits et ensuite quelles sont les limites que le droit pose à l'expérience dans ce rôle. L'analyse va confirmer que le principal instrument par lequel l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits pénètre dans le procès civil est la présomption de fait. / The theme of the use of experience as a mode of fact findings, i.e. as an element which fills the gaps in a totality of evidence in the civil procedure, is somewhat tabooed. The doctrine is frequently based upon the premise that a decision-maker should render a decision solely on the basis of evidence and that he should completely abstain from inserting into the fact findings anything which is not present in the evidence. This vision is distant from the legal reality. In the first part, three procedural principles which prevent the experience from the use as a mode of fact findings will be treated. The principles in question are the principle of reconstruction of the past event, the principle of setting aside the knowledge obtained out of the procedure and the principle of exclusion of hearsay evidence. Then the attention is paid to different types of experience (i.e. the lay experience, divisible into "bon sens" and into common sense, and the scientific experience) and to the methods of their fonctionning in the civil procedure. The first part is concluded by a brief confrontation of different types of experience with the procedural principles. The second part is dedicated to an analysis of the experience in the three legal instruments: judicial notice, presumption of fact and expert testimony. The interest is focused especially on verification whether the experience works inside the legal instruments as a mode of facts findings and then what are the limits which the law fixes to the experience in this role. The research will confirm that the principal instrument by which the experience as a mode of fact findings penetrates into the civil procedure is the presumption of fact.

During the 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda were swept by wars accompanied by serious violations of international humanitarian law. Grave and severe crimes wiped away lives and destroyed properties. The United Nations Security Council determined that the violations committed constituted threats to international peace and security, declaring itself empowered to take action. It established international ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda with the mandate of prosecuting individuals responsible for those crimes as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Investigating the tribunals’ effectiveness enables one to assess whether they achieved the anticipated outcomes based on the tribunals’ mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems. The research relies on naturalism and positivism to put the tribunals in a moral and ethical perspective. By examining how the tribunals were established, their objectives, the investigation and prosecution processes, the reliance on guilty plea and judicial notice and the imputation of criminal responsibility by applying joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines; the study argues that prosecution has not been an effective tool as contemplated by the Security Council. An analytical and comparative review of various domestic and international legal resources helped to provide an insightful approach for an effective prosecution of international crimes. Credible, legitimate and legal judicial institutions in which professional judges and prosecutors discharge their function independently, impartially and are accountable may achieve justice for the victims of international crimes. Ad hoc tribunals failed to thoroughly investigate and assume the dual role of prosecution. They conveniently used legal procedural tools that fit petty domestic crimes; unfortunately demeaning the magnitude of international crimes of concern. Criminal responsibility was mostly imputed without properly scrutinising the legality, extent, actual participation and guilty mind of the alleged perpetrators. Effectiveness should be a value assessment. Imposed and overburdened ad hoc tribunals are inappropriate and should be abandoned. / Public, Constitutional, and International / LL. D.

L'utilisation de l'expérience comme un mode de détermination des faits, c'est-à-dire comme un élément qui comble les lacunes dans l'ensemble des éléments de preuve dans le procès civil, est un thème quelque peu tabou. La doctrine est souvent basée sur la prémisse voulant que le décideur rende une décision uniquement en vertu des éléments de preuve et qu'il doit absolument s'abstenir d'insérer aux constatations quoi que ce soit qui n'est pas présent dans les éléments de preuve. Cette vision est éloignée de la réalité juridique. Dans la première partie, nous allons aborder les principes procéduraux qui empêchent l'utilisation de l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits. Ce sont le principe de la reconstruction de l'événement du passé, le principe de l'abstraction des connaissances acquises hors du procès et le principe de l'exclusion de la preuve par ouï-dire. Ensuite, nous portons notre attention sur les différents types d'expérience, c'est-à-dire l'expérience profane, divisible en bon sens et sens commun, et l'expérience scientifique, ainsi sur leurs modes de fonctionnement dans le procès civil. La première partie se termine par une brève confrontation des différents types d'expérience avec les principes procéduraux. La deuxième partie est consacré à l'analyse de l'expérience dans trois instruments juridiques: la connaissance d'office, la présomption de fait et le témoignage d'expert. Nous nous intéressons principalement à vérifier si l'expérience fonctionne à l'intérieur de ces instruments juridiques comme mode de détermination des faits et ensuite quelles sont les limites que le droit pose à l'expérience dans ce rôle. L'analyse va confirmer que le principal instrument par lequel l'expérience comme mode de détermination des faits pénètre dans le procès civil est la présomption de fait. / The theme of the use of experience as a mode of fact findings, i.e. as an element which fills the gaps in a totality of evidence in the civil procedure, is somewhat tabooed. The doctrine is frequently based upon the premise that a decision-maker should render a decision solely on the basis of evidence and that he should completely abstain from inserting into the fact findings anything which is not present in the evidence. This vision is distant from the legal reality. In the first part, three procedural principles which prevent the experience from the use as a mode of fact findings will be treated. The principles in question are the principle of reconstruction of the past event, the principle of setting aside the knowledge obtained out of the procedure and the principle of exclusion of hearsay evidence. Then the attention is paid to different types of experience (i.e. the lay experience, divisible into "bon sens" and into common sense, and the scientific experience) and to the methods of their fonctionning in the civil procedure. The first part is concluded by a brief confrontation of different types of experience with the procedural principles. The second part is dedicated to an analysis of the experience in the three legal instruments: judicial notice, presumption of fact and expert testimony. The interest is focused especially on verification whether the experience works inside the legal instruments as a mode of facts findings and then what are the limits which the law fixes to the experience in this role. The research will confirm that the principal instrument by which the experience as a mode of fact findings penetrates into the civil procedure is the presumption of fact.

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Law)

On October 1, 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front launched a war from and with the support of the Republic of Uganda against Rwanda. This war was accompanied by unspeakable violations of International Humanitarian Law. Both conflicting parties violated the basic rules protecting the civilian population in situations of armed conflicts. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, passed resolution 955 of November 8, 1994 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to prosecute alleged responsible of such violations. This study investigates the background of the ICTR and questions the nature of the conflict that prompted the Security Council to establish another ad hoc international criminal tribunal after the one established for the former Yugoslavia. It further inquires into its jurisprudence and reflects critically on the ICTR's approach to serious violations of IHL under Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Law)