This dissertation is concerned with the ways in which Māori legal traditions have changed in response to the process of negotiated settlement of historical claims against the state. The settlements agreed between Māori groups and the state provide significant opportunities and challenges for Māori communities and, inevitably, force those communities to confront questions relating to the application of their own legal traditions to these changed, and still changing, circumstances. This dissertation focuses specifically on Māori legal traditions and post-settlement governance entities. However, the intention is not to simply record changes to Māori legal traditions, but to offer some assessment as to whether these changes and adaptations support, or alternatively detract from, the two key goals of the settlement process - reconciliation and Māori self-determination. I argue that where the settlement process is compelling Māori legal traditions to develop in a way that is contrary to reconciliation and Māori self-determination, then the settlement process itself ought to be adjusted. This dissertation studies the nature of changes to Māori legal traditions in the context of the Treaty settlement process, using a framework that can be applied to Māori legal traditions in other contexts. There are many more stories of Māori legal traditions that remain to be told, including stories that drill into the detail of specific legal traditions and create pathways between an appropriate philosophical framework and the practical operation of vibrant Māori legal systems. Those stories will be vital if we in Aotearoa/New Zealand are to move towards reconciliation and Māori self-determination. The story that runs through this dissertation is one of a settlement process that undermines those objectives because of the pressures it places on Māori legal traditions. But it need not be this way. If parties to the Treaty settlement process take the objectives of self-determination and reconciliation seriously, and pay careful attention to changes to Māori legal traditions that take place in the context of that process, a different story can be told – a story in which Treaty settlements signify, not the end of a Treaty relationship, but a new beginning. / Graduate / 0398 / 0332 / 0326 / carwyn@uvic.ca

This dissertation is concerned with the ways in which Māori legal traditions have changed in response to the process of negotiated settlement of historical claims against the state. The settlements agreed between Māori groups and the state provide significant opportunities and challenges for Māori communities and, inevitably, force those communities to confront questions relating to the application of their own legal traditions to these changed, and still changing, circumstances. This dissertation focuses specifically on Māori legal traditions and post-settlement governance entities. However, the intention is not to simply record changes to Māori legal traditions, but to offer some assessment as to whether these changes and adaptations support, or alternatively detract from, the two key goals of the settlement process - reconciliation and Māori self-determination. I argue that where the settlement process is compelling Māori legal traditions to develop in a way that is contrary to reconciliation and Māori self-determination, then the settlement process itself ought to be adjusted. This dissertation studies the nature of changes to Māori legal traditions in the context of the Treaty settlement process, using a framework that can be applied to Māori legal traditions in other contexts. There are many more stories of Māori legal traditions that remain to be told, including stories that drill into the detail of specific legal traditions and create pathways between an appropriate philosophical framework and the practical operation of vibrant Māori legal systems. Those stories will be vital if we in Aotearoa/New Zealand are to move towards reconciliation and Māori self-determination. The story that runs through this dissertation is one of a settlement process that undermines those objectives because of the pressures it places on Māori legal traditions. But it need not be this way. If parties to the Treaty settlement process take the objectives of self-determination and reconciliation seriously, and pay careful attention to changes to Māori legal traditions that take place in the context of that process, a different story can be told – a story in which Treaty settlements signify, not the end of a Treaty relationship, but a new beginning. / Graduate / 0398 / 0332 / 0326 / carwyn@uvic.ca

This paper is a law thesis that is based on a combined theoretical framework of Green Legal Theory (GLT) and Theories of International Regimes (TIR). GLT has a broad conception of ‘law’. It is based on the argument that ‘laws’ exist at different levels and in different forms, and that ‘legal laws’ are themselves manifestations of regulatory dynamics that are embedded in institutions and processes; and cultural logics that generate and support those laws. TIR examines the negotiation, development, formation, and sustenance of international regimes. The paper is a critical analysis of, especially, the combined effects of capitalist laws and the liberal democratic system of state-based governance. This allows me to highlight the underlying factors/dynamics that are responsible for the continuing inability to address climate change because of the mandated pursuit of energy security (i.e. the regulatory imperative). The analysis revolves around four key global actors, which are the multinational corporations (MNCs), the state, civil society (Non-governmental Organizations), and global institutions. First, I discuss the growing economic and political powers of MNCs in a liberalized and deregulated system, and establish the need for a better regulatory system. Second, I criticize the territorial sovereignty principle and deconstruct the contemporary system of national governance, while highlighting the need to relax the Westphalian system for global constitutionalism. Third, I analyze two approaches to globalization, and make a case against ‘globalization from above’ while arguing for ‘globalization from below’. I also highlighted the crucial role non-governmental organizations have begun to play in global governance. Fourth, I make a critical analysis of inter-state relations in global institutions to show the underlying factors that have compromised the level of cooperation needed to address the conundrum. Finally, based on all of the issues that I analyze in the paper, I propose some foundational principles, and a specific strategy, that would help to propel the needed re-form in global governance, to help to restore its ability to address global problems / Graduate / 0398 / 0616 / ikulasi@yahoo.com

This thesis examines data and theory about how the system of law (SL) operates and evolves: it contrasts data from social workers and attorneys working in the juvenile dependency court with theories about how individuals and social systems evolve. The analysis is based on research conducted in San Diego and revolves around a theory about human development, or the "individual as a system" (HD), and a theory about social systems, such as the autopoietic theory of law and its self-reproducing system (LA). It is suggested that together, the theories of HD+LA help to examine how professionals and law operate and evolve in the legal system. Overall, the thesis rejects the autopoietic systems theory that law reproduces itself, by itself. Instead, analysis in this study supports the finding that law is defined and operates through a dialectic of the individual and the social (or the organic and the mechanistic respectively) such that each gives rise to the other. On the basis of this system connection, aspects from systems theory about legal autopoiesis are integrated into concepts from constructive-developmental theory (HDLA), thus providing a new framework through which to examine how law and its system functions. The new framework is built around an equation that emerged some time after data analysis and theoretical development: SL=HDLA+DSA . The equation states that: The evolution of the system of law involves processes of human development and to some but a much lesser degree, the autopoietic nature of law. The extent of this evolution is best determined by analyzing data from a court setting. The dialectical relationship between individual and social influences in the evolution of law is facilitated by the accumulation of social action � such as activity from media and advocacy groups � and the individual meaning that professionals make about this action, which in turn has an influence on the formal and informal operations that they perform when operating law. The nature of these interacting dynamics will be shown through two interconnected tools of analysis: one is a typology of individual, professional and system self-concepts; the typology helps to show how a cycle of system change (human development giving rise to legal change and vice versa) occurs in the court; the other is the operative structure (or culture) of systems for law and social work in child abuse cases � which unite in court operations. These two interconnected tools help to show how the court operates and how social action (SA) for change contributes to professional and system change in the evolution of law.

La peine est une institution paradoxale des démocraties libérales contemporaines : les excès et les effets de sur-pénalisation qu’entraînent certaines politiques sécuritaires sont critiqués, mais l’impunité de certains crimes fait scandale et l’on appelle à ce que justice soit faite ; l’abolition de certaines peines (de prison par exemple) ou l’introduction de formes alternatives de régulation (telles les mesures de justice restaurative) sont revendiquées, mais l’on bute sur la difficulté à donner force au droit sans sanctions dissuasives. La présente thèse porte sur les raisons qui font passer l’institution pénale pour indépassable. Elle soutient qu’au-delà de son statut d’instrument afflictif ou de véhicule au ressentiment collectif, la justice pénale est investie d’un troisième rôle, que l’on propose de nommer la fonction normative de la peine. Cette fonction se manifeste à plusieurs égards : l’institution pénale affirme le caractère fondamental de certains interdits et participe à reconnaître les torts subis par les individus, parfois au rebours de la morale dominante ; elle contribue à déplacer les normes sociales et à distinguer les infractions qui importent à l’État et celles qui demeurent invisibles ; elle modèle le contenu et les formes de la conflictualité sociale en mettant en scène les demandes de justice face à l’autorité publique. L’examen de cette fonction normative et de ses répercussions sur la justification de la peine constitue les deux versants de ce travail. La première partie montre qu’au nom du rôle de reconnaissance des torts et des injustices dont l’institution pénale peut être investie, son emploi peut délibérément accroître la souffrance et l’exclusion sociale des condamnés. La deuxième partie cherche plus fondamentalement à comprendre si et comment l’État peut imposer des repères pratiques et des critères d’évaluation aux individus par la menace, malgré la généralité de la loi et le désaccord qui peut affecter les décisions des tribunaux. La troisième partie évalue les ambiguïtés de l’identification des condamnations à la reconnaissance d’un tort. Indexer la sévérité de la peine à la demande de la victime tout en tenant compte du châtiment mérité par le coupable revient à confier à la justice la tâche d’évaluer avec justesse les motifs des différends entre individus et groupes. Le problème est qu’elle le fait dans un cadre défini a priori par trois opérations : la qualification des infractions, l’imputation de la responsabilité et l’individualisation de la sentence. L’enquête conclut que la peine ne se réduit pas à un instrument auxiliaire de dissuasion ou de neutralisation. Elle contribue à trancher les conflits et à transformer la vie morale d’une société, ce qui explique en partie sa résistance face aux arguments de l’abolitionnisme ou de la justice restaurative. Elle demeure néanmoins une institution ambivalente, dont la justification est insatisfaisante : à la fois point d’appui à l’expression des demandes de justice, et, en raison de son caractère étatique, source de déception pour ces mêmes demandes. / Punishment is a paradoxical institution of contemporary democratic societies: the abuses and over-penalisation consequences of security policies are criticized, but the impunity of certain crimes remains scandalous and people urge for justice; the abolition of specific kinds of punishments (for instance prison) or the introduction of alternative forms of regulation (such as practices of restorative justice) are claimed, but the difficulty of enforcing law without deterrent sanctions seems inextricable. This dissertation deals with the reasons why such an institution as criminal justice is considered as unavoidable. It advocates that punishment assumes a third role in society, beyond its use as an afflictive instrument or as a vehicle for collective indignation. I call it the normative function of punishment. This function is manifested through various phenomena: penal institutions affirm the fundamental character of certain prohibitions and take part in recognizing wrongs suffered by individuals, even sometimes against the dominant morality; they help renew social norms and distinguish offenses that matter to the state from those that stay invisible; they shape the content and the forms of social conflictuality by raising demands for justice in front of the public authority. The study of this normative function and its consequences regarding the justification of punishment form the two sides of this dissertation. In the first part, I claim that in order to recognize wrongs and injustices, criminal justice can deliberately increase the social suffering and the exclusion of those who are punished. In the second part, I try to understand more fundamentally how penal institutions provide direct practical guides and evaluation criteria to individuals, despite the generality of legal norms and the disagreement that may affect courts’ decisions. In the third and final part, I assess the difficulty to identify criminal conviction with wrongs recognition. If the severity of sentences is indexed to the request of victims, and if judges still intend to limit deserved punishment to one’s culpability, criminal justice is entrusted with the task of accurately assessing the reasons of conflicts between individuals or groups. The problem is that it does so within a framework based (a priori) on three practices: the legal definition of offenses, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the individualization of sentence. This work concludes that punishment cannot be defined as a secondary instrument of deterrence or neutralization. Punishment contributes to resolve conflicts and transform societies’ moral life, which partly explains its resistance to claims of abolitionism or to restorative justice theory. However, criminal justice remains an ambivalent institution, of which justification is unsatisfactory: it is both a mean to express demands for justice and, as it remains in the hands of the state, a source of disappointment regarding these same demands.

O presente trabalho parte da concepção de que o direito constitui um medium de exposição da realidade, em analogia, ainda que distante, com as reflexões sobre a literatura do filólogo alemão Erich Auerbach. Desse ponto de partida, segue-se para a identificação de um tema específico em que essa forma de exposição jurídica poderia, com mais clareza, ser analisada. São então enfocados os conflitos e debates ligados às desapropriações por zona realizadas no século XX na cidade de São Paulo e que estiveram fortemente relacionadas com os movimentos de estruturação e crescimento da metrópole. Da observação das densidades históricas e jurídicas do projeto de saneamento do Rio Pinheiros e da reurbanização do Metrô de Santana, será possível identificar, pelo contraste existente entre eles, uma alteração na forma como, face a um mesmo instituto jurídico a desapropriação variou o modo de conceber o público e o privado, suas funções e limites. Se no começo do século XX foi unanimemente aceito o exercício por uma empresa privada do direito de expropriação de terras particulares ao longo do Rio Pinheiros, as visões se alterariam de tal forma que ato semelhante, nos anos de 1970, levaria a uma profunda divisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal quanto à legalidade da medida. A hipótese pesquisada é a de que a jurisprudência reflete e medeia movimentos mais amplos da sociedade e, por isso, tornou-se mais permeável à representação de outros interesses e alargou seu espectro de exposição da realidade, o que se busca mostrar no epílogo com o exemplo da reintegração de posse de uma favela em São Paulo, em que a racionalidade jurídica mais estrita cedeu lugar a uma representação mais direta de um conflito urbano. / The work departs from the conception that the law is a medium of realitys representation, in analogy, perhaps distant, with the work on literature of the German philologist Erich Auerbach. Taking this as a starting point, what follows identifies a specific subject in law practice in which the laws representation of reality could be clearly analyzed: the conflicts and debates arising from excess condemnation procedures in São Paulo along the 20th century and their relationship to the growth and restructuring of the city as a metropolis. Its aim is to observe legal and historical densities related to urban projects of intervention in the Pinheiros River and the urbanization for the construction of the Santana subway station. In both cases shall be identified, in their contrast, how the conceptions of private and public changed along the years. Even if the analysis keeps centered on the same legal instrument takings procedures it shall nevertheless become clear that conceptions of public and private spheres have undergone deep changes, as well as the functions and roles that each of these spheres plays in Brazilian society. If in the beginning of the 20th century the exercise of excess condemnation rights by a private company was unanimously accepted, the legal mentalities would significantly change so that the same procedure would create a deep dissention within Brazilian Supreme Court Justices when they had to decide on its legality. The research hypothesis is that judicial decisions became more open to the representation of a legal reality containing the interests of different people and groups, what shall be shown in the conclusion by the analysis of a legal action undertaken against a slum in São Paulo at the end of 20th century in São Paulo.

A dissertação visa expor a tese de Ronald Dworkin que veio a ser conhecida como interpretativismo, segundo a qual o direito é uma prática interpretativa. O objetivo principal é entender a contribuição metodológica que essa tese representa para o entendimento teórico do direito e qual seu argumento contra teorias do direito meramente descritivas. Para localizar a contribuição de Dworkin, são apresentadas, em primeiro lugar, as inovações metodológicas que surgem na obra seminal de Herbert Hart, O Conceito de Direito. A ideia chave que passa a ser discutida a partir dessa obra é a de ponto de vista interno. É considerada uma tese segundo a qual o próprio Hart teria plantado as sementes do interpretativismo. A teoria de Dworkin é então apresentada como uma teoria que, inicialmente, preocupa-se em entender a controvérsia no direito. Para isso, ela se vale de do argumento dos desacordos teóricos e do argumento relacionado do ferrão semântico. Esses argumentos revelam uma característica política da prática jurídica que o positivismo analítico desconsiderou, ao tentar entender essa prática apenas por meio da abordagem da filosofia da linguagem. Ao interpretativismo é contraposto então o desafio proposto por uma teoria positivista contemporânea, a qual, ainda que não discorde do caráter normativo da prática, pretende defender o descritivismo na teoria. Por fim, como resposta a esse desafio, é apresentada a formulação mais recente do interpretativismo, a partir das obras de Dworkin Justiça de Toga e Justice for Hedgehogs. Nessas obras, estão formulados de maneira definitiva dois argumentos que são a chave para o entendimento da teoria interpretativa de Dworkin: o argumento sobre caráter controverso da prática jurídica e a indisponibilidade de explicações criteriais, e o argumento sobre a impossibilidade de realização de teorias arquimedianas (externas). A conclusão do trabalho é apresentada em forma de uma agenda de pesquisas para a teoria do direito e também para a sociologia jurídica, agenda esta que decorre da adoção da teoria interpretativista como a maneira mais adequada de enxergar a prática jurídica. / The dissertation aims to expose the Ronald Dworkins thesis that has come to be known as interpretivism, according to which the law is an \"interpretive practice\". The main objective is to understand the methodological contribution that this thesis represents to the theoretical understanding of the law, and the argument it offers against merely descriptive theories of law. To locate the contribution of Dworkin\'s theory, the dissertation presents, first, the methodological innovations that arise in the seminal work of Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law. The key idea that starts being discussed is that of the internal point of view. It is considered an argument that Hart himself would have \"planted the seeds\" of Dworkins interpretivism. Dworkin\'s theory is then presented as a theory that is initially concerned to understand the controversy in the practice of law. For that, it relies on the argument of theoretical disagreements and on the argument regarding the \"semantic sting\". These arguments reveal the political character of legal practice that was disregarded by analytical positivism due to its commitment to understand this practice only through the approach of the philosophy of language. Interpretivism is then contrasted to the challenge posed by a contemporary positivist theory, which agrees that the legal practice has normative character, but intends to defend descriptivism in theory. Finally, in response to this challenge, it is presented the latest formulation of interpretivism, bearing on recent Dworkin\'s books, Justice in Robes and Justice for Hedgehogs. In these works, two arguments that are key to the understanding of Dworkin\'s interpretive theory receive its final formulation: the argument about the controversial character of legal practice and the unavailability of criterial explanations, and the argument about the impossibility of \"Archimedean\" (external) theories. Following the adoption of interpretive theory as the most appropriate way of looking at legal practice, the study concludes in the form of a research agenda for the theory of law and to legal sociology.

Although United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) are said to protect humanitarian rights, peacekeepers are found to commit sexual assault, war crimes, and gross negligence. International legal immunities exempt peacekeepers and the UN from criminal liability and civil litigation. Whereas the literature on peacekeeper abuses conceptualizes the problem to be one of implementation of immunities, this thesis contends that such views are uncritical towards peacekeeping, immunity itself, and international society that organizes UNPKO. I theorize that the legal structures permitting such abuses (e.g. the UN Charter) render individuals expendable and hence objectified for the sake of international order. The argument presents a case study of the Srebrenica Massacre and ensuing legal cases to illustrate how immunities objectify individuals. Drawing on Agamben's theory of homo sacer, I introduce the term civis sacer to describe individuals excluded from international law with UNPKO immunities that objectifies them for the sake of maintaining international order. / Graduate / 0616

Partant du constat de la récente consécration de la notion d’acte juridique par le code civil, cette thèse s’interroge sur les conséquences de cet avènement par rapport à la notion de contrat. L’auteur commence par montrer que cette adjonction de l’acte juridique au contrat est nécessaire. En effet, comme le montre nettement l’étude de la relation médicale que l’auteur prend comme point de départ, le contrat rencontre des faiblesses techniques et psychosociales, rendant impossible son application dans certaines situations.D’où l’importance, au-delà du contrat, de disposer d’un autre outil : l’acte juridique. Pour que ce dernier soit efficace, il est nécessaire d’approfondir sa définition et de le doter d’un régime propre, distinct du contrat. D’après cette étude, l’acte juridique se définit désormais comme un acte volontaire reconnu dans un ordre juridique comme créant des normes. Plusieurs propriétés de l’acte juridique ont été mises à jour, notamment l’existence de conditions de validité propres tenant à l’exigence d’une volonté non viciée de l’auteur de l’acte et à la licéité des motifs. Bien que ces propriétés aient été dégagées à partir du droit des contrats, il a été vérifié qu’elles pouvaient s’appliquer à l’ensemble des actes juridiques, en passant du consentement de la victime en droit pénal, au mariage, au jugement ou à la loi. / On the acknowledgment of the recent consecration of the notion of legal act by the Frencg civil code, the purpose of this thesis is to reflect on the consequence of this evolution on the notion of contract.The author first starts by demonstrating that the addition of the legal act to the contract is necessary. Indeed, a close study of the medical relation shows that the contract has technical and psychosocial weaknesses which make it impossible to be used in some situations. Henceforth the importance of having another tool at one’s disposal, the legal act, likely to take over from the contract. In order to enable thelegal act to sustain the contract, it is yet necessary to reinforce this first concept, going deeper in itsdefinition and giving it its own legal system, separate from the one of the contract. In this work legalwas eventually defined as an act acknowledged in a legal system as creating legal normes. Moreover,several properties have been highlighted, in particular the existence of its own validity conditions, owingfirst to the requirement of the unflawed will of the author of the act and second to the legitimacy of the motives. Although these properties were brought out from contract law, it has been shown that they could apply to all legal acts, from victim consent in criminal law, to marriage, judgment, administrative act or to the law.

An embedded case study investigating the ongoing securitization of migration in the EU from 2014-2020 and the role of legal institutions, in this case the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in these processes. Securitization Theory is used in combination with Critical Legal Theory to create a framework that attempts to both illuminate the role of the functional actor in Securitization Theory further, and the impact securitization has on legal institutions. It provides explanations for sudden shifts in legal argumentation, especially in cases of high political relevance with the use of Critical Legal Theory. The case of N.D. & N.T. vs. Spain serves as an example of a functional actor providing two contrasting judgments on the same events within a short period of time and opens up discussions about political influences on legal institutions. Securitization and the framing of refugees as existential threats to European identity and culture is one of the many ongoing political processes related to the issue of migration and refuge in Europe. As the political landscape shifts and right-wing populist parties establish themselves in European Member States, illegal pushbacks have become common practice at the outer borders of the EU and are challenged both politically and legally. This study investigated cases of illegal pushbacks to renew criticism against the institutions engaging in and enabling the practice.