The absence of previous research regarding Russia´s use of information warfare has not been able to show if there has been a new way of adapting information warfare alongside the development in the warfare in general. The previous research has established a development in warfare by the means of information technology. This is important to understand as it constitutes an equalizer between small states and great powers in the global arena. At the same time, it is even more important to understand that the development of Russian behavior has implications on warfare in a global perspective. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the conclusions of previous research which predicted a transformation in the warfare and give a new view of the transformation by inspecting Russia´s use of information warfare in modern warfare and probe if there has been a change. Additional purpose of this study is to understand Russia´s way of conduct in modern conflicts and have a better ability of control in forthcoming conflicts. The method used reflects the qualitative case and is constructed as a one-case study with variation in time, using three different conflicts. The analysis is conducted by the means of operational indicators extracted from Libickis theory. The result of the study shows that Russia have changed their way of using information warfare in between all of the three conflicts, and it is not that easy to say that the use of information warfare has changed. It might depend on the situation or the opposite side and how the individual conflict occur. There is no clear answer on that question, but this essay gives a deeper view in the use of information warfare by Russia in modern conflicts.

The Russian operation on the Crimean peninsula has been referred to as a victory enabled by the operationalization of the concept of New Generation Warfare. According to some military theorists, this concept and its operationalization cannot be characterized in terms of the traditional wars waged up to this point. It is, however, also argued that this new generation of warfare is primarily a new approach to strategy, a new way of applying traditional methods to achieve political goals. The purpose of this study is to discern whether Russia employed strategic deception in its operation in Crimea and if this is the case; what methods and principles were used and if these can be explained using a traditional view of deception. The application of theories on deception by Michael Dewar and Barton S. Whaley respectively on the Russian operation in Crimea finds that the foundation for conducting deception operations has not changed fundamentally and that the methods and principles originally formulated within the concept of ‘maskirovka’ in the Soviet Union still applies to this day, even within the context of New Generation Warfare.

The characteristics of the Russian military operations during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and again in the Crimean Crisis 2014, were “rude awakenings” to a shift in the strategic behaviour of Russia, not refraining from military aggression as means to political aims. In the aftermath of these “strategic shocks”, the scholarly debate on how to interpret and understand these limited wars, has several ongoing discussions, among which is whether this modern Russian style of warfare, as demonstrated in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere, really is a novel concept or plainly “old wine in a new bottle”. This thesis is part taking in that debate through the theoretical framework of three Soviet era warfare methods from the psychological dimension: Deception – Maskirovka, Information Warfare – Reflexive Control, and Subversion – Active Measures. Within the framework, an analytical tool for qualitative text analysis is designed and then applied for the case studies of the Russo-Georgian War, as it compares to the Crimean Crisis, collecting indicators for the apparent presence of traditional methods in these cases. The study concludes that the Soviet era warfare concepts of Maskirovka, Reflexive Control and Active Measures, are relevant as explanators for a facet of the modern day Russian warfare style, in alignment with the general argument on the Russian warfare doctrine as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, vis-a-vis the strategic practices of the Soviet era.

This essay seeks to evaluate whether or not  the war in Crimea, conducted by the Russian Federation, is to be considered “just”. This is done in accordance with the theory of Just war, which demands that there be two separate evaluations of the war. Firstly the reasons and actions that lead up to the war must be evaluated if they fulfill the demands set up by the theory, this is called “Jud ad bellum”. Next, the conduct once in the war must be evaluated if it fulfills the demands set up in the theory, this is called “jus in bello”. The Russian occupation of Crimea was not following a declaration of war, was against several international agreements and the war was not a last resort after attempts of diplomatic solutions  all of these actions violate key demands of jus ad bellum. Going through reports by various human rights organizations on the matter, the demands set up by “jus in bello” are determined to not be satisfied, mostly due to the Russian use of torture on prisoners to subtract incriminating information for use in court against prisoners of war.