La déontologie constitue, de tout temps, un élément essentiel de la profession d'avocat. Constituée d'un ensemble de règles, dont certaines restent purement coutumières, elle est ce qui fait de l'avocat bien plus qu'un simple auxiliaire de la justice. S'il demeure incontestable que l'ensemble des barreaux français adopte, et depuis très longtemps, une attitude commune sur les principes, en partie dictée par le puissant barreau de Paris, il n'en est pas moins vrai, que les barreaux de province, et notamment ceux du sud-est, ont toujours fait preuve d'indépendance, préférant, bien souvent, l'esprit à la lettre. Leur position en ce qui concerne principalement la recherche de clientèle et la lutte contre les réseaux d'affaires est incontestablement courageuse. La réponse qu'ils donnent au délicat de problème de l'honoraire est novatrice. Les Conseils de l'Ordre, principalement dans le Sud-Est, avant d'être des organes de sanction, sont avant tout des organes de conseil. Ceux du ressort de la Cour d'appel d'Aix-en-Provence font de la conservation des traditions un devoir et de la modération une vertu. / Legal ethics have always been an essential part of legal business. Made up of a set of rules, some of which are merely customary rules, legal ethics lead the lawyer to be more than an aid of the justice. One usually notice the common, very ancient and general agreement of all french Bars on some principles, behaviour partly dictated by the powerful Bar of Paris. However, it’s also true that other Bars, in particular those of the South-East of France from Marseille to Nice, have always shown a real independence in the application of such principles, liking better the spirit of these rules than their letter. Regarding the search for customers and the wrestling against business networks, the positions of these bars is unarguably brave. The solution they give to the delicate problem of the fees of the lawyer are innovative. The Bars’ Councils, mainly in the South-East of the France, besides being organs of penalty for their profession, are especially organs of reflexion ans council. Those depending of the competence of the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence, carry out the duty to defend the traditions and consider moderation as virtue.

Not available / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1915. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.

In the twenty-first century, as in the sixteenth, a blindfolded woman holding a sword and scales personifies justice; her blindfold conveys impartiality, her scales evenhandedness, and her sword the authority to compel obedience. In pre-democratic early modern England, Justice’s iconography was often used to legitimate the pain that the state imposed on those who broke the common peace. Simultaneously, the creative and cultural narratives within which the penal code was embedded often complicated and contradicted the state’s legally violent precepts. The relationship between legal violence and justice is at the center of this project: Must the law be violent to control violence? Does the law’s violence promote justice or disrupt it? How do the formal mechanisms of law and social control operate within the complex world of art, sermons, and literature? This project maps the late Elizabethan and early Stuart engagement with those questions. I examine a continuum of responses to legal violence embedded in the judicial institutions of Parliament, the Star Chamber, and the Queen’s Bench as well as in poetry, plays, sermons, broadsides, iconography, utopian narratives, paintings, and engravings. Often drawing on the metaphoric force of Justice’s symbols, the early modern response to legal violence was not purely semantic but strongly aesthetic, defending, mediating, reflecting, and refracting the state’s formal mechanisms of law. Reading case law along with works by Thomas More, Elizabeth I, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, Edward Coke, John Donne, George Herbert, Thomas Hobbes, John Milton, and Margaret Cavendish, I trace law as a cultural practice, expressed and understood aesthetically through both codified and creative means.

In the twenty-first century, as in the sixteenth, a blindfolded woman holding a sword and scales personifies justice; her blindfold conveys impartiality, her scales evenhandedness, and her sword the authority to compel obedience. In pre-democratic early modern England, Justice’s iconography was often used to legitimate the pain that the state imposed on those who broke the common peace. Simultaneously, the creative and cultural narratives within which the penal code was embedded often complicated and contradicted the state’s legally violent precepts. The relationship between legal violence and justice is at the center of this project: Must the law be violent to control violence? Does the law’s violence promote justice or disrupt it? How do the formal mechanisms of law and social control operate within the complex world of art, sermons, and literature? This project maps the late Elizabethan and early Stuart engagement with those questions. I examine a continuum of responses to legal violence embedded in the judicial institutions of Parliament, the Star Chamber, and the Queen’s Bench as well as in poetry, plays, sermons, broadsides, iconography, utopian narratives, paintings, and engravings. Often drawing on the metaphoric force of Justice’s symbols, the early modern response to legal violence was not purely semantic but strongly aesthetic, defending, mediating, reflecting, and refracting the state’s formal mechanisms of law. Reading case law along with works by Thomas More, Elizabeth I, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, Edward Coke, John Donne, George Herbert, Thomas Hobbes, John Milton, and Margaret Cavendish, I trace law as a cultural practice, expressed and understood aesthetically through both codified and creative means.

Nos casos em que prevalece a incerteza científica sobre as repercussões que novas descobertas da própria ciência e da técnica podem causar nas condições que mantém a harmonia do ambiente, o princípio da precaução surge como instrumento político e jurídico de gestão de riscos. Nesse contexto, onde prevalece a dúvida sobre a causa e o grau de perigo em potencial, encontra-se o seguinte problema: é possível distinguir entre a aplicação racional e a utilização inacional ou arbitrária do princípio da precaução como norma de Direito Ambiental? Diretrizes como a não discriminação, a proporcionalidade e a coerência, que devem orientar as decisões de atuar ou de não atuar, tanto no campo político, como no do Direito Ambiental, exigem das instâncias decisórias o aprofundamento da compreensão do conteúdo de sentido do princípio da precaução, pois o que está em jogo é o equilíbrio entre, por um lado, as liberdades dos indivíduos, das empresas e das organizações, e, por outro, a necessidade de reduzir o risco de efeitos nocivos ao ambiente e à saúde das pessoas. Assim, a presente dissertação tem como objetivo geral a indicação de elementos para que uma decisão jurídica envolvendo ciência e ambiente seja racional, relativamente à fundamentação e à aplicação de medidas inspiradas pelo princípio da precaução. No primeiro capítulo, o trabalho procura esclarecer o conceito de princípio, investigando se há diferença, no âmbito do Direito, entre regras e princípios. Para tanto, são Observadas as contribuições de Dworkin, Alexy e Ávila. Examina-se, ainda, o papel da norma moral na justificação de escolhas racionais e justas, procurando ampliar a compreensão do problema. As bases teóricas escolhidas são as éticas de Aristóteles, Kant e Jonas. No segundo capítulo, a pesquisa pretende analisar- o conteúdo de sentido do princípio da precaução como princípio de direito ambiental, a fim de destacar suas principais características. No terceiro e último capítulo se busca explorar- a ideia de risco, com fundamento, principalmente, na perspectiva de Ulrich Beck, e retomar as principais diretrizes de aplicação do princípio, a partir das quais, por meio do pensamento de Habermas, pretende-se esboçar uma resposta válida ao problema investigado. Tendo em vista a preocupação da sociedade mundial com a proteção dos valores que fundamentam e orientam escolhas, o presente trabalho pode contribuir para melhor compreender, ética e juridicamente, o conteúdo de sentido do princípio da precaução, criando, assim, ao menos teoricamente, condições favoráveis à construção política e jurídica de justificativas ponderadas e coerentes, que buscam formar e orientar a geração e a implementação do Direito Ambiental. / Submitted by Ana Guimarães Pereira (agpereir@ucs.br) on 2015-09-23T19:03:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Ricardo de Abreu.pdf: 20160731 bytes, checksum: 2f8a2ee653b9beab621283461ea39040 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-23T19:03:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Ricardo de Abreu.pdf: 20160731 bytes, checksum: 2f8a2ee653b9beab621283461ea39040 (MD5) / The principle of precaution surges as a political and judicious instrument to manage risks within cases in which there is a prevailing scientific uncertainty about the repercussions that new scientific discoveries and techniques can have on the conditions that maintain a harmonious environment. In this context, where doubt supersedes the potential degree and danger, the following problem arises: Is it possible to distinguish between rational application and irrational utilization or the arbitrary application of the principal of precaution in environmental law? Principals such as anti-discrimination, proportionality and coherence should guide decisions to act or not to act as much as politics and environmental law, and also require that decisions deepen one's understanding of the principle of precaution. Consequently, what is at stake is the balance between, on the one hand, the liberties of individuals business and organizations and, on the other hand, the need to reduce risk of harmful effects on the environment and the public's health. Therefore, the general objective of this dissertation is the identification of the elements needed for making rational legal decisions that involve science and the environment in the context of measures inspired by the principle of precaution. The first chapter aims to clarify the principal concept, examining whether there are differences in the legal context between roles and principles. The contributions of Dworkin, Alexy and Avila. are recognized. The paper of the moral norm in the justification of rational and just choices is examined in order to expand the understanding of the problem. The theoretical foundation consists o f the ethics of Aristotle, Kant and Jonas. The second chapter intends to analyze the meaning of the principle of precaution as the beginning of environmental law, in order to illustrate its main characteristics. The third and final chapter attempts to explore the idea of risk as a fundamental perspective, principally through the perspective of Ulrich Beck, and retake the legal principles of the application from the beginning and through the thoughts of Habermas, intends to sketch a valid answer to the investigated problem. In view of world-wide social concem over the protection of the values that undergird and guide choices, the present work can contribute toward an improved understanding, both ethical andjudicial, the content of the principle of precaution, resulting in the creation of, at least theoretically, conditions favorable for the political, judicial building of coherent and weighted justifications, that aim to form and guide the generation and implementation of environmental law.

Nos casos em que prevalece a incerteza científica sobre as repercussões que novas descobertas da própria ciência e da técnica podem causar nas condições que mantém a harmonia do ambiente, o princípio da precaução surge como instrumento político e jurídico de gestão de riscos. Nesse contexto, onde prevalece a dúvida sobre a causa e o grau de perigo em potencial, encontra-se o seguinte problema: é possível distinguir entre a aplicação racional e a utilização inacional ou arbitrária do princípio da precaução como norma de Direito Ambiental? Diretrizes como a não discriminação, a proporcionalidade e a coerência, que devem orientar as decisões de atuar ou de não atuar, tanto no campo político, como no do Direito Ambiental, exigem das instâncias decisórias o aprofundamento da compreensão do conteúdo de sentido do princípio da precaução, pois o que está em jogo é o equilíbrio entre, por um lado, as liberdades dos indivíduos, das empresas e das organizações, e, por outro, a necessidade de reduzir o risco de efeitos nocivos ao ambiente e à saúde das pessoas. Assim, a presente dissertação tem como objetivo geral a indicação de elementos para que uma decisão jurídica envolvendo ciência e ambiente seja racional, relativamente à fundamentação e à aplicação de medidas inspiradas pelo princípio da precaução. No primeiro capítulo, o trabalho procura esclarecer o conceito de princípio, investigando se há diferença, no âmbito do Direito, entre regras e princípios. Para tanto, são Observadas as contribuições de Dworkin, Alexy e Ávila. Examina-se, ainda, o papel da norma moral na justificação de escolhas racionais e justas, procurando ampliar a compreensão do problema. As bases teóricas escolhidas são as éticas de Aristóteles, Kant e Jonas. No segundo capítulo, a pesquisa pretende analisar- o conteúdo de sentido do princípio da precaução como princípio de direito ambiental, a fim de destacar suas principais características. No terceiro e último capítulo se busca explorar- a ideia de risco, com fundamento, principalmente, na perspectiva de Ulrich Beck, e retomar as principais diretrizes de aplicação do princípio, a partir das quais, por meio do pensamento de Habermas, pretende-se esboçar uma resposta válida ao problema investigado. Tendo em vista a preocupação da sociedade mundial com a proteção dos valores que fundamentam e orientam escolhas, o presente trabalho pode contribuir para melhor compreender, ética e juridicamente, o conteúdo de sentido do princípio da precaução, criando, assim, ao menos teoricamente, condições favoráveis à construção política e jurídica de justificativas ponderadas e coerentes, que buscam formar e orientar a geração e a implementação do Direito Ambiental. / The principle of precaution surges as a political and judicious instrument to manage risks within cases in which there is a prevailing scientific uncertainty about the repercussions that new scientific discoveries and techniques can have on the conditions that maintain a harmonious environment. In this context, where doubt supersedes the potential degree and danger, the following problem arises: Is it possible to distinguish between rational application and irrational utilization or the arbitrary application of the principal of precaution in environmental law? Principals such as anti-discrimination, proportionality and coherence should guide decisions to act or not to act as much as politics and environmental law, and also require that decisions deepen one's understanding of the principle of precaution. Consequently, what is at stake is the balance between, on the one hand, the liberties of individuals business and organizations and, on the other hand, the need to reduce risk of harmful effects on the environment and the public's health. Therefore, the general objective of this dissertation is the identification of the elements needed for making rational legal decisions that involve science and the environment in the context of measures inspired by the principle of precaution. The first chapter aims to clarify the principal concept, examining whether there are differences in the legal context between roles and principles. The contributions of Dworkin, Alexy and Avila. are recognized. The paper of the moral norm in the justification of rational and just choices is examined in order to expand the understanding of the problem. The theoretical foundation consists o f the ethics of Aristotle, Kant and Jonas. The second chapter intends to analyze the meaning of the principle of precaution as the beginning of environmental law, in order to illustrate its main characteristics. The third and final chapter attempts to explore the idea of risk as a fundamental perspective, principally through the perspective of Ulrich Beck, and retake the legal principles of the application from the beginning and through the thoughts of Habermas, intends to sketch a valid answer to the investigated problem. In view of world-wide social concem over the protection of the values that undergird and guide choices, the present work can contribute toward an improved understanding, both ethical andjudicial, the content of the principle of precaution, resulting in the creation of, at least theoretically, conditions favorable for the political, judicial building of coherent and weighted justifications, that aim to form and guide the generation and implementation of environmental law.

Even if they do not realize it, readers are perpetually in a condition that is strikingly similar to that of the Good Samaritan. Right now they have access to a vast network of communication that both enhances their senses and increases their sphere of influence. They can, for example, sit down at a computer and click on a certain combination of "sites" and the result will be that, in two weeks (or sooner), a DVD will arrive on their doorstep. Or, they can choose another combination, and the result will be that, in about two weeks (or less), a child will be saved from starvation and dehydration in some distant and destitute nation. Like the Good Samaritan, a reader of this thesis can see the desperate need of others and they have the ability to affect their condition. This perpetual Good Samaritan condition is directly a result of the recent changes the world has undergone as a result of technological advancement. This thesis is an exploration of the ethical implications of the potential perpetual good Samaritan. I will argue that (1) affluent individuals are able to affect positively the global poor and that they have a moral obligation to do so, (2) that this moral obligation is limited insofar as fulfilling the obligation requires a moral agent to sacrifice something of substantial significance (i.e., something that would cause a long term decrease in happiness), and (3) fulfilling this obligation requires specific actions on political, social, and individual levels.

This thesis identifies the financial incentives of litigants and lawyers to behave in certain ways in relation to civil litigation files. By identifying such incentives, this thesis raises questions about the extent to which substantive and procedural private law is capable of being influenced by them. Specifically, this thesis argues that: lawyers have a lawmaking function within the private law system; lawyers have financial incentives distinct from those of their clients; and the costs of retaining lawyers produce observable incentives and effects on the outcomes of civil litigation matters. In addition to the many theoretical materials cited, empirical data have been cited from research observing the legal profession in North America and elsewhere. This thesis argues that external influences--such as financial incentives for non-parties--can affect the way private law applies and develops. This thesis also identifies general regulatory strategies that might limit the influence of external factors on private law.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-15T11:36:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gilson Lucas da Silva.pdf: 2177745 bytes, checksum: 8ddd96540058d803702c96da8515de2a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-15T11:36:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gilson Lucas da Silva.pdf: 2177745 bytes, checksum: 8ddd96540058d803702c96da8515de2a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-08 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The aim of this writing is to demonstrate the following hypothesis: the moral improvement of the judge implies the betterment of the adjudication. The way to prove it is the application of the theory of the interdependence of the virtues – classically known as connexio virtutum, perhaps the most important topic of Aristotle’s and Thomas Aquinas’ ethical thinking – to the issue of the judge’s virtues. Initially, the idea of fulfilling this application was only to fill a gap present in the literature on the judicial virtues, which makes scarce reference to the topic of the interdependence of the virtues, although it is based primarily on the doctrine of the two mentioned authors. But the results that were obtained through this procedure lead to the conclusion that the increase of the moral character of the magistrate redounds in an administration of justice that meets the individual and collective human needs more effectively. The operation of applying connexio virtutum to judge’s virtues raises at least four questions, whose answers – it is believed – make up the demonstration of the hypothesis here assumed. It is thought that this sets an innovative contribution to the theme of judicial virtues. This work is divided into two major parts: (1) a walk by the found materials on the judicial virtues, in order to characterize this issue, which is still little known in the ambit of the law; and (2) the application of connexio virtutum to the theme of judicial virtues, in order to obtain subsidies that support the claim that proper adjudication and the ethical progress of the judges are closely intertwined / O intuito deste escrito é demonstrar a seguinte hipótese: o aperfeiçoamento moral do juiz implica o aprimoramento da prestação jurisdicional. O meio para comprová-la é a aplicação da teoria da interdependência das virtudes – classicamente conhecida como connexio virtutum, talvez o tópico mais importante do pensamento ético de Aristóteles e de Tomás de Aquino – ao tema das virtudes do juiz. Inicialmente, a ideia de realizar essa aplicação era apenas suprir uma lacuna existente na bibliografia sobre as virtudes judiciais, que faz escassa alusão ao tópico da interdependência das virtudes, embora se baseie principalmente na doutrina dos dois autores referidos. Mas os resultados que se obtiveram por meio desse procedimento conduzem à conclusão de que o incremento do caráter moral do magistrado redunda numa administração da justiça que atende as necessidades humanas individuais e coletivas de forma mais eficaz. A operação de aplicar a connexio virtutum às virtudes do juiz suscita ao menos quatro perguntas, cujas respostas – acredita-se – compõem a demonstração da hipótese aqui assumida. Pensa-se que isto configura um aporte inovador ao tema das virtudes judiciais. Este trabalho articula-se em duas grandes partes: (1) um percurso pelos materiais encontrados sobre as virtudes judiciais, de modo a caracterizar este tema, que ainda é pouco conhecido no âmbito do Direito; e (2) a aplicação da connexio virtutum ao tema das virtudes judiciais, a fim de obter os subsídios que sustentem a afirmação de que a adequada prestação jurisdicional e o progresso ético dos juízes estão intimamente imbricados