This masters thesis titled 'Buying across price tiers in the Australian wine market' explores if the duplication of purchase law (DoP) can be used to describe how consumers purchase across price tiers. The law has traditionally been used to describe how consumers buy across different brands in repeat purchase markets over time. This thesis builds on the generalisability of the DoP law by applying it to how consumers buy from different price tiers in a market where much price choice exists.

<p>The reason for this study of the Swedish banking sector is that we suspect that collusion is at hand in the sector. We ground our suspiciousness on the extensive revenues and high retail banking fees. Swedish banking fees are the highest in EU. Based on this and that the banking sector is oligopolistic with only a few significant competitors we found it interesting to apply theories concerning tacit collusion on the banking sector. Our main conclusions are that cooperative pricing could be successful for banks since prices are a poor means of competition whereas customers focus on service quality instead of price. There is little asymmetry among the established banks and they cooperate through a number of systems. Since they cooperate through these systems the banks experience similar cost pressures and information is available. The Swedish bankers’ association plays an important role in the exchange of information. Thus, the facilitating features are strong and cooperative pricing can be profitable. An effective banking sector is essential for an economy and has a central role in the society as a whole. The presence of collusion can therefore have important implications, not only for the customers but also for the society. Efficiency costs also appear when collusion is at hand and can exceed the society’s welfare losses.</p>

<p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1990</p>

The reason for this study of the Swedish banking sector is that we suspect that collusion is at hand in the sector. We ground our suspiciousness on the extensive revenues and high retail banking fees. Swedish banking fees are the highest in EU. Based on this and that the banking sector is oligopolistic with only a few significant competitors we found it interesting to apply theories concerning tacit collusion on the banking sector. Our main conclusions are that cooperative pricing could be successful for banks since prices are a poor means of competition whereas customers focus on service quality instead of price. There is little asymmetry among the established banks and they cooperate through a number of systems. Since they cooperate through these systems the banks experience similar cost pressures and information is available. The Swedish bankers’ association plays an important role in the exchange of information. Thus, the facilitating features are strong and cooperative pricing can be profitable. An effective banking sector is essential for an economy and has a central role in the society as a whole. The presence of collusion can therefore have important implications, not only for the customers but also for the society. Efficiency costs also appear when collusion is at hand and can exceed the society’s welfare losses.

Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

Due to the sharpen regulation of the Swedish plain vanilla warrant in 2006 and the recent increase in trade among private investors, this thesis examined the informa-tion efficiency of Swedish plain vanilla warrants. This was done in three different ways. First the theoretical Black &amp; Scholes (B&amp;S) price was tested against the ac-tual market price. Secondly likelihood ratio test statistics was used to see whether information regarding past returns added any information to that already captured by the implied volatility (IV) generated from observed warrant market prices via the B&amp;S model. The third method used was a comparison of the IV´s among com-parable warrants. As the regulation of the Swedish plain vanilla warrant market states that only certified issuer are allowed short calls and puts, the self adjusting price mechanism found in the option market doesn’t exist on this market. As a con-sequence of this, investors on this market is reliant of accurate ask and bid prices from the issuers. Further, the information efficiency of a capital market is of es-sence for capital allocation, price discovery and risk management. The results from all three tests rejected the information efficiency hypothesis of the sample. Thus concluding that the included warrants in this thesis are none ideally for activities such as capital allocation, price discovery and risk management.

The imposed commission ban to Finnish insurance intermediaries has generated some controversy and the intermediary market has experienced consolidation in the few last years. The thesis examines the relationship between market structure and profitability among Finnish life insurance intermediaries and tests for the applicability of two market power hypotheses. The panel data analysis shows that there is support for the Relative Market Power hypothesis while the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis is not applicable for Finnish life insurance intermediaries. The implication of this research is that competition authorities should be concerned with market structure effects when discussing changes to the regulatory environment which surrounds life insurance intermediaries.

Με την παρούσα διδακτορική διατριβή εξετάζουμε τις επιπτώσεις της απελευθέρωσης της ελληνικής τηλεπικοινωνιακής αγοράς στη δομή της αγοράς, στην τιμολόγηση και στην απασχόληση από το 1992 έως το 2005. Τα στοιχεία αφορούν 44 από τις πιο σημαντικές επιχειρήσεις της σταθερής τηλεφωνίας, της κινητής τηλεφωνίας και του διαδικτύου, και συλλέχθησαν με τη μέθοδο των συνεντεύξεων με τη βοήθεια ερωτηματολογίου. Η αξιολόγηση των στοιχείων έγινε τόσο περιγραφικά όσο και οικονομετρικά. Τα περιγραφικά μας αποτελέσματα υποστηρίζουν αρκετές άλλες έρευνες που συμπεραίνουν ότι η απελευθέρωση της αγοράς μειώνει το βαθμό συγκέντρωσής της, αυξάνει τον ανταγωνισμό, προκαλεί μείωση τιμών και αυξάνει συνολικά την απασχόληση. Στο οικονομετρικό επίπεδο, χρησιμοποιήσαμε Panel Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) που θεωρείται κατάλληλο εργαλείο για δείγματα, όπως το δικό μας, τα οποία αποτελούνται από διαστρωματικά δεδομένα για χρονικές περιόδους μεγαλύτερες της μιας, και δεν υπάρχει συσχέτιση μεταξύ των μη παρατηρούμενων παραγόντων και των ερμηνευτικών μεταβλητών. Η οικονομετρική έρευνα έδειξε ότι στο νέο ανταγωνιστικό περιβάλλον (όπως αυτό προέκυψε από την οικονομετρική ανάλυση) η ιδιωτική ιδιοκτησία και η ύπαρξη εξειδικευμένου προσωπικού στον εμπορικό και τεχνικό τομέα φαίνεται να επηρεάζουν θετικά το μερίδιο αγοράς των επιχειρήσεων. Επιπλέον, η κατοχή ενός μεγάλου μερίδιου αγοράς παρέχει μεγαλύτερη δυνατότητα στις επιχειρήσεις να μειώσουν τις τιμές των υπηρεσιών τους. Τέλος, η απασχόληση επηρεάζεται κυρίως από την ιδιωτική ιδιοκτησία. Κατ’ αυτόν τον τρόπο, το άρθρο μας προσφέρει χρήσιμη οικονομετρική πληροφόρηση σε ένα πεδίο που παρατηρείται ακόμη ένα μεγάλο ερευνητικό έλλειμμα. / -

Prescription drugs play an increasingly significant role in the Canadian healthcare system. Drug spending accounts for a considerable share of total healthcare expenditure and continues to be one of the fastest growing expenditure components in Canada. But, drug manufacturers’ price setting behaviours are not well understood in the literature. I develop a framework of oligopoly theory with two-dimension product differentiation based on a synthesis of the literature on the institutional history and development of the Canadian pharmaceutical system. I find that: (1) The differentiation in perceived quality between brand-name and generic drugs can explain the generic competition paradox. The degree of the product differentiation can be pivotal in shaping the brand-name drug manufacturers’ price setting behaviours in response to the shift in patients’ preference and changes in government policies. (2) Copay and generic drug price-cap policies are commonly adopted by the Canadian public drug plans to contain drug reimbursement cost. Policy-makers should use caution when applying these policies in combination or separately in order to reach the intended outcomes. (3) The generic drug price-cap can elicit competition among brand-name drug manufacturers, but it may need coordinated regulations on patented drug prices. Without full coordination among major stakeholders and across jurisdictions, the benefits of lowered drug prices for some can become additional costs for others. I innovatively adopt the multilevel model to analyze the pharmaceutical market structure and evaluate the net effect of the generic competition paradox. The empirical research on the drug price dynamics is consistent with the predictions of the previously developed theory. I find that: (1) More generic substitutes in a drug molecule are associated with a net effect of increases in drug prices, after other contextual variables are properly controlled for. (2) More therapeutic substitutes do not have a net effect of lowering drug prices. (3) When a generic substitution policy is in place, the studied brand-name drugs maintain net price premiums over their generic substitutes. But, the net price premiums in the case when there is a generic substitution policy are lower than those where there is no such policy.