Market structure affects the informational and real frictions faced by traders in equity markets. Using bid-ask spreads, we present evidence which suggests that while real frictions associated with the costs of supplying immediacy are less in order-driven systems, informational frictions resulting from increased adverse selection risk are considerably higher in these markets. Firm value, transaction size and order location are all major determinants of the trading costs borne by investors. Consistent with the stealth trading hypothesis of Barclay and Warner (1993), we report that informational frictions are at their highest for medium size trades that go through the order book. Finally, while there is no doubt that the total costs of trading on order-driven systems are lower for very liquid securities, the inherent informational inefficiencies of the trading format should not be ignored. This is particularly true for the vast majority of small to mid-size stocks that experience infrequent trading and low transaction volume.

Meat substitutes are an increasingly popular subject area for sustainability studies and industrial transition.  A transition to plant-based alternatives requires a substantial value chain with the ability to withstand transitional structure and market changes. While the value chain poses challenges at each level, considering the topmost level reveals unique market dynamics specific to the agriculture of legumes.  Western markets have shown a trend favoring plant-based protein as a sustainable source of nutrition however, research on raw material sourcing, processing, and its market structure is limited, often with low government intervention. The Indian agriculture sector comprises mainly legume farming, contributing to a significant portion of the country’s economy. This thesis aims to describe the actor interactions in the Indian agriculture sector with a focus on drivers and hindrances that promote and limit the growth of the legume agriculture technological innovation system.  Using qualitative research methods to gather data from candidates directly involved in the legume trade has proven insightful. Findings show that there are complex interaction scenarios between the actors involved. Restricted by the size of farming area, target markets, and market convention, farmers are subjected to a lock-in type scenario with respect to sales and purchasers. Although government intervention offers protection and assistance, it remains a safety net for the agriculture community. Authoritative influence is used to promote policy however, interactions between actors are not optimized to support this change effectively.  Inter-organizational and actor networks are weak apart from certain business relationships arising from contractual obligations. Knowledge development is present but formal procedures of knowledge diffusion are absent, leaving opportunities not being capitalized on. The study discusses the merits and demerits of this system using the Technology Innovation System framework functions for the analysis. Limitations of the theoretical framework is discussed as a modified version of the framework is utilized in this thesis, giving importance to interactions and localized application of TIS functions.

In the extensive literature on price dispersions that exists to date, there is a gap in the analysis of how market structure affects prices as well as the degree of dispersion in prices. Specifically, the literature is deficient in analyzing how price levels and price dispersion are affected by the number of firms operating in a market. I use secondary data to look at the prices of prescription drugs at the retail level in nine hundred and seventy pharmacies across one hundred and sixty five markets in Maryland and compare price dispersion across these brick and mortar pharmacies as well as across a separate set of pharmacies that only operate online. I compare online versus offline price dispersion, as well as price dispersion in purely offline markets from the structure of the market’s context. Stahl’s (1989) theoretical model is used to formulate and test the hypotheses that an increase in the proportion of positive search cost consumers in a market will cause price levels to rise and price dispersion to initially increase and then decrease. Furthermore, in markets with the proportion of positive search cost consumers above a threshold level, an increase in the number of firms will also lead price levels to rise and price dispersion to initially increase and then decrease. Conversely, in markets with positive search cost consumers below the threshold level, an increase in the number of firms will lead to lower price levels, i.e. the competitive outcome. For the analysis, I look at prices at the pharmacy level and price dispersion at the market level and determine the proportion of high search cost consumers for a specific pharmacy or a specific market relative to the other pharmacies and markets in the dataset. I find that a significant part of the differences in prices for a homogeneous prescription drug can be attributed to asymmetric information and that price dispersion is higher in markets with a greater number of firms, and price levels are higher in low income neighborhoods.

平板玻璃工業乃台灣主要製造工業之一，由民國四十五年三月「新竹玻璃製造廠股份有限公司」第一廠正式開工生產平板玻璃以來，即開始蓬勃發展，成長迅速，生產量年有增加，不但供應國內市場有餘，且可大量外銷。五十五年底「東亞玻璃廠股份有限公司」加入生產行列，五十六年二月又有「台灣玻璃公司」建廠完成，開工生產，於是產量更形大增，至民國六十一年台灣平板玻璃的生產量已達二百一十八萬七千餘標準箱，銷售量二百一十一萬四千餘標準箱約空前記錄。然最近數年來，不僅平板玻璃的國內需求，因市場缺乏開拓，似已臻飽和；即在佔總銷量三分之二的外銷方面，亦由於原為我國外銷市場之東南亞地區國家，如泰國、韓國、菲律賓等均已自行設廠，其生產量不但足供自給，且有餘裕輸出，加上日本、意大利、比利時、西德、英國等與我國在美、加市場的激烈競爭，及美國保護主義的抬頭，而迭遭困難，因此，供過於求的現象於焉產生。 就生產者的市場結構觀之，東亞玻璃公司與台灣玻璃公司的加入 ，打破了新竹玻璃公司壟斷市場十年的局面，市場結構由「獨占」轉變成「寡占」狀態，同業競爭，乃在所難免。至於中間商的市場結構，則或為寡占或為純粹競爭，視其種類與地域而別，咸信在最近的將來，此等市場型態不致有太大的改變。 於此種市場結構之下，台灣平板玻璃業界產生了三方面的問題，即競爭問題，生產問題，與行銷問題。 在競爭問題方面，台灣平板玻璃不但在國際上遭遇強烈的競爭，在國內市場更因市場狹小而尤為激烈。國內市場的競爭，來自橫的與縱的兩方面，並構成六種主要的方式。 在生產問題方面，雖然台灣生產平板玻璃的天然條件極為有利，但是，由於生產者市場寡占競爭，廠商易趨妥協，阻礙了生產者求進步的決心與行動，致生產方面呈現著如下的特徵：(a)技術落後，(b)品質低劣，(c)生產成本偏高。 在行銷問題方面，生產者所實施的是一種「生產導向」的管理，不注重行銷，於是分配通路之選擇、定價政策之訂立、市場之開拓、產品之發展等行銷策略多半付諸闕如或一成不變，隨之而起的是經營效率的不如理想。至於中間商所實行的，則為一種得過且過，盲目無方的經營。總之，無論那一階層的經營者均缺乏遠大的眼光，所孜孜矻矻以求的是獲得短期利潤，但實際能獲得者卻屬有限。 凡此種種，使台灣平板玻璃業普遍蒙上一層悲觀的氣氛，業者多覺前途黯然，而不知所措。故針對以上的情況與問題，本文研究目的可述之如次： 本文研究目的之一，乃就公正客觀的立場，剖析台灣平板玻璃生產者的市場結構、競爭狀況、政策得失、產銷情形等，以作改善發展之準據。 就經濟學的觀點，在獨占市場之下，獨占者享有獨占利潤，消費者福利被剝削殆盡，故而，取締壟斷，提倡競爭，以提高消費者之議時有所聞。台灣平板玻璃工業既由獨占進入寡占局面，是否果使消費者福利增進呢？實有加以測度之必要，此本文研究目的之二。 分析行銷系統，發掘中間商經營困難的主因，並尋求其解決之道，期能提醒業者採取正確行動，突破難關，又為本文研究目的之三。 目前，台灣平板玻璃約有三分之二是用於外銷，在國際市場上遭受日本、意大利、英國、比利時、西德等國的強烈競爭，以及韓國的威脅。研究這些國家的一般既況與美、加市場的情形，藉供本省業者比較參酌，以收知己知彼之效，乃本文研究目的之四。 台灣平板玻璃既已進入競爭激烈，生產過剩之境，然則，其最適度的規模與產量究應為何，方能配合市場之需要，故本研究之五，即在循計量途徑，預測未來約市場需求量，俾作業界今後配合發展的指引。 二、研究方法 本文係兼採「描述研究」與「探測研究」兩種懂方法，以個體經濟學與行銷學的理論為構架，運用統計及簡單計量經濟學的方法分析台灣平板玻璃之市場結構及成長趨勢，由於上述各學科同屬經濟學的範疇，故不互悖，反可收相輔相成之功。 三、內容 本文共分成六章，第一章為緒論，提出問題之說明、研究目的、及本文研究方法與所受限制。 第二章為生產者市場結構與產銷分析，首先敘述台灣平板玻璃工業之發展沿革，其次將各生產者簡介與比較，然後分析生產、市場競爭與銷售情形，最後將價格作一分析，並測度市場結構的轉變對消費者福利是否有所影響。 第三章為行銷系統分析，依次介紹中間商種類及分配通路結構，中間商組織型態與規模分析、行銷成本分析、現存分配問題及一般問題的探討，以及解決分配及一般問題的方案。 第四章為國外重要平板玻璃工業及市場概況，分別就東亞地區、美加地區、及歐洲地區的國家略做說明，必要時並與我國比較之。 第五章為模型分析，先以簡單計量經濟方法建立平板玻璃內銷需求模型，進一步從事預測。然後，根據趨勢值預測平板玻璃外銷量，最後將內外銷量預測加總，成立銷售總量之預測。 第六章為結論及建議。 四、結論及建議 本文的結論及建議，已分別在各章提及，並在第六章做一總括，於此，僅簡單摘要之： （甲）有關結論部份： 1.台灣平板玻璃生產者市場結構的演變，係由獨占而寡占競爭再成寡占勾結，「勾結」乃阻礙生產者求進步之決心與意願的最主要原因。 2.台灣平板玻璃對外銷的依賴性極大，且集中於美、加等少數地區，所遭受的競爭壓力也大，但業者並不能以有系統、有步驟的方法進行外銷開拓工作，國內廠商且將競爭延展到國外，影響成長至鉅。 3.市場結構由原先的獨占局面轉變成二大一小的寡占情況，單以價格而言，由短期觀之，並未令消費者的福利增加，但若由長期觀之，則最後消費者確蒙其利。 4.平板玻璃的行銷系統未臻理想，代銷制度令市場分配通路趨於複雜，徒增運銷手續及行銷成本。此外，中間商的相互競爭、價格紊亂、人員素質低落、經營不得其法等，致內銷市場形成一片黯淡景象。 5.與國外重要平板玻璃工業國家比較，台灣平板玻璃的市場結構並無特殊之處，即同屬寡占型態，所異者在於外國平板玻璃生產者的勾結情況並不嚴重，未受政府的保護、對外銷依賴不大、品質較優、行銷系統也較健全。 6.由模型及趨勢驗證預測的結果，台灣平板玻璃的未來發展，仍大有可為。 （乙）有關建議部份： I.對於生產者的建議 1.實施外銷聯營，停止內銷勾桔—由生產者共同設立一個統一的外銷機構，實施外銷聯營，集兩公司之力，進行國際廣告、開拓等工作，以建立台灣平板玻璃的信譽，奠定堅固的外銷基礎。在內銷方面停止協議劃分市場，俾提高國內消費者的福利。 2.縮短內外銷價格差距——長久以來，台灣平板玻璃一直保持內外銷價格相距懸殊的現象，廠商以內銷貼補外銷，國內消費者長期承受高價玻璃的負擔，既不公平，也不合理，生產者實應設法逐漸減少內外銷價格的差距，內銷減價，外銷價格透過品質之提高而逐漸上揚，使兩者逐漸拉平。 3.取銷代銷制度——因為在內銷市場代銷商僅做形式的轉手，鑑於零售商對於各玻璃公司並不陌生。由零售商直接向生產者訂購已屬可行，故取消代銷制度以增加行銷效率，乃生產者改進其營運所必需的步驟之一。 4.採取綜合性的經營方式——建議各玻璃生產者自行集資附設純石咸工廠、採石工廠、其他玻璃原料工廠，甚至於包裝用的木箱工廠等，以確保原料來源無虞，裨益台灣平板玻璃工業的發展。 5.新產品發展——為適應需求的高級化，應積極發展平板玻璃的新產品，如磨板玻璃、浮式平板玻璃、有色平板玻璃、吸熱平板玻璃等，以延展平板玻璃的生命循環。 總之，吾人所期望於平板玻璃生產者的，仍是利用行銷組合——價格策略、分配通路策略、產品策略、推廣策略，來使其經營現代化，提高效率，己利而利人利國。 II.對中間商的建議： 吾人對於中間商建議為盼其能實施現代化的經營，減少彼此的競爭，如欲競爭，則應以非價格的方式來進行。至於一般規模太小的零售店，吾人建議不妨實施合作，以減少小規模的不經濟，增強議價及營業能力。 III.對政府的建議 1.開放平板玻璃進口—停止對平板玻璃生產者的保護，促進其改善品質，健全行銷。 2.扶植成立強有力的公會—扶植公會使其成為強有力的組織，使之統籌玻璃業界之事宜，影響其成員，則一切問題可大為減少。 3.以貨款或為之保證方式，協助建立浮式玻璃工廠。

O setor sucroenergético do Brasil encarou uma década de expansão da produção, seguida por um período de retração das atividades. Neste período, 80 usinas e destilarias deixaram de operar por motivo de falência das empresas ou decisões operacionais dos grupos controladores. A cana de açúcar possui características biológicas que determinam a necessidade de processamento industrial em poucas horas após a atividade de colheita, sob pena de grande perda de teor de sacarose. Essa questão tecnológica determina que a organização espacial da produção de açúcar e etanol seja preferencialmente realizada dentro de um raio geográfico reduzido em relação aos canaviais. O objetivo desta tese é analisar se as recentes paralisações e falências no setor sucroenergético do Brasil foram influenciadas pelas condições operacionais dos mercados regionais de cana de açúcar, assim como identificar os principais determinantes dos eventos de paralisação das atividades das usinas e destilarias entre 2001 e 2016. Indicadores de estrutura de mercado e concentração espacial são desenvolvidos e discutidos com base no conceito de mercado antitruste usado pelas principais agências de defesa da concorrência. A descrição da estrutura de mercado e a intensidade dos eventos de desligamento e falência em cada região são avaliados considerando a existência de múltiplas unidades de processamento que são de propriedade de uma mesma empresa em cada região. Os resultados indicam que a concentração e a disputa pela cana de açúcar como insumo por usinas localizadas próximas umas das outras estão espacialmente associadas aos eventos de falência e desligamento. No entanto, a análise de sobrevivência indica que o aumento do número de concorrentes demandando este insumo e a expansão do processamento de cana de açúcar no raio geográfico de colheita viável não foram fatores que contribuíram isoladamente para as falências e interrupções. Estes eventos foram menos frequentes entre as unidades industriais cuja empresa controladora conta com investidores estrangeiros na estrutura de capital e nos casos em que uma parcela mais alta dos insumos é obtida por meio de uma estrutura verticalmente integrada. / Brazil\'s sugar and ethanol industry faced a decade of expansion of production, followed by a period of retraction of activities. During this period, 80 mills and distilleries ceased to operate due to corporate bankruptcy or operational decisions of the controlling groups. Sugarcane has biological characteristics that determine the need for industrial processing in a few hours after harvesting, under penalty of great loss of sucrose content. This technological issue determines that the spatial organization of sugar and ethanol production is preferably carried out within a reduced geographic radius in relation to sugar cane fields. The objective of this thesis is to analyze if the recent shutdowns and bankruptcies in the Brazilian sugarcane industry were influenced by the operational conditions of the regional sugarcane markets, as well as to identify the main determinants of stoppage events of the maills and distilleries between 2001 and 2016. Indicators of market structure and spatial concentration are developed and discussed based on the concept of the antitrust market used by the major antitrust agencies. The description of the market structure and the intensity of the shutdown and bankruptcy events in each region are evaluated considering the existence of multiple processing units that are owned by the same company in each region. The results indicate that the concentration and the dispute for sugarcane as an input by plants located close to each other are spatially associated with the events of bankruptcy and shutdown. However, the survival analysis indicates that the increase in the number of competitors demanding this input and the expansion of sugarcane processing in the viable crop geographical radius were not factors that contributed in isolation to bankruptcies and interruptions. These events were less frequent among industrial units whose parent company relies on foreign investors in the capital structure and where a higher share of inputs are obtained through a vertically integrated structure.

Os bancos nunca foram tão grandes como depois da Crise de 2008. No momento de maior pânico, logo após a quebra do Lehman Brothers, autoridades do mundo inteiro autorizaram fusões e aquisições antes vetadas. Era preciso garantir a estabilidade do sistema financeiro alegava-se e tentar preservar a concorrência nesse instante apenas aumentaria o pânico. O Brasil não ficou imune a esse movimento. Fusões como a do Itaú com o Unibanco e aquisições como a da Nossa Caixa pelo Banco do Brasil levaram o setor a um grau de concentração nunca visto antes. A discussão entre o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) e o Banco Central, sobre quem deve julgar tais concentrações, faz parecer que existe uma contradição entre a disciplina constitucional da defesa da concorrência e a garantia da segurança e estabilidade das instituições financeiras. O resultado é a proliferação de instituições hipertrofiadas, os megabancos, em prejuízo desses mesmos princípios da ordem concorrencial estabelecidos constitucionalmente. Os principais argumentos em favor dos megabancos seriam, primeiro, o de que as rendas derivadas de poder no mercado que estes auferem (o chamado valor de franquia) formaria um colchão que aumentaria a sua resistência no caso de choques como o de 2008. Em segundo lugar, sugere-se que esses bancos, ao crescerem, acumulariam ganhos de escala, de escopo e de eficiência custo. Este trabalho propõe que não existe nenhum antagonismo entre a defesa da concorrência e a regulação bancária tradicional, de cunho prudencial e sistêmico. Propõe ainda que o modelo dos megabancos coloca um grande risco para a sociedade, tratando-se na realidade de um movimento estratégico de grandes instituições para acumular mais poder no mercado. São dois os motivos pelos quais se defende que não existe nenhum ganho no crescimento dessas instituições. Em primeiro lugar, as economias de escala se esgotam muito cedo, proposição com amplo suporte teórico e empírico. Na previsão mais otimista, bancos com mais do que 25 bilhões de dólares em ativos já estão na área de deseconomias de escala. Tampouco existem economias de escopo que autorizem a concentração de atividades tão diversas como as de banco comercial e de investimento. Bancos que concentram muitas atividades são, na realidade, avaliados negativamente pelo mercado. Mesmo os ganhos de eficiência custo, resultantes de uma melhor gestão de instituições mal administradas, não tem suporte empírico relevante. Em segundo lugar, uma estrutura moderna do setor bancário pressupõe bancos especializados e concentrados nas áreas em que têm maior eficiência. São bancos menores, que dividem com os mercados financeiros e outros intermediários a tarefa de prover o crédito. A concorrência do mercado de capitais, de instituições não bancárias (como gestores de fundos e financeiras) e de instituições não financeiras (como redes de supermercados, correios e empresas comerciais) forçou esses bancos a fazer o descruzamento de subsídios e a abandonar as atividades em que eram menos eficientes. Os megabancos vão na contramão dessa modernização, negando os princípios da Ordem Concorrencial. A reação dessas instituições, entretanto, é contundente. Os bancos procuram o crescimento excessivo, de forma a criar as megainstituições, para colher ganhos que não vêm de uma operação mais eficiente. São ganhos provindos das inconsistências na atuação do regulador. Este trabalho propõe a extensão das doutrinas de comportamento estratégico, de forma a incluir três categorias novas de comportamentos adotados pelos megabancos: 1. Expansão Não-Eficiente de Participação no Mercado: Bancos operam muito além da escala eficiente para obter as vantagens da garantia de socorro aos grandes bancos (o too big to fail), para influenciar a regulação e aumentar lucros e, por fim, para explorar os acionistas não controladores. 2. Saturação Anticompetitiva de Mercados: Bancos acumulam produtos para além do recomendado pelos ganhos de escopo, e também agências além do que geraria ganhos de escala, para bloquear a entrada de novos concorrentes. Mostra-se neste trabalho como o excesso de agências e produtos funciona como uma barreira à entrada, o que explicaria essas expansões como um movimento preventivo. 3. Bloqueio de Modernização Pró-Competitiva: Como uma estrutura moderna do setor obriga uma redução do tamanho dos bancos e, também, uma redução da participação do setor bancário nas atividades de crédito, os bancos tentam bloquear a modernização. O bloqueio é feito através de práticas anticoncorrenciais já conhecidas, como o bloqueio ao acesso de bens essenciais (por exemplo, ao sistema de pagamentos) e as ações concertadas, entre outros. A resposta do regulador para esses comportamentos estratégicos seria a aplicação pura e simples das ferramentas do Direito Concorrencial. Este deve aplicar medidas ordenando a desconcentração de mercados e deve investigar e punir as práticas anticompetitivas. É uma atuação que difere, portanto, da regulação bancária tradicional, em que constantemente se consideram os aspectos prudenciais e sistêmicos. Isso ocorre porque, no caso desses comportamentos, o restabelecimento da livre concorrência é condição necessária e suficiente para garantir a segurança e a higidez dos mercados financeiros. Essa conclusão, aplicada ao Brasil, leva a que se deve proceder à desconcentração no setor, com a adoção de medidas compensatórias para a maioria das fusões recentemente aprovadas. Essas medidas encontram precedente significativo naquelas adotadas tanto na Europa quanto nos Estados Unidos durante a Crise de 2008. Finalmente, algumas das previsões das hipóteses desenvolvidas no trabalho são testadas empiricamente. Foi desenvolvido um modelo jurimétrico que mostra que mais competição resulta em maior estabilidade financeira. O modelo também confronta a abordagem da Nova Economia Institucional com a NeoEstruturalista, mostrando que esta última resulta em mais competição e maior estabilidade financeira. / Banks have never been as great as after the 2008 crisis. At the moment of greatest panic, just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, authorities all around the world authorized otherwise unlawful mergers and acquisitions. It was necessary to ensure the stability of the financial system, it was claimed, and try to preserve competition right now would only increase the panic. Brazil has not been immune to this trend. Mergers such as Itaú and Unibanco and operations as the acquisition of Nossa Caixa by Bank of Brazil led the industry to a concentration degree never seen before. The discussion between the Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the Brazilian Central Bank, about who should examine such concentrations, makes it appear that there is a contradiction between the constitutional underpinnings of antitrust policy and the ensuring of soundness and stability of financial institutions. The result is a proliferation of institutions hypertrophied, the megabanks, with unrepairable damages to the principles of competition constitutionally assured. The main arguments in favor of megabanks would be, first, that the income derived from market power they earn (franchise value) form a buffer that increases its resistance to such shocks as the 2008 Crisis. Secondly, it is suggested that banks accumulate economies of scale, scope and cost efficiency as they grow. This research proposes that there is no antagonism between antitrust law and traditiona banking regulation, more focused in prudential and systemic aspects. It also proposes the model of megabanks poses a major risk to society, since it is actually a strategic move from large institutions to accumulate more market power. There are two reasons why it is argued that there is no gain in the growth of these institutions. First, economies of scale are exhausted too early, a proposition that rests in extensive theoretical and empirical support. In the most optimistic forecast, banks with more than $ 25 billion in assets are already incurring in scale diseconomies. Nor are there economies of scope allowing the concentration of activities as diverse as commercial and investment banking. Financial institutions that concentrate many activities are actually evaluated negatively by the market. Even the cost efficiency gains resulting from better management of institutions has no relevant empirical support. Second, a modern financial system requires specialized banks, focused in areas which they have greater efficiency. They are smaller banks, which share with the financial markets and other intermediaries the task of providing credit. The competition provided by non-bank institutions (such as mutual funds and credit unions) and non-financial institutions (such as retail stores and conglomerates) forced these banks to do the unwinding of subsidies and abandon activities they were less efficient. Megabanks go against this modernization, and they are a deny of the principles of the competition order. The reaction of these institutions, however, is striking. Banks seek overgrowth in order to create megainstitutions, seizing profits that does not come from a more efficient operation. They seek gains stemmed from inconsistencies in the work of regulators. This work suggests the extension of the opportunistic behavior doctrines, in a way to include three new types of strategic behavior adopted by the megabanks: 1. Non-efficient Increase of Market Share: Banks operate far beyond efficient scale to take advantage of the implicit government guarantee of the rescuing of large banks (the too big to fail policy), to influence regulation and thus increase profits, and finally, to explore non-controlling shareholders. 2. Anticompetitive Market Crowding: Banks accumulate products beyond what is recommended in order to attain gains of scope, and also agencies in excess of what generates economies of scale, doing so to block the entry of new competitors. It is shown here how the excess branches and products acts as entry barrier, explaining these expansions as a preemptive move. 3. Blocking of Pro-Competitive Modernization: As a modern industry structure requires a reduction in the size of banks and also a reduction in the share of the banking sector in lending activities, banks try to block the modernization. This blocking is done through anticompetitive practices already known, such as denying access to essential facilities (eg, the payment system) and by adopting a collusive behavior, among others. The answer of regulators for such strategic behavior would be a pure and simple application of Competition Law remedies. They should apply measures ordering the deconcentration of markets and should investigate and punish anticompetitive practices. This approach differs from traditional banking regulation, in which constantly consideration of prudential and systemic aspects reign. This is because, in the case of these behaviors, restoring free competition is necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the safety and soundness of financial markets. This conclusion applied to Brazil, means that one must increase competition in the industry, with the adoption of compensatory measures to the most recently approved mergers. These measures have a significant precedent in the measures adopted in both Europe and the United States during the Crisis of 2008. Finally, some of the predictions of these hypotheses are tested empirically. It is developed a jurimetric model, which shows that more competition yields more financial stability. The model also confronts the New Insitutional Economics approach to the question with a neo-structuralist approach, showing that the former entails more competition and financial stability.

Esse trabalho faz da indústria de combustível de aviação no Brasil, especificamente o querosene de aviação - QAV, o seu objeto de pesquisa, uma vez que a mesma, do ponto de vista da estrutura de mercado, se caracteriza pela presença de poucas empresas atuantes desde a produção do bem até a sua distribuição, possibilitando o exercício de poder de mercado, levando à perda de bem estar social e alocação ineficiente de recursos. Ademais, busca analisar o ambiente institucional e como são formados os preços desse combustível no Brasil, tanto a nível de produtor quanto a nível do distribuidor, visto que os preços nacionais do querosene de aviação ao consumidor são elevados em relação aos preços praticados no mercado internacional. Devido a isso, esse estudo visa identificar também a existência de poder de mercado no segmento de distribuição desse combustível. O que tem se verificado no período de análise desta pesquisa é o Estado intervindo na política de preços de alguns combustíveis, por exemplo a gasolina, através da Petrobras, empresa aberta de capital misto sendo o governo nacional o maior acionista, e que é líder no mercado de refino e distribuição de derivados no país, apesar da desregulamentação nacional do setor do petróleo e seus derivados iniciada na década de 1990 e finalizada em 2001. A indústria nacional de querosene de aviação tem apresentado consideráveis índices de consumo e produção no período recente, devido principalmente ao aumento na demanda pelo transporte aéreo no país na última década. Por fim, a lacuna existente na literatura sobre a indústria referida motivou a realização da pesquisa, almejando contribuir para o entendimento da estrutura de mercado e formação de preços, bem como apresentar o ambiente institucional em que tal sistema produtivo está inserido. Para tanto, são utilizadas vertentes teóricas da Organização Industrial, especificamente o paradigma Estrutura-Conduta-Desempenho (ECD), a Nova Economia das Instituições (NEI) e a NEIO (New Empirical Industrial Organization). / This paper has the Brazilian aviation fuel industry (specifically the jet fuel) as object of research since that, from the point of structural view, is characterized by the presence of few firms operating in the production and in the distribution segment, which ones may exert market power, leading to loss of social welfare and inefficient allocation of resources in the economy. Moreover, aims to analyze the institutional environment of that industry and how the jet fuel prices are formed in national market, both at the producer and distributor level, since domestic prices of aviation fuel to consumers are high in comparison to that in the international market. Because of this aspect, the study also aims to identify the existence, or not, of market power in the Brazilian jet fuel distribution segment. Currently, what has been verified during the analysis period of this research is the Union intervening in pricing policy of some fuel, e.g. gasoline, through Petrobras, a mixed capital company, being the national government the largest shareholder, leader in the refining and distribution of oil products in the Brazilian market, despite the national deregulation oil and its derivatives, which started in the 1990s and was completed in 2001. Beyond these issues, the potential of the jet fuel industry is remarkable, showing considerable rates of consumption and production in the recent period, due to an increase in the national demand by air transportation in the last decade. Finally, the gap in the literature about the Brazil\'s industry of jet fuel is a notable fact to accomplish this study witch will contribute to the structural and institutional understanding of it. Therefore, to support this paper, theoretical stands of Industrial Organization are used, specifically the paradigm Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP), the New Institutional Economics (NIE) and the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO).

No description available.

La définition et la mesure de la confiance restent toujours une ambiguïté en économie, sociologie et philosophie. Les "trois papiers" de cette thèse comparent, tout en considérant le niveau de confiance deux mécanismes de vente: la vente de gré à gré et la vente aux enchères. Le marché de Boulogne-sur-Mer, caractérisé par la coexistence stable de deux systèmes de vente constitue le centre de notre analyse empirique. Ces trois papiers sont précédés par une introduction générale et une revue de la littérature. Le premier papier est dédié à la comparaison des deux structures en termes de robustesse et de "nestedness", en s’appuyant sur de outils de réseaux employés par les écologistes. Le deuxième papier analyse la création des liens de confiance du côté de l’acheteur à l’aide d’un modèle de durée. La taille des acheteurs a son rôle sur la confiance. Le troisième papier s’intéresse à l’effet de l’indice de confiance sur les "outcomes" des transactions. Des graphes bipartis et homogènes montrent une différence de structure. Nos résultats affirment que le marché de gré à gré est plus atteint par la confiance comme l’information est centralisée. Les agents se basent sur cette confiance comme alternative au risque. Cela n’est pas le cas des enchères où l’information est connue. / How to define and measure trust is still an enigma in economics, philosophy and sociology. This "three papers" thesis compares two different mechanisms - egotiated(decentralised submarket) and auction (centralised submarket) - on the basis of trust. Through an empirical study, the level of trust is evaluated and its impact is analysed on the "Boulogne-sur-Mer" fish market characterised by a stable coexistence of these two mechanisms. The three papers are preceded by a general introduction and a literature review. Paper one aims at comparing the nestedness and the robustness of both submarkets. Social network tools of ecologists are applied in order to provide an answer. Paper two models trust creation on both structures from the buyer side using the survival analysis and considering the buyer size. Paper three studies the effect of a trust index on the outcomes of transactions. Bipartite and projected graphs reveal the difference between submarkets. This thesis shows that the negotiated market is marked by a higher level of trust as agents interact and are not fully informed about the market situation unlike the auction one where information is centralised. We believe that trust is a way out of risk when there is lack of information.

O objetivo central da presente dissertação é analisar criticamente a estrutura bancária brasileira durante e após a crise financeira de 2008, chamada de crise do subprime. Há certo consenso na literatura especializada de que o Brasil atravessou bem o colapso financeiro internacional, principalmente quando se coloca o desempenho da economia e dos bancos brasileiros lado a lado com o de outros países, notadamente os Estados Unidos. A explicação básica é a de que isso se deu, em grande medida, pelas condições concorrenciais e regulatórias previamente existentes no país. Entretanto, este estudo demonstra que o fenômeno da crise do subprime não foi completamente compreendido quando são feitas essas comparações, em especial quando se analisam as condições que propiciaram a origem da crise nos Estados Unidos. Ainda, vários dos fatores apontados como razão da solidez financeira brasileira foram criticados em outros momentos como sendo gargalos e deficiências históricos do setor bancário nacional. Por mais que se deva avaliar positivamente o comportamento das instituições financeiras no Brasil durante o período de dificuldades, essa análise deve ser feita com parcimônia para evitar a complacência acadêmica e operacional quanto à qualidade do sistema financeiro, visto que ainda são grandes os desafios a serem enfrentados para humanizar e democratizar as finanças no país. / The main purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyze the Brazilian banking structure during and after the financial crisis of 2008, called the subprime crisis. There is some consensus among authors that Brazil and its banks behaved well during the international financial turmoil, especially when compared to other countries, like the United States. The given explanation for that soundness is basically the competitive and regulatory conditions previously existing in the country. However, as this study tries to demonstrate, the subprime crisis was not fully understood when these comparisons between countries were (and are) made, especially when considering the conditions that led to the origin of the crisis in the United States. Besides, several factors cited as reasons for the Brazilian financial strength have been criticized in other moments as bottlenecks and historical flaws of the domestic banking sector. As much as one should positively evaluate the behavior of financial institutions in Brazil during the period of difficulties, such analysis should be done sparingly to avoid academic and operational complacency about the quality of the financial system, as there are still major challenges to be faced to humanize and democratize the country\'s finances.