Quels rapports entretiennent le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello ? S’agit-il de deux corps de règles indépendants? Ou sont-ils au contraire influencés l’un par l’autre, comme certaines théories le professent de manière récurrente ? Dans la présente thèse, nous avons tenté de répondre à cette question et de clarifier certains aspects fondamentaux des relations entre ces deux corps de règles. Dans la première partie, nous avons procédé à l’étude du principe de l’égalité des belligérants. Ce principe constitue la pierre angulaire de l’application des règles du DIH et proscrit toute invocation du jus contra bellum pour influencer l’application du jus in bello. Cela n’est pas évidemment sans poser de problèmes dans un ordre juridique dont une des règles fondamentales interdit le recours à la force. Ainsi, le principe de l’égalité des belligérants a fait l’objet de théories visant à remettre en cause son caractère absolu. Notre étude a montré qu’il n’en était rien. Le principe de l’égalité des belligérants est de nature coutumière et ne souffre pas d’exception. Ainsi, il incarne, dans sa forme la plus absolue, l’indépendance qui existe entre le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello. La seconde partie de notre étude a eu pour objet de vérifier si cette indépendance pouvait également caractériser d’autres aspects des relations entre ces deux corps de règles, ou si on contraire, l’étanchéité entre ces deux branches du droit international n’était pas absolue. Ont été analysés, d’une part, les champs d’application ratione materiae et personae de ces corps de règles et, d’autre part, deux notions de fond qui sont considérées comme formant des « ponts » entre le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello : la nécessité et la proportionnalité. Ici encore, notre analyse confirme que l’indépendance constitue la caractéristique principale des relations entre le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello.

Modern warfare in general, and targeted killing (TK) in particular, challenge conventional legal paradigms. While some contend that targeted killing is a clear violation of law, others argue that it is the law that should adapt to its modern context. In this thesis, I argue in favor of the latter. I will first explain the two dominant paradigms through which one can interpret TK: law enforcement versus armed conflict, going on to argue that an armed conflict paradigm can be legitimately invoked. In sections IV and V, I examine the rights and status of targeted individuals in modern conflict. I will then explore Jeremy Waldron’s objection to TK—that its potential for abuse outweighs its utility. I conclude by arguing that TK, like all warfare, is justified only by the unacceptability of its alternative, and that the justification of all warfare abides under the same pragmatic presumption.

JORDÃO, Marco Aurélio de Medeiros. A guerra justa no liberalismo político de John Rawls. 2008. 97f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Linguística, Fortaleza (CE), 2008. / Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-02T16:05:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_dis_mamjordao.pdf: 548126 bytes, checksum: 22ae5d3c543b79e0505bea3a2c50c387 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-10-04T15:42:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_dis_mamjordao.pdf: 548126 bytes, checksum: 22ae5d3c543b79e0505bea3a2c50c387 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-04T15:42:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2008_dis_mamjordao.pdf: 548126 bytes, checksum: 22ae5d3c543b79e0505bea3a2c50c387 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / This work intends to study the concept of just war from an analysis of the political international philosophy of the American philosopher John Rawls. We will take like base the work Law of People (2001), and will retake some basic concepts of too many works, in special A Theory of the Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993). Our objective in this dissertation is to examine two questions: I) How the principle of justice of the international right of Rawls, justify a military intervention? II) Are there cases in which to do a war it is morally legitimize? Our star point is from the general concept of war and will present the thought of four authors paradigmatic what boarded this subject, and they are: Voltaire and his humane vision of bases Illuminists; Kant and his project of perpetual peace; Clausewitz and the war as exceptional case of the politics; Carl Schmitt and the concept of political and binomial friend – enemy. The concepts what we will board in Rawls are: a)the concept of political liberalism and the idea of pluralism and tolerance what they are harnessed to him; b) The conception of traditional liberalism and the difference of his political liberalism; c) The idea of original position, essential notion to understand why the war is just when is only made of “society of the people”. Finally, we will investigate the questions from the recovering that Rawls does from the concept of Jus ad Bellum, what in an immediate translation is it Justice of the war, and therefore, answers which motives of going away to war. And Jus in Bello, whose translation would be a justice in waging war, in other words, which moral behaviour what the soldier must adopt in struggle. / Esse trabalho tem como objetivo estudar o conceito de guerra justa, a partir de uma análise da filosofia política internacional do filósofo americano John Rawls. Tomaremos como base à obra Direito dos Povos (2001), e retomaremos alguns conceitos básicos das demais obras, em especial Uma Teoria da Justiça (1971) e Liberalismo Político (1993). O nosso objetivo nessa dissertação é examinar duas questões, a saber: I) Segundo os princípios de justiça do direito internacional de Rawls, se pode justificar uma intervenção militar? II) Existem casos em que fazer uma guerra é moralmente legitimo? Partiremos do conceito geral de guerra e apresentaremos o pensamento de quatro autores paradigmáticos que abordaram esse tema, são eles: Voltaire e sua visão humanitária de bases Iluministas; Kant e seu projeto de paz perpétua; Clausewitz e a guerra como caso excepcional da política; e Carl Schmitt e o conceito do político e o binômio amigo – inimigo. Os conceitos que abordaremos em Rawls são: a) o de liberalismo político e a idéia de pluralismo e tolerância a eles atrelados; b) A concepção de liberalismo abrangente e o porque esse se diferencia do seu liberalismo político; c) A idéia de posição original, noção essencial para entender como se dará à sociedade dos povos e por que a guerra só é justa quando travada por essa sociedade específica. Finalmente, investigaremos essas perguntas a partir da retomada que Rawls faz de dois conceitos, a saber, Jus ad Bellum, isto é, justiça do guerrear, e do Jus in Bello, que em uma tradução imediata significa justiça no guerrear, ou seja, qual o comportamento moral que o soldado deve adotar em luta.

FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / Esse trabalho tem como objetivo estudar o conceito de guerra justa, a partir de uma anÃlise da filosofia polÃtica internacional do filÃsofo americano John Rawls. Tomaremos como base à obra Direito dos Povos (2001), e retomaremos alguns conceitos bÃsicos das demais obras, em especial Uma Teoria da JustiÃa (1971) e Liberalismo PolÃtico (1993). O nosso objetivo nessa dissertaÃÃo à examinar duas questÃes, a saber: I) Segundo os princÃpios de justiÃa do direito internacional de Rawls, se pode justificar uma intervenÃÃo militar? II) Existem casos em que fazer uma guerra à moralmente legitimo? Partiremos do conceito geral de guerra e apresentaremos o pensamento de quatro autores paradigmÃticos que abordaram esse tema, sÃo eles: Voltaire e sua visÃo humanitÃria de bases Iluministas; Kant e seu projeto de paz perpÃtua; Clausewitz e a guerra como caso excepcional da polÃtica; e Carl Schmitt e o conceito do polÃtico e o binÃmio amigo â inimigo. Os conceitos que abordaremos em Rawls sÃo: a) o de liberalismo polÃtico e a idÃia de pluralismo e tolerÃncia a eles atrelados; b) A concepÃÃo de liberalismo abrangente e o porque esse se diferencia do seu liberalismo polÃtico; c) A idÃia de posiÃÃo original, noÃÃo essencial para entender como se darà à sociedade dos povos e por que a guerra sà à justa quando travada por essa sociedade especÃfica. Finalmente, investigaremos essas perguntas a partir da retomada que Rawls faz de dois conceitos, a saber, Jus ad Bellum, isto Ã, justiÃa do guerrear, e do Jus in Bello, que em uma traduÃÃo imediata significa justiÃa no guerrear, ou seja, qual o comportamento moral que o soldado deve adotar em luta. / This work intends to study the concept of just war from an analysis of the political international philosophy of the American philosopher John Rawls. We will take like base the work Law of People (2001), and will retake some basic concepts of too many works, in special A Theory of the Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993). Our objective in this dissertation is to examine two questions: I) How the principle of justice of the international right of Rawls, justify a military intervention? II) Are there cases in which to do a war it is morally legitimize? Our star point is from the general concept of war and will present the thought of four authors paradigmatic what boarded this subject, and they are: Voltaire and his humane vision of bases Illuminists; Kant and his project of perpetual peace; Clausewitz and the war as exceptional case of the politics; Carl Schmitt and the concept of political and binomial friend â enemy. The concepts what we will board in Rawls are: a)the concept of political liberalism and the idea of pluralism and tolerance what they are harnessed to him; b) The conception of traditional liberalism and the difference of his political liberalism; c) The idea of original position, essential notion to understand why the war is just when is only made of âsociety of the peopleâ. Finally, we will investigate the questions from the recovering that Rawls does from the concept of Jus ad Bellum, what in an immediate translation is it Justice of the war, and therefore, answers which motives of going away to war. And Jus in Bello, whose translation would be a justice in waging war, in other words, which moral behaviour what the soldier must adopt in struggle.

Notre thèse portant sur les « difficultés de mise en œuvre du droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles dans les territoires occupés et les territoires non autonomes » est née d’un constat initial selon lequel le droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles dans les territoires occupés et les territoires non autonomes n’est toujours pas respecté par plusieurs acteurs de la scène internationale, dont certains se disant très attachés aux normes du droit international. Deux hypothèses ont été avancées pour expliquer ce dilemme, à savoir soit le principe de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles n’a pas été encore affirmé comme une règle de droit international positif applicable aux territoires occupés et aux territoires non autonomes ; ou bien ce principe est d’ores et déjà enraciné en droit international mais il n’est pas encore effectif en raison du manque de mécanismes de suivi permettant sa mise en œuvre. Concernant la question de savoir si le principe de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles constitue une règle du droit international positif, notre examen a montré que l’enracinement juridique de ce principe a profondément bouleversé le cadre juridique régissant les activités d’exploration et d’exploitation des ressources naturelles menées dans les territoires occupés et les territoires non autonomes. L’examen de l’effectivité du droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles devait passer inévitablement par un état des lieux des activités d’exploration et d’exploitation des ressources naturelles dans un échantillon des territoires occupés et des territoires non autonomes. Cet état des lieux a renforcé davantage la présomption de la difficile effectivité du droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles. Les actions menées par les organisations internationales en faveur du suivi et de la mise en œuvre du droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles dans les territoires occupés et les territoires non autonomes ont montré de nombreuses limites en la matière. L’effectivité du droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles est également et manifestement remise en cause par une pénurie de mécanismes juridictionnels capables de remédier efficacement à l’exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles dans les territoires non autonomes et les territoires occupés. Par ailleurs, l’examen du rôle joué par certains ONG et fonds d’investissement dans le suivi et la mise en œuvre du droit de souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles dans les territoires non autonomes et les territoires occupés, a montré que ces acteurs privés peuvent constituer des outils efficaces afin d’inciter les entreprises mises en cause à mettre fin à leurs activités illégales. Toutefois, ce rôle encourageant des acteurs privés est loin de remédier seul à la situation causée par la pénurie de mécanismes mis en place par les acteurs publics (Etats et organisations internationales). / Our thesis on "the difficulties in the implementation of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in occupied and non-self-governing territories" was developed from the initial observation that the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in occupied and non-self-governing territories is still not respected by several actors on the international scene, some of whom claim to be very committed to the norms of international law. Two hypotheses have been put forward to explain this dilemma: either the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has not yet been affirmed as a positive rule of international law applicable to occupied and non-self-governing territories; or this principle is already rooted in international law but is not yet effective due to the lack of monitoring mechanisms for its implementation. On the question of whether the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a rule of positive international law, our review has shown that the legal routing of this principle has profoundly changed the legal framework regulating the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in occupied and non-self-governing territories. The examination of the effectiveness of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources would inevitably require an inventory of natural resource exploration and exploitation activities in a sample of occupied and non-self-governing territories. This inventory has further reinforced the presumption of the difficult effectiveness of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The efforts of international organizations to monitor and implement the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the occupied and non-self-governing territories have shown many limitations in this regard. The effectiveness of the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is also clearly undermined by a lack of jurisdictional mechanisms capable of effectively remedying the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the non-self-governing and occupied territories. Furthermore, an examination of the role of certain NGOs and investment funds in monitoring and implementing the right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the non-self-governing and occupied territories has shown that these private actors can be effective tools in encouraging the implicated companies to put an end to their illegal activities. However, this encouraging role of private actors is far from remedying by itself the situation caused by the lack of mechanisms put in place by public actors (States and international organizations).

During World War II the British Royal Air Force undertook a campaign of area bombing of German cities, resulting in hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. The debate over the ethics of this policy began at the time and has continued to the present. Area bombing clearly violated the traditional Just War norms of discrimination and noncombatant immunity. Apologists for the bombing have argued that such norms are no longer applicable in conditions of modern total war; critics of the bombing disagree. This dissertation defends the continuing relevance and applicability of these norms, and argues that area bombing constituted a violation of the moral laws governing the conduct of warfare. The dissertation also shows that the seeming intractability of the ethical debate on area bombing results from the participants' positions being informed by distinct and often incompatible ethical traditions. To understand and evaluate the different positions in the debate, it is necessary to engage critically with these underlying traditions. The dissertation shows how five ethical traditions touching on the norm of noncombatant immunity conditioned the positions taken by protagonists in the debate. The ethical traditions are Holy War / Crusade; Classical Realism; Christian Realism; Christian Just War / Jus in Bello; and Christian Pacifism. The first part of the dissertation explores the theoretical background and historical development of each of these traditions. The second part examines five protagonists in the British debate during World War II and analyzes how their positions were informed by the ethical traditions considered in the first part. The participants examined are Lord Vansittart (Holy War / Crusade), Captain Basil Liddell Hart (Classical Realism), Archbishop William Temple (Christian Realism), Bishop George Bell (Just War / Jus in Bello), and Vera Brittain (Christian Pacifism). The dissertation evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, and contributions of each of these traditions. By considering the voices raised against the area bombing at the time - especially those of Bishop Bell and Vera Brittain - the dissertation seeks to encourage theologically and ethically informed opposition to potential violations of the jus in bello norms in present and future conflicts.

Pourquoi certaines armes disparaissent des champs de bataille tandis que d’autres ne cessent d’y être déployées? Afin de répondre à cette question, notre travail entreprend d’analyser sous un angle inédit l’influence du droit de la guerre (jus in bello) dans le choix des acteurs (gouvernements et militaires) d’utiliser une arme plutôt qu’une autre. Plus précisément, il s’attache à démontrer que les perceptions collectives de ce que proscrit ou autorise le droit de la guerre concernant les conditions d’utilisation des armes (conceptualisées sous le nom de meta-norme du « combattre justement ») est décisif dans la manière qu’ont les acteurs d’appréhender, évaluer et utiliser leur armement. A travers l’analyse des trajectoires de trois armes différentes (armes chimiques, armes incendiaires et drones de combat) fondée sur des données objectives, archives et sources secondaires, nous démontrons que chacun des pics significatifs de l’utilisation de ces armes s’explique aussi par des changements importants dans les perceptions collectives du « combattre justement ». Ainsi, les acteurs cessent d’utiliser leurs armes, ou prétendent cesser, quand ils ne parviennent plus à justifier et démontrer que leur utilisation s’accorde avec leurs perceptions collectives du « combattre justement », et vice versa. In fine, notre travail démontre que la guerre demeure un processus de justification continu, et, parce que les perceptions du combattre justement forment le socle de ces justifications, elles sont décisives pour comprendre le choix des pratiques de guerre. En second lieu, parce que les perceptions collectives du combattre justement sont décisives pour comprendre les pratiques de guerre, notre travail s’intéresse à leur formation. Il démontre que les acteurs sont plus enclins à imposer leur propre perception comme étant la plus légitime lorsque leur argumentaire perpétue un ordre symbolique dominant et ne révèle pas les fondamentales contradictions inhérentes au droit de la guerre. Ainsi, notre travail propose d’analyser sous un nouvel angle l’impact du droit de la guerre, mais aussi celui des argumentaires et des symboles dans les pratiques de guerre. / The dissertation investigates why certain weapons continue, or cease to be employed on the battlefields. Employing an interpretivist perspective, it investigates an aspect largely overlooked by the extant literature: the impact of the meta-norm of 'fighting justly' on actors' weapons utilizations. The meta-norm of fighting justly is defined as the collective preconceptions shared by actors, on how and when the extant laws of war (jus in bello) either ban or allow weapons utilization. My work reveals that the significant shift in the utilization of three weapons (chemical weapons, incendiary weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles) can be explained by shifts in the dominant perceptions of the meta-norm of fighting justly. It is when actors believe that they cannot justify their weapons utilization with regards to their own meta-norm of fighting justly, that they decrease (or pretend to decrease by hiding) this utilization, or vice versa. In fine, when engaged in a war, militaries and states constantly seek to justify their actions, and the basis of these justifications is their understanding of the meta-norm of fighting justly. Because the meta-norm of fighting justly impacts on weapons variations, it is crucial to understand who shapes the norm, at the international level. My work reveals that states are engaged in a constant argument, where they defend, articulate and promote their own conception of fighting justly. In this 'battle for legitimacy', states are more likely to enshrine their own conception as the most legitimate one, under two conditions: namely, when their argument does not disrupt the extant symbolic order, and when it does not foster the inherent contradictions of the laws of war. Ultimately, this work aims to shed new light on how the laws of war influence practices of war. It also explores and provides new insights into the 'logic of arguing' and into the symbolic power in international relations.

Quels rapports entretiennent le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello ?S’agit-il de deux corps de règles indépendants? Ou sont-ils au contraire influencés l’un par l’autre, comme certaines théories le professent de manière récurrente ?Dans la présente thèse, nous avons tenté de répondre à cette question et de clarifier certains aspects fondamentaux des relations entre ces deux corps de règles.<p><p>Dans la première partie, nous avons procédé à l’étude du principe de l’égalité des belligérants. Ce principe constitue la pierre angulaire de l’application des règles du DIH et proscrit toute invocation du jus contra bellum pour influencer l’application du jus in bello. Cela n’est pas évidemment sans poser de problèmes dans un ordre juridique dont une des règles fondamentales interdit le recours à la force. Ainsi, le principe de l’égalité des belligérants a fait l’objet de théories visant à remettre en cause son caractère absolu. Notre étude a montré qu’il n’en était rien. Le principe de l’égalité des belligérants est de nature coutumière et ne souffre pas d’exception. Ainsi, il incarne, dans sa forme la plus absolue, l’indépendance qui existe entre le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello. <p><p>La seconde partie de notre étude a eu pour objet de vérifier si cette indépendance pouvait également caractériser d’autres aspects des relations entre ces deux corps de règles, ou si on contraire, l’étanchéité entre ces deux branches du droit international n’était pas absolue. Ont été analysés, d’une part, les champs d’application ratione materiae et personae de ces corps de règles et, d’autre part, deux notions de fond qui sont considérées comme formant des « ponts » entre le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello :la nécessité et la proportionnalité. Ici encore, notre analyse confirme que l’indépendance constitue la caractéristique principale des relations entre le jus contra bellum et le jus in bello. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Due to the rapid technological advancements of the 21st century the fundamental nature of warfare has changed. Drones along with autonomous weapon systems has presented new challenges to the traditional concept and internal interpretations of just war theory. The purpose of this thesis is to present an analytical summary of the academic debate surrounding the emergence of AI technology, and how it has challenged the core principles embodied within jus in bello and jus ad bellum. Furthermore, the thesis explores the ethical issues external to just war theory principles, with a focus on how AI technology has established unique challenges for drone operators as a consequence of this contemporary phenomenon of war. This is done through a descriptive idea analysis and a critical analysis based on existing empirical material on the current academic debate on this issue.  While the advantages of drones and LAWS are evidently presented throughout this thesis, the repercussions are equally as important to contemplate. Thus, the findings in this thesis concludes that it is difficult to argue in favour or against the emergence of AI technology in war, as relevant arguments exist on both sides of the spectrum. However, the challenges for future just war theorists will be to adjust and reinterpret the moral foundations embodied within the principles of jus in bello and jus ad bellum to adhere to this contemporary phenomenon of war.

The development and application of artificial intelligence (AI) for military purposes are increasing rapidly in many parts of the world. Military powers are driving programs aimed at the advantages that AI can generate. Simultaneously, ethical questions arise concerning autonomous military systems. This study aims to provide clarity on how future Swedish officers with different backgrounds within the profession relate to the ethical issues that accompany the use of autonomous weapon systems. In this study, the respondents are presented with two fictitious scenarios based on the principles of distinction and proportionality, describing ethically problematic attacks that affect civilians. In each scenario, respondents are asked to take a stance on attacks carried out with different degrees of autonomy. The results of the study show that future officers consider the ethical defensibility of an attack to decrease as the degree of autonomy in the weapon system used increases.