The paper contains comment, clarification and criticism, even constructive criticism, of some theses that have been put forward by Laurence Bonjour in his In Defense of Pure Reason. It presents a concept of experience that deals with the relation between cognizer and object of experience that has a great similarity to that of Bonjour. Through analysis it is shown that the concept of a priori entails that Bonjour has two concepts of a priori, a narrow and a broad one. The narrow one is, in my own words: According to moderate rationalism a proposition p is a priori justified if and only if you apprehend that p must be true in every possible world. This doesn’t mean that Bonjour doesn’t believe in an epistemological, metaphysical and semantic realm. The broad one does not mention anything about possible worlds. Casullo in his A priori justification rejects Bonjour’s argument against Quine’s coherentism. A defense is put forward with the concept ‘an ideal of science for apparent rational insights’. The concept of axiomatic system and foundationalism is used. If we assume that the colour proposition ‘nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time’ has the meaning that we, in this very moment, are representing a property in the world, thus we have an argument of superposition for the correctness of the proposition. The ground for this argumentation relies on the identification of colours with superposing electromagnetic waves.

My thesis aims to show that Wittgensteins view of rule-following involves a misleading picture of the rule. Since he saw the rule as something fundamentally independent of the rule-follower and something with which the rule-follower must comply, he inevitably became entangled in the paradox of compliance: that is, the idea that there must be something other than the rule-follower for rule-following to exist, even though he knew that there was really nothing there to guide the rule-follower or to measure his action. This paradox, dimly expressed within key Wittgensteinian problems relating to how one is able to follow a rule and whether one can follow a rule privately, eventually gave rise to the question over the social nature of rules. In that debate, Wittgensteins commentators vigorously argued, and continue to argue, whether the concept of rule-following presupposes a community of practitioners or not. I argue that this debate itself is misguided, since both sides in this debate take as their starting point a picture of compliance which sees rule and rule-follower as essentially different. In contrast to a compliant picture, I offer a different picture of the rule, which I will call the pliant picture of the rule. I will show that rule and rule-follower are fundamentally the same, and are related to one another, not socially or grammatically, but genealogically. This relationship of identity is in fact exhibited in the relationship between teacher and pupil, when the pupil becomes what his teacher already is through following his teacher. Although compliance can be said to define this relationship initially, it ends with the pupil learning, or becoming, the rule. To conceive of the rule in this way is to avoid the paradox of compliance; that is, it is to go beyond Wittgensteins picture of a paradox.

My thesis aims to show that Wittgensteins view of rule-following involves a misleading picture of the rule. Since he saw the rule as something fundamentally independent of the rule-follower and something with which the rule-follower must comply, he inevitably became entangled in the paradox of compliance: that is, the idea that there must be something other than the rule-follower for rule-following to exist, even though he knew that there was really nothing there to guide the rule-follower or to measure his action. This paradox, dimly expressed within key Wittgensteinian problems relating to how one is able to follow a rule and whether one can follow a rule privately, eventually gave rise to the question over the social nature of rules. In that debate, Wittgensteins commentators vigorously argued, and continue to argue, whether the concept of rule-following presupposes a community of practitioners or not. I argue that this debate itself is misguided, since both sides in this debate take as their starting point a picture of compliance which sees rule and rule-follower as essentially different. In contrast to a compliant picture, I offer a different picture of the rule, which I will call the pliant picture of the rule. I will show that rule and rule-follower are fundamentally the same, and are related to one another, not socially or grammatically, but genealogically. This relationship of identity is in fact exhibited in the relationship between teacher and pupil, when the pupil becomes what his teacher already is through following his teacher. Although compliance can be said to define this relationship initially, it ends with the pupil learning, or becoming, the rule. To conceive of the rule in this way is to avoid the paradox of compliance; that is, it is to go beyond Wittgensteins picture of a paradox.

This chapter is a continuation of the preceding one, and we begin it at the place where the authors of Basic Modal Logic left us about fifteen years ago. Concluding his historical overview, Krister Segerberg wrote: “Where we stand today is difficult to say. Is the picture beginning to break up, or is it just the contemporary observer’s perennial problem of putting his own time into perspective?” So, where did modal logic of the 1970s stand? Where does it stand now? Modal logicians working in philosophy, computer science, artificial intelligence, linguistics or some other fields would probably give different answers to these questions. Our interpretation of the history of modal logic and view on its future is based upon understanding it as part of mathematical logic.

La presente investigación tiene como objetivo analizar la teoría del fisicalismo cromático kripkeano en respuesta al problema del color. Para ello, dividiré el trabajo en tres capítulos. En el primer capítulo, explicaré el problema del color basado en dos intuiciones: el realismo del color y la variación perceptual. Mientras el primero afirmaba que los colores son propiedades de los objetos, el segundo afirma que dos observadores pueden ver correctamente el mismo objeto de diferentes colores. Veremos que las dos intuiciones son inconsistentes, lo cual presenta el problema del color. En el segundo capítulo, explicaré la tesis central del fisicalismo cromático kripkeano, la cual divide el color en sí mismo (referente) de la sensación de color (la fijación de la referencia). Asimismo, extenderé su propuesta basándome en dos autores: Alex Byrne y David R. Hilbert. Finalmente, explicaré cómo el fisicalismo cromático kripkeano responde exitosamente al problema del color. Por último, en el tercer capítulo, explicaré dos posibles objeciones al fisicalismo cromático kripkeano. La primera es la deuda explicativa del contenido representacional y la segunda la violación a la disponibilidad de los colores

In this thesis, I describe and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These accounts are motivated by Kripke?s response to Russell?s Description Theory of Names (DTN). Particularly, I consider Kripke?s Modal Argument (MA) and various arguments that have been given against it, as well as Kripke?s responses to these arguments. Further, I outline a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider how he responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In order to evaluate the claim that MA is decisive against all description theories, I outline the Nominal Description Theory (NDT) put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether it constitutes a principled response to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds to Kripke?s arguments against descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid designation as a purely semantic thesis. Finally, I consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and Soames. Upon doing so, I argue that MA is not as decisive against description theories as it has long been thought to be. In fact, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames.

Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Prouver l’équivalence de programmes écrits dans un langage fonctionnel avec références est un problème notoirement difficile. L’objectif de cette thèse est de proposer un système logique dans lequel de telles preuves peuvent être formalisées, et dans certains cas inférées automatiquement. Dans la première partie, une méthode générique d’extension de la théorie des types dépendants est proposée, basée sur une interprétation du forcing vu comme une traduction de préfaisceaux de la théorie des types. Cette extension dote la théorie des types de constructions récursives gardées, qui sont utilisées ensuite pour raisonner sur les références d’ordre supérieure. Dans une deuxième partie, nous définissons une sémantique des jeux nominale opérationnelle pour un langage avec références d’ordre supérieur. Elle marie la structure catégorique de la sémantique des jeux avec une représentation sous forme de traces de la dénotation des programmes, qui se calcule de manière opérationnelle et dispose donc de bonnes propriétés de modularité. Cette sémantique nous permet ensuite de prouver la complétude de relations logiques à la Kripke définit de manière directe, via l’utilisation de types récursifs gardés, sans utilisation de la biorthogonalité. Une telle définition directe nécessite l’utilisation de mondes omniscient et un contrôle fin des locations divulguées. Finalement, nous introduisons une logique temporelle qui donne un cadre pour définir ces relations logiques à la Kripke. Nous ramenons alors le problème de l’équivalence contextuelle à la satisfiabilité d’une formule de cette logique générée automatique, c’est à dire à l’existence d’un monde validant cette formule. Sous certaines conditions, cette satisfiabilité peut être décidée via l’utilisation d’un solveur SMT. La complétude de notre méthode devrait permettre d’obtenir des résultats de décidabilité pour l’équivalence contextuelle de certains fragment du langage considéré, en fournissant un algorithme pour construire de tels mondes. / Proving program equivalence for a functional language with references is a notoriously difficult problem. The goal of this thesis is to propose a logical system in which such proofs can be formalized, and in some cases inferred automatically. In the first part, a generic extension method of dependent type theory is proposed, based on a forcing interpretation seen as a presheaf translation of type theory. This extension equips type theory with guarded recursive constructions, which are subsequently used to reason on higher-order references. In the second part, we define a nominal game semantics for a language with higher-order references. It marries the categorical structure of game semantics with a trace representation of denotations of programs, which can be computed operationally and thus have good modularity properties. Using this semantics, we can prove the completeness of Kripke logical relations defined in a direct way, using guarded recursive types, without using biorthogonality. Such a direct definition requires omniscient worlds and a fine control of disclosed locations. Finally, we introduce a temporal logic which gives a framework to define these Kripke logical relations. The problem of contextual equivalence is then reduced to the satisfiability of an automatically generated formula defined in this logic, i.e. to the existence of a world validating this formula. Under some conditions, this satisfiability can be decided using a SMT solver. Completeness of our methods opens the possibility of getting decidability results of contextual equivalence for some fragments of the language, by giving an algorithm to build such worlds.

In this thesis, I describe and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These accounts are motivated by Kripke?s response to Russell?s Description Theory of Names (DTN). Particularly, I consider Kripke?s Modal Argument (MA) and various arguments that have been given against it, as well as Kripke?s responses to these arguments. Further, I outline a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider how he responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In order to evaluate the claim that MA is decisive against all description theories, I outline the Nominal Description Theory (NDT) put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether it constitutes a principled response to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds to Kripke?s arguments against descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid designation as a purely semantic thesis. Finally, I consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and Soames. Upon doing so, I argue that MA is not as decisive against description theories as it has long been thought to be. In fact, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames.

La tesis analiza dos objeciones corrientes a la interpretación del problema de las reglas por el Wittgenstein de Kripke: el PROBLEMA DE LA OBJETIVIDAD DE LA REGLA, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el PROBLEMA DE LAS RELACIONES INTERNAS entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol de la noción de acuerdo en la misma. La estrategia general de la tesis es examinar las vías de ataque al lenguaje privado (LP) previas a la de Kripke. El contraste con las mismas permite conceptualizar adecuadamente la propuesta de Kripke, para mostrar que las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. En el marco de la tesis, comprendemos por LP a cualquier tesis que sostenga que las condiciones de significatividad del lenguaje pueden ser provistas por estados mentales subjetivos, p.e. creencias, de ahí el solapamiento de la tesis del lenguaje privado con el escepticismo epistemológico y con posiciones solipsistas, y la convicción de que la refutación del LP acarrea la ruina del escepticismo epistemológico. Hay dos versiones clásicas del argumento del LP. Las versiones epistemológicas (Malcom, Fogelin son los representantes que examinamos) derivan la imposibilidad del LP de la imposibilidad de establecer la verdad/corrección de un uso en el contexto de privacidad. La crítica a estas versiones (Ayer, thomson) muestra un círculo justificatorio entre oraciones subjetivas y objetivas. Las versiones semánticas (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) intentan evitar el círculo, elucidando las presuposiciones que le subyacen. Esta respuesta no es satisfactoria ya que o bien regenera el círculo en un nuevo nivel, o bien no logran derrocar al círculo de la justificación. Con Stroud identificamos el fallo común de estas estrategias en el hecho de que en su intento de derrotar al escéptico-privatista, requieren o bien una PREMISA FÁCTICA que indica que conocemos, o bien la especificación del conocimiento como una NOTA DEFINICIONAL de los criterios/condiciones de significatividad que el argumento trascendental elucida en la pregunta del escéptico. Kripke impone un cambio de rumbo en el argumento, al plantear el desafío como una forma de ESCEPTICISMO SEMÁNTICO ONTOLÓGICO, el cual ya no se basa en las limitaciones cognitivas de la privacidad, sino justamente en las presuntas ventajas que presenta. El desafío de Kripke pregunta por las razones que podemos aportar para sostener que no ha ocurrido un cambio en el uso, lo cual equivale a preguntar ¿cómo sabes que tu uso actual CORRESPONDE con tu intención/significado previo? De la imposibilidad de responder a la cuestión clave del realismo clásico (correspondencia) en el caso del significado, Kripke concluye que no puede haber condiciones de verdad para las oraciones semánticas. Esto motiva una paradoja escéptica y una SOLUCIÓN ESCÉPTICA de la paradoja en términos de condiciones de aseverabilidad. Tener en cuenta el abandono de las condiciones de verdad es la clave para responder al problema de la objetividad, mientras que la forma del desafío y el funcionamiento de la concordancia en los juicios como base de atribución, es la clave para la solución del problema de las relaciones internas. / This dissertation analyses two objections currently raised against Kripke's Wittgenstein interpretation of rule-following considerations: The problem of OBJECTIVITY OF THE RULE: Can a single individual be right against communal assent?; and the problem of INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. The general strategy of the thesis is to examine different ways of attacking private language (PL) previous to Kripke's one. through contrast we are able to appreciate clearly the nature of Kripke's proposal, showing that mentioned objections cannot be applied to him. In the framework of this dissertation we understand PL as every theses that claim that conditions of meaning of language can be provided by subjective mental states exclusively, believes for instance, which explains usual association between PL and epistemological scepticism, and conviction that refutation of PL is as well a refutation of epistemological scepticism. There are two main versions of argument against PL. Epistemological versions (Malcolm, Fogelin, are considered) derive impossibility of PL from impossibility to establish corection/truth of a use or application of a given sign. Criticism to this version (Ayer, Thomson) indicates that argument concludes in a justificational circle between subjective and objective sentences. Semantical versions (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) try to avoid this circle elucidating its presuppositions, which are conditions of meaning of language allegedly neglected by privatist. This answer is no satisfactory, beacuse it raises the circle in a new, semantical level, or it doesn't work properly against justificational circle. with Stroud we indentify the common mistake of both strategies as consisting in proposals to beat the sceptic/privatist that requires either a FACTUAL PREMISE of to specify knowledge as part of the meaning of criterion conditions of significance elucidated in the questions of the sceptic or the claims of the privatist. Kripke imposes a change of direction in the argument because he poses a challenge with the form of a ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTICAL SCEPTICISM, which is not based on limitations of privacy but, quite on the contrary, is grounded in the supposed advantages it offers. Kripke's Wittgenstein challenge asks for reasons we can have to be sure that we are not now committing a mistake consisting in a change of use. This is equivalent to ask: how do you now that your actual use CORRESPONDS with your previous intention or intention? From impossibility of answering this question concerning the key question of classical realism (correspondence) in the case of meaning (conceived as a special setting: idealised epistemic conditions) Kripke concludes that there cannot be truth conditions for semantical sentences. This motivates as sceptical paradox and a SCEPTICAL SOLUTION to it, in terms of assertability conditions. I largue that in rejection of truth conditions we have the key to solve the problem the objectivity of the rule, while the special from of the challenge and particular functioning of agreement in judgements in sceptical solution, as ground of attribution, is the key to solve the problem of internal relationships.