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This thesis is an investigation of the relation between language and thought in terms of the Saussurean concept of linguistic sign. However, it is not an empirical study of the relation between language and thought and, therefore, not a study of the Whorfian problem of linguistic relativity, but rather a study of how we understand the nature of language and thought such that we think they are related in a certain way. This thesis is an investigation of the “metaphysical” picture that underlies our understanding of the relation between language and thought. In this study, we believe that how we understand the nature of language and thought is implicitly related to how we understand their relation. Therefore, we cannot really deduce the relation between language and thought from our understanding of language and thought independently of how the relation is initially understood. The whole matter is indeed about what is the larger picture within which we understand the nature of language and thought. And, we think the Saussurean concept of linguistic sign, which deals with the problem of the duality of forms and ideas, provides us with such a picture. This is primarily the reason that motivates the present study. In investigating the relation between language and thought from the Saussurean semiological perspective, we will also take into account the problem of the origin of language, which we think, represents another picture of language in that it represents an attempt to study the nature of language from a naturalistic perspective. Therefore, we want to contrast the Saussurean picture of language with this naturalistic picture of language; we want to see how the problem of the origin of language is understood from a semiological perspective. This would allow us to see how language is understood from a synchronic perspective in the Saussurean picture of language. Finally, it is hoped the present study would contribute to our understanding of how language and thought is in fact always inseparable in our conception from a Saussurean perspective, that is, in terms of our existence as speakers. / published_or_final_version / Linguistics / Master / Master of Philosophy

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The thesis of this dissertation can be summed up in a nutshell: Death forces language into being. When faced with the possibility of non-existence, humans are confronted with the reality of nothingness and respond (with speech) by filling the fathomless emptiness of the abyss with permanent meaning. / Chapter I outlines this thesis in detail as grounded in Heidegger's existential analytic and provides examples of some of its manifold applications in both everyday life and literary experience. / The thesis is supported in three main steps. In Part A I explore the problem of human subjectivity in terms of Heidegger's existential ontology in particular with respect to the question of language and death. I show that the process of language evolution can be understood as an ongoing conflict resolution between the two fundamental modes of human selfhood. The gap between authenticity and inauthenticity is resolved in the dialogue of language. Death, which is nothing other than the nothingness of this yawning gap where one can easily lose oneself, thus appears to be a main factor of language origination, and, paradoxically, at the same time it finds its supersession in language. / In Part B I demonstrate that Heidegger has an answer to the question of language origins, and what his answer is. Both the "That" and the "What" lead to the further question of why language "exists" at all. The answer is simple. If Heidegger's phenomenological ontology can be understood as a linguistic ontology, as argued in Chapter I, the relationship between death and language follows. Death motivates the emergence of language, because it is the "existence" of language that can counteract the facticity of death. / In Part C I derive support for such a position from Hegel and Benjamin in order to demonstrate that the position is tenable also for other thinkers. In the concluding chapter on Parmenides I show that, with Heidegger, it is possible to see in Parmenides the originator of the thought that the "divine" ontological status of language constitutes, in its persistent thinking of being, a continued existence that defies the facticity of death.

What is the best way to understand 'applies to' when it is said of a linguistic theory that it applies to a particular language-user? We can answer by saying that a linguistic theory is applicable to an individual language-user just in case that individual tacitly-knows the theory. But this is an uninformative answer until we are told how to understand 'tacit-knowledge'. The end goal of this thesis is to defend the claim that we should take tacit-knowledge to be, simply, knowledge. Towards this end I argue against the satisfactoriness of competing ways of understanding 'tacit-knowledge'. For example, the instrumentalist position is neutral on whether linguistic theories are actually known by the ordinary language-users who tacitly-know them; instead, linguistic theories are to be such that knowing them would enable someone to do whatever it is that the tacit-knower can do. Other competing positions hold that, though tacit-knowledge is a psychological relation of some sort, it is not genuine knowledge. I also attempt to meet specific objections to the claim that a typical language-user (as opposed to a linguistic theorist) could plausibly be said to know a linguistic theory. An objection on which I focus is based on the claim that typical language-users do not possess the requisite concepts for having genuine knowledge of a linguistic theory. The aim in attempting to meet these objections is to open up the way for the linguistic theorist to exploit a paradigm of explanation: explanation of behaviour by knowledge attribution. Attributing knowledge of linguistic theories would be potentially explanatory of linguistic behaviour in exactly the same way that attributions of knowledge in non-linguistic spheres are potentially explanatory of behaviour. Finally, because my emphasis is specifically on semantic theories, I attempt to explicate and defend the claim that a semantic theory could and should have the form of a theory of truth.

A central task of contemporary analytic philosophy is to develop an understanding of how our minds are connected to the external (or mind-independent) world. Arising from this task is the need to explain how thoughts represent things in the world. Giving such an explanation is the central endeavor of this dissertation—the aim being to contribute to our understanding of what it is for a subject to be thinking of a particular object. The structure of the dissertation is set, in part, by responding to the commonly held view that a satisfactory explanation of what it is to think of a particular object can be drawn out of, or extended from, an explanation of what it is to be referring to that particular object. Typically, in investigating these matters, it is accepted that there is an explanatory priority of language over thought. This is the Priority Thesis. Some take the Priority Thesis to reflect an appropriate methodological strategy. In this form, it implies the methodological point that the best way to describe thoughts is by describing them as they are expressed in language. Most, however, seem to take the Priority Thesis to be symptomatic of a substantive, metaphysical truth. This, to put it one way, is that the content of a thought is paralleled by the content of the associated linguistic expression. I call this the Assumption of Parallelism. This characterizes what we call Linguistic Turn philosophy (i.e., analytic philosophy). The body of the dissertation arises out of questioning the extent of the application ofthe Priority Thesis in developing theories of reference and thought. I call the move of the partial overturning ofthe Priority Thesis the Linguistic U-Turn. The overall conclusion is that we cannot explain what it is to think of a particular object by extending explanations of what it is to be referring to that particular object. In particular, I reject what I call the Causal Theory of Thought—the view that the representational properties of a thought are explained by the referential properties of the appropriate singular term. My aim, then, is to show that a popular conviction concerning the representational properties of thoughts about things in the world is not warranted.

There is an interesting connection between cardinality of language and the distinction of lingua characterica from calculus rationator. Calculus-type languages have only a countable number of sentences, and only a single semantic valuation per sentence. By contrast, some of the sentences, and only a single semantic valuation per sentence. By contrast, some of the sentences of a lingua have available an uncountable number of semantic valuations. Thus, the lingua-type of language appears to have a greater degree of semantic universality than that of a calculus. It is suggested that the present notion of lingua provides a platform for a theory of ambiguity, whereby single sentences may have multiply - indeed, uncountably - many semantic valuations. It is further suggested that this might lead to a pacification of paradox. This thesis involves Peter Aczel's notion of a universal syntax, Russell's question, Keith Simmons' theory of diagonal argument, Curry's paradox, and a 'Leibnizian' notion of language. / vii, 111 leaves ; 29 cm.

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No abstract available. / Thesis (M.A.) - University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2007.