Tarptautinis jūrų teisės tribunolas- įsteigtas 1982 m. Jungtinių Tautų jūrų teisės konvencijos ir yra joje įtvirtinto kompleksiško ginčų sprendimų mechanizmo dalis. Naujos teisminės institucijos atsiradimo tarptautinėje teisėje poreikis analizuojamas pirmajame šio darbo skyriuje, kartu aptariant Tribunolo sudėtį ir struktūrą. Antrajame skyriuje nustatomos Tribunolo kompetencijos ribos. Aptariama Konvencijos privalomųjų ginčų sprendimo procedūrų pasirinkimo laisvė ir valstybių pareiškimų pagal Konvencijos 287 straipsnį turinys. Šioje vietoje atkreipiamas dėmesys į tai, kad bylos Tribunolui dažniausiai perduodamos atskiru šalių susitarimu nepaisant to, kokia privalomoji procedūra turėtų būti taikoma. Todėl faktas, kad Tribunolas nėra pasirinktas kaip privalomoji institucija iš Konvencijos kylančių ginčų sprendimui, neužkerta kelio ginčo nagrinėjimui šioje teisminėje institucijoje. Kitoje skyriaus dalyje analizuojama Tribunolo kompetencija skiriant laikinąsias apsaugos priemones bei sprendžiant sulaikytų laivų ir įgulų paleidimo klausimus. Nagrinėjamos laikinųjų apsaugos priemonių skyrimo sąlygos ir jų taikymas Tribunolo praktikoje. Atskleidžiamas aktyvus Tribunolo vaidmuo skatinant šalis bendradarbiauti. Taip pat apibrėžiama Tribunolo kompetencija spręsti sulaikytų laivų ir jų įgulų paleidimo bylas. Aptariamas laivo nacionalinės priklausomybės klausimas, kuris yra lemiamas Tribunolo jurisdikcijai pagal Konvencijos 292 straipsnį kilti. Toliau darbe kalbama apie Tribunolo... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea is a new court created by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the judicial institution which is an integrate part of dispute resolution mechanism composed in this bilateral agreement. The first section of this paper discusses main reasons for establishing the new Tribunal, the composition of this judicial institution and the structure of it. The competence of the International Tribunal for the Law of the sea is enclosed in the second chapter. Primarily it is analyzing the choice of procedure under Article 287 of the Convention and the declarations of States under this article. At this point, it is noted that only one case, the M/V “Louisa” was instituted before the Tribunal on the basis of such declarations. And nevertheless, the fact that arbitration would be the only mandatory means available to the parties to a dispute, does not prevent them from agreeing to transfer the dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication. Further it is analyzing the competence of the Tribunal to deal with request for the prescription of provisional measures ant to deal with applications for the prompt release of vessels and crews. The requirement for prima facie jurisdiction and other conditions to be met for the grant of provisional measures are discussed in this paper, along with application of these requirements in Tribunal‘s practice. In this section also jurisdiction and the scope of the procedure under Article 292 of the Convention... [to full text]

In the decades after attaining independence from its colonial masters, Rwanda’s two principal ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, suffered worsening tensions which often resulted in the perpetration of atrocities. Peace agreements brokered by the international community did not ease these ethnic tensions. In April 1994, the ethnic crisis took a different dimension following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. A full-blown genocide was committed by the Hutus who targeted their Tutsi and Hutu-moderates victims because of their ethnic identity and tolerant political views respectively. In a hundred days, about a million Tutsis and Hutu-moderates were massacred. Gross violations of human rights had been committed. The planning, preparation and execution of these atrocities were done by almost everyone within the Hutu majority: the leadership (both civilian and military), business men, the clergy, artists, professors, journalists, militias, the commoners, and other civil society actors. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the leadership of General Paul Kagame overthrew the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and brought the genocide to an end. In an effort to build a government of national unity, the Government of Rwanda under the leadership of President Paul Kagame requested the United Nations Security Council to establish a tribunal for the trial of persons who bear responsibility for the atrocities committed in Rwanda. In response to this request, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) creating the second United Nations’ ad hoc international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Annexed to Resolution 955 was the Statute of the ICTR. The Statute gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over three crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Amongst other things, it also defined on which individuals it would impose criminal responsibility. The definition of genocide and the punishable acts as contained in the Statute of the ICTR (Article 2) were simply imported from the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 (Article III). One of these punishable acts is direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute of the ICTR). As seen in Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR, there are five different modes of participation that would lead to the imposition of criminal responsibility: planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting. Instigation is one of these modes of participation. An examination of the jurisprudence of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTR reveals that there is an overlap between direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) and instigation as a mode of participation under Article 6(1). The Trial and Appeal Chambers have contributed enormously to the development of the jurisprudence of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c). Now settled as an inchoate crime in international criminal law, criminal responsibility is imposed irrespective of whether the direct and public incitement successfully results in the commission of genocide. On the other hand, instigation is one of the modes of participation which would lead to the imposition of criminal responsibility. Participation under Article 6(1) is not limited to any particular crime, but extends to all the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction – genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. The jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers on Article 6(1) states that criminal responsibility can only be imposed where it is proved that the accused’s mode of participation substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. Therefore, instigation, which is one of the modes of participation, must be shown to have substantially contributed to the commission of the crime for criminal responsibility to be imposed. In my opinion, this requirement of substantial contribution for the imposition of criminal responsibility is wrong. It emanates from a poor understanding of Article 6(1) and the construction of the words therein. It is a judicial invention which does not square with established principles of criminal responsibility in general and inchoate crimes in particular. This thesis critiques the jurisprudence of the ICTR on instigation as a mode of participation under Article 6(1). Instigation is a recognised mode of participation in international crimes. Under the common law system, it is also an inchoate crime. International instruments and the jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers have recognised the inchoate nature of incitement. However, in the construction of Article 6(1) wherein instigation features as a mode of participation, the Trial and Appeal Chambers erred. I illustrate in this thesis that a correct construction and understanding of Article 6(1) shows its inchoate and bifurcated character: first, any of the modes of participation must lead to any of the stages of any of the crimes (planning, preparation or execution). These modes of participation are not limited to any particular crime. Therefore, if instigation leads to the planning or preparation of any of the crimes, that renders it inchoate (which is understood to mean a criminal activity that is incomplete, still at its initial stage). Second, the imposition of criminal responsibility is bifurcated. In other words, it must go through two stages: first, there must be a mode of participation, and second, it must lead to any of the stages of the crimes. Third, the substantial contribution requirement does not square with a strict construction of Article 6(1). In articulating the different stages that a mode of participation must lead to, it states ‘planning, preparation or execution’ of any of the crimes. The use of a disjunctive word ‘or’ rather than a conjunctive word ‘and’ suggests that any of the modes of participation that leads to any of these stages (planning, preparation or execution) of any of these crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II) would suffice. Therefore, to require that there must be a substantial contribution to commission of a crime before criminal responsibility can be imposed under Article 6(1) is a clear limitation to the last stage of the crime, which is execution (or commission). As evidenced by the cases tried at the Tribunal, Article 2(3)(c) which addresses the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide and Article 6(1) which deals with the imposition of criminal responsibility, do overlap. In other words, incitement that qualifies as direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) may as well qualify as instigation to any of the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction under Article 6(1). From the delivery of its first judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu,1 the Trial Chambers did not recognise the confluence 1 Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4. T. Ch. I, 2 September 1998. between these two Articles. However, in the case of The Prosecutor v Callixte Kalimanzira,2 the Trial Chambers made this observation, and outlined a set of guidelines on how to resolve cases of overlap. Though a colossal step in fixing this problem, the guidelines are faulted because they repeat the same mistakes made by previous Trial Chambers: first, they limit instigation only to genocide even under Article 6(1); second, they still hold that criminal responsibility can be imposed under Article 6(1) only when it is proved that the mode of participation substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. While it resonates with conventional wisdom today that incitement, synonymous with instigation, is limited to the crime of genocide, this thesis critiques the jurisprudence of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTR and argues that instigation is a mode of participation in crimes against humanity following a strict construction of Article 6(1). Furthermore, incitement that qualifies as ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) may also qualify as instigation to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or both under Article 6(1). Third, ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) is limited to the crime of genocide, and must fulfil the caveats of ‘direct’ and ‘public’. Meanwhile, instigation under Article 6(1) does not need to meet any requirement as long as it leads to the ‘planning, preparation or execution’ of any of the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction. The poor construction of Article 6(1) has resulted in huge controversies about instigation as a mode of participation in crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction under Article 6(1). More specifically, instigation, which is one of the modes, overlaps with the wording of Article 2(3)(c) which deals with the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The substantial contribution requirement is a judicial invention which does not align squarely with established principles of criminal responsibility for inchoate crimes. It is the unfortunate outcome of a poor construction of Article 6(1) and has orchestrated a confused understanding of instigation as a mode of participation. It has blurred and obfuscated instigation as a mode of participation in crimes against humanity; stagnated the evolution of the jurisprudence on instigation to 2 Judgment, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, T. Ch. III, 22 June 2009. commit crimes against humanity; and above all, propelled international criminal law on an ambitious and controversial mission from which it must retreat

1982 m. Jungtinių Tautų jūrų teisės konvencija nustato sudėtingą ginčų, susijusių su jūrų teisės klausimais, sprendimo mechanizmą, derindama įvairius ginčų sprendimo būdus bei plačią šalių pasirinkimo laisvę: nuo tradicinių diplomatinių ginčo sprendimo metodų iki privalomojo ginčų sprendimo. Be to, Konvencija įkuria naują nuolatinę teisminę instituciją Tarptautinį jūrų teisės tribunolą. Šio darbo pirmuosiuose skyriuose bendrai aptariami ginčų sprendimo mechanizmo ypatumai, privalomosios jurisdikcijos susiformavimo prielaidos bei naujo Tribunolo atsiradimą lėmusios priežastys. Toliau nagrinėjamos su šio Tribunolo jurisdikcija susijusios problemos. Pirmiausiai analizuojant Konvencijos 287 straipsnyje numatytų privalomųjų procedūrų pasirinkimo laisvę bei pagal šį straipsnį pateiktus valstybių pareiškimus, prieinama išvada, kad Tribunolo privalomoji jurisdikcija spręsti ginčus, susijusius su Konvencijos aiškinimu ar taikymu, apskritai yra ribota. Šioje vietoje atkreipiamas dėmesys į valstybių pasyvumą ir valios trūkumą. Toliau nagrinėjamas Konvencijos XV dalies 1 skyriaus nuostatų, konkrečiai 281 ir 282 straipsnių, interpretavimas aktualiuose Southern Bluefin Tuna ir Mox Plant arbitražų sprendimuose, šių sprendimų skirtingas vertinimas, taip pat Europos Teisingumo Teismo Mox Plant byloje sprendimas. Be to, darbe vertinama pareiškimų pateiktų pagal Tarptautinio Teisingumo Teismo Statuto 36 straipsnio 2 dalį įtaka. Galiausiai atkreipiamas dėmesys į Konvencijoje numatytus... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays out a complex system for settlement of disputes relating to the law of the sea matters and coordinates various methods of dispute settlement: from measures traditionally known under public international law to compulsory dispute settlement. Moreover, in its dispute settlement system it establishes a new judicial institution the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The foremost chapters of this paper discuss general features of this dispute settlement system, objectives which led to the adoption of compulsory jurisdiction and main reasons for establishing the new Tribunal. Further it examines problems concerning the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. Primarily analyzed the choice of procedure under Article 287 and States’ declarations made thereunder it appears that the Tribunal has very limited compulsory jurisdiction for the disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention. This results from the policy of drift. Further this paper comments on the relevant cases concerning the interpretation of Articles 281 and 282, namely Southern Bluefin Tuna and Mox Plant arbitrations, also the judgement of European Court of Justice in Mox Plant. Moreover, it deals with the impact of the acceptance by all parties to a dispute of the International Court of Justice compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2 of Court’s Statute. The second part of the paper discusses the Tribunal’s compulsory... [to full text]

Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, par sa Résolution 827, institue le 25 mai 1993, un tribunal pénal international (TPIY) ayant pour but du juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991. Ainsi, près de cinquante ans après le procès de Nuremberg, des personnes physiques sont à nouveau poursuivies devant une juridiction pénale internationale. Toutefois, depuis ce procès mémorable l'ordre juridique international a beaucoup changé; le TPIY ne ressemble pas au Tribunal militaire de Nuremberg et les conventions relatives aux droits de l'Homme reconnaissent maintenant un droit fondamental à un procès équitable de tout accusé. Notre étude porte sur l'un des aspects du droit à un procès équitable qualifié d'équité systémique et qui comprend le droit d'être jugé par un tribunal établi par la loi, qui soit compétent, indépendant et impartial. Nous analysons les caractéristiques du TPIY à la lumière du droit comparé et plus particulièrement en examinant si cette institution judiciaire internationale répond aux exigences du principe de l'équité systémique tel que défini à l'article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme (CEDH) et tel qu'interprété par la jurisprudence d'une institution judiciaire supranationale, la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme. Les conclusions de notre étude sont que le TPIY satisfait en partie aux exigences de l'équité systémique; son indépendance et son impartialité sont sujettes à caution selon les paramètres du standard de la CEDH. / On May 25th 1993, the UN Security Council, by its Resolution 827, established an international criminal tribunal (ICTY) for the purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Thus, nearly fifty years after the Nuremberg trial, individuals are once again being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal. However, the international legal order has changed a great deal since this memorable trial: the ICTY is not a carbon copy of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the international conventions on Human Rights have recognized to every accused a fundamental right to a fair trial. This thesis analyzes one aspect of the right to a fair trial - the systemic fairness requirement - which encompasses the right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial court that is established by law. The study of the characteristics of the ICTY is done with a comparative law perspective. More particularly, this work is answering the fol1owing question: is this international judicial tribunal meeting the requirements of systemic fairness as set forth in section 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights? It concludes that the ICTY fulfils these requirements only in part; its independence and impartiality are much dubious with respect to the ECHR standard. / 2002-10

Le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, par sa Résolution 827, institue le 25 mai 1993, un tribunal pénal international (TPIY) ayant pour but du juger les personnes présumées responsables de violations graves du droit international humanitaire commises sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie depuis 1991. Ainsi, près de cinquante ans après le procès de Nuremberg, des personnes physiques sont à nouveau poursuivies devant une juridiction pénale internationale. Toutefois, depuis ce procès mémorable l'ordre juridique international a beaucoup changé; le TPIY ne ressemble pas au Tribunal militaire de Nuremberg et les conventions relatives aux droits de l'Homme reconnaissent maintenant un droit fondamental à un procès équitable de tout accusé. Notre étude porte sur l'un des aspects du droit à un procès équitable qualifié d'équité systémique et qui comprend le droit d'être jugé par un tribunal établi par la loi, qui soit compétent, indépendant et impartial. Nous analysons les caractéristiques du TPIY à la lumière du droit comparé et plus particulièrement en examinant si cette institution judiciaire internationale répond aux exigences du principe de l'équité systémique tel que défini à l'article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme (CEDH) et tel qu'interprété par la jurisprudence d'une institution judiciaire supranationale, la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme. Les conclusions de notre étude sont que le TPIY satisfait en partie aux exigences de l'équité systémique; son indépendance et son impartialité sont sujettes à caution selon les paramètres du standard de la CEDH. / On May 25th 1993, the UN Security Council, by its Resolution 827, established an international criminal tribunal (ICTY) for the purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Thus, nearly fifty years after the Nuremberg trial, individuals are once again being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal. However, the international legal order has changed a great deal since this memorable trial: the ICTY is not a carbon copy of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the international conventions on Human Rights have recognized to every accused a fundamental right to a fair trial. This thesis analyzes one aspect of the right to a fair trial - the systemic fairness requirement - which encompasses the right to be tried by a competent, independent and impartial court that is established by law. The study of the characteristics of the ICTY is done with a comparative law perspective. More particularly, this work is answering the fol1owing question: is this international judicial tribunal meeting the requirements of systemic fairness as set forth in section 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights? It concludes that the ICTY fulfils these requirements only in part; its independence and impartiality are much dubious with respect to the ECHR standard. / 2002-10

Thesis (M.J.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-218). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2005. / Theses (School of Criminology) / Simon Fraser University.

Thesis (M.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2005. / Theses (School of Criminology) / Simon Fraser University.

LL.M. (International Law) / Please refer to full text to view abstract.

During the 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda were swept by wars accompanied by serious violations of international humanitarian law. Grave and severe crimes wiped away lives and destroyed properties. The United Nations Security Council determined that the violations committed constituted threats to international peace and security, declaring itself empowered to take action. It established international ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda with the mandate of prosecuting individuals responsible for those crimes as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Investigating the tribunals’ effectiveness enables one to assess whether they achieved the anticipated outcomes based on the tribunals’ mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems. The research relies on naturalism and positivism to put the tribunals in a moral and ethical perspective. By examining how the tribunals were established, their objectives, the investigation and prosecution processes, the reliance on guilty plea and judicial notice and the imputation of criminal responsibility by applying joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines; the study argues that prosecution has not been an effective tool as contemplated by the Security Council. An analytical and comparative review of various domestic and international legal resources helped to provide an insightful approach for an effective prosecution of international crimes. Credible, legitimate and legal judicial institutions in which professional judges and prosecutors discharge their function independently, impartially and are accountable may achieve justice for the victims of international crimes. Ad hoc tribunals failed to thoroughly investigate and assume the dual role of prosecution. They conveniently used legal procedural tools that fit petty domestic crimes; unfortunately demeaning the magnitude of international crimes of concern. Criminal responsibility was mostly imputed without properly scrutinising the legality, extent, actual participation and guilty mind of the alleged perpetrators. Effectiveness should be a value assessment. Imposed and overburdened ad hoc tribunals are inappropriate and should be abandoned. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LLD