Credit rating is an important financial indicator of the debtor's ability to repay the debt duly and on time and it is expressed in a simple form of credit score. It has been talked about the issue of credit rating particularly in context of the financial crisis 2008 because of the failure of credit rating agencies and their contribution to global dimensions of the crisis. This thesis critically assesses the European legal regulation of credit rating in the light of 2008 financial crisis. The evaluation is carried through an economic analysis of law while also using the knowledge of behavioural economics, so that efficiency of both individual provisions and legal regulation as a whole is examined. The fundamental problem of current regulation is its ambiguity, as on the one hand it promotes greater institutionalization of credit rating and on the other hand it promotes greater market discipline of financial market participants. This dichotomy is inefficient because it does not provide for clear incentives neither for investors, nor for issuers or credit rating agencies. Key finding of this thesis is that credit rating regulation would be more efficient if it was aimed exclusively at supporting market discipline. It is important to draw conclusions from analysis of the efficiency of current...

A presente dissertação investiga o potencial contributivo da Análise Econômica do Direito (AED) no plano das relações de trabalho como ferramenta de verificação da eficácia da observância da boa-fé objetiva nas negociações coletivas de trabalho. Ao ser efetivamente adaptado para o Direito do Trabalho, o ferramental da AED pode contribuir para agregar eficiência do ponto de vista da concretização de melhores condições de trabalho através de métodos mais eficazes de negociação no Brasil. Partindo de tais premissas, se os atores da negociação coletiva efetivamente observarem os deveres decorrentes do princípio da boa-fé objetiva, atuando de forma leal e colaborativa entre si, problemas decorrentes da assimetria de informações; condutas negociais desprovidas de racionalidade; procrastinação indevida dos atos negociais; dentre outras ações antissindicais; seriam evitadas, tornando mais eficiente a negociação e, via de consequência, potencializando os resultados desta. Além disso, uma negociação coletiva efetivamente conformadora da vontade das partes envolvidas evita a necessidade de judicialização do conflito, seja na fase negocial, seja na fase de cumprimento do avençado, o que torna ainda mais vantajosa a relação do ponto de vista da celeridade de dos custos de transação. É prudente notar que tanto a negociação coletiva, quanto a boa-fé são constantemente analisadas na doutrina, tanto de forma isolada quanto em conjunto, inexistindo qualquer pretensão de novidade na evidenciação de tal conjugação. Da mesma forma, não se descura que a AED é igualmente objeto de aprofundados exames, inclusive quanto à sua incidência no princípio da boa-fé, esta última em menor medida. Assim, o que se pretende é algo um pouco menos usual, e em alguma medida até mesmo controverso, conjugar os três institutos e pô-los em dinâmica visando evidenciar os contributos de tal entrelaçamento para a dimensão negocial coletiva e, em alguma medida, para o próprio fenômeno econômico daí derivado. / This dissertation investigates the contribution of Law and Economics in terms of labor relations, acting as a tool for verification of the effectiveness compliance of objective good faith in collective bargaining. When effectively adapted to the Labour Law, the Law and Economics tools can contribute to aggregate efficiency from the prism of achievement of better working conditions through more effective negotiation methods in Brazil. Starting from these assumptions, if the actors of collective bargaining effectively observe the obligations arising from the principle of objective good faith, acting fairly and collaboratively with each other, problems arising from asymmetric information; negotiation behaviors devoid of rationality; undue procrastination of business documents; among other anti-union actions; would be avoided, making more efficient trading process, and, consequently, enhancing they results. Moreover, a collective bargaining effectively representative of the parties aspirations avoids the lawsuit, whether in negotiation phase, both at the negotiation phase and in due performance, making more advantageous relationship and reducing transaction costs. Both, collective bargaining and the good faith are constantly analyzed by doctrine, alone or in conjunction, therefore, there is nothing new in their conjugation. Likewise, Law and Economics is also subject to rigorous examination, including their effect on the good faith principle. So, what is intended here is something a little less common, and even controversial, from combining the three institutes and put them in dynamic, to realize the contributions of this entanglement for the collective bargaining dimension and, somehow, to economic phenomenon itself.

A presente dissertação investiga o potencial contributivo da Análise Econômica do Direito (AED) no plano das relações de trabalho como ferramenta de verificação da eficácia da observância da boa-fé objetiva nas negociações coletivas de trabalho. Ao ser efetivamente adaptado para o Direito do Trabalho, o ferramental da AED pode contribuir para agregar eficiência do ponto de vista da concretização de melhores condições de trabalho através de métodos mais eficazes de negociação no Brasil. Partindo de tais premissas, se os atores da negociação coletiva efetivamente observarem os deveres decorrentes do princípio da boa-fé objetiva, atuando de forma leal e colaborativa entre si, problemas decorrentes da assimetria de informações; condutas negociais desprovidas de racionalidade; procrastinação indevida dos atos negociais; dentre outras ações antissindicais; seriam evitadas, tornando mais eficiente a negociação e, via de consequência, potencializando os resultados desta. Além disso, uma negociação coletiva efetivamente conformadora da vontade das partes envolvidas evita a necessidade de judicialização do conflito, seja na fase negocial, seja na fase de cumprimento do avençado, o que torna ainda mais vantajosa a relação do ponto de vista da celeridade de dos custos de transação. É prudente notar que tanto a negociação coletiva, quanto a boa-fé são constantemente analisadas na doutrina, tanto de forma isolada quanto em conjunto, inexistindo qualquer pretensão de novidade na evidenciação de tal conjugação. Da mesma forma, não se descura que a AED é igualmente objeto de aprofundados exames, inclusive quanto à sua incidência no princípio da boa-fé, esta última em menor medida. Assim, o que se pretende é algo um pouco menos usual, e em alguma medida até mesmo controverso, conjugar os três institutos e pô-los em dinâmica visando evidenciar os contributos de tal entrelaçamento para a dimensão negocial coletiva e, em alguma medida, para o próprio fenômeno econômico daí derivado. / This dissertation investigates the contribution of Law and Economics in terms of labor relations, acting as a tool for verification of the effectiveness compliance of objective good faith in collective bargaining. When effectively adapted to the Labour Law, the Law and Economics tools can contribute to aggregate efficiency from the prism of achievement of better working conditions through more effective negotiation methods in Brazil. Starting from these assumptions, if the actors of collective bargaining effectively observe the obligations arising from the principle of objective good faith, acting fairly and collaboratively with each other, problems arising from asymmetric information; negotiation behaviors devoid of rationality; undue procrastination of business documents; among other anti-union actions; would be avoided, making more efficient trading process, and, consequently, enhancing they results. Moreover, a collective bargaining effectively representative of the parties aspirations avoids the lawsuit, whether in negotiation phase, both at the negotiation phase and in due performance, making more advantageous relationship and reducing transaction costs. Both, collective bargaining and the good faith are constantly analyzed by doctrine, alone or in conjunction, therefore, there is nothing new in their conjugation. Likewise, Law and Economics is also subject to rigorous examination, including their effect on the good faith principle. So, what is intended here is something a little less common, and even controversial, from combining the three institutes and put them in dynamic, to realize the contributions of this entanglement for the collective bargaining dimension and, somehow, to economic phenomenon itself.

A presente dissertação investiga o potencial contributivo da Análise Econômica do Direito (AED) no plano das relações de trabalho como ferramenta de verificação da eficácia da observância da boa-fé objetiva nas negociações coletivas de trabalho. Ao ser efetivamente adaptado para o Direito do Trabalho, o ferramental da AED pode contribuir para agregar eficiência do ponto de vista da concretização de melhores condições de trabalho através de métodos mais eficazes de negociação no Brasil. Partindo de tais premissas, se os atores da negociação coletiva efetivamente observarem os deveres decorrentes do princípio da boa-fé objetiva, atuando de forma leal e colaborativa entre si, problemas decorrentes da assimetria de informações; condutas negociais desprovidas de racionalidade; procrastinação indevida dos atos negociais; dentre outras ações antissindicais; seriam evitadas, tornando mais eficiente a negociação e, via de consequência, potencializando os resultados desta. Além disso, uma negociação coletiva efetivamente conformadora da vontade das partes envolvidas evita a necessidade de judicialização do conflito, seja na fase negocial, seja na fase de cumprimento do avençado, o que torna ainda mais vantajosa a relação do ponto de vista da celeridade de dos custos de transação. É prudente notar que tanto a negociação coletiva, quanto a boa-fé são constantemente analisadas na doutrina, tanto de forma isolada quanto em conjunto, inexistindo qualquer pretensão de novidade na evidenciação de tal conjugação. Da mesma forma, não se descura que a AED é igualmente objeto de aprofundados exames, inclusive quanto à sua incidência no princípio da boa-fé, esta última em menor medida. Assim, o que se pretende é algo um pouco menos usual, e em alguma medida até mesmo controverso, conjugar os três institutos e pô-los em dinâmica visando evidenciar os contributos de tal entrelaçamento para a dimensão negocial coletiva e, em alguma medida, para o próprio fenômeno econômico daí derivado. / This dissertation investigates the contribution of Law and Economics in terms of labor relations, acting as a tool for verification of the effectiveness compliance of objective good faith in collective bargaining. When effectively adapted to the Labour Law, the Law and Economics tools can contribute to aggregate efficiency from the prism of achievement of better working conditions through more effective negotiation methods in Brazil. Starting from these assumptions, if the actors of collective bargaining effectively observe the obligations arising from the principle of objective good faith, acting fairly and collaboratively with each other, problems arising from asymmetric information; negotiation behaviors devoid of rationality; undue procrastination of business documents; among other anti-union actions; would be avoided, making more efficient trading process, and, consequently, enhancing they results. Moreover, a collective bargaining effectively representative of the parties aspirations avoids the lawsuit, whether in negotiation phase, both at the negotiation phase and in due performance, making more advantageous relationship and reducing transaction costs. Both, collective bargaining and the good faith are constantly analyzed by doctrine, alone or in conjunction, therefore, there is nothing new in their conjugation. Likewise, Law and Economics is also subject to rigorous examination, including their effect on the good faith principle. So, what is intended here is something a little less common, and even controversial, from combining the three institutes and put them in dynamic, to realize the contributions of this entanglement for the collective bargaining dimension and, somehow, to economic phenomenon itself.

ABSTRACT This study provides an empirical analysis of the effect of tobacco marketing regulation on unit sales, in order to evaluate the effectiveness these laws in the United States. The analysis did not find a significant effect of tobacco advertising expenditure on unit sales. Examination of advertising expenditure revealed that tobacco companies substituted banned forms of advertising for other marketing strategies, leading to little reduction in total advertising expenditure and a limited effect on sales. Furthermore, it found an unexpected positive relationship between the 1971 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act and tobacco consumption; the ban on advertising and promotion actually increased sales by over 88 billion units. Additional empirical evidence is provided from studies performed by Fight Ordinances and Restrictions to Control and Eliminate Smoking (FORCES) and Saffer and Chaloupka that show correspondingly inconclusive results. The paper then discusses several policy implications and subsequent recommendations that follow from these results.

This thesis contributes to academic debate about the question: how much substantive protection should investment treaties (IITs) provide to foreign investment? Chapters 5 and 6 argue that arbitral tribunals have interpreted fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation provisions of existing IITs in several different ways. Each of these interpretations is sketched as a model level of protection that could be explicitly adopted by states in the future, either through inclusion in new IITs, or through amendment to existing IITs. In this way, the thesis defines a range of prospective options available to states concerning the level of protection to provide to foreign investment through IITs. The thesis evaluates the relative desirability of these different levels of protection. The thesis argues that different levels of protection should be evaluated according to their likely consequences. The thesis develops a framework for inferring and understanding the likely consequences of adopting different levels of protection. The framework proposes that the consequences of a given level of protection can be understood in terms of its likely effect on: economic efficiency; the distribution of economic costs and benefits; flows of foreign direct investment into host states; the realisation of human rights and environmental conservation in host states; and respect for the rule of law in host states. Within this framework, the thesis provides an assessment and synthesis of existing empirical evidence and explanatory theory so far as they relate to the consequences of IIT protections. It also specifies the normative criteria by which these consequences should be evaluated. Through the application of this framework, the thesis concludes that lower levels of protection of foreign investment are, in general, likely to be more desirable than higher levels of protection.

La structure de la réglementation des valeurs mobilières au Canada fait périodiquement l'objet d'un débat public et une des questions sous-jacentes est celle du partage des compétences législatives prévu par la Constitution canadienne. Le débat a été relancé en 2003 par la recommandation d'un comité de personnes averties de centraliser cette réglementation au fédéral. Les provinces, sauf l'Ontario, demeurent opposées à l'idée, préférant plutôt l'harmonisation réglementaire. Pour alléger le fardeau réglementaire des émetteurs, elles tentent également de mettre en oeuvre un « régime de passeport ». Ce débat présente la question comme un jeu à somme nulle, occultant ainsi certains principes fondamentaux du fédéralisme: innovation provinciale dans une union économique nationale. Dans ce mémoire, nous proposons donc une structure réglementaire, basée sur la théorie de la concurrence intergouvernementale, qui s'harmonise avec les compétences du gouvernement fédéral et des provinces tout en optimisant leurs atouts respectifs. / Public debate over the structure of Canada's securities regulation occurs periodically, with the constitution al division of powers being one of its underlying issues. The debate was reignited in 2003 when a Wise Persons Committee recommended that securities be regulated centrally by the federal government. The provinces, other than Ontario, maintain their opposition to this proposai, seeking instead regulatory harmonization. To alleviate the regulatory burden on issuers, the provinces are also implementing a "passport system". However, the debate appears to present the alternatives as a zero-sum game, thereby overlooking some of federalism's fundamental principles: provincial innovation, within a national economic union. This thesis proposes a regulatory structure, based on the theory of intergovernmental competition, that remains in harmony with the constitutional powers of the federal government and the provinces, while optimizing their respective strengths.

O presente trabalho é resultado de uma pesquisa que teve como objetivo a investigação sobre o possível desenvolvimento de uma nova teoria jurídica nos trabalhos vinculados a Law and Economics. A hipótese testada ainda inclui a concepção de que essa Teoria Econômica do Direito teria a eficiência como seu fundamento moral, atribuindo ao Direito a função de maximização da utilidade, riqueza ou bem-estar sociais. Para tanto, apresenta descrição sobre a maneira pela qual modelos e conceitos econômicos foram transformados em instrumentos metodológicos usados para descrever e fazer prescrições a respeito do conteúdo das regras jurídicas e de sua aplicação. Este estudo ainda explora os mecanismos sociais de produção e aplicação do Direito, a fim de verificar como suas características podem limitar essa função maximizadora atribuída pela Análise Econômica do Direito. Por fim, investiga-se quais recursos teóricos e retóricos tomaram utilizável pelo Direito o conceito puramente econômico da eficiência e o transformaram em um valor moral a guiar decisões jurídicas ou políticas. O consenso é, então, perquirido como o fundamento último sobre o qual se assentam a eficiência e a maximização como valores morais. / This paper is a product of a research which aimed to study the potential development of a new legal theory within the paper works written by those authors usually associated with the Law and Economies School. The hypothesis tested established the existence of an Economic Legal Theory that would be morally based on efficiency concepts and that assigned to the legal rules a function related to the maximization of social utility, wealth and welfare. In order to accomplish this task, this paper presents a description of how economic models and concepts were turned into methodological instruments to describe and make prescriptions about the legal rules dispositions and their application. Further, the research explores the social structures assigned to enact legal rules and those responsible for their enforcement, in order to verify how their qualifications are able to promote within the social rules efforts the function prescribed by the Economic Analysis of Law. At last, this paper explores the theoretical and rhetoric instruments that made possible the use of the purely economic concept of efficiency into a moral value claimed as an ideal guide of political and legal decisions. The consent is, then, tested as the final basis on which efficiency and maximization as moral principles lay on.

Este trabalho analisa o papel dos contratos relacionais na decisão entre a subcontratação e a integração vertical e as condições que tornam estes contratos factíveis. As proposições de Baker, Gibbons e Murphy (2002 – a partir daqui apenas BGM) e de Dixit (2004) são testadas e os resultados confirmam as principais hipóteses. Empresas podem operar através do mercado ou com um alto grau de integração vertical. No segundo caso as empresas evitam o que se chama de problemas de hold up – isto é, quando defrontada com a ocasião de cumprir os termos acertados no início da operação, a outra parte pode exigir termos de negociação mais onerosos, mas não tão onerosos a ponto de a primeira parte preferir abandonar os investimentos específicos que fez e negociar com terceiros. Se todos os ativos pertencerem a uma única empresa, tais problemas não existiriam, e isto explicaria a segunda opção, a operação em um alto grau de integração vertical (Williamson, 1985). Esta explicação, entretanto, não esclarece por que algumas empresas operam em redes, arranjos onde as partes permanecem como entidades economicamente separadas, mas com relações de longo prazo. A Toyota e outras empresas japonesas de automóveis são o exemplo típico desta situação (Holmström, Ronerts, 1998). Os contratos relacionais ajudam a contornar as dificuldades das contratações formais, independentes de essas advirem de problemas de holdup ou de outra fonte. Um contrato relacional permite que as partes utilizem o conhecimento detalhado que possuem de sua situação específica e que se adaptem também às novas informações quando essas se tornam disponíveis (MacNeil, 1978). Existe uma ressalva, entretanto: os contratos não poderão ser garantidos por uma terceira parte e por isso devem ser auto-executáveis, isto é, o valor das relações futuras deve ser o suficiente para que nenhuma das partes renegue o contrato (BGM, 2002, Dixit, 2004). Mas o que faz alguns contratos falharem enquanto outros são bem sucedidos? BGM examinam o problema à luz da teoria de contatos relacionais e da teoria de direitos de propriedade. De acordo com esses autores, a integração vertical afeta a tentação das partes de renegar um dado contrato relacional. Então, em um dado ambiente econômico e institucional, um contrato relacional pode ser factível sob integração vertical e não sê-lo para transações através do mercado – e isso será particularmente verdade quando encontrarmos uma grande variação dos preços alternativos dos ativos transacionados nestes contratos. Esses ativos não estão restritos apenas aos físicos, e podem ser o direito à propriedade de um bem ou a discricionariedade que um trabalhador subcontratado tem sobre como alocar o seu tempo na execução do trabalho contratado (Hart, 1992). Dixit (2004) discute o papel da sinalização e dos contratos formais na manutenção desses contratos relacionais. Partindo dessas hipóteses e com base na literatura de incentivos, as proposições de BGM e de Dixit são testadas. A decisão das empresas entre contratar serviços legais através do mercado ou manter um departamento jurídico próprio podem ser explicadas principalmente pela variação dos preços dos ativos (nesse caso, o valor dos serviços legais, que pode ser expresso pela maior ou menor competição no mercado de trabalho – Bertrand, 2004), mas também pelo ambiente institucional, particularmente pelo tempo necessário para se obter uma decisão da justiça e a variação do resultado esperado. Os resultados dos testes empíricos apontam para a confirmação da hipótese principal e sugere algumas linhas de pesquisa. / This work analyzes the role of relational contracts in the decision between subcontracting or vertical integration and the conditions that make these contracts feasible. The propositions of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002 – since now, just BGM) and Dixit (2004) are tested and the results are supportive to the main propositions. Firms can conduct their operations through the market or can operate in a high degree of vertical integration. In the second case firms avoid what we call “holdup" problems - that is, when it comes time to work out the terms of the deal left open at the outset, the other side might demand terms of trade that are onerous but not so onerous that the first part would willingly forfeit the value of those transaction-specific assets by taking its business elsewhere. If all this assets belongs to one firm, there is no problem at all, and that explain this second choice, the vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). This rationale, however, don’t explain why some companies operate through networks, arrangements where the parties stay economically separate entities but having long-term relationship. Toyota and others Japanese Automobile Companies are the typical example (Holmström, Roberts, 1998). Relational contracts help circumvent difficulties in formal contracting no matter if these difficulties come from holdup problems or from another source. A relational contract allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes available (MacNeil, 1978). There is a caveat, however: they cannot be enforced by a third party and must be self-enforcing, that means, the value of the future relationship must be sufficiently large that neither party wishes to renege (BGM, 2002, Dixit, 2004). But what makes some contracts to breakdown until others goes well? BGM examine the problem in the light of relational contracts and property rights theory. According to them, integration affects the parties’ temptation to renege a given relational contract. Thus, in a given environment, a desirable relational contract might be feasible under integration but not under nonintegration – and this will be particularly true when we face a wide varying alternative prices of an asset. These assets are not restricted to physical ones, and can be even a legal title to a good or the discretion that a outsourced worker have about how to allocate his time doing the job (Hart, 1992). Dixit (2004) discuss the role of signalization and formal contracts in the maintenance of these relational contracts. Departing from these hypotheses and with ground on the incentive literature, the BGM’s and Dixit’s propositions were tested. The companies’ decision between to contract law services in the market or to employ an internal legal department can be explained mainly by the variation on assets value (in the case, the value of legal services, expressed by a greater competition degree – Bertrand, 2004), but also by the institutional environment, particularly the time to reach a decision and the variability of the expected result. The results of the empirical research confirm the main assumption and point some lines of research in the relational contracts field.

Law Wing Fai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [151]-156). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / 摘要 --- p.II / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.III / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.IV / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Purpose --- p.3 / Organization --- p.4 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- REVIEW OF THEORIES AND LITERATURE --- p.5 / The Literature on Foreign Direct Investment --- p.5 / The Literature on Legal Issues --- p.10 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- METHODOLOGY --- p.17 / Data Collection --- p.17 / Control Variables in Detail --- p.20 / Design of Regression Models --- p.26 / Methodology --- p.28 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON INVESTMENT MODE SELECTION --- p.29 / Rationale for the Study --- p.29 / Fundamental Differences between Partial Acquisition and JV --- p.30 / Importance of Legal Institutions in the Choice of M&A and JV --- p.33 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.34 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.36 / Hypothesis on the Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.39 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.42 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.43 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Investment Mode Selection --- p.45 / Legal Origin --- p.45 / Shareholder Protection --- p.48 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.50 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.52 / Other Legal Issues --- p.54 / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE --- THE EFFECTS OF LEGAL FACTORS ON OWNERSHIP PROPORTION DECISION --- p.57 / Rationale for the Study --- p.57 / Hypothesis on the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.57 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.59 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Legal Origin --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Shareholder Protection --- p.60 / Hypothesis on Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Securities Regulation --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency --- p.61 / Hypothesis on Other Legal Issues --- p.61 / Empirical Evidence for the Effects of Legal Factors on Ownership Proportion Decision --- p.63 / Legal Origin --- p.63 / Shareholder Protection --- p.65 / Government Enforcement Efficiency --- p.66 / "Securities Regulation, Accounting Standard and Corporate Transparency" --- p.67 / Other Legal Issues --- p.68 / Chapter CHAPTER SIX --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.70 / TABLE --- p.73 / Table 1: The Variables --- p.73 / Table 2: Shareholder protection around the world --- p.82 / Table 3: Government enforcement efficiency around the world --- p.85 / "Table 4: Accounting standard, corporate transparency, securities regulation, mandatory bid rule and cross-border regulation around the world" --- p.88 / Table 5A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection --- p.91 / Table 5B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection --- p.93 / Table 5C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection --- p.95 / "Table 5D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection" --- p.97 / Table 5E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection --- p.99 / Table 6A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.101 / Table 6B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.103 / Table 6C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.105 / "Table 6D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion)" --- p.107 / Table 6E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (controlling the ex-post ownership proportion) --- p.109 / Table 7A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.111 / Table 7b: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.113 / Table 7C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample) --- p.115 / "Table 7D: Effect of shareholder protection, accounting standard and corporate transparency on investment mode selection (majority ownership sample)" --- p.117 / Table 7E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Majority ownership sample) --- p.119 / Table 8 A: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.121 / Table 8B: Effect of shareholder protection on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.123 / Table 8C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on investment mode selection (minority ownership sample) --- p.125 / Table 8D: Effect of legal origin on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.127 / Table 8E: Effect of other legal issues on investment mode selection (Minority ownership sample) --- p.129 / Table 9A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.131 / Table 9b: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.133 / Table 9C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.135 / "Table 9D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (m&a sample)" --- p.137 / Table 9E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (M&A sample) --- p.139 / Table 10A: Effect of legal origin on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.141 / Table 10B: Effect of shareholder protection on ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.143 / Table 10C: Effect of government enforcement efficiency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.145 / "Table 10D: Effect of securities regulation, accounting standard and corporate transparency on ownership proportion selection (jv sample)" --- p.147 / Table 10E: Effect of other legal issues on ownership proportion selection (jv sample) --- p.149 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.151 / APPENDIX --- p.157 / Appendix 1: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of investment mode selection --- p.157 / Appendix 2: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (m&a sample) --- p.159 / Appendix 3: Summary statistics of the variables used in investigation of ownership proportion selection (JV sample) --- p.161 / "Appendix 4: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.163 / "Appendix 5: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency, Corporate Transparency, Securities Regulation and other legal issues" --- p.164 / "Appendix 6: Correlations of Shareholder Protection, Government Enforcement Efficiency and other legal issues" --- p.165 / Appendix 7: Correlations of firm-level and country-level control variables --- p.166