Development of software for electronic systems in the aviation industry is strongly regulated by pre-defined standards. The aviation industry spends significant costs of development in ensuring flight safety and showing conformance to these standards. Some safety requirements can be satisfied by performing formal verification. Formal verification is seen as a way to reduce costs of showing conformance of software with the requirements or formal specifications. Therefore, the correctness of formal specifications is critical. Writing formal specifications is at least as difficult as developing software [36]. This work proposes an approach to generate formal specifications from example data. This example data illustrates the natural language requirements and represents the ground truth about the system. This work eases the task of an engineer who has to write formal specifications by allowing the engineer to specify the example data instead. The use of a relationship model and a marking syntax and semantics are proposed that make the creation of formal specifications goal oriented. The evaluation of the approach shows that the proposed syntax and semantics capture more information than is strictly needed to generate formal specifications. The relationship model reduces the computational load and only produces formal specifications that are interesting for the engineer.

El Enigma de Frege es considerado como uno de los principales problemas al que se enfrenta el millianismo. Como se sabe, el millianismo sostiene que el significado de un nombre propio es simplemente su referente. Dicho brevemente, el problema consiste en explicar por qué dos oraciones de identidad que contienen nombres propios co-referenciales (por ejemplo, “Mark Twain es Samuel Clemens” y “Mark Twain es Mark Twain”) parecen tener distinto valor informativo, esto es, por qué una de las oraciones parece ser trivial mientras que la otra parece ser informativa. El propósito del presente trabajo es mostrar que el millianismo puede responder de manera plausible al Enigma de Frege haciendo uso de la distinción entre la proposición semánticamente expresada por una oración y la(s) proposición(es) pragmáticamente impartida(s) por el uso o la emisión de una oración. El trabajo consta de tres capítulos. En el primer capítulo planteo el Enigma de Frege, explico cuáles son los principios presupuestos al plantear el problema y expongo qué respuesta le dio Frege al Enigma de Frege. En el segundo capítulo expongo los argumentos anti-descriptivistas de Kripke que pusieron en duda la respuesta que dio Frege al Enigma de Frege. En el tercer capítulo expongo un intento milliano por responder al Enigma de Frege que consiste en distinguir entre la proposición semánticamente expresada por una oración y la(s) proposición(es) pragmáticamente impartida(s) por el uso o la emisión de una oración, y, finalmente, evalúo si haciendo uso de esta distinción el millianismo responde de manera plausible al Enigma de Frege.

The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain sentences, such as negative existentials ("Santa does not exist"), and sentences in contexts of fiction ("Holmes lived on Baker Street"), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with empty names in object-fictional contexts.

This thesis is about the distributive full Lambek calculus, i.e., intuicionistic logic without the structural rules of exchange, contraction and weakening and particularly about the two semantics of this logic, one of which is algebraic, the other one is a Kripke semantic. The two semantics are treated in separate chapters and some results about them are shown, for example the disjunction property is proven by amalgamation of Kripke models. The core of this thesis is nevertheless the relation of these two semantics, since it is interesting to study what do they have in common and how can they actually differ, both being a semantics of the same logic. We show how to translate frames to algebras and algebras to frames, and, moreover, we extend such translation to morphisms, thus constructing two functors between the two categories. Key words:distributive FL logic, distributive full Lambek calculus, structural rules, distributive residuated lattice, Kripke frames, frame morphisms, category, functor 2

This work is an essay on the reference of names in language and thought. According to the Theory of Direct Reference, nowadays dominant in philosophy of language, the semantic content of a proper name is directly its referent (Chapter 1).<p>Nevertheless, despite its current fame, this theory must face two major difficulties, familiar since Frege and Russell: the Co-Reference and the No-Reference Problems. The traditional response to these problems consisted precisely in abandoning Referentialism in favour of a version of Descriptivism according to which the semantic content of a proper name would be, not its referent, but a descriptive condition (Chapter 2).<p>However, it is also this traditional version of Descriptivism that the arguments offered by the pioneers of modern Referentialism—including Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan—have largely discredited (Chapter 3).<p>The theoretical tools developed within the framework of possible worlds semantics enable to restate the problems generated by Referentialism in terms of the opacity of linguistic intensions and Modal Illusions (Chapter 4).<p>At this stage, our semantic theory of names seems to have reached a dead end: on the one hand, modern Referentialism recreates the problems which classical Descriptivism was meant to solve, but, on the other hand, this kind of Descriptivism appears to be refuted by the argumentation of new Referentialists. A common reaction, then, has been to devise more complex semantic theories purporting to combine Referentialism with crucial features from Descriptivism. However, a careful examination reveals that the various versions of this strategy fail (Chapter 5).<p>Another type of reaction, also ecumenical, has been to draw a distinction between two kinds of contents which would be associated with names and the sentences in which these occur: while the first kind of content would be descriptive, the second would be referential. The Two-Dimensionalist framework has received several interpretations (pragmatic, semantic, metasemantic); but a new construal, metasyntactic, is defended in this work (Chapter 6).<p>The metasyntactic interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism allows for a radical gap between language and thought: while the thoughts of their users can remain descriptive, names are supposed to achieve direct reference by themselves, and independently of the mental states of their users. Hence, names must be regarded as objects living in the external world, on a par with other ordinary objects like trees or chairs, and not as mental objects. An Externalist metaphysics of names is then submitted, as well as a corresponding epistemology, according to which external names are described in the mind through a description of their reference (Chapter 7).<p>The general strategy pursued in this work amounts to combining a Theory of Direct Reference in language with a Descriptivist (hence, Internalist) account of thought. Also, certain influential arguments — notably devised by Burge — intended to support Mental Referentialism (hence, Externalism) beyond Linguistic Referentialism, are rejected; it is moreover argued that a Non-Descriptivist conception of the mental is incapable of securing the introspective transparency of thoughts, which, however, seems indispensable, among other things in order to solve and even pose the Co-Reference and the No-Reference Problems (Chapter 8).<p><p>----------<p><p>Ce travail est un essai sur la référence des noms dans le langage et la pensée. Selon la Théorie de la Référence Directe, aujourd'hui dominante en philosophie du langage, le contenu sémantique d'un nom propre est directement son référent (Chapitre 1).<p>Or, malgré son succès récent, cette théorie Référentialiste se heurte à deux obstacles majeurs, reconnus depuis Frege et Russell : les Problèmes de la Co-référence et de la Non-Référence. La réponse traditionnelle à ces problèmes consistait précisément à abandonner la conception Référentialiste en faveur d'un Descriptivisme selon lequel le contenu sémantique d'un nom propre serait, non pas son référent, mais une condition descriptive (Chapitre 2).<p>Toutefois, c'est aussi ce Descriptivisme traditionnel que les arguments formulés par les hérauts du Référentialisme moderne—dont Kripke, Putnam, et Kaplan—ont largement discrédité (Chapitre 3).<p>Les outils théoriques développés dans le cadre de la sémantique des mondes possibles permettent de reformuler les problèmes générés par le Référentialisme en termes d'opacité des intensions linguistiques et d'Illusions Modales (Chapitre 4).<p>A ce stade, la théorie sémantique des noms semble dans une impasse : d'une part, le Référentialisme moderne recrée des problèmes que le Descriptivisme classique devait résoudre, mais d'autre part, ce Descriptivisme paraît bel et bien réfuté par l'argumentation des Référentialistes. Aussi, une réaction commune a été de chercher à concilier le Référentialisme et une forme de Descriptivisme au sein d'une même théorie sémantique. Cependant, un examen approfondi révèle que les différentes versions de cette stratégie échouent (Chapitre 5).<p>Une autre réaction, elle aussi œcuménique, a été d'opérér une distinction entre deux types de contenus qui seraient associés avec les noms et les phrases dans lesquels ceux-ci figurent : le premier contenu serait descriptif, tandis que le second serait référentiel. Le cadre offert par un tel Bi-Dimensionnalisme a reçu plusieurs interprétations très différentes (pragmatique, sémantique, métasémantique) ; mais c'est une nouvelle version, métasyntaxique, qui est défendue dans ce travail (Chapitre 6).<p>Le Bi-Dimensionalisme métasyntaxique autorise une séparation radicale entre langage et pensée : tandis que les pensées de leurs utilisateurs peuvent rester descriptives, les noms sont censés référer directement par eux-mêmes, indépendamment des états mentaux de leurs utilisateurs. Dès lors, les noms doivent être considérés comme des objets appartenant au monde extérieur, au même titre que des objets ordinaires tels que les arbres ou les chaises, et non comme des objets mentaux. Une métaphysique externaliste des noms est proposée, ainsi qu'une épistémologie assortie, selon laquelle les noms externes sont décrits dans l'esprit à travers une description de leur référence (Chapitre 7).<p>La stratégie générale qui est défendue dans ce travail revient à combiner une Théorie de la Référence Directe dans le langage avec une conception Descriptiviste (et donc, Internaliste) de la pensée. Aussi, certains arguments influents — émis par notamment Burge — censés établir un Référentialisme non seulement linguistique mais aussi mental (et donc, un Externalisme) sont rejetés ; il est en outre défendu qu'une vision Non-Descriptiviste du mental apparaît incapable de garantir la transparence introspective des pensées, cependant indispensable, notamment pour résoudre et même poser les Problèmes de Co-Référence et de Non-Référence (Chapitre 8). / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The main goal of this PhD dissertation is to explore the relation between postmodern poetics and some features of other theories developed at the same time in various areas of knowledge – mainly metaphysics, physics and sociology. If we can say that the modern paradigm was born with the question of how a multiplicity of different points of view could coexist, the postmodern paradigm seems to arise with the awareness that a systematic legitimation of differences cannot be based on a sole foundation that leads to a complete inclusion. For this reason, we argue that the concept of possible world is not only a useful heuristic metaphor adopted in different areas of the artistic and scientific postmodern culture, but it can put in constructive conversation different areas of knowledge which are usually thought to be more isolated and refractory to mutual influence than they actually are. Precisely because of the diverse usages and meanings that the term ‘world’ acquires in different contexts, the ontological commitment toward possible worlds varies significantly. They can be godly concepts, fictional scenarios, real sums of individuals that are isolated from each other, or ideal set of objects that are associated with different and mutually exclusive frames of reference and cultural coordinates. To shed a light on these matters is the main goal of the first book, entitled "What is a possible world?". The second book, entitled "Entangled worlds: the postmodernist literature", is committed to explore the topology of the possible worlds projected by postmodernist texts; in fact, the paradoxical topology that emerges from these texts appears to be inherently connected with a vast range of issues concerning our world.