The best interest test is the legal mechanism which governs decision making on behalf of adults who lack the capacity to make their own health care treatment decisions. The test has attracted considerable criticism from health professionals, academics, judges and lawyers for being ill-defined and non-specific. The question of what is meant by 'best interests' remains largely unanswered. As a consequence, the test gives medical and legal decision makers considerable discretion to apply their personal value judgements within supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks - unreasoned and opaque decision making processes are the inevitable result. Because of the dominance of supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks, the place of values in decision making is not always fully understood. Reasoning is not possible without values, which stem from our emotions and passions, our upbringing, our religion, our cultures, our processes of socialisation and from our life experiences. Values help us make sense of our daily lives. I argue that law - like any other social institution - is essentially a human, values based construct. I put forward a theory of values-based law which argues for the recognition that laws, rules and conventions are based on, and contain, individual values. Currently, medical and legal decision makers justify grave decisions on behalf of society's most vulnerable citizens without revealing, or even acknowledging the values which drive and inform their decisions. Any opportunities to scrutinise or debate the values driving decisions are lost. Ultimately, values-based law argues that values underlying best interest determinations must be exposed to facilitate honest, transparent and fulsome decision making on behalf of adults who lack capacity. By applying the theory of values-based law, supposedly value-free decision making processes are exposed as insufficient to facilitate fulsome, honest and transparent legal reasoning.

The aim of this project is to study the level of paradigm development in the domain of social media studies. Based on the works of Kuhn (1970), Pfeffer (1993), and Thompson and Tuden (1959), the level of paradigm development was defined as the degree of consensus regarding: research topics, methods, and theories used in a given field of study. A sample of social media research articles was studied to analyze the level paradigm development within this domain of study. The sample consisted of a group of social media research articles that were published in the top ten journals of communication studies in the last five years. Content analysis methodology was used to analyze the research articles and clusters analysis was utilized in order to investigate the level of paradigm development in this field of study. The analysis confirmed the lack of consensus in the social sciences (Pfeffer, 1993). The level of agreement regarding research methods, theoretical concepts, and research topics used in social media studies was quite low. The lack of consensus in this new domain of study may be explained by two factors. Social media as an academic field is still in its infancy (Van Osch and Coursaris, 2014), and thus it lacks of a shared body of theoretical knowledge that can be used to analyze the phenomenon of social media (Van Osch and Coursaris, 2014; Chong and Xie, 2011; and Khang, Ki, and Ye, 2012). In conclusion, this project suggests that social media studies should aim to develop a high level of paradigm development, since academic fields with high levels of consensus are better organized, have fewer power conflicts, and get more funding (Beyer and Lodhl, 1976; Pfeffer, 1993).

Cette thèse porte sur la notion d'incommensurabilité que Thomas Kuhn a introduite dans son oeuvre la plus connue, la structure des révolutions scientifiques, pour caractériser la relation entre paradigmes successifs. Selon Kuhn, dans la SRS, le passage d'un paradigme à un autre implique une rupture qui se manifeste sur trois plans, le plan méthodologique, le plan sémantique et le plan ontologique qu'il exprime par l'idée que les scientifiques postrévolutionnaires travaillent dans un monde différent. De ce point de vue, l'incommensurabilité est une relation complexe entre paradigmes successifs, que Kuhn ne définit pas de façon systématique, mais qui semble impliquer une rupture radicale entre traditions successives. Kuhn s'appuie sur la métaphore visuelle du renversement de gestalt pour rendre compte du passage révolutionnaire d'un paradigme à un autre. Si les sociologues ont bien accueilli les thèses de Kuhn, il n'en a pas été de même des philosophes des sciences qui lui ont reproché de proposer une vision à la fois irrationnelle, relativiste et idéaliste du développement des sciences. Puisque Kuhn a toujours prétendu que ces critiques reposaient en grande partie sur l'incompréhension, il a entrepris de clarifier ses positions pour répondre aux objections. Il entreprit, en particulier, de préciser la notion d'incommensurabilité qui est au coeur de son argumentation. Ce travail retrace, dans un premier temps, l'évolution de la pensée de Kuhn relativement à cette notion et aux conséquences de l'incommensurabilité sur sa conception de la science et du progrès scientifique. Pour répondre aux objections des philosophes, il amorce son tournant linguistique qui lui permet d'interpréter l'incommensurabilité en termes de rupture de la communication entre scientifiques qui défendent des paradigmes différents. La rupture de communication repose, de ce point de vue, sur l'impossibilité de traduire le langage théorique propre à une communauté scientifique dans celui du groupe révolutionnaire. Il substitue donc une approche sémantique à la métaphore visuelle de la SRS. Ensuite pour répondre aux objections de Putnam et, surtout de Davidson, selon qui, la notion d'incommensurabilité, entendue comme intraduisibilité entre langages théoriques est incohérente, Kuhn introduit la distinction entre traduction et interprétation. Il introduit, aussi, la notion d'incommensurabilité locale, qui ne touche que quelques termes interreliés. Cette approche le conduit à la solution taxinomique, selon laquelle les langages commensurables partagent une même structure lexicale. De ce point de vue, chaque lexique détermine un ensemble de mondes possibles qui ne sont descriptibles, et donc accessibles à l'expérience, que dans le cadre de ce lexique particulier. Deux lexiques successifs, constituent des mondes différents. Le chapitre six, expose le point de vue de Feyerabend sur l'incommensurabilité et ses conséquences, principalement pour mettre en perspective les idées de Kuhn. Les chapitres suivants abordent les thèses de Kuhn d'un point de vue critique. Le chapitre sept montre, à l'encontre des critiques de Putnam et de Davidson, que la notion d'incommensurabilité locale, complétée par la distinction entre interprétation et traduction, n'est pas incohérente. Si l'idée que deux langages puissent être radicalement intraduisibles semble impensable, il n'en va pas de même si deux langages ne diffèrent structuralement que pour un nombre restreint de termes théoriques centraux. Finalement, le chapitre VIII examine la thèse controversée selon laquelle des lexiques différents déterminent des mondes phénoménaux différents. Ce chapitre critique la forme de constructivisme néo-kantien que défend Kuhn en s'appuyant sur le fait que cette thèse repose sur une théorie descriptiviste de la référence, alors que le recours à une théorie causale de la référence permettrait d'accepter l'idée que les paradigmes successifs puissent être incommensurables sans devoir renoncer à une interprétation réaliste de la science. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Incommensurabilité, Paradigme, Épistémologie, Histoire des sciences, Sémantique, Théorie descriptiviste de la référence, Théorie causale de la référence.

The best interest test is the legal mechanism which governs decision making on behalf of adults who lack the capacity to make their own health care treatment decisions. The test has attracted considerable criticism from health professionals, academics, judges and lawyers for being ill-defined and non-specific. The question of what is meant by 'best interests' remains largely unanswered. As a consequence, the test gives medical and legal decision makers considerable discretion to apply their personal value judgements within supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks - unreasoned and opaque decision making processes are the inevitable result. Because of the dominance of supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks, the place of values in decision making is not always fully understood. Reasoning is not possible without values, which stem from our emotions and passions, our upbringing, our religion, our cultures, our processes of socialisation and from our life experiences. Values help us make sense of our daily lives. I argue that law - like any other social institution - is essentially a human, values based construct. I put forward a theory of values-based law which argues for the recognition that laws, rules and conventions are based on, and contain, individual values. Currently, medical and legal decision makers justify grave decisions on behalf of society's most vulnerable citizens without revealing, or even acknowledging the values which drive and inform their decisions. Any opportunities to scrutinise or debate the values driving decisions are lost. Ultimately, values-based law argues that values underlying best interest determinations must be exposed to facilitate honest, transparent and fulsome decision making on behalf of adults who lack capacity. By applying the theory of values-based law, supposedly value-free decision making processes are exposed as insufficient to facilitate fulsome, honest and transparent legal reasoning.

Zugl.: Basel, Univ., Diss., 2002

Zugl.: Göttingen, Univ., Diss., 2004 / Hergestellt on demand

Thesis--University of Florida. / Description based on print version record. Typescript. Vita. Bibliography: leaves 106-111.

Issued also as thesis, Fribourg. / Bibliography: p. [xv]-xxiii.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 269-277).

Issued also as thesis, Fribourg. / Bibliography: p. [xv]-xxiii.