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I denna uppsats undersöker jag hur ett litterärt "jag" framställs i Arne Sands roman Väderkvarnarna (1962). Med utgångspunkt i Sands texter om ett gestaltskapande problem i den för Sand samtida "gestaltskapande" romanen tolkar jag Sands projekt i Väderkvarnarna som ett projekt där dess "gestaltskapande" tematiseras och problematiseras. Det är utifrån det gestaltskapande problemet som "jaget" i texten blir relevant. Om 60-talets roman har problem med att gestalta ett "jag" utifrån dess förändrade samhälle i efterkrigstidens följd, hur sker då jag-framställningen i en roman vars författare proklamerar detta problem? Samtidigt finns i Väderkvarnarna intertextuella kopplingar till vad jag i uppsatsen valt att kalla Kierkegaards ironiska jag-position. Med den Kierkegaardska ironin verkar ett fragmentariskt "jag" utan kontinuitet kunna skönjas, där "jaget" blir negativt fritt från verkligheten. Med den kierkegaardska ironin som teoretisk utgångspunkt och intertextuell vägvisare närmar jag mig i uppsatsen frågan om hur Väderkvarnarna framställer ett litterärt "jag", som genom problematiserandet av "gestalter" eventuellt  bereder väg för ett kommande litterärt "jag" i den svenska litteraturhistorien.

<p>This thesis deals with Soren Kierkegaard's understanding of reason and· faith. Whereas the reader may be unfamiliar with his works, I have elected to begin my discussion with an introduction to their authorship. Bringing knowledge of the authorship to bear on the question at hand, I aim to elucidate the respective viewpoints of three of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors, namely: Johannes de Silentio, Johannes Climacus and Johannes Anti-Climacus.</p> <p>Summarizing these three presentations finally with reference to the major autographic works, including his Journals and Papers, I aim to clarify Kierkegaard's point of view and understanding respecting the nature of reason and faith and their relation in a Christian's life.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

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L’œuvre philosophique de Kierkegaard s’apparente à une dialectique du paradoxe. De fait, dans son cheminement existentiel, l’individu parcourt trois sphères d’existence – l’esthétique, l’éthique et le religieux –, chacune d’elle étant une modalité de l’activité humaine qui comporte un paradoxe particulier. Il s’agit d’un itinéraire de l’intériorité qui vise, dans l’existence, le télos qu’est le devenir soi-même. Ainsi l’esthéticien est-il déchiré entre les idées et la réalité dans la réalité immédiate, tandis que l’éthicien, par la médiation du langage, préfère s’affirmer comme individu dans l’immanence concrète, ignorant toutefois qu’il intériorise des règles sociales qui lui sont impersonnelles. Quant au religieux, non seulement découvre-t-il que la vérité vers laquelle il tend ne se trouve pas en son sein, mais il fait face au plus élevé des paradoxes, fondé sur la transcendance – à savoir le paradoxe absolu, où l’éternité se temporalise sous la forme de l’Homme-Dieu. Du reste, le présent mémoire se penche spécifiquement sur le concept du paradoxe, mis de l’avant par Kierkegaard afin de brosser un portrait du devenir individuel de chaque existant. / The philosophical work of Kierkegaard deals with a dialectic of the paradox. Actually, in his existential progress, the individual goes through three spheres of existence – the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious –, each of which is a modality of the human activity that contains a particular paradox. His thought follows the progress of interiority, which aims, in existence, at the end of becoming a single individual. In this way, the aesthete is torn between the pure idea and reality, whereas the ethicist, through the mediation of language, prefers to assert himself as an individual within concrete immanence, ignoring however that he interiorizes social rules which are impersonal him. As for the religious believer, not only does he discover that the truth at which he aims is not within himself, but he faces the highest of the paradoxes, based on transcendance – that is the absolute paradox, whereby eternity temporalizes itself in the shape of the Man-God. In general, the present master’s thesis analyzes the concept of the paradox put forward by Kierkegaard to present the progress of every existing being towards becoming a single individual.

Dans L’espérance oubliée Jacques Ellul parle d’espérance comme à la fois une réponse de la part de l’être humain au silence de Dieu et une « présence éclatante des réalités dernières ». A travers le dialogue avec entre autres Paul Ricoeur et Søren Kierkegaard, en passant par Moltmann, Castelli et André Neher, notre auteur en présente les enjeux de jugement théologique sur notre situation historique, de critique envers la « déréliction » qui habite la société technicienne, et de choix fondamental pour une éthique de liberté et de non-puissance. Notre travail vise non seulement une lecture analytique de la pensée d’Ellul sur l’espérance et de sa réception, mais aussi un examen approfondi de la dialectique interne à la théologie de notre auteur ainsi qu’un travail de mise en perspective de deux axes thématiques : la prophétie et l’eschaton. Notre conviction est que le discours théologique sur l’espérance présenté par Ellul peut apporter des contributions cruciales à la théologie de notre temps. / In Hope in times of abandonment Jacques Ellul talks about hope as a human reaction to God’s silence as well as a “bright presence of the ultimate realities” in the present. Through the dialogue with Paul Ricoeur and Søren Kierkegaard, passing through Moltmann, Castelli and André Neher, our author introduces its challenges: as a theological judgement on our historical situation, a critic to the “abandonment” which inhabits the technological society and a fundamental choice towards an ethics of freedom and of non-power. Our aim is to present not only an analytic reading of Ellul’s statements on hope, but also of the inner dialectic of his theology, leading to a perspective setting upon two main topics: prophecy and eschaton. We are convinced that Jacques Ellul’s theological discourse on hope can bring crucial contributions to the theology of our time.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-12-14T13:30:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Victor Manoel Fernandes_.pdf: 1268347 bytes, checksum: e887aa9ed3f37aacb3975c704fdaaddc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-12-14T13:30:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Victor Manoel Fernandes_.pdf: 1268347 bytes, checksum: e887aa9ed3f37aacb3975c704fdaaddc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-19 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação de mestrado tem por objetivo investigar as críticas de Kierkegaard à Ciência da Lógica de Hegel contidas em seu Pós-Escrito. A respeito da relação Kierkegaard-Hegel, foram diferenciadas duas perspectivas frente a ela: a primeira é a que visa a relação do ponto de vista psicológico, isto é, que pretende saber se Kierkegaard estava contra Hegel, se ele escrevia seus livros com o intuito de atacar Hegel; e a segunda, por sua vez, que visa a relação do ponto de vista filosófico ou teórico, isto é, concentra-se em saber se as críticas de Kierkegaard cabem à filosofia de Hegel, sem pretender saber se esse autor era o verdadeiro alvo kierkegaardiano. Para atingir seus objetivos, essa pesquisa adotou a segunda perspectiva. Esta dissertação também analisou a posição de Niels Thulstrup e Jon Stewart acerca dessa relação. A atenção foi concentrada no segundo deles, tido como o status quæstionis sobre a relação investigada – resultando, no posicionamento frente a ele, um objetivo secundário para essa pesquisa. A fim de oferecer uma outra interpretação a uma pequena parcela de sua visão geral e também a uma interpretação específica a respeito da relação Kierkegaard-Hegel, essa dissertação investigou a relação filosófica entre Kierkegaard e Trendelenburg. Os resultados da pesquisa são os de que há aspectos importantes da Ciência da Lógica de Hegel contidos no Pós-Escrito de Kierkegaard e que aí são criticados – fazendo com que a relação Kierkegaard-Hegel também seja teórica e crítica, e não apenas passiva ou inexistente acerca da lógica; item relativo à visão geral de Stewart –, que Kierkegaard e Hegel não têm a mesma posição a respeito do início da lógica – item relativo a uma interpretação específica de Stewart – e que as condições colocadas por Kierkegaard em "(a) um sistema lógico pode haver" têm influência trendelenburguiana e, assim, são incompatíveis com princípios defendidos por Hegel. / This Master’s dissertation aims to investigate Kierkegaard's criticisms of the Hegel's Science of Logic contained in his Postscript. In regard to the Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship, two perspectives have been differentiated from it: the first one is that which relates to the psychological point of view, that is, whether Kierkegaard was against Hegel, if he wrote his books for the purpose of attacking Hegel; and the second one, in turn, is concerned with the relationship from a philosophical or theoretical point of view, that is, it focuses on whether Kierkegaard's criticisms fit Hegel's philosophy, without pretending to know whether this author was the true Kierkegaardian target. To reach its objectives, this research had adopted the second perspective. This dissertation also analyzed the position of Niels Thulstrup and Jon Stewart on this relationship. Attention was focused on the second of them, considered as the status quæstionis on the investigated relation – resulting, in the positioning before him, a secondary objective for this research. In order to offer another interpretation to a small part of his overview and also to a specific interpretation of the Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship, this dissertation investigated the philosophical relationship between Kierkegaard and Trendelenburg. The results of the research are that there are important aspects of Hegel's Science of Logic contained in Kierkegaard's Postscript and criticized there – making the Kierkegaard-Hegel relationship also theoretical and critical, not just passive or non-existent about logic; item on the general view of Stewart – that Kierkegaard and Hegel do not have the same position regarding the beginning of logic – an item relating to a specific interpretation of Stewart – and that the conditions put by Kierkegaard in "(a) a logical system can be given" has a Trendelenburgian's influence and thus are incompatible with principles defended by Hegel.

L’œuvre philosophique de Kierkegaard s’apparente à une dialectique du paradoxe. De fait, dans son cheminement existentiel, l’individu parcourt trois sphères d’existence – l’esthétique, l’éthique et le religieux –, chacune d’elle étant une modalité de l’activité humaine qui comporte un paradoxe particulier. Il s’agit d’un itinéraire de l’intériorité qui vise, dans l’existence, le télos qu’est le devenir soi-même. Ainsi l’esthéticien est-il déchiré entre les idées et la réalité dans la réalité immédiate, tandis que l’éthicien, par la médiation du langage, préfère s’affirmer comme individu dans l’immanence concrète, ignorant toutefois qu’il intériorise des règles sociales qui lui sont impersonnelles. Quant au religieux, non seulement découvre-t-il que la vérité vers laquelle il tend ne se trouve pas en son sein, mais il fait face au plus élevé des paradoxes, fondé sur la transcendance – à savoir le paradoxe absolu, où l’éternité se temporalise sous la forme de l’Homme-Dieu. Du reste, le présent mémoire se penche spécifiquement sur le concept du paradoxe, mis de l’avant par Kierkegaard afin de brosser un portrait du devenir individuel de chaque existant. / The philosophical work of Kierkegaard deals with a dialectic of the paradox. Actually, in his existential progress, the individual goes through three spheres of existence – the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious –, each of which is a modality of the human activity that contains a particular paradox. His thought follows the progress of interiority, which aims, in existence, at the end of becoming a single individual. In this way, the aesthete is torn between the pure idea and reality, whereas the ethicist, through the mediation of language, prefers to assert himself as an individual within concrete immanence, ignoring however that he interiorizes social rules which are impersonal him. As for the religious believer, not only does he discover that the truth at which he aims is not within himself, but he faces the highest of the paradoxes, based on transcendance – that is the absolute paradox, whereby eternity temporalizes itself in the shape of the Man-God. In general, the present master’s thesis analyzes the concept of the paradox put forward by Kierkegaard to present the progress of every existing being towards becoming a single individual.

Demanding Taxation, disciplining, and even at times requiring the sacrifice of life, the State is undoubtedly one of the most influential and important structures within a subject's existence. Nonetheless, despite these great demands, very few subjects actually choose or construct the State they inhabit. On the contrary subjects rather find themselves born into these great structures which transcend their existence. Consequently understanding how subjects come to learn about, and relate to, these great structures they are thrown into is vital for both an understanding of politics and the human condition generally. In this thesis I will explore an alternative approach to investigating the subject and State relationship: The ‘Subjective approach'. Inspired by the thought of Danish Philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, the aim of this approach will be to explore the encounters that the subject has with the State, what perception of the State is given to subjects in these encounters, and how the relationship between subject and State grows out of such encounters. The aim of this thesis is therefore to provide prolegomena to such an approach. I shall aim to outline why such an approach should be considered for investigating subject and State relations, and explore how one may begin articulating such an approach.

[pt] Não raras vezes Soren Kierkegaard foi acusado de negligenciar a vida pública em favor de uma subjetividade encerrada em si mesma. Nada mais equivocado. A presente pesquisa pretende demonstrar que a relação com o outro desempenha um papel de suma importância no pensamento deste autor (e tanto é assim que em lugar de um tratamento indiferente, Kierkegaard chama o outro de próximo). No entanto, também é verdade que o indivíduo é incomensurável com a realidade ao seu redor. Ultrapassa o geral, o coletivo, a multidão a fim de se constituir como um indivíduo, a fim de se tornar quem ele é. Enquanto não entrar nessa relação de oposição com o mundo, não terá alcançado a verdade. Como então articular existencialmente a necessidade de ser um indivíduo acima do geral com a não menos necessária demanda de ir ao encontro do próximo? Como se valer do geral para manifestar a própria singularidade? Tentaremos mostrar ao longo deste trabalho que o indivíduo é justamente este ser que quando ameaçado pelo impessoal, se refugia na sua individualidade; e que quando quer manifestar a sua individualidade, se volta ao geral: é como qualquer outro. / [en] Many times Soren Kierkegaard was accused of neglecting public life in behalf of an inner subjectivity. This could not be more mistaken. This research aims to show that interaction with the other plays a primary role in the author´s thinking. Nevertheless, it is correct to say that the individual is incommensurable with reality. So how can an individual express his need to be in contact with collectivity without losing his individuality? How can he resort to the impersonal to manifest his self? Throughout this paper we will attempt to demonstrate that the individual is a person who seeks refuge in privacy when threatened by the collective, and is communal to manifest his individuality.