Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, Dec. 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Diss.--Fachbereich I--Universität Trier, 1991. / Contient un résumé en anglais. Bibliogr. p. 121-145. Index.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Fachbereich Theologie--Göttingen--Georg-August-Universität, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. 273-279.

Ce travail a pour objet la nature et l’explication philosophique de laméthode de construction de la connaissance selon l’épistémologie kantienne. Nous soulignons non seulement l’importance de la pratique sociale de l’argumentation, mais nous mettons également en évidence son rôle dans cette méthode, ainsi que les raisons pour lesquelles Kant en est arrivé à lui donner un tel rôle. Cela nous amène à reconstituer comment Kant a élaboré son argumentation en lien avec son horizon intellectuel (notamment Locke, Crusius, Lambert et Meier). Nous procédons en deux temps : le premier temps est celui de la recherche d’éléments épistémologiques qui interviennent dans la construction de la connaissance, comme le jugement synthétique, la modalité du jugement et la modalité de l’assentiment. Le second est celui de l’étude de la méthode proprement dite, qui se décline en deux activités, à savoir la construction de la direction du travail scientifique à travers le concept d’orientation et la construction de la justification de la connaissance à travers la pratique sociale de l’argumentation. / The purpose of this work is to determine the nature and the philosophical explanation of the method for knowledge construction according to the Kantian epistemology. Not only we emphasize the importance of the social practice of argumentation, but we also shed light on its role in this method,as well as the reasons which led Kant to give such a role to this practice. This leads us to reconstruct how Kant developed his argumentation in relation to his intellectual horizon (in particular Locke, Crusius, Lambert andMeier). We proceed in two steps. The first one is the search for epistemological elements involved in the construction of knowledge such as the synthetic judgement, the modality of judgement and the modality of assent. The secondis the study of the method itself in two parts, namely the construction of the direction of scientific work through the concept of orientation, and the construction of the justification of knowledge through the social practice of argumentation.

This thesis presents a study of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger on the theme of indifference. There are two main argumentative trajectories. First, I establish the coherency of indifference as a unifying theme across both of their works. Specifically, it will be shown that for both thinkers indifference emerges as a “problem” bound up with the history of western metaphysics tending towards nihilism. For Kant, this appears as a problem of reason, and for Heidegger a loss of Being. Their responses to this problem can also be seen as broadly analogous: Both are concerned to demonstrate how a certain “authentic” relation to the inner possibility of metaphysics is possible, and do so without assuming anything in advance about the being for whom metaphysics is an issue. Second, I aim to show that Heidegger’s notion of indifference, as a closure of ecstatic time and loss of Being, more sufficiently accounts for the breadth of indifference as an experiential phenomenon, as well as makes possible a “turning” (Verwindung) of this closed mode into an kind of “open indifference” that makes possible the presencing of things. From the perspective of Heidegger’s response to the problem of indifference, Kant’s response will be shown to regenerate the very problem he seeks to overcome. / Graduate

For Kant the religious is less an independent domain of consciousness with its own laws of synthesis than a contested territory which critique must defend against both the dogmatic pretensions of speculative philosophy and an ecclesiastical orthodoxy determined to deprive reason of its authority. The result is a religion within the limits of reason alone, a rational faith which resists the false promise of knowledge through transcendent revelation but yields a practical faith in the immanent field of action. It is traditionally asserted that Kant's rational faith is the most refined expression of the aporia at which the Enlightenment arrives when philosophy and religion, rational and positive authority, become opposed. This thesis addresses the way in which Kant's confidence in the idea of an invisible church as the natural meeting-place of religion and philosophy - and to which all belong by virtue of their reason - is modulated by his understanding of the necessity of the visible church as an institution that, given certain precautions, can mediate the political concern with coercive law and the philosophical concern with freedom. The thesis has an Introduction and a Conclusion. The main body of the text divides into two sections, the first with two chapters, the second with four. The Introduction gives an account of the Enlightenment diremption between religion and philosophy, faith and reason, and its genesis in the Reformation. In the first chapter, we assess Kant's treatment of the speculative proofs in the light of Mendelssohn's description of him as der Allzermalrnende, the restricted role he retains for transcendental theology and the Ideal, and the light this sheds upon his alleged Deism. In the second, we discuss his moral proof and ethicotheology and the conjunction of ethics and religion that this necessitates. Section Two addresses the genesis of his realisation that the visible, institutional church must assume the responsibility for the preparation of the establishment of a divine ethical state on earth: chapter three considers the issue of censorship surrounding Kant's religious writings and the notion of religion as the 'focal point of Enlightenment'; chapter four, Kant's notion of the visible, its relation to what we shall formulate as the logic of the staff, and the development of the concept of the exemplarity of Christ; chapter five, the concept of the expedient as a figure which dictates the function of the letter and historical faith in their relation to the visible church; chapter six, Kant's defence of ethics and religion against the dangers of fanatical interiority and the corresponding attempt to balance out the political duty to civil society and the rational duty to the ethical commonwealth. In the Conclusion, we address the question of why Kant's philosophy of religion was to offend both the religious orthodox and the philosophical Enlightenment.

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