Este trabalho investiga o significado do termo tu/xh em Eurípides, sobretudo na tragédia Hipólito. \"Acaso\", \"sorte\", \"fortuna\", traduções usuais para tu/xh, sugerem o significado de \"acontecimento fortuito\". Se assim fosse, de que modo esse \"acaso\" coexistiria na Tragédia com a noção, tão própria ao mundo grego, de \"destino\" (moi=ra, a)na/gkh, dai/mwn)? Na verdade, a análise das ocorrências em Eurípides demonstrou que a tu/xh não é mero \"acaso\". Ao contrário, costuma ter origem divina e ser instrumento da moi=ra. A tu/xh é o destino no momento em que se precipita em acontecimento. A instabilidade da \"sorte\" é categórica na vida e reiterada na Tragédia. Não é possível considerar feliz alguém que esteja vivo, pois a vida é apenas incerteza: rapidamente se pode inverter uma situação favorável. Os reveses da \"sorte\" atingem, em particular, aqueles que, seguros de si, se vangloriam do que são e da condição que possuem. Pertinente é o aforismo de Heráclito (frag. 119.1-120.1): hÅqoj a)nqrw¯pwi daimwn, \"o caráter do homem é seu destino\" ou \"o destino do homem é seu caráter\". Há relação causal entre o caráter de um personagem trágico e aquilo que lhe sobrevém. Tal caráter é investigado através dos termos psíquicos que utiliza Eurípides para seus protagonistas (frh/n e cognatos, kardi/a, yuxh/, qumo/j, etc.). / This work investigates the meaning of the word tu/xh in Euripedes and mainly in the Hyppolytus tragedy. \"Chance\", \"luck\" and \"fortune\" suggest the meaning of \"fortuitous event\" therefore they are usual translations for tu/xh. If it was like this, on which way would this \"chance\" coexist in the Tragedy with the notion of \"fate\" (moi=ra, a)na/gkh, dai/mwn) that is so peculiar to the Greek world? Indeed, the analysis of the occurrences in Euripedes has demonstrated that tu/xh is not merely \"chance\". On the contrary, it is accustomed to have a divine origin and to be the instrument of moi=ra. Tu/xh is fate in the moment that it turns into happening. \"Luck\" instability is categorical in life and reiterated in the Tragedy. It is not possible to consider someone that is alive happy, because life is just uncertainness: a favorable situation may be reversed rapidly. Reverses of \"luck\" affect specifically those that are self-confident and pride of themselves due to what they are and the conditions they have. Heraclitus\' aphorism is pertinent (frag. 119.1-120.1): hÅqoj a)nqrw¯pwi daimwn, \"a man\'s character is his fate\" or \"a man\'s fate is his character\". There is a relation of cause between the character of a tragic personage and what befalls him. Such character is investigated through psychic terms that Euripides uses for his protagonists (frh/n and cognates, kardi/a, yuxh/, qumo/j etc.).

This dissertation is a set of three essays connected by the common theme of our epistemic fragility: the way in which our knowledge – of our own minds, of whether we are in violation of the epistemic and ethical norms, and of the philosophical truths themselves – is hostage to forces outside our control. The first essay, “Are We Luminous?”, is a recasting and defence of Timothy Williamson’s argument that there are no non-trivial conditions such that we are in a position to know we are in them whenever we are in them. Crucial to seeing why Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument succeeds, pace various critics, is recognising that the issue is largely an empirical one. It is in part because of the kind of creatures we are – specifically, creatures with coarse-grained doxastic dispositions – that nothing of interest, for us, is luminous. In the second essay, “What’s in a Norm?”, I argue that such an Anti-Cartesian view in turn demands that epistemologists and ethicists accept the ubiquity of normative luck, the phenomenon whereby agents fail to do what they ought because of non-culpable ignorance. Those who find such a view intolerable – many epistemic internalists and ethical subjectivists – have the option of cleaving to the Cartesian orthodoxy by endorsing an anti-realist metanormativity. The third essay, “The Archimedean Urge”, is a critical discussion of genealogical scepticism about philosophical judgment, including evolutionary debunking arguments and experimentally-motivated attacks. Although such genealogical scepticism often purports to stand outside philosophy – in the neutral terrains of science or common sense – it tacitly relies on various first-order epistemic judgments. The upshot is two-fold. First, genealogical scepticism risks self-defeat, impugning commitment to its own premises. Second, philosophers have at their disposal epistemological resources to fend off genealogical scepticism: namely, an epistemology that takes seriously the role that luck plays in the acquisition of philosophical knowledge.

This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski's grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.

Tendo em vista a influência confessa da poética apollinairiana nas primeiras produções de Manuel Bandeira, o que, em hipótese alguma, se deve a uma leitura positivista segundo a escola francesa tradicional, propomos a análise temático-comparativa de poemas retirados da obra A cinza das horas ( 1917 ) e de Alcools (1913 ). O estudo vem se dando a partir da recorrência motívica central do tempo, presente em ambos os poetas, que traduzem os seus desgostos íntimos através de uma linguagem sentimentalmente artística e expressiva em que o amor canta a morte. A dor, o tédio, a solidão e a melancolia são os sentimentos que sustentam essa condição poética desditosa, buscando resgatar aquilo que findou por meio de um tempo mítico, haja vista que este será eternamente não-reconciliado, estando o olhar poético direcionado para um passado que traz reminiscências dolorosas. Além disso, nossa preocupação é a de observar como esse tema é representado em seus vários subtemas, bem como nas diferentes formas poéticas que constituem nosso corpus de análise. / As we have the known influence of the Apollinaire poetry at the first production of Manuel Bandeira, which is based on the reading of the positivism according to the traditional french school, the main aim of this research is to analyse tematic and comparatively the poems taken from the works A cinza das horas (1917) and Alcools. The cited research has been developed through the central constant motive of the time, being held at both poets\' works, which translate their inner disgustings throughout the sentimental-artistic and the expressive language, where the love sings the death. The pain, the tedium, the lonely and the melancholia are the feelings that supply such unfortunate poetic condition, trying this way to recollect what is over through a mythical time, remembering that such time will never be recuperated, through a poetic sight focused on the past which brings painful remains. Nevertheless, our main concern is to observe how such theme is represented in its assorted subthemes, as well as how the different poetic forms are built in our analysis.