This thesis proposes an exception to the common law efficiency hypothesis. In many cases, common law moves toward efficient legal rules through an evolutionary process of litigation incentives. Software patent law has departed from this trend, due to an asymmetric and unopposed set of litigation incentives by parties in precedent setting decisions. This paper evaluates the history of software patent legal rules, using an economic model of litigation incentives. It concludes that software patent law has been driven toward inefficiency due to an asymmetric set of interests between patent filers and administrative agencies.

Univ., Diss.--Toulouse, 2002.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Philip Mirowski for the Department of Economics. "July 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 280-297).

Business opportunities are a chance for a company to grow its activity and to further the aggregate welfare of the society as a whole. Corporate opportunities rules and their functional equivalents should enable companies to develop their business activities when directors discover those business opportunities. Companies need to be certain that they can legally appropriate those business opportunities. A company should have this ability when it is the best potential exploiter of the opportunity at issue, which is likely when the opportunity is a chance to expand the company's line of business or to pursue vertical integration. In fact, a company's appropriation of new business opportunities justifies a company's sunk costs that stem from its specific investments. Hence, the tests adopted for identifying corporate opportunities in US (Delaware), German (line of business test), UK, French, Spanish and Italian corporate laws (interest test) reflect the need to further efficiency by way of diminishing hold-up costs. Remedies against misappropriations of corporate opportunities by directors should both pursue maximum disclosure of new corporate opportunities by directors and preserve the possibility of alternative allocations of a corporate opportunity, when a company's director can exploit the opportunity more efficiently than the company. Such an alternative allocation may occur through negotiation or through efficient breach of duty. It is suggested that a differential remedial system (higher sanctions for breach of duty following non-disclosure) would maximize both disclosure and efficient allocation. This approach is closer to the one that exists in Anglo-American law than to the one adopted in most civil law jurisdictions. The present differences in various corporate laws may be connected to the existence of institutional complementarities, which should be taken into account in future reforms.

Why are the US and China regulating cryptocurrency? This paper first uses linear regression to model the relationship between the US dollar and Bitcoin, and separately, the Chinese Renminbi and Bitcoin. Next, legal text is analyzed to make the comparative case for the United States' and China's legal responses to new advances in cryptocurrency, and how it shows threats to the traditional definition and control of currency.

Este trabalho analisa o papel dos contratos relacionais na decisão entre a subcontratação e a integração vertical e as condições que tornam estes contratos factíveis. As proposições de Baker, Gibbons e Murphy (2002 – a partir daqui apenas BGM) e de Dixit (2004) são testadas e os resultados confirmam as principais hipóteses. Empresas podem operar através do mercado ou com um alto grau de integração vertical. No segundo caso as empresas evitam o que se chama de problemas de hold up – isto é, quando defrontada com a ocasião de cumprir os termos acertados no início da operação, a outra parte pode exigir termos de negociação mais onerosos, mas não tão onerosos a ponto de a primeira parte preferir abandonar os investimentos específicos que fez e negociar com terceiros. Se todos os ativos pertencerem a uma única empresa, tais problemas não existiriam, e isto explicaria a segunda opção, a operação em um alto grau de integração vertical (Williamson, 1985). Esta explicação, entretanto, não esclarece por que algumas empresas operam em redes, arranjos onde as partes permanecem como entidades economicamente separadas, mas com relações de longo prazo. A Toyota e outras empresas japonesas de automóveis são o exemplo típico desta situação (Holmström, Ronerts, 1998). Os contratos relacionais ajudam a contornar as dificuldades das contratações formais, independentes de essas advirem de problemas de holdup ou de outra fonte. Um contrato relacional permite que as partes utilizem o conhecimento detalhado que possuem de sua situação específica e que se adaptem também às novas informações quando essas se tornam disponíveis (MacNeil, 1978). Existe uma ressalva, entretanto: os contratos não poderão ser garantidos por uma terceira parte e por isso devem ser auto-executáveis, isto é, o valor das relações futuras deve ser o suficiente para que nenhuma das partes renegue o contrato (BGM, 2002, Dixit, 2004). Mas o que faz alguns contratos falharem enquanto outros são bem sucedidos? BGM examinam o problema à luz da teoria de contatos relacionais e da teoria de direitos de propriedade. De acordo com esses autores, a integração vertical afeta a tentação das partes de renegar um dado contrato relacional. Então, em um dado ambiente econômico e institucional, um contrato relacional pode ser factível sob integração vertical e não sê-lo para transações através do mercado – e isso será particularmente verdade quando encontrarmos uma grande variação dos preços alternativos dos ativos transacionados nestes contratos. Esses ativos não estão restritos apenas aos físicos, e podem ser o direito à propriedade de um bem ou a discricionariedade que um trabalhador subcontratado tem sobre como alocar o seu tempo na execução do trabalho contratado (Hart, 1992). Dixit (2004) discute o papel da sinalização e dos contratos formais na manutenção desses contratos relacionais. Partindo dessas hipóteses e com base na literatura de incentivos, as proposições de BGM e de Dixit são testadas. A decisão das empresas entre contratar serviços legais através do mercado ou manter um departamento jurídico próprio podem ser explicadas principalmente pela variação dos preços dos ativos (nesse caso, o valor dos serviços legais, que pode ser expresso pela maior ou menor competição no mercado de trabalho – Bertrand, 2004), mas também pelo ambiente institucional, particularmente pelo tempo necessário para se obter uma decisão da justiça e a variação do resultado esperado. Os resultados dos testes empíricos apontam para a confirmação da hipótese principal e sugere algumas linhas de pesquisa. / This work analyzes the role of relational contracts in the decision between subcontracting or vertical integration and the conditions that make these contracts feasible. The propositions of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002 – since now, just BGM) and Dixit (2004) are tested and the results are supportive to the main propositions. Firms can conduct their operations through the market or can operate in a high degree of vertical integration. In the second case firms avoid what we call “holdup” problems - that is, when it comes time to work out the terms of the deal left open at the outset, the other side might demand terms of trade that are onerous but not so onerous that the first part would willingly forfeit the value of those transaction-specific assets by taking its business elsewhere. If all this assets belongs to one firm, there is no problem at all, and that explain this second choice, the vertical integration (Williamson, 1985). This rationale, however, don’t explain why some companies operate through networks, arrangements where the parties stay economically separate entities but having long-term relationship. Toyota and others Japanese Automobile Companies are the typical example (Holmström, Roberts, 1998). Relational contracts help circumvent difficulties in formal contracting no matter if these difficulties come from holdup problems or from another source. A relational contract allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes available (MacNeil, 1978). There is a caveat, however: they cannot be enforced by a third party and must be self-enforcing, that means, the value of the future relationship must be sufficiently large that neither party wishes to renege (BGM, 2002, Dixit, 2004). But what makes some contracts to breakdown until others goes well? BGM examine the problem in the light of relational contracts and property rights theory. According to them, integration affects the parties’ temptation to renege a given relational contract. Thus, in a given environment, a desirable relational contract might be feasible under integration but not under nonintegration – and this will be particularly true when we face a wide varying alternative prices of an asset. These assets are not restricted to physical ones, and can be even a legal title to a good or the discretion that a outsourced worker have about how to allocate his time doing the job (Hart, 1992). Dixit (2004) discuss the role of signalization and formal contracts in the maintenance of these relational contracts. Departing from these hypotheses and with ground on the incentive literature, the BGM’s and Dixit’s propositions were tested. The companies’ decision between to contract law services in the market or to employ an internal legal department can be explained mainly by the variation on assets value (in the case, the value of legal services, expressed by a greater competition degree – Bertrand, 2004), but also by the institutional environment, particularly the time to reach a decision and the variability of the expected result. The results of the empirical research confirm the main assumption and point some lines of research in the relational contracts field.

O presente trabalho é resultado de uma pesquisa que teve como objetivo a investigação sobre o possível desenvolvimento de uma nova teoria jurídica nos trabalhos vinculados a Law and Economics. A hipótese testada ainda inclui a concepção de que essa Teoria Econômica do Direito teria a eficiência como seu fundamento moral, atribuindo ao Direito a função de maximização da utilidade, riqueza ou bem-estar sociais. Para tanto, apresenta descrição sobre a maneira pela qual modelos e conceitos econômicos foram transformados em instrumentos metodológicos usados para descrever e fazer prescrições a respeito do conteúdo das regras jurídicas e de sua aplicação. Este estudo ainda explora os mecanismos sociais de produção e aplicação do Direito, a fim de verificar como suas características podem limitar essa função maximizadora atribuída pela Análise Econômica do Direito. Por fim, investiga-se quais recursos teóricos e retóricos tomaram utilizável pelo Direito o conceito puramente econômico da eficiência e o transformaram em um valor moral a guiar decisões jurídicas ou políticas. O consenso é, então, perquirido como o fundamento último sobre o qual se assentam a eficiência e a maximização como valores morais. / This paper is a product of a research which aimed to study the potential development of a new legal theory within the paper works written by those authors usually associated with the Law and Economies School. The hypothesis tested established the existence of an Economic Legal Theory that would be morally based on efficiency concepts and that assigned to the legal rules a function related to the maximization of social utility, wealth and welfare. In order to accomplish this task, this paper presents a description of how economic models and concepts were turned into methodological instruments to describe and make prescriptions about the legal rules dispositions and their application. Further, the research explores the social structures assigned to enact legal rules and those responsible for their enforcement, in order to verify how their qualifications are able to promote within the social rules efforts the function prescribed by the Economic Analysis of Law. At last, this paper explores the theoretical and rhetoric instruments that made possible the use of the purely economic concept of efficiency into a moral value claimed as an ideal guide of political and legal decisions. The consent is, then, tested as the final basis on which efficiency and maximization as moral principles lay on.

Orientador: José Maria Ferreira Jardim da Silveira / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-24T22:05:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Barros_PauloBertideAzevedo_D.pdf: 1986087 bytes, checksum: 435fa35b6418ac43b4217dae2acdd720 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: O Programa de bioenergia (BIOEN) criado em 2008 pela Fapesp, teve por propósito estabelecer uma linha de financiamento para pesquisa científico-tecnológica no setor de bioenergia, em especial da proveniente da cana-de-açúcar. Essa proposta exige para o seu sucesso uma articulação adequada entre a universidade e as necessidades de avanço tecnológico demandadas e a serem incorporadas pelas empresas. Nesse contexto as questões de propriedade intelectual e novos modelos de gestão de pesquisa ganham importância. Esta tese visa analisar mudanças no desenho organizacional em laboratórios e grupos de pesquisa financiados pelo BIOEN e analisar nesses projetos questões de propriedade intelectual sob a perspectiva da economia política do direito de propriedade. Para atingir estes objetivos foi realizado um estudo com a aplicação de questionário e entrevistas a 43 líderes de projetos financiados pelo BIOEN. Os métodos de coleta de dados combinaram abordagens quantitativas e qualitativas. O questionário incluiu questões que abrangiam vários tópicos: caracterização geral do laboratório e dos recursos humanos; fonte de financiamento e compartilhamento dos equipamentos mais caros; impacto do programa BIOEN, segundo a percepção dos líderes em vários aspectos físicos e organizacionais dos laboratórios; avaliação dos líderes quanto à missão do BIOEN e ao sucesso do programa em relação a vários aspectos, inclusive quanto ao envolvimento de empresas; percepção dos líderes quanto a questões referentes à propriedade intelectual e a liberdade para operar e avaliação destes pesquisadores quanto aos riscos e restrições para o desenvolvimento de seus projetos. Os resultados apontaram que nos laboratórios financiados 52,9% dos técnicos, 58% dos alunos de pós-graduação e 61,4% dos pós-doc estão vinculados diretamente ao projeto do BIOEN; 38,9% dos equipamentos mais caros desses laboratórios foram financiados pelo BIOEN e que 63,9% dos equipamentos são compartilhados com outros grupos de pesquisa da mesma ou de outra instituição; o programa, segundo os líderes, influenciou pouco a área física, mas teve impacto importante na ampliação de colaborações, na modernização de equipamentos e no potencial de produção; apenas 16% dos líderes concordam plenamente que as parcerias entre os laboratórios acadêmicos e de industrias estão ocorrendo no âmbito do BIOEN, mas 80% deles concordam plenamente que essa parceria é importante; a maioria (71%) concorda que o programa BIOEN está sendo bem sucedidos quanto à produção científica e tecnológica. Quanto às questões de propriedade intelectual, 61% dos líderes relataram pretender solicitar patente com os resultados do projeto, e 5 (11,6%) pesquisadores já haviam passado por terem tido negado material que haviam solicitado, e 11(25,6%)já haviam assinado algum Acordo de transferência de material, sendo que 54% dos líderes já haviam prestado assessorias a empresas. As entrevistas revelaram as dificuldades dos pesquisadores em patentear seus resultados, e que o interesse e o uso dos resultados pelo setor privado está aquém do esperado e a maioria concorda que a prática científica que desenvolvem é adequadamente aplicada ao setor. Portanto, uma governança voltada para conciliação dos diversos interesses - acadêmicos, do setor público e privado ¿ pode promover a integração necessária e fortalecer ainda mais o já bem sucedido setor sucroenergético brasileiro / Abstract: The Bioenergy Program (BIOEN) created in 2008 by FAPESP , had the purpose to establish a scientific- technological research division funding in the bioenergy sector, in particular from the cane sugar biomass. This Program requires for its success a proper link between the university, the needs and demands for technological advances being incorporated by the companies. In this context the issues of intellectual property and new management models in research practices gain importance. This thesis aims to analyze changes in the organizational design of laboratories and research groups financed by BIOEN t and analyze intellectual property issues from the perspective of the political economy of property right. To achieve these objectives was conducted a field study with the use of questionnaire and interviews with 43 research leaders funded by BIOEN. The method of data collection was a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. The questionnaire included questions covering various topics: general characterization of laboratory and human resources ; the source of funding and sharing of expensive equipment; the impact of BIOEN program , as perceived by research leaders in various physical and organizational aspects of the laboratories; evaluation of leaders about the BIOEN mission and the success of the program in many respects, including the enrolment of companies; perception of the leaders on issues relating to intellectual property and freedom to operate and perception of these researchers to the risks and constraints in the development of their projects . The results showed that in 52.9 % funded laboratory technicians , 58 % of students graduate and 61.4% of the post-doc are linked directly to the BIOEN project; 38.9% of the most expensive equipment of these laboratories were funded by BIOEN and 63.9% of the facilities are shared with other research groups in the same institution or another; the program , according to the leaders , had little influence on physical area, but had an important impact on the increase of collaborations, modernization of equipment and production potential; only 16% of leaders strongly agree that partnerships between the academic and industrial laboratories are occurring within the BIOEN , but 80% of them strongly agree that this partnership is important; the majority (71%) agree that BIOEN program is successful in scientific and technological production. The questions on intellectual property, 61% of leaders reported they would like to issue patent applications, and 5 (11.6%) researchers had in one occasion denied material that had been requested, and 11 (25.6%) had signed a material transfer agreement, and 54% of leaders had provided consulting services to companies .The interviews revealed the difficulties that researchers have to patent their findings, and that the use of the results are of private sector interest and by this is less than expected the sector interest and most agree that the scientific practice is properly applied to develop the sector .Thus, a governance aimed at reconciling the various interests - academic, public and private sector - can promote the necessary integration and further strengthen the already successful Brazilian sugarcane industry / Doutorado / Teoria Economica / Doutor em Ciências Econômicas

Dans le cadre des actions en responsabilité civile, la proportion de conflits résolus par le biais d’un accord à l’amiable entre les parties reste très hétérogène à travers les différents pays. L’échec des négociations entre les parties sont sources de procès dont le coût est élevé, à la fois pour l’état mais également pour les parties impliquées dans le litige. Dans cette thèse, nous utilisons unelarge panoplie de méthodes empiriques afin d’étudier les variables susceptibles d’influencer la probabilité de conciliation entre deux parties engagées dans une action en justice. Les travaux réalisés se divisent en quatre grands thèmes. Dans un premier temps, nous réalisons une méta-analyse afin d’étudier la rationalité des individus dans l’un des jeux de négociations les plus simples : lejeu de l’ultimatum. Les résultats de notre analyse montrent que les proposants agissent de manière rationnelle et anticipent correctement le comportement des répondants qui leur font face, de manière à maximiser leur profit. Consécutivementà cela, nous réalisons une méta analyse comparative des jeux de l’ultimatum et du dictateur afin d’analyser l’hypothèse d’équité selon laquelle les offres formulées dans ces deux jeux ne sont pas significativement différentes. Notre étude permet d’établir une corrélation positive entre le niveau de développement des pays et la probabilité de rejet de cette hypothèse. Dans un troisième temps, nous nous intéressons aux variables susceptibles d’influencer la probabilité de conciliation entre deux parties impliquées dans un litige prud’homal en France. La présence d’un avocat pour le demandeur lors de la phase de conciliation ainsi que l’importance de la somme en jeu dans le litige semblent exercer une influence négative sur la probabilité de conciliation. Enfin, nous réalisons une expérience en laboratoire afin d’analyser le comportement des individus qui ne souhaitent pas négocier mais y sont tout de même contraints. Les résultats de notre expérience montrent que les sujets sont plus agressifs lorsqu’ils sont contraints à négocier. Cette agressivité se traduit par des offres moins généreuses ainsi qu’un taux de rejet plus élevé. / In civil liability actions, the proportion of cases that are settled through conciliation remains very low in some countries. Negotiation failures lead to trials, the cost of which is high for both the state and the parties involved in litigation. in this thesis, we use a wide range of empirical tools to investigate the determinants that contribute to the success or failure of settlement between two parties involved in a legal action. We contribute to this topic through four original studies. We first investigate the rationality of players in one of the most simple bargaining games : the ultimatum game. For that purpose, we perform a metaanalysis of the three last decades of experimental research. Proposers’ choices, that do no match the theoretical equilibrium of the game, are found to be rationalegiven the observed behavior of responders. Subsequently, we perform a comparative meta-analysis of the ultimatum and the dictator game to investigate the “fairness hypothesis” according to which off ers in these two games are not significantly different. We find that the more developed a country, the more likely the “fairness hypothesis” is to be rejected. In a third place, we aim to identify the forces that shape decision-making in the pretrial conciliation phase of French labor courts. The results are twofold. First, conciliation is less likely when plaintiff s are assisted by a lawyer. Second, we find that the likelihood of settlement decreases as the amount at stake increases. Finally, through an original experiment, we empirically investigate the behavior of individuals who do not want to bargain, but are forced to do so. We show that individuals who are forced to bargain make less generous offers and are less likely to conciliate.

La responsabilité des intermédiaires d'Internet fait débat dans un univers numérique de plus en plus complexe. Les intermédiaires offrent des services en ligne. Ils créent ou facilitent des transactions entre des parties tierces (hébergement, e-commerce, fournisseurs d'accès…). A la fin des années 1990, un consensus s'est établi sur l'instauration d'une responsabilité limitée pour ces acteurs, dans le but de favoriser leur développement ainsi que celui d'Internet par des externalités croisées. Cependant, l'apparition régulière de nouveaux usages a induit des externalités négatives affectant certains agents économiques. La multiplication récente de décisions de jurisprudence parfois contradictoires, en particulier dans le domaine de la propriété intellectuelle, vient désormais remettre en cause cette exemption. Elle fait naître un risque juridique pour les intermédiaires d'Internet. Ces-derniers doivent alors prendre en compte ce nouveau contexte dans leurs modèles d'affaires. Notre recherche étudie les comportements spécifiques que la responsabilité des intermédiaires d'Internet engendre à travers l'exemple de la propriété intellectuelle. En premier lieu nous décrivons l'évolution historique de cette responsabilité. Nous développons ensuite un modèle théorique simple qui explore l'influence du risque légal dans un contexte de concurrence entre un intermédiaire et un ayant droit du copyright. Enfin nous étendons ce modèle de concurrence aux différents comportements de protection que peuvent choisir les intermédiaires. / Internet intermediaries' liability is a rising issue in a more and more complex digital environment. Intermediaries provide online services. They create or facilitate transactions between third parties (hosting, online shops, ISPs...). At the end of the 1990s, a limited liability has been established for these actors with the aim of developing intermediaries and Internet through cross externalities. However, the arrivals of new uses and functions have created negative externalities for some economic agents. The new increase of case law sometimes contradictory, in particular for intellectual property rights, questions this exemption. It creates legal risk for Internet intermediaries. Thus, they have to take into account this new situation in their business models. This thesis studies specific behaviors that Internet intermediaries' liability creates with the example of intellectual property rights. First we describe the historic evolution of this liability. Then we develop a simple theoretical model in order to explore the influence of legal risk when there is competition between an intermediary and a copyright holder. Finally, the model is extended to take into account avoidance activities of Internet intermediaries.