Thesis (M.Phil.)--Murdoch University, 2008. / Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Education. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-123).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz. / Xerox copy of typescript. Bibliography: leaves 196-200.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The purpose of this thesis is to discover the meaning of, and relationship among, what Kierkegaard refers to in his writings as the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious spheres of existence. The sources consulted cover the majority of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings. In the first chapter it is shown that Kierkegaard developed the concept of spheres of existence in an effort to show that philosophical categories must be derived from the structure of existence rather than the structure of thought. Contrary to Hegel, Kierkegaard maintains that in existence thought and being can never be identified, but are dialectically related in the sense of being in dialogue with each other. It is the principle of mediation to which Kierkegaard most objects. The consequence of the identification of thought and being is to put them into an immediate relationship to each other and thereby remove from thought its traditional philosophical function of elucidating and directing being. Kierkegaard uses the word existence to refer to the giveness of being, the facticity of the individual. It is in recognizing that the Hegelian attitude toward the dialectical character of existence represents a possible mode of consciousness and that his own attitude represents an opposing mode that Kierkegaard distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical spheres of existence. The third sphere of existence, the religious, arises from the possibility that consciousness may relate itself to that which underlies existence, i.e. God. The identification of the spheres of existence with the self-conscious development of human subjectivity is further supported by Kierkegaard's discussion of the self in Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard maintains that if one is to secure a position in the flux that is existence, consciousness must cease to be passive and establish itself through resolution. Hence a sphere of existence is defined not only by its moce of consciousness but by its telos. In the second chapter it is shown that the aesthetic consciousness is an immediate, non-reflexive consciousness which has its telos in the external world. It reveals itself as an essentially unstable and unfree consciousness in that it is vulnerable to events over which it has no control. This vulnerability is the sign of despair, which is the occasion for consciousness to heal itself in self-choosing or abdicate its task to exercise itself as free spirit in the dialogue of thought and being. In the phenomenon of irony Kierkegaard finds an illustration of what he calls "boundary zones" to the spheres of existence, by which he means the consciousness of the ideal and all it involves without the choice of it. In the "boundary zone" there is no telos in the proper sense as consciousness entertains the telos of both spheres it bounds. In the third chapter ethical consciousness is seen to be a reflexive, self-choosing consciousness. The self that is chosen is personal existence, which reveals itself as given, in virtue of which one has a history and because of which one must repent. The ethical telos is the eternal validity of the self, which reveals itself as the universal human. Kierkegaard characterizes the ethical choice as absolute, and thus, even though the choice is of subjectivity, the qualification of absolute rules out the possibility of capricious and anarchic subjectivity. such an absolute choice, Kierkegaard believes, must give continuity to the self and must recognize its relation or dependence on something other than itself as it immediately is. With the subjectivity of choice arises the danger of temptation in the form of the possibility of a teleological suspension of the ethical. With this possibility arises the awareness that the self did not create itself but was created by Another, to Whom consciousness may establish a relationship. At this point consciousness may again enter a "boundary zone" of existence as the humorous consciousness, prior to the decision to relate itself to God. In the fourth chapter it is seen that consciousness, in its awareness of itself as dependent is also aware of itself as separated from that on which it defends, and hence that it can assume two attitudes toward this separation, that of resignation and that of faith. When the religious consciousness is characterized by resignation, Kierkegaard calls it religiousness A. When it is characterized by faith, he calls it religiousness B. In religiousness A the dialectical character of existence becomes fully explicit and consciousness becomes a sufferin; consciousness because the continuity it desires cannot be achieved in existence. Hence, in religiousness A consciousness resigns itself to a life of strife. In religiousness A consciousness has arrived as close to the truth as it is able through its own effort. Religiousness B is possible only if the condition for truth is given by God. The condition is faith, not as an exercise of thought, but as a mode of being. The temporality and finitude that characterized personal existence and separate it from its eternal happiness are made compatible with the religious telos in the person of Christ. That is, Christ is the only true mediction. However, Kierkegaard emphasizes that belief in this mediation is possible only at the offense of thought. In the last chapter it is asserted that the significance of Kierkegaard's conception of spheres of existence is that existence is not absurd, and that while man is not self-creating, he is self-choosing. / 2031-01-01

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação do Departamento de Filosofia, 2013. / Submitted by Alaíde Gonçalves dos Santos (alaide@unb.br) on 2013-08-15T10:48:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JadsonTelesSilva.pdf: 698084 bytes, checksum: a40546e87f36ba0619fc737f0eba7233 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-08-15T10:57:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JadsonTelesSilva.pdf: 698084 bytes, checksum: a40546e87f36ba0619fc737f0eba7233 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-15T10:57:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JadsonTelesSilva.pdf: 698084 bytes, checksum: a40546e87f36ba0619fc737f0eba7233 (MD5) / Desde a antiguidade clássica que Eros ou o amor tem sido objeto de investigação filosófica. Notadamente, foi com Platão que o amor ganhou contornos filosóficos e assim ele pode construir de forma paradigmática uma erótica que teve ressonâncias na história da filosofia. O começo deste trabalho faz um retorno à filosofia ‘erótica’ de Platão, com vista a demonstrar como Kierkegaard opera uma continuação, ainda que crítica, da erótica socrático-platônica. Atualiza o tema do amor e investiga como ele aparece na modernidade através do movimento romântico conduzindo-o a uma transfiguração. Na conclusão da erótica kierkegaardiana, impetrada em As Obras do Amor, o Eros não será mais uma idealização ou objeto de predileção, mas uma prática do indivíduo cristão. Kierkegaard se valerá do mandamento bíblico “tu deves amar ao próximo como a ti mesmo” para ensejar uma interpretação polissêmica e cheia de polêmica. O amor ao próximo será a nova face de Eros estabelecida por Kierkegaard. A alteridade e a igualdade são requeridas para se relacionar com o próximo, este que equivale a todos os homens indistintamente. O Eros é transfigurado e assim passa a ser uma prática obrigatória do verdadeiro cristão. O amor passa a ser um dever. _______________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / Since the Classical Antiquity that Eros or the Love has been subject of philosophic investigation. Notably, was Plato that gave to the love philosophical contours and, by this way, he could build, in a paradigmatic form, erotic issues that have resonances in the History of Philosophy. The beginning of this work makes a return to the Plato’s erotic philosophy, in order to demonstrate how Kierkegaard operates one continuation – albeit critical – of the Socratic-Platonic’s erotic. It updates the theme about the love and investigates how it appears in the Modernity through the Romantic Movement, conducting itself to a transfiguration. In the conclusion of the kierkegaardian’s erotic, perpetrated in ‘The Works of Love’, Eros won’t no more be an idealization or an object of predilection but a practice of the Christian individual. Kierkegaard uses the biblical commandment “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” to try a polysemic interpretation full of controversy. The love to the neighbor will be the new face of the Eros, as established by Kierkegaard. The alterity and the equality are required to relate with other persons, which is equivalent to all men, indistinctly. The Eros is transfigured and, by this way, becomes a mandatory practice of the true Christian. Love becomes a duty.

Ce mémoire se propose d'étudier la conception de la liberté chez Soren Kierkegaard. On y voit sa conception du paradoxe, de la qualité et du saut qualitatif, lesquels constituent la dialectique de la liberté correspondant à son concept d'existence. L'existence est une première base de la liberté. L'autre base est l'intériorité. En l'homme, le christianisme voit un combat intérieur pour devenir meilleur. Notre nature doit faire l'objet d'une perpétuelle réaffirmation, laquelle comporte effort et souffrance. Nous manifestons notre liberté à partir de cette intériorité en devenir et dans une angoisse. L'angoisse est l'état, concrètement envisagé, de l'homme libre devant prendre une décision. L'angoisse vient de tous ces possibles entre lesquels il faudra choisir. Nous examinons également quel est le statut de cet idéal auquel le chrétien doit se rapporter. Nous développons la notion du péché, et nous faisons ressortir quelles sont les caractéristiques du premier choix libre chrétien, c'est-à-dire la chute. Il ressort de notre analyse que la liberté se rapporte à l'autorité par son intériorité. L'autorité a pour elle l'être de l'idéal. De même, toute autorité se doit, de près ou de loin, de correspondre à l'idéal de l'assujetti, sinon il y a contrainte, donc autoritarisme. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Kierkegaard, Existence, Péché, Liberté, Autorité, Théologie, Philosophie, Angoisse, Intériorité, Dieu, Péché originel, Transcendance, Paradoxe, Individu, Désespoir.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. / Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2014-10-21T18:46:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2014-10-21T19:12:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-21T19:12:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_RicardoLindemann.pdf: 1112704 bytes, checksum: ff38bbd6d8a7cc25a177bff194080092 (MD5) / Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar a relação entre Platonismo e Cristianismo em Migalhas Filosóficas de Kierkegaard, mostrando que a diferença entre os modelos do Platonismo e do Cristianismo, apontadas pelo autor, na relação Mestre e Discípulona mesma obra, assinada por seu pseudônimo Johannes Climacus, não implica que tais modelos sejam essencial e mutuamente excludentes, mas que são passíveis de uma reconciliação. Para tanto, a partir do Platonismo e suas teorias interdependentes de Reminiscência e Metempsicose, será sustentado que a diferença supramencionada é, em certa medida, artificialmente criada ou exageradamente radicalizada pelo autor, e setentará evidenciar eventuais incompatibilidades do Cristianismo assim ‘inventado’ por Climacus com o Cristianismo primitivo (sugerindo pesquisa em Orígenes) e tradicional,bem como alguns dos mais relevantes pontos em comum deste último com o Platonismo, particularmente o Princípio da Imanência. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This work has the object to investigate the relation between Platonism and Christianityin Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, showing that the difference between thePlatonist and the Christian Models, pointed by the author, in the master and disciplerelationship in the same work, signed by the pseudonymous of Johannes Climacus, notimply that such models were essentially and mutually exclusives, but that they couldhave a possible reconciliation. To do such, from the Platonism and its interdependenttheories of Recollection and Metempsychosis, it will be sustained that the differencementioned above is, in certain measure, artificially created or too much radicalized bythe author, and it will be tried to show evidence of eventual incompatibilities betweenthe Christianity so ‘invented’ by Climacus and the Early (suggesting research in Origen)and Traditional Christianity, as well as some of the most relevant common pointsbetween the latter and Platonism, particularly the Principle of Immanence.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2013. / Submitted by Albânia Cézar de Melo (albania@bce.unb.br) on 2013-09-02T13:53:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_ArthurBartholoGomes.pdf: 1133542 bytes, checksum: 2c63e6e33db6ad21f9d4d19fe988bea5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2013-09-02T14:02:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_ArthurBartholoGomes.pdf: 1133542 bytes, checksum: 2c63e6e33db6ad21f9d4d19fe988bea5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-09-02T14:02:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_ArthurBartholoGomes.pdf: 1133542 bytes, checksum: 2c63e6e33db6ad21f9d4d19fe988bea5 (MD5) / Esta dissertação trata do problema da repetição em Kierkegaard do ponto de vista daquilo que ele concebe como sendo o estético. Tanto as articulações do significado deste conceito dentro da obra A Repetição, quanto o significado do estético nesta e em outras obras, serão trabalhados no sentido de aproximar aquilo que, no texto, aparece associado de maneira apenas indireta. A tarefa, portanto, exige uma exposição detalhada da ideia de repetição em toda a sua abrangência tal como Kierkegaard apresentou, bem como o significado do estético e como a repetição abre seus limites para o religioso enquanto uma postura existencial que a ultrapassa. A colisão entre o estético e o religioso, a partir da qual o poético aparece como uma forma de realização da repetição, consiste, portanto, na ideia central deste trabalho e no tema chave, em que seus elementos deverão ser desenvolvidos tanto em seus aspectos divergentes quanto convergentes. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This dissertation intents to see the problem of repetition in Kierkegaard from that point of view which he conceives to be aesthetical. Both the meaning of this concept inside the book Repetition, as well as the meaning of the aesthetic on this matter in this text and in other writings, will be developed in order to bring together what appears linked in the text only in an indirect manner. The task altogether requires a detailed exposition of the idea of repetition in all its complexity as was shown by Kierkegaard, as well as the meaning of the aesthetical and the limits opened by repetition towards the religious as an existential posture that surpasses it. The collision between the aesthetical end the religious, from which the poetical appears as a way of realizing repetition, consists, for that matter, in the main idea of this work and its key-theme, in which its elements shall be developed in both its divergents and convergent aspects.

This thesis is concerned with the psychoanalytical concept of narcissism, and the effect that texts written by narcissistic writers have upon their readers. I use Søren Kierkegaard as an example of a narcissistic writer who produced narcissistic texts. In order to follow through the logic of the thesis, it is necessary to explain first the Freudian idea of narcissism, and then narcissism as considered by one post-Freudian school called Object Relations theory. It is also necessary, second, to summarise a psychoanalytic model of what happens when we read any kind of text. The methodology of this thesis is usually called psychobiography, the systematic application of psychodynamic principles to the study of a life, and so, third, both the principles and some of the issues of this methodology are presented. Having established an operational definition of narcissism, the thesis looks first at Kierkegaard’s life, identifying a series of key events or stages that can be re-interpreted on the assumption that Kierkegaard was narcissistic. Three of his key texts are considered next - Fear and Trembling, Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death. Each of these can be interpreted to show how his narcissism influenced his writing. Two substantial appendices are included. The first is a comment upon the relationship between God and psychoanalysis, presented primarily to introduce the ideas of Donald Winnicott. The second is on the concept of psychopathology, a difficult topic, since it is at once both heavily value laden, but is also persistent in any analysis of psychological difference. In conclusion I refer to several key Kierkegaardian themes, emphasising their narcissistic origins, and ask the reader to reflect upon their own responses to these issues, to consider how Kierkegaard’s narcissism influences their own emotions, and how these in turn affect any cognitive understanding of Søren Kierkegaard.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-03-21T12:12:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ruth Faria da Costa Castanha.pdf: 816535 bytes, checksum: e9856926c070ecfd639a868ff3472fc5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-21T12:12:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ruth Faria da Costa Castanha.pdf: 816535 bytes, checksum: e9856926c070ecfd639a868ff3472fc5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-21 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present master’s dissertation is the result of the anguish caused by the Kierkegaardian thought regarding the law and reality of the legal world. The chosen subject speaks in a transversal way with several law trades, mainly with the law philosophy, in which the debate is centralized; easily gets through the Legal Sociology, Psychology and Religious Studies. However, with kindness, invites the Theology to take the floor and to speak side by side with the Law. The theme, from the point of view proposed, wasn’t much explored in the scientific field, that’s why stands out its importance on the comprehension of the anguish which bothers and moves that one that seeks for the correct interpretation of the law. For the sake of debate, we have appropriated of the anguish concept contained in the oeuvre from the Danish author Sören Kierkegaard of various legal aspects concerning what would be the law and its subject / A presente dissertação de mestrado é fruto da angústia causada pelo pensamento kierkegaardiano em face do direito e da realidade do mundo jurídico. O tema escolhido dialoga de maneira transversal com diversos ramos do direito, precipuamente, com a filosofia do direito, em que está centrado o debate; transcorre tranquilamente a Sociologia Jurídica, a Psicologia e as Ciências da Religião. Porém, com carinho, convida a Teologia a assumir a tribuna e discursar lado a lado com o Direito. A temática, sob a ótica ora proposta, foi pouco explorada no campo científico, por isto destaca-se a sua importância na compreensão da angustia que incomoda e move aquele que busca a justa interpretação da lei. Para o debate, nos apropriamos do conceito de angústia contido na obra do autor dinamarquês Sören Kierkegaard de diversas vertentes jurídicas a respeito do que seria o direito e de seu objeto

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Federação Luterana Mundial / Esta tese analisa o Paradoxo Absoluto sob a perspectiva do tornar-se cristão. Desenvolve-se o argumento de que o processo de tornar-se cristão acontece sob juízo e graça no encontro com o Paradoxo Absoluto. Na primeira parte é tecida uma articulação paradoxal entre antropologia e cristologia. No primeiro capítulo é analisada a possibilidade do pecado original recorrendo-se ao conceito de angústia. A reflexão é antropológica e se ocupa em investigar a constituição do ser humano tendo em mente a pergunta por como o pecado é possível, e não em afirmar a realidade efetiva do pecado. No segundo capítulo é desenvolvido o entendimento do paradoxo cristológico em Kierkegaard e argumentado que o encontro do indivíduo com o paradoxo acontece sob juízo e graça. Este argumento desempenha papel central na tese tanto para o entendimento da concepção de paradoxo em Kierkegaard como para a compreensão do significado de tornar-se cristão. Na segunda parte da tese o tema da relação paradoxal entre juízo e graça é analisado sob novas nuances. No terceiro capítulo o entendimento antropológico de Kierkegaard é aprofundado a partir de sua compreensão de self. Em decorrência, são analisados os conceitos de desespero e pecado, bem como o conceito de fé enquanto cura para o pecado. A partir desse desenvolvimento é argumentado que se tornar um self é um processo que acontece sob juízo e graça. No quarto capítulo Cristo é apresentado enquanto simultaneamente modelo e redentor e é enfatizada a importância do discipulado cristão enquanto seguir a Cristo. Desenvolvendo o tema do discipulado é tecida uma reflexão sobre o amor cristão destacando o dever de amar o próximo e a manifestação do amor em obras. A categoria da edificação é então trabalhada enquanto modo do amor. Finalmente, é retomado o conceito de paradoxo demonstrando-se que o discipulado cristão acontece continuamente sob juízo e graça. Nas reflexões finais alguns conceitos importantes da tese são relacionados a questões do nosso próprio contexto teológico. / The thesis analyzes the Absolute Paradox under the perspective of becoming a Christian. The argument is developed, that the process of becoming a Christian happens under judgment and grace, when encountering the Absolute Paradox. In the first part, a paradoxical articulation between Anthropology and Christology is elaborated. In the first chapter the possibility of original sin is analyzed making use of the concept of anxiety. This reflection is mainly anthropological and aims to investigate the constitution of the human being, keeping in mind the question of how sin is possible, and not in stating the actuality of sin. In the second chapter, the understanding of the christological Paradox is developed according to Kierkegaard and it is argued that the encounter of the individual with the Paradox happens under judgment and grace. This argument has a central role in the thesis, in understanding the concept of Paradox in Kierkegaard, as well as in the comprehension of the significance of becoming a Christian. In the second part of the thesis the relation between judgment and grace is analyzed under new nuances. In the third chapter the anthropological understanding of Kierkegaard is deepened, taking his understanding of the self as basis. From this concept the categories of despair and sin, as well as faith as cure to sin, are analyzed. Up from this development I argue that to become a self is a process that happens under judgment and grace. In the fourth chapter Christ is presented as simultaneously prototype and redeemer, and the importance of Christian discipleship is stressed as following Christ. Developing the notion of discipleship, it is elaborated a reflection on Christian love, stressing the commandment of loving ones neighbor and the manifestation of love in works. The category of edification is developed as a way of love. Finally I turn back to the concept of paradox arguing that Christian discipleship happens continually under judgment and grace. In my final reflections some important concepts of the thesis are related to questions of our own theological context.