Following the 2008 Georgian war, Russia identified major deficiencies in its warfare capability, which lead to an extensive reformation and modernization of Russian forces. The reformation was accompanied by a Russian theoretical discussion concerning the wars of tomorrow. Several eminent Russian theorists emphasized the growing importance of non-kinetic means and methods, of which psychological warfare was considered as one of the most primary. Western scholars also emphasized an increased Russian focus on psychological warfare. Despite the identified increased significance on the subject, there is a palpable lack of research on contemporary Russian psychological warfare. This study aims to decrease this lack of research on the subject. Using a theory consuming approach, Russian psychological warfare is analyzed from two cases, Georgia 2008 and Crimea 2014. The study is based on a qualitative text analysis of open sources. By combining two theories on psychological warfare, an analytical tool is developed which is then used in the analysis of the two cases. The theories that form the study´s theoretical base derives from Martin Libicki and Ron Schleifer. The two cases are analyzed and then followed by a comparative analysis of the cases. The study’s result shows that psychological warfare is an important component in Russian warfare, especially in the case of Crimea. Furthermore the study indicates that psychological warfare was a main component in the Crimea case, whereas it was a mere supportive component in the Georgian case.   The results show that Russian psychological warfare is used above all to create a favorable strategic context, where the Russian society and neutrals appears to be the most important target audiences to influence. The results also indicates that psychological warfare contributes in misleading the opponent and could thereby also contribute with obvious operational and tactical advantages for Russian warfare.

The absence of previous research regarding Russia´s use of information warfare has not been able to show if there has been a new way of adapting information warfare alongside the development in the warfare in general. The previous research has established a development in warfare by the means of information technology. This is important to understand as it constitutes an equalizer between small states and great powers in the global arena. At the same time, it is even more important to understand that the development of Russian behavior has implications on warfare in a global perspective. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the conclusions of previous research which predicted a transformation in the warfare and give a new view of the transformation by inspecting Russia´s use of information warfare in modern warfare and probe if there has been a change. Additional purpose of this study is to understand Russia´s way of conduct in modern conflicts and have a better ability of control in forthcoming conflicts. The method used reflects the qualitative case and is constructed as a one-case study with variation in time, using three different conflicts. The analysis is conducted by the means of operational indicators extracted from Libickis theory. The result of the study shows that Russia have changed their way of using information warfare in between all of the three conflicts, and it is not that easy to say that the use of information warfare has changed. It might depend on the situation or the opposite side and how the individual conflict occur. There is no clear answer on that question, but this essay gives a deeper view in the use of information warfare by Russia in modern conflicts.

The aim of this paper is to examine the Islamic state’s information operations and how they target three different domains of influence. Domains consisting of the field of information, the physical world and human cognition, as described by the Swedish armed forces. Previous studies showcase that the ISIS information approach is mainly characterized by utilizing the internet and distributing propaganda. All in order to gain support and legitimize their newly founded caliphate. However, studies does not show how these operations target different domains in order to influence the recipients. The lack of insight in how this phenomenon occurs is also evident in contemporary military theory. An insight that this study aim to provide. The theoretical premises used for the analysis are What is information warfare? by Martin C. Libicki and Karl Popper’s Objective knowledge. The designated method to examine the empirical data was a qualitative text analysis. The result of the analysis indicates that ISIS target all three previously mentioned domains by psychological operations. ISIS also target the field of information using cyber operations.