Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Tübingen.

Göttingen, R.- u. staatswiss. Diss. v. 15. Jan. 1931. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, 1968. / "April 1968." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.

Univ., Diss.--Frankfurt am Main, 2002.

INSTITUT PROMLČENÍ V OBČANSKÉM PRÁVU S PŘIHLÉDNUTÍM K NOVĚ PŘIJATÉMU OZ RESUMÉ IN ENGLISH RESUMÉ IN ENGLISH LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN CIVIL LAW WITH REGARD TO THE NEWLY ADOPTED CIVIL CODE The limitation of actions is a significant private law institute reflecting an impact of passing of time on rights. Its basic construction remaining almost unchangeable for ages contains a big amount of variables being subject to modification following a direction of private law development. Mentioned above matches the tendency of amendments to the limitation of actions legislation contained in the new civil code. The drift towards liberalization is one of the most obvious tendencies. It manifests itself beside other matters by shifting from obligatory to none-obligatory character of provisions. That matter of fact is being reflected in the new civil code's limitation of actions legislation by entitling the subjects to depart from a prescribed period of limitation length. Another private law inclination being found in the new civil code limitation of actions legislation, might be defined as a protection of a subject having the right reinforcement. It is presented primarily by determining the subjective nature of a general three-year long period of limitation valid for all rights of a property character which are subject to...

In Islamic Sharia law, prescription has been more commonly referred to as murūr al-zamān [the lapse of time]. It has been claimed that the abstract principle of the lapse of time only has the effect of barring a claim and that is not capable of creating and extinguishing the right itself. In the context of Islamic law, this concept of prescription is often ascribed only to the Hanafi and Maliki schools of Sharia law, and it has been claimed that such principle has not been recognized by the Hanbali School. Based on that, my reading shows that, under Saudi jurisdiction (which is principally based on uncodified Hanbali Sharia law), this hypothesis is a key problem as in practice there are many secondary Saudi laws in place applying prescription rules to bar civil actions. Thus, by arguing that such principle has not been recognized by Sharia law as applied in Saudi Arabia, the legality of such provisions would be in question, given the fact that all Saudi enacted laws must conform with Islamic law. Moreover, my analysis argues that in studies of Saudi Hanbali law, prescription has neither been discussed widely nor given serious independent consideration. In the context of Saudi and Hanbali law, issues of prescription have not only been marginalized and minimized, but also inaccuracies and mis-readings are often found in related academic literature. Drawing on findings across various disciplines, including studies of classical and modern Islamic law, as well as legal studies on Saudi and Arab laws, this study presents new readings of the issues of the existence and origins of the legal concept of civil prescription from the perspectives of the Saudi-Hanbali School of law. Moreover, it presents the first comprehensive survey of the extent of implementation of the rules of prescription in the Saudi civil regulations over the last eight decades. Finally, from both theory and practice aspects, the thesis attempts to conclude with a critical analysis of the single ‘negative’ perspective of prescription in both Islamic and Saudi law.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-08-17T13:19:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo Soares Matos Cascudo.pdf: 788622 bytes, checksum: cc5a2a5ef7892825951c864e090c44de (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T13:19:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo Soares Matos Cascudo.pdf: 788622 bytes, checksum: cc5a2a5ef7892825951c864e090c44de (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-12 / Time, not only in law, but also in any and all areas of knowledge, is a linguistic tool for measurement. The importance of the study of time lies on delimiting the beginning and the end of something planned in the empirical world. For Law, time demarcates the norms' dies a quo and ad quem, establishing the beginning of its validity, as well as the term. Therefore, the prescription's norm is viewed by much of the doctrine as the "end" of the right of action, insofar as it precludes the state judge's action in the case. But, unlike what is proposed by the doctrine, the limitation rule is not the loss of the right of action, inasmuch, in the semantic plane, it is the state judge's impossibility to satisfy the request by the inertia holder's right over a period of time. However, if we analyze in the syntactic plane, it is a rule that obliges the judge to extinguish the demand, due to the inertia time lapse provided in the antecedent of the primary prescription rule. To assert that it is a question of right action loss, is also to say that the prescription rule would act in the secondary rule, preventing its constitution, nevertheless, the premise does not proceed as long as, with the filing of the demand, the secondary rule is constituted, destroying the thesis which says the prescription is a norm of right of action extinction. It is, therefore, to affirm that the prescription rule would act in the obligatory modal, directed to the state judge's action, after the constitution of the secondary norm and of the right of action exercise, so that a third norm extinguishing the action is constituted. In these terms, the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic plan of the prescription definition would be consonant / O tempo, não só para o direito, como para toda e qualquer área do conhecimento, é ferramenta linguística de medição. A importância do estudo sobre o tempo reside em delimitarmos o início e o fim de algo que se planeja verificar no mundo empírico. Para o Direito, o tempo demarca o dies a quo e ad quem das normas, estabelecendo o início da sua vigência, bem como o término. Frente a isto, a norma de prescrição é visualizada por grande parte da doutrina como o “fim” do direito de ação, uma vez que impossibilita a atuação do estado juiz na ação. Mas, diferentemente do é proposto por parte da doutrina, a norma de prescrição não é a perda do direito de ação, na medida em que, no plano semântico, trata-se da impossibilidade do estado juiz satisfazer o pedido pela inércia do titular do direito durante certo lapso de tempo. Contudo, se analisarmos no plano sintático, trata-se de uma norma que obriga o juiz a extinguir a demanda, em virtude da inercia do lapso temporal prevista no antecedente da norma primária de prescrição. Firmar se tratar da perda do direito de ação, é dizer que a norma de prescrição atuaria na norma secundária, impedindo sua constituição, não obstante, a premissa não procede posto que, com o ajuizamento da demanda, a norma secundária restaria constituída, pondo por terra a tese segundo a qual a prescrição é norma de extinção do direito de ação. Trata-se, portanto, em afirmar que a norma de prescrição atuaria no modal obrigatório, direcionada à atuação do estado juiz, após a constituição da norma secundária e do próprio exercício do direito de ação, para que seja constituída terceira norma extinguindo a ação. Nestes termos, o plano sintático, semântico e pragmático da definição de prescrição restaria consonante

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-21T11:28:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Mauro César Bullara Arjona.pdf: 853514 bytes, checksum: f4aab0e8e38a09576e8e3e36becc3b1d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-21T11:28:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mauro César Bullara Arjona.pdf: 853514 bytes, checksum: f4aab0e8e38a09576e8e3e36becc3b1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-12 / Tax offenses are not imprescriptible and do not have specific rules regarding this type of extinguishment of punishability. Even though the importance of taxes is known in a Democratic State of Law, because they finance essential services such as health, education and security, the concept of crime or consumation cannot be distorted in order to avoid prescription. The legal framework makes it possible to respect the theory of crime and to greatly reduce the occurrence of the limitation by following only the rules established on the Penal Code, and also by the rules of the criminal procedure law and constitutional criminal principles. Using criminal law as a coercive tool to collect taxes, in a final interpretation, offends the human dignity of taxpayers / Os crimes tributários não são imprescritíveis e não possuem regras específicas no tocante à esta modalidade de extinção da punibilidade. Mesmo que pese a importância dos tributos num Estado Democrático de Direito, pois financiam os serviços essenciais como saúde, educação e segurança, não se pode desvirtuar o conceito de crime ou de consumação a fim de evitar a prescrição. O arcabouço legal permite respeitar a teoria do delito e diminuir sobremaneira a ocorrência da prescrição seguindo apenas as regras estabelecidas no Código Penal, os ditames do processo penal e os princípios penais constitucionais. Utilizar o direito penal como ferramenta coercitiva de cobrança de tributos ofende, em uma interpretação de última análise, a dignidade humana dos contribuintes

Univ., Habil.-Schr.-2005--Freiburg i. Br., 2004. / Literaturverz. S. [507] - 536.

Este trabalho trata do funcionamento da prescrição extintiva relacionada a ações pessoais, além da decadência, no âmbito do direito internacional privado. Primeiramente é feita uma breve análise histórica e comparatista do direito de regência da prescrição em relações de caráter internacional antes de se demonstrar a solução abarcada pelo direito brasileiro: a regência pela lei que rege a obrigação (lex causae). Apesar de ser um instituto de direito civil, substantivo, a prescrição possui muitas ligações com o direito processual, uma vez que o principal efeito de sua consumação é tonar inexigível uma obrigação e, em decorrência, pôr fim a um processo. Assim, o autor detalha em seguida as questões que são regidas pela lex causae e as que são regidas pela lex fori (aqui abrangendo também a lex arbitri) em matéria de prescrição no direito brasileiro, antes de tratar minuciosamente de como se opera a exceção da ordem pública para afastar a aplicação da lex causae estrangeira em matéria de prescrição no Brasil (incluindo também regras de aplicação imediata lois de police brasileiras). Ao final, cuida-se da prescrição na homologação e execução de sentenças estrangeiras no Brasil. / This work deals with the operation of limitation periods (prescription) related to actions in personam in the domain of the conflict of laws. It starts with a historical and comparatist analysis of its governing law in international relations before the rule adopted by the Brazilian law is shown: the law of the obligation as the governing law of the limitation rules (lex causae). Although limitation of actions is considered a substantive issue under Brazilian law, it is closely connected with procedural law in many aspects, since its main effect is to render an obligation unenforceable and thus terminate a lawsuit. Therefore, the author presents in detail the issues that are governed by the lex causae and the issues that are governed by the lex fori (also comprising the lex arbitri) related to limitations under Brazilian law, before he deals thoroughly with the operation of the public policy exception to the application of a foreign lex causae in such a matter (also comprising Brazilian imperative rules lois de police). And finally, this work handles the operation of statutes of limitation in proceedings for recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial and arbitral decisions in Brazil.