The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000446385-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 380103 bytes, checksum: b183f9c581926e63b6421a4fd95fb3cb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / This work intends to discuss a problem very recent in philosophy of language, namely the problem of the normativity of meaning. The fundamental locus of discussion is the position of Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, whose main ingredient is the idea that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion. Several philosophers have assumed this position as a kind of pre-theoretical restriction to assess reasonable theories, discarding all those that cannot accommodate, somehow, the “restriction of Kripke”. What animates the contemporary debate about this is precisely the possibility of disposing a descriptivist and naturalistic approach of meaning, based on the claim that such approaches fail or offer a plausible explanation of the relevant sense of normativity or fail to ensure a reasonable criterion for semantic correctness. The overall goal of this work is to show that, from the position of Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, it is not necessary to assume such a restriction, since in many ways it does seem to contradict our ordinary intuitions about the notions of “meaning” and “use”. This study aims to show, in other words, that the restriction of normativity is particularly harmless to a semantic model naturalized. The general strategy would be to deny the hypothesis that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion and show that its relevant normative aspects can be immediately derived from certain basic regularities of use. / O presente trabalho pretende discutir um problema bastante recente em filosofia da linguagem, a saber: o problema da normatividade do significado. O lócus fundamental da discussão é a posição de Saul Kripke exposta em Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cujo ingrediente principal é a ideia de que o significado é uma noção intrinsecamente normativa. Diversos filósofos têm assumido esta posição como uma espécie de restrição pré-teórica para avaliar teorias razoáveis, descartando todas aquelas que não possam acomodar, de algum modo, a “restrição de Kripke”. O que anima o debate contemporâneo a este respeito é justamente a possibilidade de inviabilizar qualquer abordagem descritivista e naturalista do significado, com base na alegação de que tais abordagens ou não conseguem oferecer uma explicação plausível do sentido relevante de normatividade ou não conseguem garantir um critério razoável de correção semântica.O objetivo geral deste trabalho é mostrar que, a partir da posição de Wittgenstein nas Investigações Filosóficas, não é absolutamente necessário assumir tal restrição, já que em múltiplos sentidos ela parece mesmo contradizer nossas intuições ordinárias a respeito das noções de “significado” e “uso”. Este trabalho pretende mostrar, em outras palavras, que a restrição de normatividade é particularmente inofensiva para um modelo de semântica naturalizada. A estratégia geral consistirá em negar a hipótese de que o significado seja uma noção intrinsecamente normativa e mostrar que seus aspectos normativos relevantes podem ser imediatamente derivados de certas regularidades básicas de uso.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução em Filosofia, 2012. / Submitted by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza (jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2012-09-18T14:51:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_MaysaMariaMassimoRibeiro.PDF: 909108 bytes, checksum: ae3f93fdee1bb71ce74d516ce3fe7bd2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza(jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2012-09-18T14:52:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_MaysaMariaMassimoRibeiro.PDF: 909108 bytes, checksum: ae3f93fdee1bb71ce74d516ce3fe7bd2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T14:52:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_MaysaMariaMassimoRibeiro.PDF: 909108 bytes, checksum: ae3f93fdee1bb71ce74d516ce3fe7bd2 (MD5) / Na presente dissertação, apresenta-se, no primeiro capítulo, o paradoxo do cético de Wittgenstein que, segundo Kripke, seria o problema fundamental das Investigações Filosóficas, e estabelece que nenhum curso de ação pode ser determinado por uma regra, pois não se pode garantir que o aprendizado de uma regra no passado pode determinar o comportamento consoante a mesma regra no futuro. Posteriormente, apresenta-se o que seria, para Kripke, a solução ao paradoxo, que reside no argumento contrário à linguagem privada, passando pela mudança no pensamento de Wittgenstein, a partir da comparação entre suas obras Tractatus e Investigações Filosóficas. Nas Investigações, Wittgenstein teria rejeitado a visão realista do Tractatus de que a forma de explicação da significação advém da declaração das condições de verdade de uma frase, substituindo-a por uma visão que salienta mais o papel normativo da linguagem. Nesse sentido, destaca-se o conceito de condição de justificação, introduzido por Kripke em substituição às condições de verdade na declaração da veracidade ou falsidade de uma frase. Sob esse cenário, a solução ao paradoxo seria indagar quais circunstâncias efetivamente permitem a emissão de afirmações e qual o papel prático que essa permissão exerce. A justificação da obediência a uma regra só seria possível se considerado o contexto no qual tal regra e a pessoa que irá obedecer-lhe estão inseridas, ou, segundo Wittgenstein, uma regra só terá conteúdo substantivo se considerada dentro de seu jogo de linguagem, daí a não possibilidade de se seguir uma regra “privadamente”. No segundo capítulo do trabalho, apresentam-se posicionamentos contrários e favoráveis à interpretação dada por Kripke ao pensamento de Wittgenstein, visando à realização de um confronto de argumentos, que culmina, no terceiro capítulo do trabalho, com a conclusão pela correção da interpretação de Kripke, particularmente no que tange à mudança na filosofia da linguagem de Wittgenstein do Tractatus para as Investigações Filosóficas, como uma mudança de condições de verdade para condições de justificação ou de assertibilidade. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The present work introduces, in its first chapter, Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox, which is, according to Kripke, the fundamental problem of Philosophical Investigations, and establishes that no course of action could be determined by a rule, because we cannot assure that the learning of a rule in the past can determine any behavior according to the same rule in the future. Later, this work presents what Kripke believes is the solution to the paradox, which lies in the argument against the private language, and represents a change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from his work in the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejected the realistic view present in the Tractatus, which advocated a truth-conditional conception of meaning, and substituted for a view that gives more emphasis to the normative role of language. In this context, Kripke introduces the concept of justification conditions, substituting the concept of truth conditions in the role of declaring the truth or falsity of a sentence. Thus, the solution to the skeptical paradox is to see what circumstances actually license assertions and what role this license actually plays. The justification for following a rule is only possible within the context which the rule and the person who will follow it belong, or, according to Wittgenstein, a rule only has substantive content if considered inside its language game, therefore, it is not possible to follow a rule “privately”. In the second chapter of this work, we present positions pro and against Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgensten’s philosophy, aiming a confrontation of arguments, which reach to the conclusion, in the third chapter. Thereby, the conclusion of this work is that Kripke is correct in his interpretation of Wittgensten’s philosophy, particularly regarding the change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, as a change from truth conditions to assertability or justification conditions.

Has the theory of direct reference for general terms ontological consequences or requirements? It has normally been said that general terms should be conceived as rigid designators of natural classes”, but this is a very vague expression. What is a natural class” here? Is it a universal? Is it a class of resembling objects or tropes? It is argued that the theory of direct reference functions better in connection with an ontology of universals. The semantic model actually requires certain type of successful cognitive relation with the referent and it is difficult to explain how such a successful connection could be obtained if there are no universal properties, but only perfect resemblance classes of objects or tropes. / ¿Hay consecuencias o requerimientos ontológicos que puedan desprendersede la teoría de la referencia directa? Se ha dicho frecuentemente quelos términos generales deben ser concebidos como designadores rígidos de clasesnaturales”, pero esta es una expresión demasiado vaga. ¿Qué es aquí una clasenatural”? ¿Es un universal? ¿Una clase de objetos o tropos semejantes entre sí?Se argumenta que la teoría de la referencia directa funciona mejor en conexióncon una ontología de universales. El modelo semántico, en efecto, requiere ciertotipo de relación cognitiva exitosa con el referente, y es difícil explicar cómo podríadarse esa conexión exitosa si no hay propiedades universales, sino solo clasesde objetos o tropos perfectamente semejantes.

This paper is a comparative study of the propositional intuitionistic (non-modal) and classical modal languages interpreted in the standard way on transitive frames. It shows that, when talking about these frames rather than conventional quasi-orders, the intuitionistic language displays some unusual features: its expressive power becomes weaker than that of the modal language, the induced consequence relation does not have a deduction theorem and is not protoalgebraic. Nevertheless, the paper develops a manageable model theory for this consequence and its extensions which also reveals some unexpected phenomena. The balance between the intuitionistic and modal languages is restored by adding to the former one more implication.

No description available.

A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 446385.pdf: 380103 bytes, checksum: b183f9c581926e63b6421a4fd95fb3cb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-12-17 / This work intends to discuss a problem very recent in philosophy of language, namely the problem of the normativity of meaning. The fundamental locus of discussion is the position of Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, whose main ingredient is the idea that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion. Several philosophers have assumed this position as a kind of pre-theoretical restriction to assess reasonable theories, discarding all those that cannot accommodate, somehow, the restriction of Kripke . What animates the contemporary debate about this is precisely the possibility of disposing a descriptivist and naturalistic approach of meaning, based on the claim that such approaches fail or offer a plausible explanation of the relevant sense of normativity or fail to ensure a reasonable criterion for semantic correctness. The overall goal of this work is to show that, from the position of Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, it is not necessary to assume such a restriction, since in many ways it does seem to contradict our ordinary intuitions about the notions of meaning and use . This study aims to show, in other words, that the restriction of normativity is particularly harmless to a semantic model naturalized. The general strategy would be to deny the hypothesis that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion and show that its relevant normative aspects can be immediately derived from certain basic regularities of use. / O presente trabalho pretende discutir um problema bastante recente em filosofia da linguagem, a saber: o problema da normatividade do significado. O l?cus fundamental da discuss?o ? a posi??o de Saul Kripke exposta em Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cujo ingrediente principal ? a ideia de que o significado ? uma no??o intrinsecamente normativa. Diversos fil?sofos t?m assumido esta posi??o como uma esp?cie de restri??o pr?-te?rica para avaliar teorias razo?veis, descartando todas aquelas que n?o possam acomodar, de algum modo, a restri??o de Kripke. O que anima o debate contempor?neo a este respeito ? justamente a possibilidade de inviabilizar qualquer abordagem descritivista e naturalista do significado, com base na alega??o de que tais abordagens ou n?o conseguem oferecer uma explica??o plaus?vel do sentido relevante de normatividade ou n?o conseguem garantir um crit?rio razo?vel de corre??o sem?ntica. O objetivo geral deste trabalho ? mostrar que, a partir da posi??o de Wittgenstein nas Investiga??es Filos?ficas, n?o ? absolutamente necess?rio assumir tal restri??o, j? que em m?ltiplos sentidos ela parece mesmo contradizer nossas intui??es ordin?rias a respeito das no??es de significado e uso. Este trabalho pretende mostrar, em outras palavras, que a restri??o de normatividade ? particularmente inofensiva para um modelo de sem?ntica naturalizada. A estrat?gia geral consistir? em negar a hip?tese de que o significado seja uma no??o intrinsecamente normativa e mostrar que seus aspectos normativos relevantes podem ser imediatamente derivados de certas regularidades b?sicas de uso.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-05-20T18:16:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 linguagem_privada.pdf: 841449 bytes, checksum: 07ebf3d352878308a876b40eeb92565d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-20T18:16:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 linguagem_privada.pdf: 841449 bytes, checksum: 07ebf3d352878308a876b40eeb92565d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Este trabalho tem como objeto principal de estudo o Argumento da Linguagem Privada, de Wittgenstein. Saul Kripke, em On Rules and Private Language (1982), propõe uma interpretação do argumento, vinculando-o à questão do seguir regras e do ceticismo. O resultado é a elaboração de uma visão comunitarista sobre ele. Assim, partimos de um estudo dos argumentos de Wittgenstein e do Wittgenstein de Kripke, para uma posterior confrontação entre ambos. Esta confrontação visa destacar os pressupostos característicos da interpretação kripkeana, possibilitando avaliá-la em termos de sua correção ou incorreção em relação à visão apresentada pelo próprio Wittgenstein. Visa também analisar fundamentalmente se ela faz justiça à questão comunitarista sobre o significado que o Argumentoda Linguagem Privada suscita. Assim, defendemos a possibilidade de uma visão comunitarista do significado partindo do Argumento da Linguagem Privada e uma abordagem de como ela pode ser desenvolvida em adequação ao pensamento wittgensteiniano das Investigações Filosóficas, apoiados no resultado da confrontação entre os já mencionados argumentos de Wittgenstein e de Kripke sobre Wittgenstein. / This work has as its main subject the study of the Private Language Argument, by Wittgenstein.Saul Kripke, in On Rules and Private Language (1982), developed an interpretation of the Private Language Argument, attaching it to the question of rule-following and skepticism. As a result, is the development of a communitarian view on Wittgensteins argument. Thus, we start from a study of the arguments of Wittgenstein and of Kripkes Wittgenstein, aiming to a confrontation between them. This confrontation seeks to throw some light in the characteristic presuppositions of Kripkes interpretation, making possible to evaluate it in terms of his correction or not concerning Wittgensteins own view. Too, it analyses if it correctly considers the communitarian question about meaning that the Private Language Argument raise. Taking this point in relation to the question of meaning, we defend the possibility of a communitarian view of the Private Language Argument and how it can be developed adequately concerning the wittgensteinean thought, based on the results of the confrontation between the arguments by Wittgensteinand by Kripke on Wittgenstein.

<p>The paper contains comment, clarification and criticism, even constructive criticism, of some theses that have been put forward by Laurence Bonjour in his In Defense of Pure Reason.</p><p>It presents a concept of experience that deals with the relation between cognizer and object of experience that has a great similarity to that of Bonjour. Through analysis it is shown that the concept of a priori entails that Bonjour has two concepts of a priori, a narrow and a broad one. The narrow one is, in my own words: According to moderate rationalism a proposition p is a priori justified if and only if you apprehend that p must be true in every possible world. This doesn’t mean that Bonjour doesn’t believe in an epistemological, metaphysical and semantic realm. The broad one does not mention anything about possible worlds.</p><p>Casullo in his A priori justification rejects Bonjour’s argument against Quine’s coherentism. A defense is put forward with the concept ‘an ideal of science for apparent rational insights’. The concept of axiomatic system and foundationalism is used. If we assume that the colour proposition ‘nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time’ has the meaning that we, in this very moment, are representing a property in the world, thus we have an argument of superposition for the correctness of the proposition. The ground for this argumentation relies on the identification of colours with superposing electromagnetic waves.</p>