Scandinavia is famous for their Viking ships and their raids during the 9th century. However, the Scandinavian society was widely divided between the ruling forces. There are a lot of evidence for conflicts within the Viking world, with both written sources, stories and archaeological records speaking for it. As the ship, and travel by water, was one of the most efficient ways of travelling, widely used within all of Iron Age Scandinavia, this paper seeks to explore the possibilities of a maritime defense system within the central Viking society using place names and GIS. Uppland, as one of the most influential areas in Scandinavian Iron Age, hosting sites as Vendel and Gamla Uppsala, the use and need of a maritime defense would have been, due to the risk of conflict, vital.

I takt med att det säkerhetspolitiska omvärldsläget förändrats har frågor kring statens förmåga att möta kriser och rena krigshandlingar accentuerats. En statlig utredning har därför föreslagit att på sikt skapa ett samlat sjöförsvar genom att integrera Kustbevakningen och Marinen i en gemensam myndighet. Riktningen på de politiska besluten har dock gått åt en fördjupad samverkan i stället trots att samverkan mellan Försvarsmakten och Kustbevakningen varit behäftad med svårigheter. Denna studie syftar till att analysera varför man i Sverige valt att utöka samverkan mellan Försvarsmakten och Kustbevakningen. Studien är en kvalitativ fallstudie där WPR-metoden används för att analysera SOU 2012:48 kompletterad med en samtalsintervju av en informant vid Försvarsdepartementet. Teoretisk utgångspunkt utgörs av Sundelius m.fl. forskning kring svensk nationell krishantering. Sammanfattningsvis kan konstateras att det inte finns någon politisk vilja till en sammanslagning. Detta grundar sig på en generell ovilja att blanda civila och militära uppgifter samt att man fram tills nyligen inte låtit statens förmåga att hantera kriser och ytterst ett väpnat angrepp vara dimensionerande. Vår slutsats är för att uppnå bästa möjliga operativa förmåga för staten att kunna hantera framtida kriser, och ytterst ett väpnat angrepp, så är en integrering av Kustbevakningen och Marinen i en och samma myndighet den bästa lösningen. / Along the changes in the security situation in the world, questions about the government's ability to face crisis and acts of war have risen. An official report of the Swedish Government has suggested that an integration of the Coast Guard and the Navy into a consolidated maritime defence force is needed in the future. The aim of governmental policy has despite this been on focusing on cooperation despite difficulties regarding the relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard in cooperating. This study aims to analyze why Sweden has chosen to increase cooperation between the two authorities. The study is a qualitative case study in which WPR-approach is used to analyze the official government report supplemented by an interview with a ministry of defence official. The theoretical basis is the research of Sundelius et al consisting of theories regarding Swedish national crisis management. In summary - no political will exists regarding consolidation. It stems from a general unwillingness in mixing civilian and military tasks and that up until recently the government's ability to handle crisis, and ultimately war, was not the dimensioning aim. The conclusion is that in order to achieve the optimal ability for the government in handling future crisis and full war, an integration of the Coast Guard and Navy into one authority is the best solution.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.