Although the literature in the field of criminal justice and philosophy is full of ideas of what constitutes "justice," little to nothing has been done to see where the average individual's opinion falls in relation to these ideas. This paper analyzes a cross-sectional convenience sample of students at UCF to determine their preference of six models of justice: utilitarianism, contractarianism, fairness, retributivism, moralism, and libertarianism. Correlating demographic factors are also discussed.

What makes for a just society constitutes one of the most intensely debated subject among political philosophers. There are many theorists striving to identify principles of justice and each believes his/hers theory to be the best. The literature on this subject is much too voluminous to be canvassed in its entirety here. I will, however, examine the stances and arguments of three key schools of thought shaping the modern discussion of social justice: libertarianism (particularly Robert Nozick and Milton and Rose Friedman), liberal egalitarianism (John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin), and socialism (Karl Marx and John Roemer). Each of these schools articulate sharply contrasting views. These differences create an intriguing debate about what the most just society would look like.

År 2003 publicerade Richard H. Thaler och Cass R. Sunstein två artiklar om en föreslagen policymetod, på svenska kallad libertariansk paternalism, som med hjälp av både öppna och subtilt influerande metoder är tänkt att bistå människor med bättre beslutsfattande, och samtidigt tillfredsställa libertarianska ideal och principer rörande individuell autonomi genom dess avsaknad av tvångsmetoder. Min tes hävdar, såsom flertalet kritiker, att denna föreslagna policymetod och dess praktiska metoder inte klarar av att leva upp till de libertarianska idealen och principerna gällande individuell autonomi, då de trots allt innehåller paternalistiska aspekter av tvång, vilket anses vara anti-libertarianska. Jag argumenterar för att de främsta anledningarna till detta är 1) avsaknaden av medgivande från tilltänkt influerad agent, samt 2) att de utövade metoderna kan anses vara manipulativa och inte respektera en agents originella preferenser. I denna uppsats undersöker jag även om och på vilka grunder manipulation som fenomen kan anses innehålla aspekter av tvång. / In 2003, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein published two articles presenting a proposed policy method called libertarian paternalism, which with the help of both open and subtly influential methods is intended to assist people with better decision-making, and at the same time satisfy libertarian ideals and principles of individual autonomy through its lack of coercive methods. My thesis argues, like most critics, that this proposed policy method and its practical methods fail to live up to the libertarian ideals and principles of autonomy, as the nevertheless contain paternalistic aspects of coercion, which is considered anti-libertarian. I argue that the main reasons for this are 1) the lack of consent from the intended influenced agent, and 2) that the methods practiced can be considered manipulative and not respect an agent’s original preferences. In this paper, I also examine whether, and on what grounds manipulation as a phenomenon can be considered to include aspects of coercion.

In times of crisis and disaster, history can testify to humanity's tendency to burst at the seamsof morality. This thesis aims to investigate and prove that the introduction of vaccinepassports can be considered ethically justified on the basis of a theory whose basic values canbe said to be furthest from such a conclusion. Based on paternalism, freedom and autonomy, Iintend to examine whether the state is justified in introducing measures that restrict people'sfreedom with the aim of preventing them from harming others. The discussion is based onJason Brennan's ‘clean hands principle’ and examines arguments concerning collectivelyharmful activities and unacceptable risk. What does it really say about libertarians'propensity, or obligation, to accept vaccine passports? The conclusion is that libertarians donot have to be too sure that the justification of vaccine passports is beyond reason, but neithermust those who have been convinced abandon the basic values of libertarianism.

This thesis lays out a critique of the libertarian autonomy in Clark Pinnock's open theism. It contends that libertarian autonomy (defined as the choice to do otherwise) is unable to do justice to the fuller sense of freedom described in the biblical narrative. Offering more than a critique, this thesis suggests an alternative definition of freedom by qualifying Karl Barth's "freedom as obedience" as 'freedom as faithfulness'. As such, true freedom is contrasted to the autonomy that leads to evil, and is found beyond the false dichotomy of compatibilism and incompatibilism, heteronomy and autonomy. Freedom is recognized as a good gift of creation and a promise of the eschaton, and thus must be distanced from the shadow of evil which haunts human autonomy. Ultimately, this thesis contends that faithfulness to God as the source and call of life leads to responsive, transformative, and eschatologically unlimited freedom.

This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not.

Writers tend to exude political views and ideas in their works. Robert A. Heinlein and his works havebeen interpreted from multiple political standpoints, yet almost no such interpretation has beenapplied to his later works. In this paper Lazarus Long, the protagonist in Heinlein’s Time Enough forLove, is interpreted through a libertarian looking glass, focusing on the novel’s societal critique andideas regarding liberty, power, government and economy. This paper is written with the goal ofshowing that the protagonist in Time Enough for Love can be said to be libertarian in perspective andattitude. This is done by using libertarian concepts divided into five categories, these categories beinginterpreted from David Boaz´s primer on libertarianism: societal criticism, governmental criticism,economic criticism, flourishing and observations. Conclusively this paper states that Robert A.Heinlein’s protagonist in the novel Time Enough for Love seems to have many influences by libertarianideals and can be said to be libertarian in perspective and attitude.

Student Number : 9112588A - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities / There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

O argumento principal que defendo nesta tese é que a formação de uma nova direita no Brasil é um amálgama ultraliberal-conservador cuja origem remonta à organização de contra-públicos digitais durante o auge do lulismo, entre 2006 e 2010. Para sustentar meu argumento realizo uma reconstrução histórica da atuação política da direita brasileira na esfera pública desde a década de 1940, passando pela formação destes contra-públicos na metade dos anos 2000 até as eleições de 2018, quando a nova direita chega ao poder. Meu foco principal, porém, recai na trajetória do contrapúblico ultraliberal, uma vez que este foi o único cujos membros foram capazes de se organizar institucionalmente na sociedade civil de forma precoce, isto é, ainda durante o auge do lulismo, o que foi decisivo para desencadear a Campanha Pró-Impeachment de Dilma de Rousseff (2014-2016) e para fortalecer outras iniciativas políticas que foram importantes para a constituição da nova direita. Empiricamente, me apoio em 30 entrevistas em profundidade realizadas com lideranças e militantes que participaram deste processo e dados coletados em uma pesquisa de campo levada à cabo entre o segundo semestre de 2015 e o primeiro semestre de 2018. / The mais argument of this thesis is that the Brazilian New Right in an ideological combination of libertarianism with conservatism and its origins are connected to the formation of digital counter-publics during the height of Lulas terms, between 2006 and 2010. In order to explain how this happened, I make a historical reconstruction of the Brazilian Political Right performance on the public sphere activities from the 1940s on, passing by the formation of these counter-publics in the middle of the 2000s, until the 2018 elections, when the new right comes to power. My main focus, however, lays on the trajectory of the libertarian counter-public, since this was the one whose members were able to organize themselves institutionally at an early stage, that is, during the height of Lulas terms, which was decisive to trigger Dilma Rousseffs Pro-Impeachment Campaign (2014-2016) and to strengthen other political initiatives that were important for the constitution of the Brazilian New Right. My empirical data is based on 30 in-depth interviews with political leaders and activists who took part in this political process and on informations gathered in a field research carried out between the second half of 2015 and the first half of 2018.

<p>Denna uppsats är en granskning av Robert Kanes libertarianska teori om viljeansträngningar, hur dessa kan lösa det problem som det så kallade turargumentet utgör för en libertariansk händelse-kausal teori och om hans teori ger en bra redogörelse för fri vilja, framför allt i samband med moraliska konflikter. Jag undersöker också Randolphs Clarkes kritik mot Kanes teori, som bland annat går ut på att de dubbla viljeansträngningarna är irrationella, att de inte behövs för att bemöta turargumentet och att Kanes teori inte tillför tillräckligt mycket för att ge en typ av fri vilja som vi inte redan skulle kunna ha i en deterministisk värld. Jag kommer fram till att Kanes teori kan bemöta turargumentet på ett ganska bra sätt, men att den inte tillför något som skulle kunna ge fri vilja även om fri vilja skulle vara omöjlig i en deterministisk värld. Som libertariansk teori misslyckas den alltså.</p>