Dissertation--Frankfurt (Oder)--Europa-Universität Viadrina.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Civil-Military Relations))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Donald Abenheim, Hans E. Peters. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-57). Also available online.

De l’éclatement de l’ex-Yougoslavie en 1991 à la montée des tensions à la fin de 1997, la crise du Kosovo a été insuffisamment considérée par la communauté internationale, qui était accaparée par la gestion des conflits ouverts en Croatie et en Bosnie. Mais l’éclatement du conflit armé au début de 1998 poussa la communauté internationale à réagir au Kosovo. Or, cette réaction était à la fois tardive et insuffisante pour permettre de parvenir à une solution diplomatique du conflit. L’une des interrogations de ce travail est donc de déterminer si un règlement politique et pacifique du conflit était possible. Si, avant le conflit armé, tout n’a pas été tenté pour prévenir son éclatement, les chances de trouver une solution politique une fois les hostilités déclenchées, étaient illusoires. Aussi, toutes les initiatives entreprises par la communauté internationale au cours de l’année 1998 et le début de 1999 échouèrent.L’absence d’une solution diplomatique conduisit l’OTAN à intervenir militairement contre l’ex-République fédérale de Yougoslavie, entre mars et juin 1999. Les raisons qui ont motivé cette intervention constituent un autre questionnement important de cette thèse. Dans cette crise, l’OTAN semble avoir subi l’évolution de la situation plus qu’elle ne l’a précédée et anticipée. Selon notre hypothèse, l’Alliance atlantique s’est impliquée dans le conflit en espérant que ses menaces lui éviteraient une intervention militaire qu'elle croyait brève lorsque celle-ci devint inévitable. En entendant mettre fin au conflit par une démonstration de force contre Belgrade, l’OTAN se retrouva donc engagée dans une guerre qu'elle devait mener jusqu'au bout, car il en allait de sa propre crédibilité. Si d’autres facteurs ont également joué un rôle important, l’enjeu de crédibilité nous semble donc constituer l'élément déclencheur de l’intervention de l’OTAN, puis son moteur au fur et à mesure qu’elle se prolongeait et s’intensifiait. / From the collapse of former Yugoslavia in 1991 to the rising tensions at the end of 1997, the crisis of Kosovo had not been sufficiently considered by the international community, which was preoccupied with the management of open conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. However, the outbreak of the armed conflict in early 1998 pushed the international community to react in Kosovo. That reaction was both late and insufficient to achieve a diplomatic solution for the conflict. One of the research questions of this work was to determine whether a political and peaceful resolution of the conflict was indeed possible. If, before the armed conflict, everything was not attempted to prevent its outbreak, chances to find a political solution, once the hostilities began, were illusory. Therefore, all of the initiatives undertaken by the international community during 1998, and in early 1999, were to no avail.In absence of any diplomatic solution, NATO intervened militarily against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from March to June 1999. The reasons behind this intervention constitute another important question of this thesis. In this crisis, NATO seems to have undergone the evolution of the situation rather than precede and anticipate it. According to our hypothesis, the Atlantic Alliance was involved in the conflict hoping that, by its threats, would avoid the need for a military intervention; and when the intervention became inevitable, NATO believed it to be short. Waiting to put an end to the conflict through military force demonstration against Belgrade, NATO found itself engaged in a war that had to be carried to the end, because its own credibility was at stake. While other factors have also played an important role, the issue of credibility seems to us to have been the major element that triggered NATO's intervention, and as such became its driving force as the intervention prolongated and intensified progressively.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis presents the possible scenarios for the final political status of Kosovo, undecided since 1999, and the implications of these scenarios for the stability of the Balkans. In the beginning, basic elements of theory about the reconstruction of war-torn societies are presented in terms of such aspects as security, governance, economy, and justice. The goal is an understanding of the current situation in Kosovo, the challenges that the international administration had to handle when it arrived in Kosovo in June 1999, and its achievements and weaknesses till now. Finally, the possible scenarios for Kosovo's final status are examined and the one best for regional stability is suggested. / Commander, Hellenic Navy

Thesis advisor: Ali Banuazizi / This thesis explores the centrality of myth in the master narrative of Serbian ethno-nationalism that erupted in the late 1980s through the 1990s. By looking at Serbian folk epics depicting the battle of Kosovo, this thesis examines the role of myth as a part of Serbian identity and culture. The way the myth of the battle of Kosovo is remembered is a way of reconstructing the past through using themes in the myth to manipulate public memory and political consciousness. This thesis shows that while myth represents a key construction of a master national narrative, the narrative does not represent the stories of all members of the nation. The theoretical and official “history” of a nation is separate from the lived history of individuals. The last chapter uses gender as a lens to examine the master national stemming from the Kosovo myth, showing how the national master narrative connects to the “myth of the all pervasive patriarchy” in how history is understood. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: History.

This thesis examines the adoption of a multiethnic liberal democratic model of governance in post-independence Kosovo and the dual task of statebuilding to secure unity and accommodate diversity through the development of an extensive institutional and legal framework of minority rights. It defines the management of plurality as a fundamental element of contemporary statebuilding that seeks to build social cohesion and gain the obedience of all its constituent peoples. This thesis explains why in post-conflict and postindependence Kosovo, its domestic sovereignty and legitimisation have become conditioned by the integration, accommodation and protection of minorities. In the context of the international involvement in Kosovo and its highly contested statehood, the existing literature highlights the imposing and exogenous character of statebuilding as largely responsible for its shortcomings. This research challenges this predominant view and draws attention to endogenous factors that may offer a more accurate analysis of how the state model designed for Kosovo has been transformed and limited by local idiosyncrasies. Through a collection of in-depth personal interviews and extensive analysis of laws, reports and official documents, this work answers the question of how successful Kosovo has been in managing diversity. These data reveals the legislation implementation gap and the variation in the de facto levels of integration, depending on the will and capacity of each community to assume their rights and on their socio-economic, demographic and political particularities. The tensions and unintended consequences arising from the priority to address the situation of Kosovo Serbs through power-sharing and farreaching provisions are highlighted in their asymmetrical impact on different communities and the enhanced risk of segregation and marginalization. Overall, this thesis shows that the adoption of a multiethnic state model is crucially limited by endogenous conditions and the state-society relationship in Kosovo remains largely undefined.

This thesis focuses on the Kosovo Albanian national movement between 1968 and 2008. Using a multi-layered approach, it analyses a) the factors that determined its political success, b) its continuous transformation and, above all, the internal dynamics of power competition, and c) the prevalence of the independence option in the early 1990s. A key feature of this research project is that it emphasises intra- Albanian struggles, elite competition and tensions over internal legitimacy and power to dominate and generate political identities. In other words, it depicts the way in which nationalism is contested within a national movement that seeks independence. As regards the political success of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, the thesis has demonstrated that although the latter has been fragmented, especially during the war, external intervention was essential in the removal of the Serbian/Yugoslav control and, later on, in achieving independence. It not only proved to be a determining factor in the achievement of Kosovo’s independence, but also played an essential role in sustaining a minimal consensus within the deeply fragmented nationalist movement. Regarding the issue of the internal dynamics of contention and power-struggles and ideological and political transformations of the nationalist movement, the findings suggest that the Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement has constantly been an arena of struggle for competing groups/organisations and political stances. Such power struggles in turn led to the bifurcation, trifurcation or even total fragmentation of the movement, with various groups and parties standing at opposite ends of the spectrum of political and nationalist demands. The thesis contends that the internal power struggle intensified in the aftermath of critical junctures that provided new opportunities (such as audiences) and constraints for the competing parties/groups. These ‘episodes of contention’ in turn resulted in the fundamental transformation and the restructuring of the power relations within the Kosovo Albanian nationalist arena and political field and, consequently, of the political demands and ideological orientation of the movement. The thesis adopts the institutionalist approach to explain the predominance of the independence option. While examining the role of political institutions in structuring political life and forging a new political identity, it argues that the project of an independent Kosovo is tightly linked to, and even stems from, the existence of Kosovo’s quasi-republican status in Yugoslavia. In other words, the existence of separate Kosovan cultural and political institutions during the period of autonomy was crucial in the process of the emergence of independence-oriented elites. Finally, as regards the contribution of this thesis to the wider scholarly work on nationalism, it reinforces the necessity of shifting the focus from the political success of nationalism to its sociological development and the properties of political and social interactions that define the emergence of factionalism and competing political stances. Most importantly, this thesis has shown that even in cases of apparent ethnic homogenisation and cemented inter-ethnic distance, internal dissent and strife is inevitable as groups and individuals strive for power and domination.

This thesis aims to facilitate an understanding of some of the critical debates in public relations theory and practice. It joins others in contributing to a shift from a functional systems-based public relations paradigm to one where public relations is transparently seen as playing a role in shaping democracy in a global society. The research analyses NATO's communication operations in the Kosovo Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, examining the case from a number of different perspectives. The thesis contributes to the body of knowledge of public relations practices and how, in this case, they were used to inform and persuade publics of the moral cause of a bombing mission to achieve specific strategic organisational and communication goals. Further, it contextualises the case of NATO as an organisation facing a crisis in legitimacy following the end of the Cold War. It demonstrates how the Kosovo Campaign provided a vehicle to transform NATO's identity while retaining military capabilities, to make the organisation relevant to the global demands of the 21st century. In this way, NATO could claim a unique self and maintain its credibility and relevance. The thesis argues that NATO's public relations campaign was successful in maintaining both credibility and popular support for a 78-day bombing campaign within the 19 nations of the Alliance. The campaign allowed NATO to claim that it was the only organisation that could provide ii security and stability, as well as be the main bulwark of the defence of Western values in a rapidly globalising and changing world. Moreover, by framing the Kosovo air campaign as a humanitarian intervention, NATO was not only able to legitimise its actions but transform its military might with an acceptable human face in order to achieve its broader ideological goals in Europe. This thesis demonstrates how military interventions on behalf of powerful interests can be legitimised if the appropriate public relations framework is used and acceptable communication strategies employed. It suggests how citizens of democratic countries can be led to support decision-makers who present themselves as acting altruistically even when their actions may be self-interested.

la présente thèse veut fonder le droit moral à faire sécession, en analysant le principe de souveraineté nationale, le concept de peuple, celui de nation et de nationalisme, pour arriver à considérer la sécession en tant que phénomène inévitable suivant la dissolution de l'Etat en tant que principe absolu, et en tant que conséquence parfois souhaitable dans les conflits inter-ethniques qui n'arrivent pas à être résolus. Notre point de vue ne sera pas celui de qui veut forcer une minorité ou un groupe à demeurer dans une situation de status quo, afin de ne pas déranger les équilibres politiques internationaux ou de ne pas trahir le principe de la souveraineté d’un État sur son territoire ou celui de la non-ingérence. Nous aurons plutôt à cœur d’établir la réalité des faits derrière le mouvement sécessionniste, pour garantir au peuple demandeur de sécession une impartialité de traitement et l’avènement de meilleures conditions de vie pour sa population. Nos considérations seront pragmatiques, réalistes, marginalisant les fondements de droit international comme le principe de non-ingérence et le respect de la souveraineté étatique ainsi que les considérations d’ordre politique et stratégique. Ce qui nous intéresse est la fondation d’un droit moral qui puisse se révéler capital dans la résolution de conflits et crises interethniques, et qui puisse faciliter les prises de décisions dans les crises sécessionnistes – quand la sécession en cours sera justifiable – pour aboutir à la création d’un nouvel État pour des raisons biens fondées, raisons qui n’ont pas pu être accommodées à travers des instruments tels quels l’octroi de droits spéciaux, les tentatives de pacification, la cohabitation forcée, l’autonomie, le fédéralisme. Les événements qui portent une minorité ou un groupe national à contempler une solution sécessionniste sont en général marqués par une tension politique plus ou moins forte, des problèmes d’ordre social ou économique, parfois des violations de droits collectifs ou, pire, des conflits armés, violence de masse, génocide. Ce n’est jamais, ou seulement dans de très rares cas, une situation de bien-être qui génère une demande d’indépendance, et ce sera donc avec une encore plus grande humanité et de sentiments d’impartialité et de bienveillance qu’on devra considérer la situation en question. Le droit à faire sécession existe parce qu’il appartient à chaque peuple de pouvoir se donner l’organisation politique et juridique de son choix. La référence juridique ne tournera plus autour des droits de l’homme (les droits fondamentaux des individus) mais autour des droits des gens (les droits fondamentaux des peuples) : ce droit, dans lequel ont cru aussi des philosophes comme Walzer, Livingstone, Boykin et Sandel, est une priorité éthique très forte pour la communauté internationale. C’est un droit fondamental et inaliénable, et comme tel il appartient à la sphère de la praxis humaine qui a à faire avec le comportement social, l’organisation politique et l’action civile pour une meilleure survie anthropologique du groupe. La norme qui devrait sanctionner la fondation du droit moral à faire sécession est l’application effective du droit des peuples à choisir librement leur organisation politique et à poursuivre leur développement économique, social et culturel. Cette norme est reconnue à l’article 1er du Pacte international sur les droits politiques et civils, et à l’article 55 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Mais notre interprétation est très utopiste et elle se place très loin de la pratique de la politique internationale, qui veut voir dans le droit à l’autodétermination des peuples la seule autodétermination politique des peuples avec un État national bien défini : ce magnifique droit collectif est ainsi réduit à la seule possibilité de choisir son régime politique par les élections.

Zugl.: München, University, Diss., 2009.