Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 238-244).

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Federação Luterana Mundial / Esta tese analisa o Paradoxo Absoluto sob a perspectiva do tornar-se cristão. Desenvolve-se o argumento de que o processo de tornar-se cristão acontece sob juízo e graça no encontro com o Paradoxo Absoluto. Na primeira parte é tecida uma articulação paradoxal entre antropologia e cristologia. No primeiro capítulo é analisada a possibilidade do pecado original recorrendo-se ao conceito de angústia. A reflexão é antropológica e se ocupa em investigar a constituição do ser humano tendo em mente a pergunta por como o pecado é possível, e não em afirmar a realidade efetiva do pecado. No segundo capítulo é desenvolvido o entendimento do paradoxo cristológico em Kierkegaard e argumentado que o encontro do indivíduo com o paradoxo acontece sob juízo e graça. Este argumento desempenha papel central na tese tanto para o entendimento da concepção de paradoxo em Kierkegaard como para a compreensão do significado de tornar-se cristão. Na segunda parte da tese o tema da relação paradoxal entre juízo e graça é analisado sob novas nuances. No terceiro capítulo o entendimento antropológico de Kierkegaard é aprofundado a partir de sua compreensão de self. Em decorrência, são analisados os conceitos de desespero e pecado, bem como o conceito de fé enquanto cura para o pecado. A partir desse desenvolvimento é argumentado que se tornar um self é um processo que acontece sob juízo e graça. No quarto capítulo Cristo é apresentado enquanto simultaneamente modelo e redentor e é enfatizada a importância do discipulado cristão enquanto seguir a Cristo. Desenvolvendo o tema do discipulado é tecida uma reflexão sobre o amor cristão destacando o dever de amar o próximo e a manifestação do amor em obras. A categoria da edificação é então trabalhada enquanto modo do amor. Finalmente, é retomado o conceito de paradoxo demonstrando-se que o discipulado cristão acontece continuamente sob juízo e graça. Nas reflexões finais alguns conceitos importantes da tese são relacionados a questões do nosso próprio contexto teológico. / The thesis analyzes the Absolute Paradox under the perspective of becoming a Christian. The argument is developed, that the process of becoming a Christian happens under judgment and grace, when encountering the Absolute Paradox. In the first part, a paradoxical articulation between Anthropology and Christology is elaborated. In the first chapter the possibility of original sin is analyzed making use of the concept of anxiety. This reflection is mainly anthropological and aims to investigate the constitution of the human being, keeping in mind the question of how sin is possible, and not in stating the actuality of sin. In the second chapter, the understanding of the christological Paradox is developed according to Kierkegaard and it is argued that the encounter of the individual with the Paradox happens under judgment and grace. This argument has a central role in the thesis, in understanding the concept of Paradox in Kierkegaard, as well as in the comprehension of the significance of becoming a Christian. In the second part of the thesis the relation between judgment and grace is analyzed under new nuances. In the third chapter the anthropological understanding of Kierkegaard is deepened, taking his understanding of the self as basis. From this concept the categories of despair and sin, as well as faith as cure to sin, are analyzed. Up from this development I argue that to become a self is a process that happens under judgment and grace. In the fourth chapter Christ is presented as simultaneously prototype and redeemer, and the importance of Christian discipleship is stressed as following Christ. Developing the notion of discipleship, it is elaborated a reflection on Christian love, stressing the commandment of loving ones neighbor and the manifestation of love in works. The category of edification is developed as a way of love. Finally I turn back to the concept of paradox arguing that Christian discipleship happens continually under judgment and grace. In my final reflections some important concepts of the thesis are related to questions of our own theological context.

A partir de uma leitura epistemolÃgica de vÃrios escritos do psicÃlogo estadunidense, Carl R. Rogers, em que ele declara âafinidadesâ teÃricas com o pensamento do filÃsofo dinamarquÃs, SÃren Kierkegaard, o objetivo maior deste estudo à confrontar os conceitos de âIndivÃduoâ, delineado por Kierkegaard, e o conceito de âPessoaâ, formulado por Rogers, em suas similaridades e diferenÃas. Contribuindo na constituiÃÃo de mais uma faceta da epistemologia da Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (criada e desenvolvida por Rogers), à tambÃm intenÃÃo desta pesquisa, aproximar estes conceitos apoiando-se na hipÃtese de que a suposta influÃncia kierkegaardiana na obra de Rogers nÃo à tÃo significativa como ele (Rogers) e, sobretudo, seus comentadores, querem fazer crer. Estando Kierkegaard numa dimensÃo filosÃfica e epistemolÃgica de um cristianismo pietista e angustiado, em que sua meta maior era mostrar o verdadeiro âdevir cristÃoâ, e que o âIndivÃduoâ à aquele que escolhe existir ligado subjetivamente numa relaÃÃo tensionada com Deus, dificilmente poderia sua filosofia servir de base em outro contexto tÃo heterogÃneo como era o da psicologia humanista norte-americana, onde Rogers tinha seu espaÃo e que considerava a âPessoaâ como um âorganismo digno de confianÃaâ que guarda em si mesma as potencialidades de se construir em todas as suas esferas e em direÃÃo a uma existÃncia congruente e autÃntica. Aproximando os conceitos de âIndivÃduoâ e de âPessoaâ em suas semelhanÃas e diferenÃas, descrevendo atà onde a influÃncia de Kierkegaard no pensamento rogeriano à verÃdica, pretende-se mostrar o lugar de fato da filosofia kierkegaardiana na construÃÃo da psicologia centrada na pessoa efetuada por Rogers. / From a epistemological reading of some writings of the American psychologist, Carl R. Rogers, in which he declares âtheoretical affinitiesâ with the thought of the Danish philosopher, SÃren Kierkegaard, the biggest objective of this study is to collate the concepts of âIndividualâ, delineated by Kierkegaard, and the concept of âPersonâ, formulated by Rogers, in its similarities and differences. Contributing to the constitution of one more face of the Person-Centrered Approaching epistemology (created and developed by Rogers), is also intention of this research, to approximate these concepts taking as support the hypothesis of that the supposed kierkegaardian influence in Rogerâs production is not so significant as he (Rogers) and, over all, his commentators, wants to make to believe. Being Kierkegaard in a philosophical and epistemological dimension of a pietistic and anguished Christianity, where its biggest goal was to show the true âChristian-to-beâ, and also that the âIndividualâ is that one who chooses to exist subjectively in a tensioned relation with God, hardly could his philosophy stand as another so heterogeneous context as it was the case of Humanist North America Psychology, where Rogers had space and that considered the âPersonâ as a âreliable worthy organismâ that keeps in itself the potentialities of constructing itself in all its spheres and in direction to an authentic existence and congruence. Approaching the concepts of âIndividualâ and âPersonâ in its similarities and differences, describing until where the influence of Kierkegaard in the rogerian thought is veridical, it is intended to show the place in fact of the kierkegaardian philosophy in the construction of the psychology centered in the person effected by Rogers.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-05-31T20:32:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 elvioneifigur.pdf: 2651084 bytes, checksum: 2772677f0539e39c525d652067a83802 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-06-01T11:52:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 elvioneifigur.pdf: 2651084 bytes, checksum: 2772677f0539e39c525d652067a83802 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T11:52:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 elvioneifigur.pdf: 2651084 bytes, checksum: 2772677f0539e39c525d652067a83802 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-15 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Para Søren Kierkegaard, a vida exige o encontro de uma verdade pela qual se possa viver e morrer. Segundo ele, a incerteza objetiva, sustentada na apropriação da mais apaixonada interioridade é a verdade, a mais alta verdade que há para um existente. Essa definição de verdade como subjetividade é, ainda, uma paráfrase da fé. Para o filósofo da religião, a verdade do cristianismo está, não na objetivação de doutrinas, mas na apropriação de seu(s) paradoxo(s) com a paixão da interioridade; no salto da fé. Decorre daí que a verdade religiosa, essencialmente subjetiva, só é efetivamente comunicada de forma indireta; por e para o indivíduo livre em sua existência. Muitas vezes, entretanto, a verdade religiosa é transformada em verdade objetiva, absoluta. É o que acontece em instituições religiosas, caso da Igreja Evangélica Luterana do Brasil (IELB), em que o ideário de proclamação baseia-se na premissa de que o erro precisa ser corrigido e a verdade proclamada. Tal realidade, observada claramente na atuação comunicacional midiática, revela forte tendência à racionalização da fé em detrimento da subjetividade do existente em busca de sentido último. / For Søren Kierkegaard, life demands the encounter of a truth one can live and die for. According to him, the objective uncertainty, sustained by the appropriation of the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest existent truth for a person. This definition of truth as subjectivity is also a paraphrase of faith. For the philosopher of religion, the truth of Christianity does not lie in the objectification of doctrines, but in the appropriation of its paradox(es) with the passion of inwardness; In the leap of faith. Religious truth, essentially subjective, is only effectively communicated indirectly; by and for the free individual in their existence. Often, however, religious truth is transformed into absolute, objective truth. This is what happens in religious institutions like the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Brazil, where the idea of proclamation is based on the premise that the error has to be corrected and the truth proclaimed. This reality, clearly observed in the media communication, reveals a strong tendency towards rationalization of faith at the expense of the subjectivity of the existing person in search of ultimate meaning.

In this doctoral dissertation I examine the development of Kierkegaard's sense of vocation as a Christian creative artist by research into his journals and published works, as well as investigating how this was influenced by his scriptural hermeneutic. I then attempt to sketch some starting points for a theology of Christian creative artwork contextualised within modern theological aesthetics by drawing upon this examination. I argue that Kierkegaard began writing without documented reflection on his intentions and communicative methodology, but was nonetheless a religious author from the start of his career, as his text The Point of View for my Work as an Author later claimed. I trace how he began with a more "indirect" approach in his writing and gradually developed a theory of "indirect communication", though there were more "direct" elements present in his work from the beginning (the "first authorship"), yet as he continued in his authorial career he became ever more "direct" in his mode of communication (the "second authorship"), until it eventually became exclusively more "direct" religious writing (the "attack on Christendom"). I conclude that the most concise and complete formulation of Kierkegaard's mature conception of his task as a Christian artist becomes "to communicate Christianity in Christendom" in a more direct mode-to explain straightforwardly what authentic Christianity is in an age of cultural, purely nominal religion. I allow that this task is in some ways unique to his own historical situation but contend nonetheless that a consideration of it is profitable for contemporary theology because of the many different ways that he attempted to carry it out. In Kierkegaardian terms, and following on from resources in Kierkegaard and his use of scripture, I argue constructively from all of this that more "direct" communication is the more valuable form of communication to the Christian creative artist for theological reasons, but that more "indirect" communication can still be useful, in the task of communicating creatively through art.

Ce mémoire présente une analyse des influences causées par l’œuvre kierkegaardienne à l’intérieur des différentes conceptions de l’existentialisme du 20e siècle. Considérant tout d’abord deux lectures chrétiennes de l’existentialisme moderne, celle proposée dans l’Introduction aux existentialismes d’Emmanuel Mounier et celle du Court traité de l ’existence et de l ’existant de Jacques Maritain, l’auteur souligne ensuite l’héritage de Kierkegaard et met en évidence l’intérêt porté à la philosophie kierkegaardienne par ces deux penseurs de l’existence du 20e siècle. L’analyse fait ressortir les richesses et les limites de la pensée kierkegaardienne telle que l’appréhendaient Mounier et Maritain, tandis que la présentation de leurs deux conceptions de l’existentialisme aura fait voir comment l’œuvre de Kierkegaard a diversement influencé le cours de l’histoire philosophique.

This thesis provides a theoretical framework that brings the unity of Kierkegaard’s ‘middle period’ into relief. I will analyse Kierkegaard’s writings between 1846 and 1852 when, I argue, the socially constructive dimension of his thought comes to prominence, involving two dialectical aspects of religiousness identified by Kierkegaard: the edifying and the polemical. How these two aspects come together and get worked out in the lives of individuals form the basis of what can be called a Kierkegaardian ‘social praxis’. I conclude that the tension between the edifying and the polemical can be coherently maintained in a communicative life that is also characteristic of a militant faith. This militant faith and life is presented as a critical guard against absolutisms, fundamentalisms, and intellectual aloofness; but the ‘militant’ individual is also utterly dependent, in need of edification and critique, and therefore chooses the risk of encountering others, seeking relationships out of a commitment to the development of persons and communities in co-operation. Therefore, not only does this dialectic provide readers with an important theoretical framework for understanding Kierkegaard’s ‘middle period’, but it is also a valuable resource for a constructive analysis of active social living suitable for theology in the twenty-first century.

No description available.

Kierkegaard is generally regarded as a quintessential individualist who leaves no room for social or political engagement. This interpretation is the dominant lens through which many scholars view Kierkegaard, and it also shapes the way Kierkegaard’s thought has been received by his followers and critics. Many recent works have significantly challenged the traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, but they have not examined the topic systematically. In order to remedy this deficit, this study provides a holistic account of Kierkegaard’s social thought. First, it challenges the dominant view that society as represented by the crowd is simply a foil for Kierkegaard’s individual by: (a) articulating a general approach for understanding how Kierkegaard’s negative comments about society and community do not constitute a rejection of sociality as such, and (b) demonstrating that Kierkegaard’s well-developed ideas on faith and religiosity are compatible with an account that emphasizes a broader social dimension in his thought. Second, I present a framework that outlines a positive theory of community, a ‘Dialectic of Community,’ which explains the importance of the Kierkegaardian single individual in the formation and development of community. This framework provides an interpretation of the social period of Kierkegaard’s authorship and its importance for the entirely of the authorship. Even though the interpretation is helpful for understanding Kierkegaard and his relationship to 19th and 20th century European moral, social, and political thought, Kierkegaard never explicitly describes how his conception of the self is consistent with his social thought. I address this problem by developing a narrative model of selfhood that illustrates the importance of subjectivity and the single individual for an adequate account of intersubjective selfhood. More specifically, I argue that narratives are important intersubjectively for becoming a person and a moral agent, but the concept of self is not exhausted in narrative. That is, having a self-narrative presupposes that the person is a subject who has a set of principles that organize one’s experiences and activities. This framework not only shows how Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity can be understood in a social context, but it also addresses a significant problem in narrative identity theory.

This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaard’s early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaard’s conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaard’s reception of Hamann and that of Hegel’s review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamann’s critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamann’s critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their critique of alternative conceptions of selfhood which undermine this unity. I show that Kierkegaard’s arguments in relation to despair and forgetfulness share important similarities with Hamann. Chapter four explores Kierkegaard’s critique and repair of post-Kantian reflection theory. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard proceeds to provide a minimal view of the self achieved through reflection which finally encounters its own limits in its own self-knowledge. I propose that Kierkegaard presents this as Socratic ignorance and that his model for outlining the limits of self-knowledge stems from Hamann. I develop my argument by arguing that for Hamann and Kierkegaard self-knowledge is only available through divine revelation.