In recent decades, a debate has arisen within analytic philosophy concerning the nature, validity and possible uses of Kantian transcendental arguments. This thesis examines two of the main questions within this debate: (i) what is a transcendental argument, and (ii) could there be a successful transcendental argument. The first chapter surveys some recent attempts at definition. A general lack of consistency in the literature makes it impossible to reach any precise conclusion about what a transcendental argument is, but a two-fold working definition is proposed on the basis of two identifiable general approaches to this question. The second chapter looks at two forms of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world in order to set up in a Kantian way the two epistemological problems to which transcendental arguments have been proposed as solutions. One problem concerns how it can be known that the external world exists; the other concerns conceptual relativism and the possibility of transcendental justification of a particular conceptual scheme. The third chapter examines and expands upon Stephan Korner's forceful argument to show that transcendental arguments are impossible. This argument counts decisively against the possibility of a transcendental solution to the problem of conceptual relativism, but does not touch arguments to demonstrate that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world. The fourth chapter examines several transcendental arguments which attempt the latter demonstration, beginning with Kant's Refutation of Idealism and then turning to some recent variations on this argument. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaard’s early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaard’s conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaard’s reception of Hamann and that of Hegel’s review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamann’s critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamann’s critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their critique of alternative conceptions of selfhood which undermine this unity. I show that Kierkegaard’s arguments in relation to despair and forgetfulness share important similarities with Hamann. Chapter four explores Kierkegaard’s critique and repair of post-Kantian reflection theory. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard proceeds to provide a minimal view of the self achieved through reflection which finally encounters its own limits in its own self-knowledge. I propose that Kierkegaard presents this as Socratic ignorance and that his model for outlining the limits of self-knowledge stems from Hamann. I develop my argument by arguing that for Hamann and Kierkegaard self-knowledge is only available through divine revelation.

Dans le présent travail de thèse, nous nous proposons de mettre en lumière les raisons pour lesquelles Heidegger donne le coup d’envoi à un questionnement de longue haleine et de grand ampleur sur la question de la liberté à la suite de la publication, en 1927, de son chef d’oeuvre, Etre et Temps. Nous nous efforcerons de formuler et d’élaborer progressivement deux thèses à la lumière des objections heideggeriennes adressées à la conception kantienne et à la doctrine schellingienne de la liberté. Notre première thèse est que la radicalisation heideggerienne de la conception kantienne de la liberté, développée dans le cadre d’une « métaphysique du Dasein », ne permet pas de découvrir un contexte philosophique dans lequel une problématique plus originelle de la liberté pourrait être formulée puisque le questionnement heideggerien de la liberté se réduit en dernier ressort en une répétition de la démarche transcendantale de Kant et en un exemple d’application remarquable de cette démarche à une question non kantienne, à savoir la question de l’être. Notre deuxième thèse est qu’à partir de la thèse de la différence ontologique et au prix de l’oubli du concept schellingien de l’absolu, l’investigation heideggerienne de la liberté ne donne lieu qu’à une forme sécularisée de la théologie dialectique de Schelling, qui prend en garde malgré son caractère panthéiste la thèse de la bonté divine et la doctrine de la révélation de la dogmatique chrétienne. Dans la perspective ontologique proprement heideggerienne, l’être fondé dans la liberté, dans le fondement du fondement (Grund des Grundes), dans l’abîme (Abgrund) se manifeste à travers ce qu’il rend possible, c’est-à-dire l’étant / In this thesis, we tried to highlight the reason for which Heidegger initiates an investigation of large scale on the question of freedom after the publication of Being and Time. We tried to formulate and elaborate progressively two theses in the spot of objections that Heidegger addresses to the Critique of Kant and to the Schellingian theology of freedom. Our first thesis is that the Heideggerian radicalization of Kantian conception of freedom developed in the framework of metaphysics of Dasein does not allow to the discovery of a philosophical context from where a more original problematic of freedom could be formulated and the Heideggerian questioning is nothing but a repetition of it and a remarkable application example for elaborating a non Kantian question, to namely the question of Being. Our second thesis is that from the thesis of ontological difference and further to forgetting Schellingian concept of absolute, Heideggerian questioning only could develop a secularized variant of theological dialectics of Schelling, which despite its pantheistic view affirm the thesis of divine goodness and the doctrine of revelation of Christian dogmatics. In Heideggerian ontological perspective, the Being (Sein) melted in the freedom, in the ground of ground (Grund des Grundes), in abyss (Abgrund) manifests itself through what it renders possible, that is to say through being (Seiende)

La paix : l’Idée de l’avenir du monde selon Kant. Kant est un auteur qui ose, alors que l’Europe s’est construite par la guerre entre les Etats, penser que la guerre est « démodée » et tend à perdre toute valeur politique. Il ose penser que la paix sera désormais ce qui fait la valeur des politiques extérieures de tous les Etats. Il a inspiré la SDN et l’ONU.La paix entre les nations est d’abord une exigence morale (« la raison pratique impose son veto », écrit Kant). Mais cette exigence morale doit obtenir une validité juridique, historique et politique pour devenir une réalité juridique historique et politique / The peace: the Idea of the future of the world according to KantKant is an author who dares, while Europe built itself by the war between States, to think that the war is "old-fashioned" and tends to lose any political value. He(it) dares to think that the peace will be from now on what makes the value of the foreign policies of all the States. He(it) inspired LEAGUE OF NATIONS and UNO.The peace between nations is at first a moral requirement (" the practical reason imposes its veto ", writes Kant). But this moral requirement has to obtain a legal, historic and political validity to become a legal historic and political reality.

Cette thèse développe une théorie de nos devoirs globaux de justice en accord avec notre expérience commune du devoir en général comme ayant une origine purement a priori. La base de cette théorie consiste en un nouveau type de constructivisme, que j’appelle « constructivisme téléologique » dans la mesure où il réhabilite la notion kantienne de téléologie pure pratique. Dans l’introduction, je jette les bases du constructivisme téléologique en montrant que toutes les théories déontologiques d’inspiration kantienne sont intérieurement téléologiques, dans la mesure où les principes de justice, bien que premiers par rapport au bien, sont eux-mêmes définis en lien avec les fins prescrites a priori par la raison. Dans le chapitre 1, je m’appuie sur la doctrine Rawlsienne du Droit des Peuples pour développer une théorie de la justice internationale qui reconnaît le rôle normatif joué dans la déduction de nos devoirs de justice par une certaine idée de la société internationale. Dans le chapitre 2, je détermine les conditions auxquelles cette théorie est compatible avec le constructivisme téléologique. Dans les chapitres 3 et 4, je définis le constructivisme téléologique comme une approche qui fait dépendre le choix des premiers principes non seulement du respect pour une procédure de réflexion idéale, mais aussi de la reconnaissance de la fin morale finale prescrite purement a priori par la raison. Finalement, dans le chapitre 5, j’explique comment le constructivisme téléologique différencie entre les devoirs éthiques et les devoirs de justice. En conclusion, je reviens sur la spécificité du constructivisme téléologique en tant qu’approche distincte en théorie politique. / This dissertation provides an account of our global duties of right and justice in line with our common experience of duty in general as having a purely a priori origin. The basis of this account is formed by a new type of constructivism, which I call “teleological constructivism” insofar as it rehabilitates the Kantian notion of pure practical teleology. In the introduction, I prepare the ground for teleological constructivism by showing that all Kantian-inspired deontological theories are internally teleological insofar as the principles of right and justice, though prior to the good, are themselves defined in relation to a final end prescribed purely a priori by reason. In chapter 1, I draw on Rawls’ doctrine of the Law of Peoples to develop an institutionalist account of international justice which recognizes the normative role played by a certain idea of international society in the deduction of our distributive obligations. In chapter 2, I further specify the terms of this account to make it compatible with teleological constructivism. In chapters 3 and 4, I go deeper into the definition of teleological constructivism as an approach that makes the choice of the first principles depend not only on respect for a procedure of ideal reflection, but also on the recognition of a final moral end prescribed purely a priori by reason. Finally, in chapter 5, I explain how teleological constructivism differentiates between ethical and juridical duties and argue for the superiority of the contractualist view over the property-based account of our duties of justice. In conclusion, I discuss the specificity of teleological constructivism as a distinct approach in political theory.

The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.

The aim of this thesis is to define, develop, and defend an interpretation and application of the mystical ontology of Meister Eckhart. Briefly, mystical ontology should be understood as a distinctive theology insofar as it presents God's being, the being of the world, and the individual's being as an essentially unified whole. My research focus for this thesis will then be to situate Eckhart's theology within current debates on mysticism and amidst the post-Kantian philosophical turn toward ontology. The cumulative effort of this thesis will reach its height when I apply my conclusions on the mystical nature of being that can be found in Eckhart's medieval writings and transcriptions in order to address the modern, theological problem of secularity. This effort will be implemented with the objective of creating a space for dialogue between Christian theology and the generally secularized culture that, in part, defines the present age. In so doing, this thesis will demonstrate the philosophical and cultural relevance of this particular understanding of the nature of being when treating modern problems in theology. The guiding question for this thesis will be the following: what insights can Meister Eckhart's thought offer to theologians today in addressing the problem of secularity? My overall thesis will then be: the mystical ontology of Meister Eckhart can be interpreted and applied in a manner that successfully opens a space for constructive dialogue between secular culture and the presence of God in the world. Overall, this thesis should be read as a scholarly project on Eckhartian theology and its applicability toward productively treating the problem of secularity. All of my conclusions will be derived as a result of having been situated and argued for amidst current debates on relevant topics, as well as in relation to other major works that are indispensable for such a project. To be clear, my aim will not be to appropriate Eckhart's work and to assimilate it to a post-Kantian perspective. Rather, I will look to Eckhart for his clear and definitive theological statements. I will then interpret those statements and apply them in a manner that efficaciously engages specific principles of secularity in demarcating a common ground for dialogue.

The aim of this work is to show that criticisms of Kantian ethics from the field of virtue ethics misfire because they rely on a widespread reading of Kant which centers on the Groundwork and the Formula of Universal Law as the key elements in his moral philosophy. This reading, I argue, is susceptible both to charges of “empty formalism” and moral “rigorism” as well as the complaint voiced by virtue ethicists that Kantian ethics lacks a full-blooded account of the virtues, along with the attendant desiderata of sociality, character and the emotions. In response, I defend the proposal that the Formula of Humanity and the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals represent the final form of Kant’s ethical thought. If this is accurate, a rich and novel ethical theory emerges, and many of the criticisms from the field of virtue ethics are subsequently disarmed.

Environmental philosophers have argued that Kant’s philosophy offers little for environmental issues. Furthermore, Kant scholars typically focus on humanity, ignoring the question of duties to the environment. In my dissertation, I turn to a number of underexploited texts in Kant’s work to show how both sides are misguided in neglecting the ecological potential of Kant, making the case for the green Kant at the intersection of Kant scholarship and environmental ethics. I build upon previous literature to argue that the green Kant matters for both sides. Rather than a liability, Kant is indeed a conceptual resource. Though many conceive of Kant’s philosophy as environmentally problematic, I argue that underappreciated evolutionary, aesthetic, and holistic sides of Kant’s philosophy can provide conceptual resources for issues in climate change and environmental ethics. Some aspects, such as the pre-critical view of nature, are quite green and merely require an application, while others, such as Kant’s philosophy of history, require a green appropriation to be relevant. The theoretical foundations I develop in these texts will allow Kantians to articulate duties regarding nature and duties for sustainability. This re-thinking of Kant redresses the complaints environmental thinkers hold against Kant. By means of a philosophical interpretation, defense, and application of particular texts from Kant’s works such as Universal Natural History, Critique of Judgment, and Idea for a Universal History, I show how the greening of Kant is not only helpful for contemporary issues, but also defensible. This will make the green Kant agreeable to Kant scholars yet all the while relevant for today with regard to environmental ethics and, more importantly, climate change.