學者研究中國上古時期政治思想，往往以漢武帝以後的儒家思想作為國家權力正當性的基礎，但是此理論的缺憾是，如果只以儒家思想作為國家意識形態的標誌，就難以解釋西漢武帝以前的國家權力正當性是如何運作的。其實早在作為中國最早期實行帝制的秦王朝，已憑著統一的法律標準與有利於專制王權實行管治的官僚機構，確立國家專制權力的基本模式。 / 本文試圖從儒法之爭的框架跳出來，從法律思想的角度，考察先秦至秦代的法律觀念、法律與國家官僚機構的關係及法律原則與「國家意識形態」的關係等議題。為了更貼近自秦至秦知識分子的「生活世界」，本文採用回到文本本身的研究方法，找出反映儒、道、法各家思想特徵的文本及其中的思想如何互相對話與融合，並從中探討戰國中後期至秦的知識分子與國家官僚對法律與政治觀念的表達，及其中的政治關懷。 / 本文將從法律思想與國家意識形態的角度，更緊密地考察法律觀念背後反映的政治權力意識，從先秦至秦「刑」、「法」的觀念與實踐的起源、秦國家法律標準、秦法律原則與官僚政治道德的關係三方面探討秦代國家專制權力的正當性基礎。 / Conventional studies on Ancient Chinese political thoughts consider Confusianism as the basis for legitimising the ruling of the state. However, this theory fails at explaining the period before Han Wudi(漢武帝) officially proclaimed the supreme status of Confusianism. As early as Qin Dynasty(秦朝), the state has established a centralised authoritarian government through its standardised legal practice and complex bureaucratic system. / Therefore, this study avoids the orthodoxy in explaining political thoughts with the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism and investigates the relationship of laws and the bureaucratic system as well as that of legal principals and state ideology in pre-Qin and Qin period. By scrutinising the contemporary thoughts through careful textual analysis, this study expounds the encountering of Confusianism, Daoism, and Legalism and also their synthesis. Upon this, it moves on further to examine how the literati and the bureaucrats in later Warring-States period(戰國時代) to Qin Dynasty delineated laws, political beliefs, and the political concerns therein. / From the perspective of state ideology, this study aims at analysing the conception of political power as reflected by the legal thoughts in three dimensions: 1) the origin and practice of "xing"(刑) and "fa"(法) in Pre-Qin and Qin period; 2) the historical image and the relationship between legal standard and state ideology as embodied in the reform of Shang Yang(商鞅變法) in the Qin state(秦國); and 3) the legal principles and the political morality of the state bureaucrats in the later Warring-States period and Qin Dynasty. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 余嘉浩. / Thesis (M.Phil.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 195-204). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Yu Jiahao.

This dissertation is a social, political, and cultural history of the organized Chilean legal profession in the first half of the twentieth century. It explores the causes for the creation of the Chilean Bar Association and its Legal Aid Service in the mid-1920s and follows their evolution until the mid-1960s. In the early twentieth century, lawyers were dealing with growing internal and external challenges to the traditional power they had occupied in the Chilean state throughout the nineteenth century. The main internal challenge was the social and political diversification of lawyers; the external one was the social question and working- class mobilization, which represented a threat to the existing oligarchic social and political order. Both issues questioned the traditional place of lawyers in society, their formalistic understanding of the legal system, and the role of law as the main state- building tool. In response to these threats, a group of male elite Santiago lawyers founded the Bar Association in 1925, and its Legal Aid Service, in 1932. These two institutional mechanisms created and enforced a hegemonic discourse of “professional prestige” that affirmed the power of the traditional legal elite over the growing number of middle-class, leftwing, provincial, and women lawyers. These two institutions also modified the engagement of the legal profession with the state, replacing its former political engagement with a new technical, “apolitical” and “social” function of lawyers more atuned to the new welfare state. The internal power dynamics within the Chilean Bar Association and the Legal Aid Service explain the process through which the Chilean legal profession defined the “legal field,” as increasingly distinct from, but in constant tension with, the “political”and the “social” fields. Indeed, through the combined action of the Bar Association and the Legal Aid Service, lawyers were directed to deal with social inequalities, but only to the extent that this engagement did not challenge the formalistic approach to legal procedures and the liberal understanding of property rights. Furthermore, the final result of this professional project was to push lawyers to withdraw from the field of politics and from the public sphere. However, the process of imposing this notion of lawyering was constantly contested and negotiated with a diversifying constituency of rank-and-file lawyers, and subjected to increasing external pressures from the press, the state, and the lower classes. Thus, the professional model that the Bar had contributed to construct and maintain in the first half of the century would become increasingly contested in the revolutionary decades of the 1960s and 1970s. The relative success of the Bar Association in imposing its model of lawyering in the first half of the twentieth century allows us to understand why the legalistic framework that Chilean lawyers had inherited from the nineteenth century did not change over the course of the twentieth despite the momentous social and political evolution that both profession and country experienced in this period. The history of the Chilean Bar Association thus provides an institutional explanation for the continuity of ideas about the law in the face of accelerated social transformations. At the same time, by revealing the tensions and the resistance that this project faced, the history of the Bar also reveals the gears that would eventually lead to the legal profession’s historical change.

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The thesis investigates and analyses the hitherto neglected phenomenon of political reaction within the judiciary of south-eastern France during the period between the Thermidorian Reaction and the advent of the Consulate. The character, objectives and effects of the 'reaction judiciaire1 are studied through a series of different perspectives. The first task is to highlight the discrepancy between the concepts of the social and political effects of a revamped judicial system formulated during the Year III and the corrupt abuse of judicial power by reactionary provincial judges. Indeed, the study constantly seeks to explore the conceptual as well as the practical damage inflicted on the Directorial regime by the supposed trustees of the post-Terrorist republican settlement. Emphasis is placed upon the collaboration between the southern judges and the counter-revolutionary elements within the local community, especially in the discussion of the origins of the judicial reaction. The changes of technique and of objective which the judiciary experienced are explored in full. It is described from its beginnings as a weapon of retribution for the aggrieved local community against the former agents of the Terror to its role in the subversion of regional jacobinism to its support for the period of unchecked counter-revolution during the Year V and finally to its function as a 'rearguard' defender of arrested counter- revolutionaries during the period of the Second Directory. In addition, due consideration is given to the motivation of individual judges who operated the reaction. It is hoped that the thesis has provided a model for the study of the causes, techniques and aims of political reaction from within an independent state power. Furthermore, it is hoped that the work is seminal in its suggestion that judicial reaction and its many ramifications had both a direct and indirect bearing upon the fall of the Directory.

This dissertation studies the politics of 'Public Interest Litigation' (PIL) in contemporary India. PIL is a unique jurisdiction initiated by the Indian Supreme Court in the aftermath of the Emergency of 1975-1977. Why did the Court's response to the crisis of the Emergency period have to take the form of PIL? I locate the history of PIL in India's postcolonial predicament, arguing that a Constitutional framework that mandated a statist agenda of social transformation provided the conditions of possibility for PIL to emerge. The post-Emergency era was the heyday of a new form of everyday politics that Partha Chatterjee has called 'political society'. I argue that PIL in its initial phase emerged as its judicial counterpart, and was even characterized as 'judicial populism'. However, PIL in its 21st century avatar has emerged as a bulwark against the operations of political society, often used as a powerful weapon against the same subaltern classes whose interests were so loudly championed by the initial cases of PIL. In the last decade, for instance, PIL has enabled the Indian appellate courts to function as a slum demolition machine, and a most effective one at that - even more successful than the Emergency regime. A recurring sentiment in these recent PIL cases is a deep impatience with the populism that is believed to characterize political life in India, and with the illegalities fostered by it. However, I argue that the enormous powers of PIL stem from its own populist character, which allows the appellate courts great flexibility in being able to maneouvre themselves into positions of overweening authority. With little or no procedure to regulate it, it is increasingly difficult to locate PIL within the conventional rubric of adjudicatory practice. With radical departures from legal norms that further empower the Courts, I argue, PIL has emerged as the vanishing point of jurisprudence. As a weapon of civil society, PIL appears to be a mere legal tool and therefore a classic example of associational activity. But it is really a mirror image of the populist contemporary politics it assails, just without any of the protections that populist political mobilisation regularly requires in a liberal democracy like India. Just as the practices of illegality rampant among India's white-collared denizens make its civil society uncontainable within any conventional notions of civic behaviour, its favourite weapon, PIL, too, has only a thin veneer of legality. The judicial populism of PIL allows for a radical instability that continually pushes the limits of what a court can do. This dissertation, after examining the why and the how of the rise of PIL, will focus on the most intensive laboratory of PIL in recent times - the city of Delhi. I foreground PIL's role in the radical reconfiguration of the city in the 2000s, and go on to critique the limitations of the existing critical discourses on PIL: their obliviousness to its materiality and their insistence on purely ideological and consequentialist understanding of recent trends in PIL. Lastly, I address the conundrum of the enduring appeal of 'debased informalism' in contemporary India, particularly the self-conscious and opportunistic adoption and celebration of it by the most formal of judicial institutions. If the Weberian account of the emergence of modern law was anything to go by, legalism's stock in India should have risen to its highest with the growth of capitalism in the post-liberalisation era. Instead 'legalism' has decisively acquired a negative connotation in India precisely in this same period. PIL is the most striking illustration of this peculiar historical trajectory.

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This thesis asks the following fundamental question: to what extent can economic and social rights be made effective through law? Because this question touches at once upon the effectiveness of these rights and on their status as norms of positive law, attempting to answer it requires first, an openness to other disciplines, and subsequently, to the question of the respect and control of these norms, namely that of sanction. From the outset, a preliminary and multidisciplinary analysis of the issue of contemporary poverty hints at an undeniable deviation with "pure legal theory". Moreover, economic and social rights are becoming more and more tangible in national legislation and more frequently invoked before the court (who is turn are showing a growing openness). 'Hard law' does have a place in this implementation, notably a symbolic one. Thus, the first part is dedicated to the determination of the role of 'hard law' as well as to the relevance of judicial activism. Given the limitations of 'hard law', the second part examines the issue of alternate courses of State action as opposed to any other demands for rights. Two forms of 'soft' and 'reflexive' law will then be examined in the interest of rendering economic and social rights effective: respectively from within the State, and from outside its framework. First, strategic planning (accompanied by outcome-based management) may serve to coordinate the State apparatus in the struggle against poverty. In what concerns the role of law at a societal level and in the context of a complex society, societal guidance will be preferred to impose strategic planning. In this way, it will be possible to shed light on other forms of sanction, which may be complimentary to legal ones. Finally, it is necessary to establish certain control and follow-up mechanisms of this category of rights, more relevant and innovative in order to garner a greater effectiveness of economic and social rights.

Dans cette thèse de doctorat, je m’attache à interpréter, à systématiser et à soumettre à un examen critique la pensée politique du droit de Hannah Arendt. En effet, alors que le versant politique de cette œuvre a fait l’objet d’une attention tout à fait considérable, on n’a toujours pas pris la mesure de l’intérêt évident de la philosophe pour le droit et les institutions juridiques et judiciaires les plus essentielles. Or, selon la thèse que je défends, l’une des raisons qui expliquent l’originalité de cette pensée et son caractère stimulant est à chercher du côté du positionnement qu’elle adopte vis-à-vis de la question du droit.<p><p>Pour atteindre ces différents objectifs, ma thèse est structurée en deux grandes parties qui correspondent à deux points de vue que l’on peut adopter par rapport au droit et qui se révèlent tout à fait opératoires si l’on accède à une vision panoramique des écrits dispersés qu’Arendt a consacrés au droit. Je distingue ainsi, et ne cesse de faire dialoguer dans ma thèse, le « pôle objectif » (première partie) et le « pôle subjectif » (seconde partie) de la philosophie du droit de Hannah Arendt.<p>1/ Dans la première partie de mon étude, je montre comment la philosophe s’attache, dans ses livres les plus célèbres, à construire des modèles politiques qui ont tous pour particularité d’être aussi – et de manière indissociable – des modèles juridiques. a) Mon premier chapitre est dédié à l’intérêt manifesté par Hannah Arendt pour les sources de l’Antiquité, et vise en particulier à clarifier le rapport qu’elle entretient vis-à-vis des sources romaines. b) Dans mon deuxième chapitre, je propose une interprétation de sa réflexion consacrée aux deux grandes révolutions modernes de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, les Révolutions française et américaine. Je mets en lumière de quelle façon Arendt, en s’inspirant du précédent américain, élabore un modèle républicain et peut ainsi approfondir sa conception de l’articulation entre droit et politique. c) Dans mon troisième chapitre, je précise les contours d’un contre-modèle élaboré par Arendt dans ses premiers écrits politiques d’envergure, ceux qu’elle a consacrés au totalitarisme.<p>2/ Dans la seconde partie de mon étude, je me concentre sur le « pôle subjectif » de la philosophie de mon auteur :j’indique comment Arendt mobilise des situations existentielles limites pour penser la condition de l’homme contemporain. a) Dans mon quatrième chapitre, je montre que c’est à partir de la situation des réfugiés et des apatrides de l’entre-deux-guerres que Hannah Arendt nous invite à repenser non seulement les droits de l’homme, mais aussi leur titulaire, que j’appelle l’« homme des droits de l’homme ». b) Dans mon cinquième chapitre, je m’attache à mettre en évidence, dans toutes ses nuances, la figure du « juge » que Hannah Arendt s’attache à reconstituer après avoir assisté au procès d’Adolf Eichmann, après avoir ressenti ce que je nomme le « choc » du procès Eichmann. c) Dans mon sixième et dernier chapitre, enfin, je m’interroge sur les raisons profondes qui incitent Arendt à voir dans les grandes campagnes de désobéissance civile qui éclatent aux États-Unis durant les années 1950 et 1960, non le signe d’un déclin des institutions, mais, au contraire, la marque d’une renaissance de l’action citoyenne.<p><p>Je conclus en synthétisant l’apport de Hannah Arendt à notre pensée juridique. Dans cette œuvre, le droit n’apparaît jamais comme une simple contrainte extérieure pour la politique, ni comme son « supplément d’âme », mais comme sa condition d’existence :en conférant à la liberté politique ses limites, limites spatiales mais aussi relationnelles et temporelles, en lui offrant un cadre stable au sein duquel elle peut s’épanouir, le droit n’ampute pas la politique d’une part d’elle-même mais, au contraire, participe de sa constitution. Me fondant sur trois catégories centrales de la réflexion juridique (législation, constitution, juridiction), je souligne en outre tout l’intérêt d’une confrontation approfondie et détaillée entre l’œuvre arendtienne et les questions classiques et contemporaines qui animent le champ de la théorie et de la philosophie du droit, ce qui me permet d’ouvrir un certain nombre de perspectives de recherches futures.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In December 1640 the Long Parliament brought accusations against Lord Keeper Finch and six judges of the three main Westminster courts. These asserted the illegality of decisions and opinions given by these judges. This thesis examines those accusations and argues that the government of Charles I engaged in a defensible process of political management of the law and the judges to legitimate its policies particularly after the suspension of parliament in 1629. This policy emerged as a response to the government's difficulties in enforcing the payment of the Forced Loan caused by its dubious legality. The policy took advantage of important features of the contemporary relationship between the law and the government and it had five features. The most senior and able lawyers were recruited as government law officers and counsel. They amassed and used a substantial and well researched body of legal authority to support royal rights. The chief justices were appointed from amongst the government lawyers and were used as political managers of their courts. New incentives were offered as rewards for the most senior judges. Judicial views on aspects of government policy were sought in advance and the Privy Council was used to by-pass the judges if necessary. These features are examined in relation to government revenue policies including distraint of knighthood fines and the forest laws, and religious policies in relation to the application of the writ of prohibition to the economic condition of the Church and High Commission. The application of this analysis to the Ship Money Case is considered. It is concluded that the judges were manipulated rather than coerced and often successfully avoided the pressure by technical stratagems. Most importantly the government showed that it generally had the law on its side. That had serious political implications but went a long way towards exonerating the judges.

L'étude a porté sur deux outils élaborés par l’Union européenne à l'appui de ses politiques d'allocation d'aide extérieure au bénéfice principalement d'Etats en développement et participant à sa stratégie de promotion du respect de droits de l’homme dans les Etats tiers. Il s'agit du mécanisme de conditionnalité démocratique d’une part, et de la doctrine fondée sur le concept de gouvernance d’autre part. L'une des principales critiques que la doctrine adresse à l’Union au sujet de sa politique de conditionalité est son incapacité à répondre à l’une des attentes fondamentales qui la sous-tend, à savoir :la naissance d’une politique d’aide extérieure détachée des considérations géopolitiques et visant à protéger et promouvoir efficacement les droits de l’homme. Dans la mesure où la doctrine en attribue en général la responsabilité à l’absence de clarté et de prévisibilité du mécanisme de la conditionnalité démocratique, cette critique eut dû conduire à l’élaboration d’un régime davantage juridicisé. Or, l'émergence de la doctrine fondée sur le concept de gouvernance révèle que l’Union n’a pas opté pour une telle solution. C’est alors que, divisant mon étude en deux parties, la première affectée à l’étude du mécanisme conditionnel et la seconde affectée à l’étude de la doctrine de gouvernance, je me suis interrogée sur les raisons pour lesquelles l’Union avait pu choisir de recourir d’abord à un appel au droit, et ensuite à une repolitisation partielle de son mécanisme. Prenant appui sur une étude des documents officiels des institutions européennes, de la pratique de l'Union et des théories des relations internationales, l'étude tend à révéler les atouts et les limites théoriques de chacune de ces stratégies déstinées à suciter des réformes particulières dans les Etats partenaires de l’Union.Il apparaîtra que l’appel au droit opéré dans le cadre du mécanisme de conditionnalité répondait à des besoins et à une logique spécifiques lors de son institution, mais que la forme juridicisée du mécanisme conditionnel tel qu’institué se heurtait à diverses limites. La doctrine fondée sur le concept de gouvernance, dans le même temps qu’elle acte ces limites et tend à les dépasser, amène à de nouveaux questionnements.<p><p>The study related to both EU tools, affecting its external aid policies and contributing to its human rights strategy :conditionality and governance. One of the main critic that the doctrine addresses to EU conditionality, is its incapacity to lead to an external aid free of geopolitical considerations and acting to protect and promote effectively the human rights. The doctrine explains this weakness by pointing out the mechanism of conditionality’s lack of clearness and previsibility. Despite this critic is pleading for a more legalized mechanism, the governance strategy reveals that the Union did not choose such a solution.Then, dividing the study into two parts, the first assigned to conditional mechanism and the second assigned to governance, I’m asking the reason why a less legalized mecanism succeeded to conditionality. Based on cooperation agreements, strategic orientations, EU practice and the international relations theories, the study tends to reveal the assets and limits of the two strategies. It appears that the legalization process of conditionality can be explained by specific needs but it encountered various limits. At the same times, while strategy based on Governance adresses some of them, this new tool reveals new questions.<p><p> / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished