O presente estudo pretende promover uma discussão acerca dos aspectos ideológicos que envolvem o contrato individual de trabalho. Partindo do alicerce tríptico proposto por Slavoj iek para a crítica da ideologia, bem como da crítica da economia política de Karl Marx, buscamos uma aproximação do estudioso dos fenômenos jurídicos à realidade do contrato de trabalho, em seus ideais, instituições e práticas sociais. Para tanto, além de uma avaliação teórica aprofundada acerca do assunto, provocamos a reflexão do leitor trazendo um retrospecto acerca da instalação do ideal neoliberal no contratualismo trabalhista brasileiro. / This present study aims to promote a discussion on the ideological aspects that involve the individual labor contract. From the foundation proposed by Slavoj Zizek for the critique of ideology, as well as from the critique of the political economy by Karl Marx, we seek an approach between the studious of the juridical phenomena and the reality of the labor contract in its ideals, institutions and social practices. To this end, in addition to an in-depth theoretical evaluation on the subject, we provoke the reflection of the reader by presenting a retrospective concerning the installation of the neoliberal ideal on the Brazilian labor contractualism.

D.Phil. (Leadership in Performance and Change) / Executive behaviour is a captivating socioeconomic phenomenon. Four executive-related matters attracted the researcher’s interest: (a) What, indeed, is executive effectiveness?; (b) What specific executive behaviours, tasks, attributes, styles of leadership or other considerations make trendsetting executives effective?; (c) In what respects do executives who hold long-term (up-to-retirement) employment contracts differ from their fellow-executives who have opted for short-term contracts, with regard to matters such as remuneration, executive capability, executive migration, and psychosocial dynamics in the workplace?; and (d) How do executives from the public and private sectors differ in their executive job performance and what can they learn from each other with regard to executive effectiveness? Employment patterns of senior executives in many organisations change as their conditions of employment vary. In South Africa, the King report of 1994 questioned the wisdom of granting executive leaders of institutions and organisations contract terms of indefinite length. The researcher considered length of employment contract term as a critical matter. Would a reduction of stipulated duration of terms of employment in executive contracts promote executive effectiveness, result in higher productivity and restrict opportunities for deliberate corporate misconduct? In the study, the researcher intended to explore the effects of length of contract term on executive performance by comparing executives with long-term (up-to-retirement) employment contracts with executives who have opted for short-term employment contracts. The perceived differences will be apparent in criteria of effective executive leadership such as daily executive behaviours, executive tasks, and executive leadership styles.

Clauses in restraint of trade agreements concluded between an employer and an employee often present difficult legal issues to deal with. This complexity is due to the fact that a court, in deciding whether to enforce a restraint provision, has to strike a balance between two equal but competing policy considerations, namely, the sanctity of the contract and the freedom of movement of people in a market economy. In striving to balance the sanctity of contract with the right of freedom to trade, it is necessary to decide which of these two policy considerations should take precedence by having regard to the public interest served by them in the particular circumstances. In the watershed case of Magna Alloys and Research(SA)(Pty) Ltd v Ellis, the Appellate Division decided the sanctity of contract had greater precedent in South African law and that undertakings in restraint of trade were prima facie valid and enforceable, unless the party seeking to avoid its obligations could show that the restraint of trade was contrary to public interest. The second consideration, namely that a person should be free to engage in useful economic activity and to contribute to the welfare of society, tempers the sanctity of contract considerations. Accordingly, the courts have struck down any unreasonable restriction on the freedom to trade where it was regarded as contrary to public interest. In considering the reasonableness and therefore the acceptability of restraint of trade provisions from a public policy perspective, the following five questions need consideration: Is there a legitimate interest of the employer that deserves protection at the termination of the employment agreement? If so, is that legitimate interest being prejudiced by the employee? If the legitimate interest is being prejudiced, does the interest of the employer weigh up, both qualitatively and quantitatively against the interest of the employee not to be economically inactive and unproductive? Is there another facet of public policy having nothing to do with the relationship between the parties but requires that the restraint should either be enforced or rejected? Is the ambit of the restraint of trade in respect of nature, area and duration justifiably necessary to protect the interests of the employer? In enforcing a restraint, the court will consider all the facts of the matter as at the time that the party is seeking to enforce the restraint. If a court finds that the right of the party to be economically active and productive surpasses the interest of the party attempting to enforce the restraint, the court will hold that such restraint is unreasonable and unenforceable. Consideration of the enforceability of restraints is often found to be challenging in view of the answers to the above stated five questions often remaining of a factual nature and subjective, i.e. the view and perceptions of the presiding officer play an important role. A further complexity is the limited early effect which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa had on dispute resolution pertaining to restraints of trade in the employment context and the prospects of imminent changes to the pre-Constitutional era locus classicus of Magna Alloys and Research (SA)(Pty) Ltd v Ellis.

Most microeconomic models of Labor unions take the union's membership size as exogenous, and limit union members' time horizons to a single contract period. Particularly for unions allocating employment by means of a seniority system, and for unions facing stochastic demand for labor conditions, these limitations in current union models lead to unsatisfactory predictions of union behavior. In this thesis, an n-period majority voting model of a monopoly union facing a fixed demand for labor schedule and allocating employment by seniority is developed to show the interdependence between the union's present wage choice, the size of the union's future voter pool and its future wage choices. Union members are assumed to predict the union's future voting behavior, and to account for the consequences of the retirement of senior union members. The optimal contract wage is shown analytically to be not lower than that wage which causes the layoff of twice the number of retiring workers per contract period in each contract period, and not to exceed the wage level at which half of the union's present voter pool would lose its union employment. Computer simulation solutions for various demand conditions suggest that after a potential sharp first-period increase in the contract wage, the union's contract wage path follows its analytically derived lower limit - with each contract, union employment declines by twice the number of retirees per contract period. The time path of union employment is shown to be largely independent of anticipated changes in demand for labor. A similar two-period model is developed for stochastic demand for labor conditions. For some cases, the union's wage choice can be shown to be lower when the consequences of this period's wage choice on next period's voter pool are taken into account. Majority voting instability problems cannot be ruled out for this type of model, and are interpreted as a potential cause for a union-internal political process. These seniority-based models are then compared with models where union employment is allocated by a random draw among union members. With nonstochastic demand for labor, this allows for the analysis of discrete changes in union rules, and yields the principal prediction that the union will eventually replace an employment by random draw rule with employment according to seniority. The economic approach to the analysis of union behavior is assessed critically, and put in some perspective by an informal discussion of other union-internal determinants of union behavior. In conclusion, it is suggested that the formal prediction of an ongoing gradual decline in union employment may be usefully amended by considering potential benefits from union size maintenance and union membership rejuvenation. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Lausanne, 1972. / Thèse Dr. Lausanne; 1972. - Bibliogr. p. 156-161.

No description available.

The subject of this thesis concerns the tense situation of the pregnant employee in Sweden. Drawing on the critical ontology of Michel Foucault the situation is characterized as a specific problematization within a historical theme around procreation (as an eventuality). The purpose of the thesis is to explain the functioning of the current situation of the pregnant employee as an inherent conflict, but also to draw out the implications of this specific analysis in relation to general wage labor. First an objective analysis is out-lined on how free wage labor gradually develops into a) a rational way of “knowing” about wo/man, b) a normal (institutional) way of organizing this knowledge, and c) a normalized subject position for the expectant individual. Second the investigation turns towards the subjective experience of this positioning. This analysis, drawing on the works of Iris Marion Young and Erving Goffman, focus on a) the conflicts logic b) its practical management and c) the situations’ ethical implications. The empirical material for the second part consists of legal cases, diaries and discussion-threads from the Internet. The conclusions drawn suggest that the pregnant employee is a rather abstract problem but that this abstraction still is real enough to make her disqualified from the calculus regime of employment. The second conclusion states that the pregnant employee becomes temporarily “closeted” and engaged in practices of concealment and tension management. Finally the ethics of this situation is analyzed, stating that the pregnant employee becomes positioned in a situation of structural shame which she has to relate to no matter her specific employment conditions. In the end the wider implications of the analysis is drawn out, stating that wage labor has developed into a biased categorization of individuals as proper or non-proper labor power. Rational discrimination has been normalized, just as the handling of oneself as more or less deviant from norms.

Lam, Wing Man Wynne. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 40-41). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- The Model --- p.5 / Chapter 3 --- One-Period Game --- p.8 / Chapter 3.1 --- Revenue Share --- p.8 / Chapter 3.2 --- Implications --- p.11 / Chapter 4 --- Two-Period Game --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Contract Duration --- p.12 / Chapter 4.2 --- Implications --- p.16 / Chapter 5 --- Two-Sided Game --- p.17 / Chapter 5.1 --- Negotiation of the Share --- p.17 / Chapter 5.2 --- Implications --- p.20 / Chapter 5.3 --- Discussion --- p.21 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion and Ideas for Future Research --- p.24 / Chapter 7 --- Appendices --- p.26

Lee, Hung Fei. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 67). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.P.1 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Reviews --- p.P.1 / Chapter 2.1 --- Sources of peer effect --- p.P.1 / Chapter 2.2 --- Peer pressure and contracts --- p.p.8 / Chapter 3 --- Model --- p.p.16 / Chapter 4 --- First Best Situation --- p.p.18 / Chapter 5 --- Revenue Sharing Contract under Peer Pressure --- p.p.20 / Chapter 5.1 --- No constraints on the fixed payments and commission rates --- p.p.21 / Chapter 5.2 --- "Negative fixed payment is allowed, but the sum of commission rates has to be less than 100%" --- p.p.24 / Chapter 5.3 --- Negative fixed payment is not allowed --- p.p.27 / Chapter 5.4 --- Implications on human resource investment --- p.p.31 / Chapter 5.5 --- Implications on players preference for a new member --- p.p.33 / Chapter 6 --- Fixed Wage Contract with Supervision under Peer Pressure --- p.p.33 / Chapter 6.1 --- No agent exceeding the target --- p.p.34 / Chapter 6.2 --- One agent exceeding the target --- p.p.40 / Chapter 6.3 --- Implications on human resource investment --- p.p.44 / Chapter 6.4 --- Implications on players' preference for a new member --- p.p.45 / Chapter 7 --- The Choice between Revenue Sharing and Fixed Wage --- p.p.46 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.p.49 / Chapter 9 --- Appendix --- p.p.49

A debate exists regarding the effect of labor protection laws on labor costs. Whether labor protection laws increase or decrease labor costs has implications for risk exposure of affected firms. If the labor costs go up, all else the same, the firm’s breakeven point goes up. Facing increased business risk, the firm must resort to strategies that inhibit the risk exposure, especially if the higher labor costs cannot be transferred, without adverse consequences, to consumers. The strategies include reigning in, if at all possible, operating leverage and financial leverage. Conversely, if the labor costs decrease, a firm’s business risk declines, and the firm has options to increase its operating leverage and/or financial leverage, lower the product price, or do nothing. By examining the Chinese firms’ reactions to the 2007 labor protection laws, we draw conclusions about laws’ directional impact on labor costs. We find that Chinese firms attempt to reduce business risk by lessening labor intensity, and labor-intensive firms are able to reduce the labor intensity at a significantly higher rate than capital-intensive firms. Neither group is able to significantly reduce asset tangibility. We also find that all firms significantly reduce their financial leverages. Consequently, firms’ investments, as measured by sales growth, decline in the post-reform period. These results are consistent with the cost of labor increasing as a result of the stricter labor protection laws.