Thomas Kuhn foi um dos mais importantes filósofos da ciência do século XX. Entre suas principais contribuições, destaca-se a tese da incomensurabilidade das teorias científicas. O presente trabalho visa mostrar como tal tese, apresentada originalmente no livro A estrutura das revoluções, de 1962, foi modificada por Kuhn ao longo dos anos, com foco em seus últimos artigos, escritos entre as décadas de 1980 e 1990. A incomensurabilidade é reduzida então a uma relação semântica restrita a certos pontos da linguagem (incomensurabilidade local). A fim de explicar como isso é possível, Kuhn é levado a pensar, em primeiro lugar, no aprendizado e funcionamento dos conceitos, e como se organizam em estruturas taxonômicas. Em seguida, elabora outros aspectos de uma filosofia da linguagem, como significado e verdade, que lhe permitem responder às principais críticas que haviam sido dirigidas à noção de incomensurabilidade originalmente exposta. / Thomas Kuhn was one of the most important philosophers of science of the twentieth century. Among his major contributions, there is the thesis of incommensurability of scientific theories. This work aims to show how this theory, originally presented in the book The Structure of Revolutions, from 1962, was modified by Kuhn over the years, focusing on his last articles, written between the 1980s and 1990s. The incommensurability is then reduced to a semantic relation restricted to certain portions of language (local incommensurability). To explain how this is possible, Kuhn is led to think, firstly, in the learning and operation of the concepts, and how they are organized in taxonomic structures. After that he elaborates other aspects of a philosophy of language, as meaning and truth, which allow him to answer the main criticisms which had been directed to the notion of incommensurability originally exposed.

Doppelt defends the key elements of Kuhn's thesis that scientific revolutions occur when one paradigm is replaced by another and that crucial aspects of competing paradigms are incommensurable. He concedes the merits in the views of those positivist critics of Kuhn who contend that for paradigms to be comparable their proponents must be able to communicate with one another, to agree on a common core of meaning for basic concepts and to deal with shared data and problems. However, he maintains that in identifying the problems which are held to be of fundamental importance and in adopting the standards by which explanatory adequacy is to be evaluated, rival paradigms do not overlap sufficiently for them to have genuine commensurability. This leads Doppelt to accept Kuhn's version of epistemological relativism which maintains that the rationality of the acceptance of new paradigms by the scientific community, at least in the short-run, has an irreducible normative dimension that is strongly conditioned by subjective factors. Doppelt also accepts Kuhn's views with respect to the loss of data, and the question of cumulative progress. The absence of paradigm-neutral external standards allegedly allows each paradigm to assign priority to its own internal standards, thus providing persuasive grounds for the incommensurability of competing paradigms and for epistemological relativism. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that the validity of these arguments over the long term is a contingent issue which can only be resolved by a careful examination of the historical evidence. A chemical revolution took place in the latter part of the eighteenth century when the oxygen theory replaced that based on hypothetical phlogiston. This transition is frequently cited as a typical example of a paradigm - one that illustrates Kuhn's claims for a shift in standards and a loss of data as central features of scientific revolutions. The phlogiston theory held that phlogiston was a normal constituent of air. It explained smelting as the transfer of phlogiston from the air (or from phlogiston-rich charcoal) to the earthy components of the ore, and held that the similar properties of the metallic products could be attributed to their phlogiston content. Combustion, including the calcination of metals and the respiration of living organisms, was viewed as a process involving the release of phlogiston to the atmosphere. The development of improved techniques for collecting gases and for measuring their volume and weight lead to emphasis on precise quantitative methods for evaluating chemical data as distinct from those based on simple quantitative descriptive observations. These developments soon posed difficulties for the phlogiston theory (eg.,the anomalous weight loss during combustion). Eventually, clarification of the composition of water and the use of the 'nitrous air1 test for the ability of a gas to support combustion and respiration (its 'goodness') led to the discovery of oxygen as a component of air and the demonstration that combustion involved combination with an exact quantity of this gas. Within a relatively short period of time, the oxygen theory gained general acceptance and the phlogiston theory was abandoned by most chemists. A critical examination of the events which culminated in the chemical revolution fails to bear out the claim that it was accompanied by a significant loss of empirical data or that it did not represent genuine cumulative progress in scientific knowledge. Instead the history of this revolution indicates that paradigm-neutral external standards for evaluating explanatory adequacy (conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, internal and external coherence, refutability, precision, successful predictions) were available and played a crucial role in bringing about this transition. Accumulating evidential warrant played the decisive role in the triumph of the oxygen theory. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Munich, 1973. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. [291]-313.

O debate atual sobre a racionalidade científica tem envolvido uma tomada de posição quanto ao relativismo epistemológico. Um dos focos do debate consiste na superação do relativismo presente em pronunciamentos de Thomas Kuhn sobre a escolha científica. Procurando libertar-se de um relativismo kuhniano nas justificações de escolhas científicas, Hilary Putnam e Larry Laudan apresentam estratégias bastante distintas. Putnam vê incoerências autodestrutivas em tal relativismo, especialmente por duas razões: sua formulação seria auto-refutante e, quanto aos atributos cognitivos, essa posição não permitiria distinguir o homem de qualquer outro ser. Laudan procurou desmistificar os efeitos que a incomensurabilidade kuhniana teria causado para uma visão de racionalidade dirigida por regras metodológicas e, além disso, buscou mostrar a falta de poder explicativo do relativismo decorrente dela. O presente trabalho investiga se ainda há razão para considerar que o relativismo gerado pela incomensurabilidade kuhniana constitui uma ameaça à racionalidade científica. Apresentamos um modelo kuhniano de racionalidade, com base em uma análise dos textos de Kuhn sobre a escolha de paradigmas, que ressalta o papel da incomensurabilidade de problemas e padrões científicos. Procuramos mostrar que duas das principais acusações de incoerência, elaboradas por Putnam, não atingem tal modelo. Por fim, defendemos que esse modelo kuhniano de racionalidade apresenta várias restrições para o efetivo estabelecimento das críticas que Laudan lhe dirige. / The current debate on scientific rationality has involved taking sides regarding the question of epistemological relativism. The debate is focused, among other things, in overcoming the relativism present in Thomas Kuhns statements about scientific choice. Hilary Putnam and Larry Laudan, aiming at dispensing with a Kuhnian relativism in the justification of scientific choices, propose quite different strategies. Putnam sees self-destructive incoherencies in such relativism, mainly for two reasons: first, its formulation would be self-defeating and, second, this position wouldnt allow one to distinguish man from any other being as regards cognitive attributes. Laudan attempted to demystify the effects that Kuhnian incommensurability could cause to a vision of rationality governed by methodological rules, and, furthermore, attempted to show the lack of explanatory power of the relativism that follows from it. The present work inquires whether there is still reason to consider that the relativism originated by Kuhnian incommensurability constitutes a menace to scientific rationality. We present a Kuhnian model of rationality, based on an analysis of Kuhns texts on paradigm choice, which highlights the role of incommensurability as regards scientific problems and standards. We aim to show that two of the main charges of incoherence, formulated by Putnam, arent able to affect the model. Lastly, we maintain that this Kuhnian model of rationality poses various constraints on the actual establishment of the criticisms directed against it by Laudan.

<p>The paper discusses the problems contemporary Swedish art criticism faces when judging performance art and interactive art. Problems include among others that performance art is collectively ignored in Swedish newspaper art criticism. This prevents art critics from fair contextualising of contemporary performance art. Down in the rabbit hole, performance by Tris Vonna-Michell and its reception exemplifies these problems. Performance and interactive art seems to be disturbing art critics. Works of art which demands the viewer to take active part in its realisation makes it hard – not to say impossible - to maintain an objective point of wiew. Objectivity has been a condition to be able to judge a work of art since Kant’s theories 1791. In order to isolate all the problems concerning performance art and interactive art, the conditions of contemporary Swedish newspaper art criticism are described. To show that the general conditions and its problems have been discussed earlier, the paper also includes the latest big debate about Swedish art criticism. The paper shows that the problem for art critics to remain objective and independent from the work of art presented is not exclusive for performance and interactive art. It is an emblematic problem for Swedish art criticism 2006. This problem includes economic and careerist opportunities witch makes it hard for Swedish art critics to remain independent.</p>

The paper discusses the problems contemporary Swedish art criticism faces when judging performance art and interactive art. Problems include among others that performance art is collectively ignored in Swedish newspaper art criticism. This prevents art critics from fair contextualising of contemporary performance art. Down in the rabbit hole, performance by Tris Vonna-Michell and its reception exemplifies these problems. Performance and interactive art seems to be disturbing art critics. Works of art which demands the viewer to take active part in its realisation makes it hard – not to say impossible - to maintain an objective point of wiew. Objectivity has been a condition to be able to judge a work of art since Kant’s theories 1791. In order to isolate all the problems concerning performance art and interactive art, the conditions of contemporary Swedish newspaper art criticism are described. To show that the general conditions and its problems have been discussed earlier, the paper also includes the latest big debate about Swedish art criticism. The paper shows that the problem for art critics to remain objective and independent from the work of art presented is not exclusive for performance and interactive art. It is an emblematic problem for Swedish art criticism 2006. This problem includes economic and careerist opportunities witch makes it hard for Swedish art critics to remain independent.

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Na obra de Thomas Kuhn, ao compreender as revoluções científicas como mudanças de concepção de mundo, surge o problema de em que sentido e em que medida o mundo muda com uma revolução científica. Esse é o problema central desta dissertação, o qual será analisado através da investigação dos textos de Kuhn e de seus comentadores. Depois de estabelecido o problema, os conceitos utilizados por Kuhn são esclarecidos. Em seguida, é analisado como se desenrola uma mudança de mundo e, com base nisso, é investigado em que medida o mundo muda com uma revolução científica. A conclusão desse trabalho sustenta que a mudança de mundo se fundamenta na mudança das relações de similaridade valorizadas pelos paradigmas e que o mundo muda apenas na sua organização, ou seja, na distribuição dos seus objetos particulares em diferentes tipos a partir das relações de similaridade enraizadas na comunidade científica. / In Thomas Kuhn‟s work, by understanding the scientific revolutions as changes in world conception, the problem related to in what sense and to what extent the world is changed by a scientific revolution arises. This is the central problem of this thesis, which will be analyzed by investigating Kuhn' and his reviewers‟ work. After establishing the problem, the concepts applied by Kuhn are explained. It is then analyzed how a world change takes place and, based on that, it is investigated in what extent the world changes with a scientific revolution. The conclusion argues that the change of world is based on a change in the similarity relationships valued by the paradigms and that the world only changes on its organization, ie, on the distribution of its particular objects in different types from the similarity relationships settled in the scientific community.

O debate atual sobre a racionalidade científica tem envolvido uma tomada de posição quanto ao relativismo epistemológico. Um dos focos do debate consiste na superação do relativismo presente em pronunciamentos de Thomas Kuhn sobre a escolha científica. Procurando libertar-se de um relativismo kuhniano nas justificações de escolhas científicas, Hilary Putnam e Larry Laudan apresentam estratégias bastante distintas. Putnam vê incoerências autodestrutivas em tal relativismo, especialmente por duas razões: sua formulação seria auto-refutante e, quanto aos atributos cognitivos, essa posição não permitiria distinguir o homem de qualquer outro ser. Laudan procurou desmistificar os efeitos que a incomensurabilidade kuhniana teria causado para uma visão de racionalidade dirigida por regras metodológicas e, além disso, buscou mostrar a falta de poder explicativo do relativismo decorrente dela. O presente trabalho investiga se ainda há razão para considerar que o relativismo gerado pela incomensurabilidade kuhniana constitui uma ameaça à racionalidade científica. Apresentamos um modelo kuhniano de racionalidade, com base em uma análise dos textos de Kuhn sobre a escolha de paradigmas, que ressalta o papel da incomensurabilidade de problemas e padrões científicos. Procuramos mostrar que duas das principais acusações de incoerência, elaboradas por Putnam, não atingem tal modelo. Por fim, defendemos que esse modelo kuhniano de racionalidade apresenta várias restrições para o efetivo estabelecimento das críticas que Laudan lhe dirige. / The current debate on scientific rationality has involved taking sides regarding the question of epistemological relativism. The debate is focused, among other things, in overcoming the relativism present in Thomas Kuhns statements about scientific choice. Hilary Putnam and Larry Laudan, aiming at dispensing with a Kuhnian relativism in the justification of scientific choices, propose quite different strategies. Putnam sees self-destructive incoherencies in such relativism, mainly for two reasons: first, its formulation would be self-defeating and, second, this position wouldnt allow one to distinguish man from any other being as regards cognitive attributes. Laudan attempted to demystify the effects that Kuhnian incommensurability could cause to a vision of rationality governed by methodological rules, and, furthermore, attempted to show the lack of explanatory power of the relativism that follows from it. The present work inquires whether there is still reason to consider that the relativism originated by Kuhnian incommensurability constitutes a menace to scientific rationality. We present a Kuhnian model of rationality, based on an analysis of Kuhns texts on paradigm choice, which highlights the role of incommensurability as regards scientific problems and standards. We aim to show that two of the main charges of incoherence, formulated by Putnam, arent able to affect the model. Lastly, we maintain that this Kuhnian model of rationality poses various constraints on the actual establishment of the criticisms directed against it by Laudan.

Na obra de Thomas Kuhn, ao compreender as revoluções científicas como mudanças de concepção de mundo, surge o problema de em que sentido e em que medida o mundo muda com uma revolução científica. Esse é o problema central desta dissertação, o qual será analisado através da investigação dos textos de Kuhn e de seus comentadores. Depois de estabelecido o problema, os conceitos utilizados por Kuhn são esclarecidos. Em seguida, é analisado como se desenrola uma mudança de mundo e, com base nisso, é investigado em que medida o mundo muda com uma revolução científica. A conclusão desse trabalho sustenta que a mudança de mundo se fundamenta na mudança das relações de similaridade valorizadas pelos paradigmas e que o mundo muda apenas na sua organização, ou seja, na distribuição dos seus objetos particulares em diferentes tipos a partir das relações de similaridade enraizadas na comunidade científica. / In Thomas Kuhn‟s work, by understanding the scientific revolutions as changes in world conception, the problem related to in what sense and to what extent the world is changed by a scientific revolution arises. This is the central problem of this thesis, which will be analyzed by investigating Kuhn' and his reviewers‟ work. After establishing the problem, the concepts applied by Kuhn are explained. It is then analyzed how a world change takes place and, based on that, it is investigated in what extent the world changes with a scientific revolution. The conclusion argues that the change of world is based on a change in the similarity relationships valued by the paradigms and that the world only changes on its organization, ie, on the distribution of its particular objects in different types from the similarity relationships settled in the scientific community.