Denna studie tar upp forskning kring tillgänglighet inom data/tv-spel och fokuserar främst på ljudspel, en genre som särskilt uppstått för synnedsatta. Texten tar upp frågeställningen kring seende personers upplevelser av ljudspel och att kvalitativ data ska samlas in för denna studie. Metoden diskuteras och relevant forskning för denna studie nämns därefter. Genom att lyfta fram viktiga designval för genren ljudspel har en artefakt skapats dedikerad till studien. Denna artefakt består av ett enkelt spel med syfte att undersöka seende personers förmåga att navigera i en okänd 3D-miljö utan grafik, samt undersöka deras mentala representation av 3D-miljön. Undersökningen visade resultat som gav förståelse för personers upplevelse av ljudspel och hur deras mentala bild ser ut. För framtida arbeten borde även synnedsatta ta del av artefakten för att se om den mentala representationen skiljer sig mellan grupperna.

Bering and colleagues (2004, 2005) reported that the expectation that conscious mental states cease with the onset of death (discontinuity reasoning) emerges developmentally, and discontinuity reasoning for some states (emotions, desire, epistemic) remains lower than for others (psychobiological, perceptual). Cormier (2005) reported very similar findings for the context of sleep and proposed a modular explanation of these effects (“intentional persistence”) and suggested that intentional persistence represents an evolved adaptation designed to maintain vigilance and behavioral preparedness while in the presence of animals of ambiguous agency status (e.g., death, sleep, hibernation, feigned death). The current study extended this line of research to realistic animal characters. Although results revealed patterns of discontinuity reasoning and intentional persistence that were consistent with those of previous studies, the prediction that intentional persistence would be more pronounced for predators was not fulfilled. A newly proposed evolutionary product, “Cooptation,” was introduced to further explain the results. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

The main purpose of this thesis was to explore if there existed one single underlying semiotic function for representation. The problem was examined from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. In the first part of this thesis the theoretical considerations about Piaget's hypothesis of a single semiotic function are described and compared with a number of alternative approaches. The hypothesis is critically analyzed and its limitations are pointed out. In the second part of this thesis the empirical studies are reported. One of the guiding lines for the experiments performed was the distinction made by Piaget between figurative and operative aspects of representation. The main conclusions to be drawn from the four studies were that they all supported, however tentatively, Piagets hypothesis of a single underlying semiotic function. In terms of figurative and operative aspects of cognition it was concluded that the underlying form (the operative aspect) at different ages is constant across the different representation modes. The differences found in the figurative aspect of representation were bound to the representation media, and could vary as a function of media, task demands and individual differences. In the third part of this thesis problems with representation media and task demands are discussed together with research in related areas of the semiotic function. The general conclusions drawns from this thesis were that there might exist a single underlying semiotic function for representation. The issue is neither simple nor uncomplicated. The distinction made between the figurative and operative aspect of representation is considered as one attempt to narrow down the generality of the hypothesis, and to distinguish between what is expected to be a universal aspect of the semiotic function and what varies as a function of media, task demands and individual-, social- , and cultural differences. / digitalisering@umu

My thesis is an attempt to develop a naturalistic account of mental representation based on the notion of causation. The thesis consists of two main parts. The first part (chapters II and III) develops an understanding of naturalization. According to my proposal, naturalization is a two-step process: in the first step a set of conditions is specified which are thought to be the essential aspects of the notion under study and in the second step a naturalistic system is proposed which is claimed to satisfy these conditions. In accordance with this understanding of naturalization, the second part (chapters IV and V) of the thesis sets out the conditions which a successful naturalization of mental representation has to satisfy and then develops a new naturalistic account of mental representation based on the causal connections between environmental properties and the brain.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-131). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

Thesis (M.A.)--York University, 2002. Graduate Programme in Psychology. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 71-78). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ71623.

Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms "representation" and "function" undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses "use theories" of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. According to this theory, representations are physically instantiated structures, and represent whatever other structures are isomorphic to them, regardless of how or whether these structures are used by some cognitive system. Unfortunately, since isomorphism is a rather weak constraint, Cummins' theory underdetermines representational content so severely that it too undermines explanatory appeals to representation. One task I undertake is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids this difficulty.My second task is to adapt Cummins' argument to criticize most current analyses of "function," which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of "function," by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins' notion of function, both as it appears in cognitive science, and elsewhere. However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms "representation" and "function," I argue that they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define "representation" and "function" must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task by providing principles for theory choice in the face of empirical underdetermination of facts about representational and functional use.

This study explores characteristics of students’ repertoires of representations in two mathematical contexts: whole number multiplication and the comparison of common fractions. A repertoire of representations refers to a set of representations which a student can reconstruct as needed. Of particular interest are (1) how multiplicative relationships among units were represented, and (2) whether continuous measurement was an underlying conceptual framework for their representations. In addition, the characteristics of students’ representations and interpretation of units of linear and area measurement were explored. Data were collected through a series of interviews with Grade 5 and Grade 7 students. Some results of the study were as follows. Each repertoire of representations was exemplified by a dominant form of units, either discrete or contiguous. Within a repertoire, all forms of units were related, first through a common system of measurement (either numerosity or area), and second through their two-dimensional characteristic. In the multiplication context, some repertoires were comprised only of representations with discrete units, but others also included some representations with contiguous units. Students sought characteristics in their representations which reflected those based on continuous measurement, however linear or area measurement was not used as a conceptual framework. Instead, all representations were based on the measurement of numerosity. Also, students exhibited different limits in their representation of multiplicative relationships among units. Some represented no multiplicative relationships, but most represented at least a multiplicative relationship between two units. Relationships among three units were seldom constructed and difficult to achieve. Common fraction repertoires were based on the measurement of either numerosity or area, but the physical characteristics of the units varied. Some repertoires had only contiguous representations of units, others also included representations with discrete units, and a few did not represent fractional units at all. Students’ representations reflected characteristics of area-based representations, however area measurement was not necessarily a conceptual framework. In addition, students’ beliefs about what constituted units of area measurement were variable. As a result, they either represented no multiplicative relationships among units, or fluctuated between representing two-unit and three-unit relationships. Linear measurement was notably absent as a basis for representations in both mathematical contexts. The one-dimensional characteristic of linear measurement did not fit students’ dominant framework for constructing mathematical representations. With respect to measurement, students represented linear units in terms of discrete points or line segments. Counting points and interpreting the count in terms of the numerosity of line segments was problematic for nearly all students. When partitioning regions into units of area, a few students also equated the number of lines with the number of parts. The direct relationship of action and result in counting discrete objects was generalized without consideration of other geometric characteristics. When comparing quantities having linear or area units, numerical reasoning was not always used. Alternatively, either quantities were transformed to facilitate a direct comparison, or only perceptual judgements were made. No students consistently used numerical reasoning to compare fractional units of area. In the latter situations, the part-whole relationship among units seldom was observed. In general, there was no direct relationship between the forms of representations used by students in the two mathematical contexts and the characteristics of their representations of units of the measurement contexts. The development of repertoires of representations appears to be context specific. The repertoires were strictly limited in terms of the forms of representations of which they were comprised.

In this thesis, I apply teleofunctionalism to a current debate concerning the normativity of practical rationality. Assuming teleofunctionalism is the correct theory of mental phenomena, I argue that it can provide a promising account of the normativity of practical rationality. This claim is motivated by the idea that a capacity to represent internal states, external states, and relations between these states as reasons for action has a teleofunction, and is thus a source of normativity. This teleofunction is marked by a distinctive causal role that reason-representation plays in action. Although I argue that this capacity developed out of processes of biological natural selection, the content of representations of reasons for action produced by the mechanisms underlying this capacity need not be determined solely by biological selection. In an effort to naturalize normativity in this way, I discuss the relation between biological-functional normativity and the normativity of rationality itself.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Feb. 29, 2008). Directed by Stuart Marcovitch; submitted to the Dept. of Psychology. Includes bibliographical references (p. 44-48).