A investigação aqui realizada examina o papel que os valores cognitivos e nãocognitivos desempenham nas práticas científicas. Essa análise fundamenta-se em uma comparação entre os modelos propostos por Hugh Lacey e por Larry Laudan para explicar a dinâmica da atividade científica. Veremos que, no modelo desenvolvido por Lacey, cuja idéia central reside nas estratégias de pesquisa, ambos os tipos de valor possuem papéis legítimos na atividade científica. Já no modelo reticulado, proposto por Laudan, o autor admite apenas os valores cognitivos como constituintes da racionalidade científica. A partir de uma comparação entre ambos os modelos, pretendemos mostrar que o modelo de Lacey parece ser mais abrangente do que o modelo reticulado, na medida em que este último poderia ser considerado como uma parte do primeiro. / The present investigation examines the role of cognitive and non-cognitive values in scientific practices. This analysis is based on a comparison between the models proposed by Hugh Lacey and Larry Laudan to explain the dynamics of scientific activity. We will see that in Laceys model, whose main idea are the strategies of investigation, both kinds of values have legitimate roles in scientific activity. In the reticulated model, proposed by Laudan, the author admits only cognitive values as constitutive of scientific rationality. Based on a comparison between both models, we will try to show that Laceys model seems broader than the reticulated model, in the sense that the reticulated one could be considered as a part of Laceys model.

A investigação aqui realizada examina o papel que os valores cognitivos e nãocognitivos desempenham nas práticas científicas. Essa análise fundamenta-se em uma comparação entre os modelos propostos por Hugh Lacey e por Larry Laudan para explicar a dinâmica da atividade científica. Veremos que, no modelo desenvolvido por Lacey, cuja idéia central reside nas estratégias de pesquisa, ambos os tipos de valor possuem papéis legítimos na atividade científica. Já no modelo reticulado, proposto por Laudan, o autor admite apenas os valores cognitivos como constituintes da racionalidade científica. A partir de uma comparação entre ambos os modelos, pretendemos mostrar que o modelo de Lacey parece ser mais abrangente do que o modelo reticulado, na medida em que este último poderia ser considerado como uma parte do primeiro. / The present investigation examines the role of cognitive and non-cognitive values in scientific practices. This analysis is based on a comparison between the models proposed by Hugh Lacey and Larry Laudan to explain the dynamics of scientific activity. We will see that in Laceys model, whose main idea are the strategies of investigation, both kinds of values have legitimate roles in scientific activity. In the reticulated model, proposed by Laudan, the author admits only cognitive values as constitutive of scientific rationality. Based on a comparison between both models, we will try to show that Laceys model seems broader than the reticulated model, in the sense that the reticulated one could be considered as a part of Laceys model.

The problem of demarcation continues to attract attention, in part because solutions are perceived to have enormous social significance. The civic motivation, however, I argue is in tension with the heterogeneity of the sciences. Philosophers of science would be better employed reflecting on the features, causes, and consequences, of created, scientific controversies. These arise when relevant experts are in broad agreement about what conclusions can sensibly be drawn from available evidence, but the public perceives an expert community deeply divided and conclusions that are plagued by profound and systemic uncertainty. In the second part of the paper I explore this concept further.

One common approach to managing the inevitable erroneous convictions and erroneous acquittals produced by criminal justice systems is to employ various means (rules and procedures) to decrease the number of erroneous convictions at the expense of increasing, even many more times, the number of erroneous acquittals. Blackstone’s famous dictum (1765) that “[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer” (“the Blackstone ratio”), and others like it, have inspired this error distributing approach to error management. A mathematical analysis is provided demonstrating that, under certain conditions (“the R-conditions”), error distributing approaches result in criminal justice systems that function worse, by all quantitative measures (including the number of innocents convicted), than similar systems in which defendants are randomly acquitted. These results follow from one of a pair of derived fundamental equations applicable to all criminal justice systems, regardless of circumstance. Thus, the results hold irrespective of the means used to avoid convicting the guilty and challenge those who wish to engage in a particular error distributing approach to show that the R-conditions do not obtain for that approach (with reasonably convincing accuracy). Further, the results presented herein identify an upper bound to the Blackstone ratio, according to one conception of that ratio. / text

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.