This thesis investigates the inner connection between politics and morality and the analytical challenges it has posed and still poses for political philosophy. In part one, I explore the problematic relationship between politics and morality as it has been conceived and analyzed by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli and Weber. This exploration is a historical reconstruction, a ‘genealogy’, of four major philosophical accounts concerning the tension between the moral demands of politics and the moral demands of ‘ordinary’ life. The historical reconstruction aims at revealing the philosophical complexity of the problems that characterize the relationship between politics and morality. It is set to show that those problems have some basic perennial features which remain unresolved until nowadays. In part two, following the conclusions of the historical reconstruction, I make the central contention that the insoluble fragmentation of moral values that characterizes our world is central to the understanding of the inner connection between politics and morality. For this reason I analyze this connection from the perspective of moral pluralism, the philosophical tradition that conceives moral conflicts as the very essence of moral activity. My claim is that politics appears to be structurally opposed to specific types of moral values, because political moral values themselves are part of the fragmentation of morality. I support this claim with a further analysis of the moral divisions between the private, public and political spheres of conduct. My argument is that each of those spheres is permeated by a dominant type of moral values which is in permanent tension with the dominant types of values in the other two spheres of conduct. Finally, I make the case, that the usual aphorisms against the immorality of politicians and the famous concept of ‘dirty hands’ can be better understood when viewed as the inevitable result of the insoluble fragmentation of morality. I conclude, however, that the perennial attempts to achieve some sense of moral unity through politics indicate the special moral status we should attribute to political action.

The aim of this study is to produce a critical description and analysis of the understanding of religious belief (with particular reference to the concept of 'truth') which underlies the current practice of collective worship in schools. The research is based on a sample of twelve schools which makes no pretence at being random, but is broadly representative of state education in Luton between the ages of 5 and 16. The study was conducted primarily within the qualitative, interpretive tradition of social research, using the method of 'verstehen', and the 'grounded theory' approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967). The main sources of data were semi-structured interviews with teachers who lead collective worship, participant observation, and the relevant official documents. There was also a brief questionnaire. The research data was, in grounded theory terminology, 'saturated' with four major themes: inclusivity; freedom of choice and personal integrity; the location of the heart of collective worship in moral exhortation, individual reflection, personal spirituality, and 'worthship' rather than in traditional worship; and the powerful influence and leeway of the individual teacher. A critical analysis of these themes leads to the conclusion that the understanding of religious belief which underlies the current practice of collective worship in this sample of schools sees it as an individually chosen, private, practical guide to living - in the terminology of grounded theory this is the 'core category'. This has the conseqences that religious belief is also treated as relative and as subjective. It is further argued that the teachers are operating primarily within a liberal, rationalist understanding of both education and religious belief. This understanding is coming under attack from several directions and looks increasingly unlikely to be able to provide an adequate framework for collective worship in a genuinely plural and postmodern world.

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The thesis argues that Christianity underwent a profound process of inculturation during the "long eighteenth century", which was caused by the absence of foreign missionaries after the edict of 1724 and by the fact that the Christian centres moved from China's cities into the countryside and wilderness.

abstract: The current study explored whether intrinsically religious individuals are able to separate the "sin" from the "sinner" (i.e., separate category membership from behavior) when judging homosexual individuals, or whether they are instead subject to the negativity bias (judgments based solely on category membership) in moral judgments. All effects were expected to occur only for participants high in homophobia. Participants were 305 undergraduate male and female students at a large, public university in the southwestern U.S. Respondents read one of five scenarios that described gay or straight targets who were celibate or engaged in same or opposite sex relationships, then were asked to respond to a series of questions evaluating attitudes and behavioral intentions toward the target. Results revealed that homophobia led to a negativity bias in judgments of gay targets, which was intensified by intrinsic religiosity. However, individuals high on intrinsic religiosity and high on homophobia also differentiated between gay targets based on sexual behavior, such that gay targets who were celibate or in an opposite-sex relationship were rated more favorably than gay targets in a same-sex relationship. These findings demonstrate that the negativity bias and "sin vs. sinner" differentiation may both be occurring for intrinsically religious individuals. The moderating effect of homophobia on the interaction between intrinsic religiosity and judgments of gay and straight targets shows us that religiosity itself is not inherently tolerant or intolerant. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Psychology 2011

In England, medical, nursing and other healthcare professions are required by their codes of professional ethics to have a working knowledge of moral principles and to be able to apply them in practice. Little, if anything, is said explicitly by these professions about the virtues. However, much is said about the character of the doctor or the nurse, and their supposed ability to recognise moral issues in their professional work and make morally good decisions. Edmund Pellegrino has questioned the appropriateness of applying moral principles to medical practice in contemporary times without a firm foundation. He attempts to restore the moral foundation of the profession of medicine, by restricting an account of the good to the profession which he claims, unlike ethics in general, there can be agreement on norms. From this position, moral principles in medical ethics can be justified, agreed upon, and provide firm action guidance in practice, as well as provide an independent ground for medical virtues. I will claim that Pellegrino's concern about disagreement and a loss of norms in ethics in general is not resolved in the restricted field of professional medical ethics and that his understanding of principles and the link with virtue is confused. Then, using virtue terms Pellegrino himself thinks necessary for making good decisions in practice, I will show how a certain account of the virtues can provide a plausible account of how we can become good healthcare workers and so support Pellegrino's goal; though it will not support his confidence in supplying both clear, moral, and normative constraints in a code of professional medical ethics and firm decision-making in practice.

This study explores how human beings became moral beings. Are we the only creatures that engage in this way of thinking, doing and discerning? The ultimate focus of this study is to present an integrated perspective on the origin of morality, taking its lead from evolutionary biology. It further stresses the notion that a firmer grip on the origin of morality can provide us with a clearer understanding of what it means to be human. In the discussion of important ethical issues, it is of utmost importance to have a clear understanding of embodied existence. The study commences by gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the origin of morality, which is achieved by exploring the modern discourse on the origin thereof. It consists of an exposition of three perspectives on the origin of morality – theological, philosophical and evolutionary biological – in which the contribution of influential representatives of each perspective are in focus. The study continues with a more in-depth study of the evolutionary biological perspective on the origin of morality. This is accomplished through an in-depth study of primatologist Frans de Waal’s perspective on the origin of morality. De Waal posits that morality is built into our species. Rather than coming to us top-down from God, or any other external source, morality for De Waal arises bottom-up from our emotions and our day-to-day social interactions, which themselves evolved from foundations in animal societies. De Waal’s opinion on the origin of morality is assessed by means of a discussion of contemporary responses on his particular view. This research is undertaken from the basic conviction that an exclusive theological perspective on the origin of morality does not represent a comprehensive genesis of morality. Theology engaging with the evolutionary biology will, therefore, result in a more comprehensive understanding of the origin of morality. / Dissertation (MTh)--University of Pretoria, 2016. / Dogmatics and Christian Ethics / MTh / Unrestricted

Thesis advisor: Elizabeth A. Kensinger / Thesis advisor: Hiram Brownell / The present research used a combination of resting-state functional connectivity and behavioral testing within and beyond the laboratory to examine how age is associated with potential cognitive and socioemotional motivational mechanisms in relation to first-person moral decision-making and third person moral judgments. Part I investigated whether the gray matter structure and resting-state functional connectivity of the Default Mode Network were similarly related to working memory capacity and sacrificial moral decision-making in younger and older adults. Results indicated that better working memory performance was positively associated with Default Mode Network segregation in both groups, as marked by increased within-network resting-state functional connectivity, and decreased between-network connectivity. Critically, reduced bias to endorse the utilitarian option during sacrificial dilemmas involving incidental harm was associated with increased segregation of the Default Mode Network in younger adults. Similar behavioral performance in older adults, however, was associated with reduced segregation of the Default Mode Network via increased coupling with Salience Network regions. These findings suggest that Default Mode Network functional integrity may be differentially associated with age-related changes in working memory capacity and sacrificial moral decision-making. Part II investigated whether age differences in utilitarian moral decision-making extend beyond the laboratory in non-sacrificial settings during the COVID-19 pandemic. Results indicated that older age and negative affect were associated with the purchase of extra amounts of hard to find good and medical supplies. Negative memory was additionally associated with the purchase of hard to find goods. Advancing age was also associated with reported distribution of these goods to family members, suggesting that these behaviors may have actually resulted in more utilitarian outcomes than when younger adults reported purchasing these goods. These findings suggest that advancing age may be associated with the engagement in utilitarian moral decision-making in real-world settings more than sacrificial moral decision-making literature might suggest. These results also highlight the link between emotional memory and moral decision-making in real-world settings. Part III sought to determine whether younger adults display memory biases for mixed-valence moral scenarios about others’ actions in a similar manner to the negativity biases demonstrated in the emotional memory literature. It also sought to determine whether episodic memory content could be used to predict subsequent judgments about agents’ actions. Indeed participants demonstrated an immoral memory bias for motivational content that they learned about agents’ actions. Additionally, memory for motivational content appeared to predict subsequent judgments of agents’ actions. These findings suggest that the information recalled from episodic memory stores may be important for informing subsequent moral judgments about agents’ actions. These immoral memory biases observed in younger adults highlight important avenues for future research to consider when examining age-related motivational shifts in emotional memory and moral judgment. The findings of the present work highlight the complex interplay of cognitive and socioemotional motivational mechanisms associated with age-related effects on first-person moral decision-making and third-person moral judgments. In the context of the broader literature, the findings indirectly point to the involvement of age-related motivational mechanisms in all three studies. These findings have important implications for moral development in the second half of life. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Far too often, theorists talk past one another making it difficult to compare and contrast the differing viewpoints. Described by what I term the 'problem of clarity,' much legal discourse has suffered at the hands of misunderstood views and lack of attention paid to focusing on arguing the truth or falsity of the same propositions. In this dissertation, I aim to develop a conceptual framework through which past, present and future debates may be understood. Focusing on morality's role in the law, this thesis sets out to alleviate the problem of clarity as it affects discourse in jurisprudence. Distinguishing objects from theories, I proceed to outline various 'levels' at which we may understand morality as functioning in law. Morality's role in law, I argue, can be understood as falling under one of three distinct levels: the 'practice-level,' the 'theoretical-level,' or the 'meta-theoretical-level.' In putting forth this framework, I hope to provide guidelines through which legal theorists will be able to focus concerns and debates. It is the aim of this thesis to help alleviate the difficulties arising out of the problem of clarity, for example, by providing a framework in which theorists will be able to work, specifically in matters concerning morality's role in law. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Moral identity, moral personality, and moral emotion have all been suggested to influence moral behavior individually, however, the results have been mixed and contradictory. Furthermore, they have never been tested together to determine their relative contribution in predicting moral decision-making. An anonymous online survey was administered to undergraduate students (N = 432). Moral Reasoning was assessed by a series of six hypothetical moral dilemmas. Participants were asked which of two choices they would prefer, one being a more deontological choice, in other words, follow a principle such as “tell the truth”, and the other being a more utilitarian choice, such as “lie to spare a person’s feelings”. In addition, participants were asked how confident they felt that they made the right choice in each dilemma. Other measures in the survey battery included Moral Identity which has two subscales, one for Moral Importance, or the degree to which they feel being a moral person is important, and one for Moral Expression, or the degree to which they try to behave consistently with their moral values; a survey of Moral Emotion with subscales for Shame and Guilt; and a measure of Moral Personality variables otherwise known as the dark tetrad: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Sadism, and Psychopathy. Age and moral expression were the only significant predictors of utilitarian choices on hypothetical moral dilemmas. Although guilt was also correlated with utilitarianism, it failed to be a significant factor when all variables were combined into one regression equation. The degree of confidence participants expressed in their decisions on the hypothetical moral dilemmas was correlated with shame and moral importance, however, none of the morality variables was a significant predictor of confidence ratings when entered together into a regression equation. Possible reasons for the lack of significant results are explored and suggestions for future studies are suggested.