Locus standi is a Latin word for standing. Traditionally, it implies that a litigant must have sufficient interest to apply to the court for the enforcement of the right of another person, challenge the actions of the government, have a court declare a law unconstitutional or even to litigate in the interest of the public otherwise the application will not be successful. The interpretation of locus standi before the courts in most common law jurisdictions is liberal. Nigerian courts, however, interpret the principle of locus standi strictly, in the sense that standing is accorded the person who shows cause of action or sufficient interest. This position denies access to justice to many Nigerians who are poor or have no knowledge of their rights as the courts position on standing prevents NGOs or other individuals from applying to the courts on their behalf or litigating in the interest of the public. Presently, the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 regulate the practice and procedure for the enforcement of human rights before Nigerian courts. The Rules encourage the courts to ‗welcome public interest litigation in the human rights field‘ and not to dismiss or strike out human right cases for want of locus standi. However, it is doubtful if the courts will accept this invitation. This study looks at the context of the interpretation of the principle of locus standi by Nigerian Courts and its effect on access to justice and public interest litigation by NGOs and individuals. It also examines the impact of the provision for locus standi of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009. Finally, this study provides an analysis of the interpretation of this concept in other common law jurisdictions such as Kenya, India, United Kingdom and South Africa who once interpreted the concept strictly but now interpret it more liberally. This comparison is necessary to show that Nigerian courts are isolated in their position in the interpretation of locus standi and that there is need for the courts to conform to international best practice. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM / Unrestricted

Magister Legum - LLM / This research examines the effectiveness of these dispute resolution mechanisms in environmental disputes and what improvements should be made in order to make those mechanisms suitable for these types of disputes. / South Africa

This dissertation purports to set out the requirements for locus standi in terms of section 38 of the Constitution, specifically when it comes to procuring standing in matters brought by way of a class action. In order to answer the question it is also necessary to look at the need for a class action procedure in the South African civil procedural law as this explains the courts' expansive approach in granting members and representatives standing before a court, specifically in cases where the common law traditional rules of standing and joinder would not suffice. Locus standi is concerned with the capability of an entity to be a participant in a matter before a court of law, having due regard to the applicability of the point in issue to the person of the litigant and its faculty to litigate. In accordance with common law prescriptions, locus standi of prospective litigants to obtain legal relief only accrues to those that have personally suffered harm or would suffer harm through the violation or threatened violation of their legally enforceable rights. In contrast to the above the procedural measures contained in section 38 of the Final Constitution of 1996 allow for representative actions to be brought on behalf of adversely affected parties where the dominus litis is not necessarily the violated party as well as the recipient of the fruits of successful adjudication. Sections 38(c) and (d) of the Final Constitution of 1996 established inter alia class actions and public interest litigation by expanding the common law mandated categories of persons capable of instituting legal proceedings. This dissertation researched the need for a procedural device such as the class action in a specific South African milieu characterised by inopportune social and economic circumstances. The class action is specifically engineered to accommodate large numbers of affected parties that do not need to be joined in a traditional manner. Judicial recognition of the benefits of the class action from a South African point of view must necessarily take into account the social and economic circumstances of the members in whose favour the procedure are implemented. Apart from the procedural advantages, this particular process provides for a diminishing effect of factors such as low income, lack of legal knowledge, lack of funds for legal assistance and nominal pecuniary claims that prevent litigants from vindicating their rights and approaching the courts single handed. The requirements for locus standi under the constitutional dispensation, with specific reference to the generous judicial approach to matters, specifically where fundamental rights are violated or threatened, were examined. It is submitted that these requirements will be of assistance when the citation of the parties is to be drafted. In order to institute action in terms of one or more subsections, a prospective litigant need to show that a right enshrined in the Bill of Rights have been encroached upon as well as sufficient interest in the relief sought. Some aspects related to locus standi but not necessary for procurement of standing were researched in order to contextualise the setting for the use of section 38 procedural measures. There are currently no formal requirements that litigating class or group members have to comply with. The lack of statutory regulatory sources has forced South African courts with inherent jurisdiction to create guidelines regarding the practical aspects of class action litigation. Unfortunately the judicial intervention in creating practical directives for prospective and current litigants to follow has not occurred without mishap. Even though the question of whether the class action procedure is the suitable method to adjudicate the matter does not have a direct bearing on the standing of a party, it is an important aspect to consider when one evaluated possible courses of action. The correct procedure is invaluable when the court is asked to grant parties leave to litigate in accordance with the class action procedure. From a procedural point of view, the court must assist in directing parties as to the preferred manner to proceed with the matter. It was found that the courts have mistakenly held that compliance with certain unique procedures specific to class actions is necessary in order to procure locus standi. Even though an extended application of section 38(c) is favoured, any consideration thereof must take the express introduction by way of legislation into account that sets out the practical aspects of this mechanism. In the socio–economic state of affairs currently prevailing in South Africa, the high costs of legal assistance, countered with the complexity of procuring state provided legal aid, deters many a plaintiff to obtain civil justice. In this respect it can be said that the adjudicative approach of group action proceedings should accommodate a contextualized social setting. The goal is ultimately to expound a device suited and shaped to accommodate both the legal and extra–curial settings of South Africa. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Procedural Law / unrestricted

In 1986, the Supreme Court of Canada cogently summarized various judicial concerns relating to the expansion of public interest standing. In doing so, the Supreme Court invited judges to engage in a purposive and functional enquiry in exercising their discretion to grant access to public interest litigants. That enquiry should take account of the broad social, political and legal factors that provide the backdrop to the constitutional claim. However, both judges and commentators alike have failed to meet this challenge. Instead, they have applied the principles of standing in an increasingly categorical and abstract manner. To this end, they have employed the abstractly defined, directly affected individual without considering who he or she is in the particular circumstances, or what benefits he or she would bring to the litigation process. This is of particular concern when our context is inequality. The increasing abstraction of public interest standing jars discordantly with the purposive interpretation of section 15(1) of the Charter, so that while equality is determined in a contextual fashion, equal access is still conceived of in an abstract fashion. In abstracting the directly affected individual out of relations of radical inequality, there has been a presumption that we all, as individuals, have an equal opportunity (and equal resources) to raise our constitutional concerns in the courts. This presumption cannot be accepted. We need to inject some context into standing. To do so, we must appreciate that inequality is a product of the distribution of power in society, and that equality is to be furthered through multi-dimensionality and respect for diversity. Armed with these insights, we must revisit the judicial concerns that underpin the development of the public interest standing doctrine, and unpack their meaning in a purposive fashion. When we do so, we will begin to appreciate that the traditional resolution of these concerns actually serves to exclude disadvantaged persons from enforcing their Charter rights and obscures the diffuse causality characteristics of disadvantage. From the contextual perspective of social-inequality-as-power, the concerns underpinning public interest standing actually promote judicial access for the public interest organization that represents disadvantaged persons. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Magistro darbo „Europos Sąjungos teisės aktų teisėtumo priežiūra pagal Europos Bendrijų steigimo sutarties 230 straipsnį” santrauka Darbe analizuojamos EB steigimo sutarties 230 straipsnio ypatybės, pabrėžiant šio straipsnio turinio dvilypį pobūdį, kuris, kalbant apie nuostatas, nustatančias teisės akto neteisėtumo pagrindus, suteikia plačias galimybes siekti neteisėto teisės akto panaikinimo, tačiau kita vertus, tas pats straipsnis atima iš privačių subjektų galimybę efektyviai pasinaudoti šiomis galimybėmis. Darbe atskleistas itin svarbus EBTT vaidmuo, darantis didžiulę įtaką 230 straipsnyje įtvirtintos teisės realizavimo galimybei. Čia plačiai aptariama susijusi teisminė praktika, formuluojanti esmines ieškinio dėl panaikinimo taisykles. Analizė pradedama atskleidžiant, kokie ES teisės aktai, atsižvelgiant į jų teisinę formą, galią ar autorių, gali būti ieškinio dėl panaikinimo objektais. Ypatingas dėmesys skiriamas teisės aktų teisėtumo kriterijams bei iš jų išplaukiantiems neteisėtumo pagrindams, atskleidžiama EBTT praktiką, kurioje matyti, jog šios Sutarties nuostatos interpretuojamos liberaliai, nuosekliai laikantis sisteminio Sutarties aiškinimo metodo. Aptariant ieškinio dėl panaikinimo skirtingų subjektų statusą, išryškinama ypač griežta nuostatų, susijusių su neprivilegijuotų subjektų padėtimi, interpretavimo kryptis. Darbe akcentuojama būtinybė liberalizuoti šių nuostatų aiškinimą, pagrindžiant tuo, jog tai išspręstų daugumą probleminių aspektų, susijusių su... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The Summary of Master Thesis “The Judicial Review of European Union Acts Under Art. 230 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community” The analysis is being focused on the specific features of the Art. 230 of the Treaty establishing the European Community with the main purpose of enlightening the dual nature of the said Article. The above mentioned specialty is disclosed on the one hand by exhibiting the vast possibilities in proving the illegal nature of the European acts and on the other hand by detecting the rather constricted locus standi of non – privileged persons. This thesis highlights the importance of the role of Court of Justice by interpreting the meaning of the Art. 230 though the Court’s precedents, which are being claimed to be the main source divulging the purport of the said Article. The analysis reveals what kind of legal acts could be challenged under the Art. 230. However the main attention is directed to the grounds of illegality by revealing the rather liberal interpretation in respect of the whole Treaty’s system. Later the thesis unfolds manifestly constricted nature of the Treaty’s interpretation by disclosing the rules of the status of non – privileged persons. The thesis highlights the exigency of loosening the nature of interpretation arguing that it would be helpful in solving problems relating to the restrictive status of private persons and would make more obtainable the application of the Art. 230 of the Treaty establishing the European... [to full text]

Locus standi of non-privileged applicants to bring an action for annulment Abstract Every developed legal system is bound to have a mechanism for checking the procedural and substantive legality of measures adopted by its institutions. In the European Union it was of significant importance to create a system of control over the acts of the EU institutions given the democratic deficit within the Union and the limited supervisory role of the European Parliament. Binding acts of the EU institutions are subject to review through a number of routes provided by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), namely action for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU), the plea of illegality (Art. 277 TFEU), the preliminary reference (Art. 267 TFEU) and the action for damages (Arts. 268 and 340 TFEU). The Court has consistently endeavoured to treat the several strands as a complex and coherent system of judicial review within the Union based on the rule of law. The action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU plays a crucial role for individuals as it is in practice the only direct way open to individuals to challenge the acts of EU institutions. The main purpose of my thesis is to examine whether the current wording of Art. 263(4) TFEU provides for individuals a sufficiently...

"The question of locus standi regarding the non-state complaints procedure before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission) is a very flexibile one. Although the language of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Charter), the enabling powers and functions of the Commission, does not provide for such broad standing, the Commission has over its 20 years of operation, given broad interpretation to the question of standing by adopting the actio popularis doctrine. As a reslut the Commission has entertained communicatons from any person, group of persons or non-governmental organisation (NGOs), whether on their own behalf or on behalf of tothers. The location or nationality of such persons is also not a bar to standing. Consequently, the Commission has accepted communications from national NGOs operating in the country of the state party against whom the complaint is made, NGOs with a regaional focus, international NGOs, and non-African nationals. ... The study has five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study and the justification thereof. Chapter two explores the origin, nature and application of locus standi in domestic legal systems with particluar respect to private protection of public rights and human rights protection using Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa as case studies. Chapter three examines the standing requirements before other regional human rights protection systems namely the ECHR, and the IACHR as well as global human rights protection mechanisms throught the lens of the HRC, the CERD-Committee, the CAT-Committee and the CEDAW-Committee. Chapter four traces and assesses the development of the broad standing requirements before the Commission regarding its non-state communications procedure and the problems associated with them. And Chapter five presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2006. / Prepared under the supervision of Mr. Angelo Matusse at the Faculty of Law, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mozambique / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

The article begins by recognizing that the Administrative Process in Peru is full jurisdiction, protects the legal situations in addition to control the legality of the administrative acts. Then the author examines the Tax Administration, specifically if SUNAT has active legitimacy to sue in a Contentious Administrative Process against the decision issued by the Tax Court that revoked or annulled their administrative acts, concluding that it does not have legitimacy but, exceptionally, according to article 157 of the Tax Code, can sue when SUNAT demonstrates that RTFs are not according to the parameters of article 10 of the General Administrative Procedure Act, confirming that the causal most used by SUNAT are those of the numeral 1 and 2, referred to the resolutions which cause serious disability vice, which, according to the author, is not the same as a different interpretative approach. Finally, the author concludes that for tax issues does not apply the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Law on Administrative Process; apply the article 157 of the Tax Code, as the special rule. / El presente artículo parte por reconocer que el proceso contencioso administrativo en el Perú es de plena jurisdicción, esto es, que protege las situaciones jurídicas de los administrados además de la legalidad del acto administrativo.Así, se lleva a cabo un análisis sobre la legitimidad activa de la Administración Tributaria, específicamente la SUNAT, para interponer una demanda contencioso administrativa contra la Resolución emitida por el Tribunal Fiscal (RTF) que revocó o anuló su acto administrativo concluyendo que no la tiene pero que, excepcionalmente, de acuerdo al artículo 157° del Código Tributario, podría demandar cuando demuestre fehacientemente que la RTF es nula de acuerdo a los parámetros del artículo 10° de la Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General (LPAG), constatándose que las causales más utilizadas por la SUNAT son las del numeral 1 y 2 de dicha norma, referidas a aquellas resoluciones que tengan un vicio grave de invalidez, lo que, según la autora, no es lo mismo que un distinto criterio interpretativo. Por último, se señala que en relación a los temas tributarios no resulta aplicable el segundo párrafo del artículo 13º de la Ley del Proceso Contencioso Administrativo si no el referido artículo 157° del Código Tributario, al ser la norma especial.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the causes and antecedents that have contributed to the fact that, in Argentina, the office of Ombudsman remains vacant. Likewise, the normative origins of the organ are reviewed, in order to understand its value and democratic mission. In the ruling entitled Center for Studies for the Promotion of Equality and Solidarity and Others and the Ministry of Energy and Mining under Collective Protection (Centro de Estudios para la Promoción de la Igualdad y la Solidaridad y otros c/ Ministerio de Energía y Minería s/ amparo colectivo), issued on August 18, 2016, the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation exhorted the Congress of the Nation to appoint an Ombudsman in accordance with the provisions conferred on it by article 86 of the National Constitution. The Court’s decision exposed a long-standing legal problem: the absence of an Ombudsman. / El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar las causas y antecedentes que han contribuido a que, en Argentina, el cargo de Defensor del Pueblo permanezca vacante. Asimismo, repasa los orígenes normativos del órgano, a fin de comprender su valor y misión democrática. En el fallo caratulado Centro de Estudios para la Promoción de la Igualdad y la Solidaridad y otros c/ Ministerio de Energía y Minería s/ amparo colectivo, emitido el 18 de agosto de 2016, la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación exhortó al Congreso de la Nación a nombrar un Defensor del Pueblo con arreglo a las disposiciones que le ha conferido el artículo 86 de la Constitución Nacional. La decisión de la Corte expuso una problemática jurídica de larga data: la ausencia de un Defensor del Pueblo.

Cette recherche doctorale part de l’hypothèse générale selon laquelle la méthode communautaire classique serait concurrencée dans les faits par de nouveaux instruments juridiques qui, loin de constituer des initiatives isolées, participent d’un modèle alternatif de gouvernance communautaire qui la transforme en profondeur. <p><p>Afin d’identifier les caractéristiques, les contours et les nouvelles formes de normativités de ce modèle alternatif, cette recherche a adopté une approche pragmatique de l’étude droit et étudie empiriquement et systématiquement six politiques publiques européennes :la stratégie européenne pour l’emploi (SEE) et la Méthode Ouverte de Coordination (MOC), le programme européen REACH; la politique européenne de l’eau; la politique comptable européenne; la politique de régulation des services financiers; et la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique et le marché européen du carbone. Ces politiques publiques sont étudiées au moyen d’une approche par les instruments d’action publique qui s’inspire de la démarche et des recherches effectuées par Michel Foucault sur la « gouvernementalité ». <p><p>Cette analyse nous aura permis de démontrer que la transformation de la méthode communautaire classique se constate à au moins trois niveaux. Au niveau des acteurs, on assiste à un renforcement de la place des acteurs privés et de la société civile dans les politiques publiques étudiées. La transformation de l’action publique européenne réside également dans l’utilisation abondante de nouveaux instruments d’action publique - plus techniques que politiques et plus incitatifs que contraignants (du type benchmarking) - qui impliquent systématiquement une collaboration entre acteurs publics et privés à différents niveaux du processus décisionnel (coproduction normative). Enfin le mode de sanction est devenu une « contrainte par l’image » reposant sur la figure du « mauvais élève de la classe » véhiculée principalement par des publications de classements basées sur une classification des bonnes pratiques. Corrélativement, cette transformation se constate également dans les phases d’élaboration, d’exécution et de contrôle du droit de l’Union européenne. <p><p>Une fois les caractéristiques et les contours de ce modèle alternatif dessinés sur base des politiques publiques étudiées, cette recherche s’est ensuite tournée vers une présentation des discours (politiques et juridiques) et écoles de pensées (Law and Economics / New Public Management / Démocratie délibérative / Expérimentalisme démocratique) permettant de justifier son existence et, par là, de fonder sa légitimité. Enfin, si ce nouveau modèle peut prétendre à une certaine légitimité ou nécessité et s’il n’apparaît pas envisageable de revenir en arrière, sa non-concordance avec le traité est problématique. En effet, ce modèle pose une série de questions relatives au manque de contrôle sur l’activité des institutions de l’Union et à la sauvegarde de l’ordre juridique constitutionnel européen. Plus précisément, l’étude de la question de la protection juridictionnelle effective et du respect du principe de l’équilibre des pouvoirs permet d’identifier un certains nombre d’écueils et de proposer des suggestions d’amélioration pragmatique du modèle décisionnel européen au regard des nouveaux instruments juridiques de la gouvernance européenne.<p><p><p>The starting point of my doctoral research is that the Classic Community Method, as described in the Lisbon Treaty, does not enable one to understand the manner in which law is currently produced in the European Union. I claim that the Community Method is in fact challenged and transformed by new legal instruments that, far from being isolated initiatives, are part of an alternative model of governance.<p><p>My research adopts a programmatic approach as to identify the features, contours and new forms of normativity of this alternative model. It studies empirically and systematically six European public policies through “an approach by instruments” inspired in the writings of Michel Foucault on "governmentality”.<p><p>This analysis shows that the transformation of the Classic Community method occurs at least at three levels. First, there is a strengthening of the role of private actors and civil society in policy making. Second, the transformation of European public action also lies in the abundant use of new policy instruments - rather technical and political incentives than binding rules (benchmarking) - that involve a systematic collaboration between public and private actors at different levels of decision-making (co-regulation). Third, control and sanctions rely greatly on a “constrained by image” system based primarily on publications of rankings and classifications of good practices.<p><p>After I present the features and contours of this alternative model, my research analyzes the political and legal discourses, as well as the schools of thought (Law and Economics / New Public Management / Deliberative Democracy / Democratic Experimentalism), that justify its existence and, therefore, its legitimacy.<p>Finally, my doctoral work rises the question about the lack of control over these regulatory activities and brings to light the safeguards that should be taken by the European Court of Justice to respect European Union’s Constitutional law<p> / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished