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This dissertation explores the role played by Kurdish theatre in the Kurdish national struggle in Iraq especially between 1975 and 1991. First, it traces the development of Kurdish theatre, within the socio-political context in Iraqi Kurdistan, from its emergence in the 1920s to the defeat of the Kurdish nationalist movement and the fall of the Kurdistan region under the direct Baath rule in 1975. It will then explore the Kurdish resistance theatre during the Baath rule and will analyse the representation of Kurdish nationalist identity in four dramas produced during the Baath rule between 1975 and 1991. By analysing the nationalist themes in the works of Ehmed Salar and Telet Saman, two prominent playwrights and directors of the late 1970s and the duration of the 1980s, I will argue that despite strict censorship during most of this period, theatre played a critical role in the Kurdish national struggle by staging Kurdish history, mythology, folklore, and re-enacting oppressed histories. Along with the thematic analysis of representative dramatic texts from the period and interviews with Kurdish theatre artists, this research draws on Kurdish theatre histories, historical documents, and journalistic accounts, to reveal how theatre participated in the Kurdish national struggle and how it responded to political changes in different historical periods.

This dissertation considers corruption and education in Iraqi Kurdistan. The sample comes from survey interviews conducted at nineteen universities in the three Kurdistan cities of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The survey was administered between May and July of 2017. The survey focuses on couple areas: students’ basic demographic information as well as characteristics associated with their personal education such as GPA and field of study; perceptions regarding the quality of education in Kurdistan, not only at the university level but in an individual’s schooling at lower levels; the quality of the Iraqi Kurdistan government, including the prevalence of different types of corruption; and students’ expectations for their future prospects, including their expectation of receiving a high ranking government job. 957 surveys were completed. In Chapter 1, we consider corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan from university students perspectives. We provide three sets of results. The first shows how perceptions of corruption differ across different demographic characteristics. A second set looks at how corruption differs based on one’s city. A final set of results considers how perceptions of corruption differ across political parties. Our results suggest that corruption perceptions do not vary across most individual characteristics as few strong associations are uncovered. Family income is an exception with higher income families reporting greater incidences of corruption. Students, however, living in different cities do report different levels of corruption. One possibility is that corruption is more prevalent in Duhok and so attention at diminishing corruption should focus there. We also find that students not belonging to any political party report lower levels of corruption. Chapter 2, we examine associations between corruption and measures of educational quality but take a different approach than do others in this literature. I use a sample of university students and examine how their views of corruption within society relate to their perceptions of the quality of education they have received. The quality of education (QEDUC) measure is constructed similarly to the quality of education component of the human capital index from World Economic Forum (2013). The quality of education has five criteria: internet access in schools, quality of the education system in meeting the needs of a competitive economy; quality of primary schools; quality of math and science education; and administrative quality of schools. I use this index since it encompasses a wide variety of characteristics of the education system. We found that Internet access is strongly associated with corruption. The other aspect of educational quality most strongly associated with corruption is the extent to which education prepares one for a competitive economy. Although students do not generally associate corruption with specific components of their education like math or primary school, they do believe that corruption is impacting how well they educational system is preparing them beyond their days as students. Finally, in chapter 3, we consider to what extent self-reported political affiliation matters for expectations of university students in Iraqi Kurdistan anticipating public sector employment. The sample data was gathered from students I interviewed at nineteen universities in the Kurdish cities of Duhok, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The survey was administered between May and July of 2017.The survey focuses on four areas: students’ basic demographic information as well as characteristics associated with their personal education such as GPA and field of study; perceptions regarding the quality of education in Kurdistan, not only at the university level but in an individual’s schooling at lower levels; the quality of the Iraqi Kurdistan government, including the prevalence of different types of corruption; and students’ expectations for their future prospects, including their expectation of receiving a high ranking government job. 957 surveys were completed. We find that party affiliation appears to influence one’s expectation of obtaining a good government job after graduating. As long as party affiliation does not correlate with attributes that increase productivity in public employment, then party affiliation is a characteristic not based on merit. the specific party to which one is affiliated does not seem to matter as much. The PDK is the largest party in the KRI but students in smaller parties such as the PKK are more likely to believe that they will find good public-sector jobs (although less can be said about members of the Goran Party). Nevertheless, we hope that these findings provide at least a first approach as to what extent party affiliation could matter in hiring.

This dissertation is an attempt to pose a challenge to the reified image of Kurdishness and Kurdayeti (awakening Kurdish nationalism), from an ethnographical perspective. The focus group is the comparatively understudied Kurmanji-speaking Kurds of Urmia county in Iran, both in rural and urban contexts. The questions is why do the Kurds of this study, in particular, and Kurds all over the Middle East, in general, have a high potential for mobilization during politically charged moments? / 博士(グローバル社会研究) / Doctor of Philosophy in Global Society Studies / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

Sectarianism has become the magic word with which many scholars and politicians describe the current Middle East politics. Much of the existing literature presumes that most of the state and non-state actors of the region are divided over Shia and Sunni blocs led by Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabi (KSA) respectively. However, so far scholars have left out the Kurds within their studies on sectarianism. Scholars have not explicitly pointed out why they are disinterested in sectarianism among the Kurds; it might be due to the perception that the Kurds are mostly Sunnis who have an ethnic and not a religious cause. The main aim of this research is to look at sectarianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and find out whether or not of this perception is true. To do so, this research rejects the general application of the English term "sectarianism" in the first place as a theme to explain the politics of the Middle East. Instead, in the first chapter it is argued that there are three tiers of relations among regional actors: 1) state-state realpolitik, which is based on geopolitical realities among Turkey, Iran and the KSA, 2) political sectarianism (taifiyya) among sectarian groups such as the MB, Wahabis and Shia, often conducted through political agents like state and non-state actors, and 3) the civil and non-violent sect-sect theological sectarianism (madhabiyya) among those three sects. In the second chapter this new understanding of sectarianism is then applied on the domestic politics of the KRI. It is argued that while there is theological sectarianism in the KRI, there is no political sectarianism. The third chapter explores the foreign relations of the KRI. It argues that the KRI as an unrecognized state, acts rationally to survive. It evades sectarianism and deemphasizes its demands of international recognition. Alternatively, the KRI pursues 'Regional Acceptance Policy' within which the Kurdish leadership persuades the regional powers, especially Turkey and Iran, that the de facto state will not declare independence, in return, they ask regional powers' acceptance of the KRI as a legitimate actor with its unique status. / Doctor of Philosophy / Throughout the 20th century ethno-nationalism was the strongest sentiment in the Middle East. Within the past decade or so, however, Islam's two main sectarian identities, Shia and Sunni, have become extraordinarily strong, if not stronger than ethno-national identities. The common understanding of the region's politics is that Iran, as a Shia majority country, has allied with the other Shia non-Persian countries and actors, such as Iraq and Hezbollah. The Sunni countries, on the other hand, have gathered around the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) against Iran or Shias in general. There is also, however, a common perception that Kurds are the only people in the Middle East who have not become sectarian. This research is to see whether this perception towards the Kurds is true, and if it is, why? The first chapter argues that the English term "sectarianism" fails to explain the current politics of the Middle East. Instead, it is argued, there are two different forms of sectarianism in Islam; one is about theological disagreements, which in Arabic is called "madhabiya", the other is about the political competition among the various Muslim groups which in Arabic is called "taifiya". Regardless of the religious factor, states of the Middle East act rationally based on geopolitical realities. Political sectarianism comes emerges especially when those sectarian groups mobilize under political parties and armed militia groups. Sects and states sometimes cooperate for mutual interests and hence it appears that the entire conflicts of the region are driven by sectarian motivations. The second and third chapters then explore sectarianism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) within this new understanding. The KRI acts like the state actors based on its interests and not its Sunni sectarian identity. Contrary to the common perception towards the unrecognized state which assumes that the KRI's ultimate goal should be international recognition (IR), it is here argued that the KRI prioritizes 'regional acceptance' (RA) over IR. Within the KRI there is theological sectarianism among Salafists, Sufis, and political Islamists. However, there is no political sectarianism because the Kurdish government has neutralized and unarmed the sectarian groups.

Sammandrag Kurder är idag världens största befolkning, som beräknas vara mellan 40-45 miljoner i hela världen, som är utan en erkänd stat. Dock finns det ett geografiskt område, i sydvästra Asien, som kallas för Kurdistan av alla kurder och är moderlandet för kurderna. I dagens läge är södra Kurdistan, norra Irak, den enda delen av Kurdistan som har en självständig region och är känd som KRG, Kurdistans regionala regering, och som den här studien kommer att fokusera på. Politiken i Mellanöstern ökar i snabb takt runt KRG, där under större delen av nittonhundratalet har setts som ett helt destabiliserande kraft i regionen, men i det senaste tio åren har denna uppfattning förändras. Idag är KRG en tillgång vad det gäller politiskt säkerhet i mellanöstern, där KRG bidrar till främjande av stabiliteten och utvecklingen i regionen. Syftet med denna uppsats är att förstå mekanismerna bakom stabiliteten och instabiliteten i konfliktfyllda regioner där KRG som aktör, i mellanöstern, ligger i fokus. Detta framställs genom att upplysa de problem som finns och förtydliggöra de regionala staternas ställningstagande gentemot KRG och vice versa. Genom de förändringar som har skett i regionen ska ett svar hittas till den övergripande frågan. Min strategi för att kunna besvara forskningsfrågan i uppsatsen är att analysera USA- och Turkiets säkerhetspolitiska hållning mot KRG. Detta tillämpades genom att göra en litteraturstudie av de dokument som tydliggör sammanställningen av geopolitiska processer och skeenden som omformat KRG:s ställning i regionen, i ett internationellt säkerhetsperspektiv. I detta används indikatorer från det teoretiska perspektivet realism för att på så sätt operationalisera och undersöka uppsatsens forskningsfråga. Slutsatsen visar att det finns många faktorer som påverkar KRG:s roll vad det gäller säkerhetsnivån både regionalt och internationell där mycket lutar åt samarbetet mellan KRG och Turkiet regionalt samt KRG och USA internationellt. Dessa kopplingar mellan KRG, Turkiet och USA ger ett kompletterande politik i regionen. / Abstract Kurds are now one of the world's largest population, estimated to be between 40-45 million worldwide, which is not a recognized state. However, there is a geographic area in southwestern Asia, known as Kurdistan by the Kurds and is the motherland. Nowadays, southern Kurdistan and northern Iraq is the only part of Kurdistan which has an autonomous region and is known as the KRG, the Kurdistan Regional Government, which this study will focus on. The politics in the Middle East is growing rapidly around the KRG, where during most of the twentieth century has been seen as a totally destabilizing force in the region, but in the last ten years this perception is changing. Today, the KRG is an asset in terms of political security in the Middle East, where the KRG contributes to the promotion of stability and development in the region. The purpose of this paper is to understand the mechanisms behind the stability and instability in conflict-ridden regions where the KRG as an actor in the Middle East is in focus. This is generated by informing the problems and clarifying the Regional States approach towards the KRG and vice versa. Through the changes that have taken place in the region an answer should be found to the overall question. My strategy to answer the research question in this paper is to analyze the US and Turkey's geopolitical posture toward the KRG. This was applied by making a literature review of the documents that clarify the compilation of geopolitical processes and events that transformed the KRG's position in the region, in an international security perspective. Indicators are used from the theoretical perspective realism to thereby operationalize and examine the essay research question. The conclusion shows that there are many factors that affect the KRG's role, in terms of security, both regional and international, where a lot leans towards cooperation between the KRG and Turkey regionally, as well as the KRG and the United States internationally. These connections between the KRG, Turkey and the United States provides a complementary policy in the region.

Den här uppsatsen undersöker den kurdiska diasporan i Sverige, utifrån intervjuer med studenter vid Stockholms universitet som engagerar sig i den kurdiska diasporan genom medlemskap i kurdiska föreningar och genom online-nätverk. Syftet är att undersöka transnationella aktiviteter och gränsöverskridande relationer i diasporan utifrån en intressant väl avgränsad grupp och hur de förmedlar positiva och negativa implikationer, samt känslor utifrån Irakiska Kurdistan som referens. Frågeställningen och utgångspunkten för uppsatsen är: Hur förhåller sig studenter vid Stockholms universitet som engagerar sig i den kurdiska diasporan till Irakiska Kurdistan genom transnationella aktiviter och gränsöverskridande relationer? Metoden som används är semistrukturerade intervjuer, analyserade med diasporabegreppet som ett teoretiskt ramverk. Genom att se hur respondenterna förhåller sig till Irakiska Kurdistan genom aktiviteter och relationer undersöks den kurdiska diasporan. Studien redovisas med citat från intervjuerna och det framgår tydligt att det finns ett engagemang för Irakiska Kurdistan hos respondenterna. Resultatet visar att flera respondenter är medlemmar i kurdiska föreningar och alla respondenter är engagerade i den kurdiska diasporan via online-nätverk. Alla respondenter svarar att de följer politiska och ekonomiska händelser i området. Flera av respondenterna har röstat i Irakiska val, en transnationell aktivitet som visar ett starkt kollektivt engagemang och hur viktig relationen mellan Sverige och Irakiska Kurdistan är. Att Irakiska Kurdistan är viktigt för den Kurdiska diasporan i Sverige tydliggörs också genom resor till området och genom en uttryckt återvändarrörelse där människor flyttar till eller tillbaks. Det uttrycks även att Irakiska Kurdistan är en fristad för människor och en arena för kurdisk kultur. Kritik som framgår är relationerna till grannländerna som ett nödvändigt ont och kritik om korruption, något som bidragit till ökade klyftor i samhället. Den kurdiska flaggan som symbol behandlas utifrån respondenternas olika perspektiv. En respondent nämner drömmen om Kurdistan som ett arv. Tydligt för studiens resultat är att Irakiska Kurdistan utgör en referens där varje individ i diasporan upprättar sin egen kontext. Något som innefattar gränsöverskridande relationer, transnationella aktiviteter och en ständigt föränderlig identitet.

Depuis 2003, la nouvelle donne politique au Kurdistan irakien a engendré des évolutions sans précédent au niveau régional. L’autonomie grandissante du Kurdistan irakien a fait émerger, dans un Moyen-Orient toujours aussi instable, de nouvelles dynamiques et enjeux géopolitiques. Les pays de la région, et en particulier la Turquie, attachent une grande importance aux relations bilatérales qu’ils entretiennent avec cet Etat embryonnaire. Suite à l'intervention militaire de la coalition américano-britannique en Irak, l'Etat turc a dû redéfinir sa politique étrangère dans la région du Moyen-Orient. Afin de contribuer à l'élaboration d'une analyse critique, nous développerons notre réflexion en deux grands axes. Dans un premier temps, nous analyserons avec une approche historique, les relations bilatérales entre la Turquie et le Kurdistan irakien, afin que nous puissions resituer au mieux les évolutions qui sont en train de se produire actuellement dans la région. Puis, dans un second temps, nous veillerons à apporter une réflexion approfondie sur la question des échanges économiques entre ces deux parties. Nous examinerons les investissements des entreprises turques qui sont faits dans le marché kurde, pour que nous puissions évaluer concrètement le potentiel économique de celles-ci au niveau régional. Dans notre étude, l'analyse de la dimension historique et celle de l'approche économique, nous permettront de mieux comprendre les évolutions et les enjeux qui émanent de cette région. / Since 2003, the new political situation in Iraqi Kurdistan has led to unprecedented developments at the regional level. The growing autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan has given birth to new dynamics and geopolitical issues in a currently unstable Middle East. The countries of the region, particularly Turkey, attach great importance to bilateral relations with this embryonic state. Following the military intervention led by the coalition of USA and Great Britain in Iraq, the Turkish state has had to redefine its foreign policy in the Middle East. In order to contribute to the development of critical analysis, we develop our thesis in two main areas. Firstly, in order to better situate the developments currently taking place in the region, we analyze the bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan with a historical approach. Secondly, we deal with in detail the question of economic exchanges between the two parties. In order to evaluate effectively the economic potential of Turkish companies at the regional level, we will analyze their investments in the Kurdish market. In our study, the analysis of the historical dimension and the economic approach will allow us to better understand the changes and challenges in the region.

La déportation des Kurdes de 1836 à 1876 à l’époque l’Empire ottomanLa présente thèse a pour but de traiter l’ensemble des implications relatives au déclin de l’Empire ottoman et les efforts que la Porte a tenté pour s’en sortir. Nous étudierons les multiples facteurs de la centralisation et de la transformation de l’administration de l’Empire du XIXe siècle et après la déclaration du Tanzimat et le changement de politique vis-à-vis des Kurdes. Nous analyserons le statut des Emirs kurdes dans l’administration jusqu’à la politique de centralisation, et la politique de déportation et de sédantarisation des tribus kurdes y compris les Emirs Kurdes au début du XIXe siècle.L’autonomie des Emirs kurdes commença à disparaitre au début du XIXe siècle. La Porte souhaitait mettre fin à l’autonomie des Emirs qu’elle voulait soumettre à l’autorité du Sultan pour leur faire payer des impôts, y compris en soldats pour l’armée ottomane. Afin de les faire plier, Reşid Pacha fut nommé en 1833 et Hafiz Pacha lui succéda immédiatement après sa mort en 1836. Ce dernier réussira à battre Bedirkhan Bey en 1847 ce qui aboutira à l’abolition de l’autonomie des Emirs kurdes en tant que Hükümet, yurtluk-ocaklık et ocaklık, entrainant la deuxième conquête du Kurdistan par la Porte et sa reconnaissance en tant que province ottomane en 1847. La création de la province du Kurdistan en 1847 fut suivie de trois grands changements politiques de l’administration; la loi foncière en 1858, la régulation du statut des villes en 1864 et pour finir en 1867 à l’abolition de la province du Kurdistan. Tous ces changements au sein de l’Empire permirent de centraliser l’Etat.La déportation des Kurdes du XIXe siècle avait un aspect différent des précédentes. À partir de cette époque, la politique de déportation tournait autour de quatre grands axes : tout d’abord : la déportation pour sédentariser les tribus nomades kurdes dans le but de prélever des impôts, deuxièmement : la déportation pour diviser et contrôler les Emirs ou Bey kurdes, troisièmement : la déportation des kurdes pour imposer l’ordre et installer la sécurité au Kurdistan et finalement : la déportation des kurdes pour les civiliser et les assimiler. C’est grâce à l’étude de nombreuses sources manuscrites ottomanes du XIXe siècle ainsi que des sources secondaires en turc, français ou anglais concernant la période que nous avons pu mettre en avant ce qui a généré la disparation de l’autonomie des Emirs kurdes et leur déportation au sein de l’Empire à partir du XIXe siècle. / The deportation of the Kurds from 1836 to 1876 at the time the Ottoman EmpireThe purpose of this thesis is to deal with all the implications of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the efforts made by the Porte to get by. We will study the multiple factors of the centralization and transformation of the administration of the Empire of the nineteenth century and after the declaration of the Tanzimat, the change of policy regarding the Kurds. We shall analyze the position of the Kurdish Emirs in the administration until the policy of centralization and the policy of deportation and sedation of the Kurdish tribes, including the Emirs in the early nineteenth century.The autonomy of the Kurdish Emirs began to disappear at the beginning of the 19th century. The Porte wanted to put an end to the autonomy of the Emirs in order to submit to the authority of the Sultan to make them pay taxes, including by giving soldiers to the Ottoman army. In order to make them fold, Reşid Pacha was appointed in 1833 and Hafiz Pacha succeeded him immediately after his death in 1836. The latter succeeded in defeating Bedirkhan Bey in 1847 which lead to the abolition of the autonomy of the Kurdish Emirs as Hükümet, yurtluk-ocaklık and ocaklık, bringing about the second conquest of Kurdistan through the Porte and its recognition as an Ottoman province in 1847. The creation of the province of Kurdistan in 1847 was followed by three major political changes in the administration; the land law in 1858, the regulation of the status of cities in 1864, and finally, in 1867, the abolition of the province of Kurdistan. All these changes within the Empire made possible to centralize the State.The deportation of the Kurds of the nineteenth century had a different aspect from the preceding one. From then on, the policy of deportation revolved around four major axes: first, deportation to settle the nomadic Kurdish tribes for the purpose of levying taxes; secondly, deportation to divide and control the Emirs or Bey Kurds, thirdly: the deportation of the Kurds to impose order and install security in Kurdistan and Finally: the deportation of the Kurds to civilize and assimilate them.It is thanks to the study of numerous Ottoman manuscript sources of the nineteenth century as well as secondary sources in Turkish, French or English concerning the period that we were able to highlight what has generated the disruption of the autonomy of the Kurdish Emirs and their deportation within the Empire from the nineteenth century onwards.