Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-91).

Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of Queensland, 2006. / Includes bibliography.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät--Bonn--Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1989. / Bibliogr. p. 245-277. Index.

Texte remanié de: Doctoral thesis--Saint Louis--Washington University. / Bibliogr. p. 137-145. Index.

Thesis (doctoral) - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München, 2003. / DatabaseEbrary. EAN: 9783110183184. Includes bibliographical references (p. [211]-230) and index.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-91).

This is a study about the relationship between the ethical sphere and Christianity in Kierkegaard's thought. Against the tendency among Kierkegaard scholars to emphasize the continuity between the ethical sphere and Christianity, I tried to show through this study that in Kierkegaard's writings there was a very strong emphasis on the discontinuity between these two spheres. I started by asking whether there is a difference and discontinuity between "rationalistic ethics" (the ethics of the person who is in the ethical sphere) and Christian ethics. {Chapter One} Firstly, in the examination of Abraham's act of faith in Fear and Trembling, I showed that even in this book there was a hint of a new ethics which follows from faith. To answer the question as to whether there is a clear description of this new ethics, I turned to Works of Love. In the examination of this book, I identified the ethics of Christian love, and asserted that the ethics of Christian love was different and discontinuous from merely human love. In the next section, I examined Christian ethics as the ethics of Christian discipleship. Through an examination of some parts of Philosophical Fragments and Training in Christianity I argued that Christian ethics, as understood by Kierkegaard, is different from merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagianism. Throughout this chapter's discussion I argued that Christian ethics was not only different from the ethics of the ethical person, but also antithetical to it. For ethics based on merely human love was criticized severely in Works of Love, and the merely ethical discipleship and semi-Pelagian discipleship were regarded as misunderstandings of Christian ethics. I turned, in the second chapter, to the consideration of the problem of becoming oneself. In this chapter, I firstly examined the second volume of Either/Or and argued that the ethical self was an autonomous self which tried to be itself by itself. In contrast, the Christian self is totally dependent on God in its becoming itself. I drew this conclusion from an examination of The Sickness unto Death. In this examination, I argued that even though there were some ambiguities in this book, despair as sin was clearly understood only by the Christian who believed in the forgiveness of sin by God and had faith. Only the existing individual who is in faith is regarded as overcoming the despair and having become a "self" (or "spirit"). I pointed out that in their understandings of the eternal, of the power of self, these two understandings of the self were different from one another. In the last section of this second chapter, I raised the question of the understanding of the self of the person in religiousness A. By an examination of the Socratic understanding of the phrase "one can be oneself in relation to God" and an analysis of Socratic inwardness, I argued that those in religiousness A had a different God, or different conception of God from the Christian God. I also argued that this difference between their respective conceptions of God was the fundamental reason for the difference between the Christian understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in religiousness A. In the third chapter, I examined the problem of epistemology. Firstly, I drew out, from Kierkegaard's various pseudonymous writings, the presuppositions and epistemological standpoint of the natural man. Then, I compared this with the Christian epistemological standpoint which was drawn from Kierkegaard's later writings. I argued that in his later writings there were very clear indications that the Christian has an epistemological standpoint which is substantially different from that of the natural man. I turned then to an examination of Kierkegaard's journal entries, and showed that even though he himself could not always think in the way which he asserted that the Christian should think, Kierkegaard did not compromise and say that it was proper and inevitable for us to mix the Christian standpoint and the natural man's standpoint. Rather, he strongly resisted the idea that such a mixture was Christian. Next I returned to one of Kierkegaard's early pseudonymous writings, philosophical Fragments, to show that Kierkegaard's ultimate intention in writing this book can be interpreted in a manner consistent with his later writings. I argued that even though, because of the ambiguity in this book, there are other ways of interpreting it, it is also possible that the Socratic standpoint and the Christian standpoint are too exclusive views of reality as a whole, and that even in this book Kierkegaard tried to show the difference and discontinuity of the Socratic (humanist) standpoint and the Christian standpoint. According to this interpretation of Kierkegaard's intention, he who has the Christian point of view should see and consider everything from the Christian standpoint; for him, there is no autonomous realm to be thought of from the Socratic (humanistic) standpoint. Based upon this examination, I concluded that for Kierkegaard Christian ethics follows on from Christian theology (his Christian theistic faith), and the understanding of becoming oneself also follows on from Christian's stance of faith (so that the Christian self is regarded as the “theological self”), and his epistemological standpoint is also Christian. In this sense, there is a wide gap between the Christian sphere and the ethical sphere, or to put this another way, their direction is different : one is theistic and one humanistic. For Kierkegaard, to be a Christian thus involves a change in one's ethics, in one's understanding of becoming oneself, and in one's epistemological standpoint. Then, I drew out some implications for Kierkegaard's theory of the existence-spheres as a whole and suggested some implications for Christian theology today.

This thesis constitutes a piece of practice-led research: its principal research aim is to reflect on, analyse, and explore the conceptual, cultural, and artistic framework within which the offered artworks stand. The introduction is designed to provide an overview of both the central ideas to be discussed and the methodology to be deployed. It will also offer a snapshot of the structure of the text as a whole. As I will indicate, both method and content can be approached via a common guiding form: that of the fixed bind or knot. I will begin by introducing those concepts as they apply both to my own works and to those with which I have brought them into relation. My central concern is with the way in which the imagination forms connections and associations, the way objects or visions are gathered together in the imagination, and the way in which such ties might form knots, might amass or fix within them. I use the terms ‘binds’ and ‘bonds’ to refer to all such relations: to investigate these binds is to investigate the architecture of the imagination. My aim is to explore the way in which the structure of such binds might be present or affirmed in a physical object. In this context, the sculptures I have submitted can thus be understood as points of consolidation, points around which imagination amasses, and points at which binds accrue and abide: they are forms wrought and fixed, but not motionless, in the imagination. In this sense, from a theoretical perspective, to reflect on the sculptures is to reflect on what it means for objects or visions to bind and fixate in the imagination and for sculptors to realise them. For example, the first sculpture arises from attempting to make a seamless and ongoing circle of rope from lengths of hair. Here a material that stops once unbound from the head is repeatedly knotted. The longer binds thereby arise through a process of perpetual repetition in seeking to form a perfect bind; I juxtapose this vision of repetition with, for example, Kierkegaard’s work on that concept in order to analyse the nature of such a joint and impulse. As I have introduced the term, ‘binds’ therefore carries a double weight; it refers both to the structure of the imagination and to the sculptural connections that affirm it. The primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the interplay between these two aspects in both my own work and in that of a number of authors and artists.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. / Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2014-10-21T18:46:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2014-10-21T19:12:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-21T19:12:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar a relação entre Platonismo e Cristianismo em Migalhas Filosóficas de Kierkegaard, mostrando que a diferença entre os modelos do Platonismo e do Cristianismo, apontadas pelo autor, na relação Mestre e Discípulona mesma obra, assinada por seu pseudônimo Johannes Climacus, não implica que tais modelos sejam essencial e mutuamente excludentes, mas que são passíveis de uma reconciliação. Para tanto, a partir do Platonismo e suas teorias interdependentes de Reminiscência e Metempsicose, será sustentado que a diferença supramencionada é, em certa medida, artificialmente criada ou exageradamente radicalizada pelo autor, e setentará evidenciar eventuais incompatibilidades do Cristianismo assim ‘inventado’ por Climacus com o Cristianismo primitivo (sugerindo pesquisa em Orígenes) e tradicional,bem como alguns dos mais relevantes pontos em comum deste último com o Platonismo, particularmente o Princípio da Imanência. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This work has the object to investigate the relation between Platonism and Christianityin Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, showing that the difference between thePlatonist and the Christian Models, pointed by the author, in the master and disciplerelationship in the same work, signed by the pseudonymous of Johannes Climacus, notimply that such models were essentially and mutually exclusives, but that they couldhave a possible reconciliation. To do such, from the Platonism and its interdependenttheories of Recollection and Metempsychosis, it will be sustained that the differencementioned above is, in certain measure, artificially created or too much radicalized bythe author, and it will be tried to show evidence of eventual incompatibilities betweenthe Christianity so ‘invented’ by Climacus and the Early (suggesting research in Origen)and Traditional Christianity, as well as some of the most relevant common pointsbetween the latter and Platonism, particularly the Principle of Immanence.