After a chapter analyzing Heidegger's Dasein Analytik as it is delineated in Sein und Zeit, in using, in large measure, an author coming from the anglo-american tradition, the A begins a quasi-commentary analysis of the second chapter of Heidegger's Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, heretofore GP or (The Basic Problems of Phenomenology). This quasi-commentary method of analysis is required due to the informal nature of presentation, insofar as this GP text is a transcription of Heidegger's 1927 summer course at Marburg. The A's chapter 3 analyzes the essence and existence distinction as it is found (or it's equivalent in Scotus's case) in Aquinas, Scotus and Suarez. In terms of inspiration it soon becomes clear – even on a vocabulary level - that Heidegger's views are heavily influenced by Suarez and his doctrines, particularly from his Disputationes Metaphysicae, DM. Whereas Heidegger pretends to analyze Aquinas, Scotus and Suarez, each in his own right, the reality is that Suarez is the 'guiding light' throughout these three central, chapter 2 subsection GP analyses, (Alpha = Aquinas, Beta = Scotus and Gamma = Suarez). An obvious sign of this is Heidegger's bringing Giles of Rome and his famous duae res version of the essence and existence distinction into the Aquinas analysis. Although he got the idea from Suarez, Heidegger is slightly more affirmative than Suarez himself in attributing this at first startling version to Aquinas. (In a word, holding to the real distinction means being an Aegidian and Aquinas is said to hold to the real distinction.) The A makes extensive use of contemporary Aquinas analysis to show that the essence and existence distinction doctrine that emerges from Aquinas's Aristotle commentaries is far from resembling Giles's. Via analysis of Metaphysics, V, 7, two Quodlibetal questions and Book II of the Posterior Analytics commentary (Lectios 1-10), a simpler doctrine emerges as to what we are doing when we predicate existence and essence of material substances. Not only is this not a duae res doctrine but one that can be explained without talking about real distinctions at all! (Heidegger's views on Scotus and Suarez are at once penetrating and much more predictable.) The A next presents a chapter on Heidegger and Luther, showing the centrality of the theme 'betrayal of the tradition' in both figures. In a final chapter, the A examines Heidegger's 1929 analysis of what the subject matter of metaphysics is, from his Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics). Heidegger claims that, for the medieval, ontotheological tradition, the oldest and most sacred, i.e., God, is the subject matter of metaphysics. (This includes Heidegger's accusation that medieval ontology is faith buttressed.) Using a contemporary phenomenologist's and a medievalist's analysis, the A tries to show that Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics reveals the subject matter of metaphysics not to be 'God', but ens commune. This philosophical conclusion is of course consequential for Heidegger's accusation that medieval ontology is faith supported. The A concludes that an examination of Aquinas's Aristotle commentaries would have led to other conclusions than Heidegger's on what the subject matter of metaphysics is as well as on Aquinas's views on predicating essence and existence.

Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191), founder of the Islamic Illuminationist tradition, is one of the most controversial and misunderstood Arabic philosophers. Corbin cultivates Suhrawardī as a mystic who revived ancient Persian wisdom; Gutas reads him as a follower of Avicenna (d. 1037); scholars like Ziai and Walbridge argue that he is an original and serious philosopher. But it seems that no reconstructions of Illuminationist philosophy are satisfactory. I propose a Cave Story approach, which relates Suhrawardī's ambitious Illuminationist project to Plato's cave allegory. By following this approach, I present a historical reconstruction of Suhrawardī's Illuminationist philosophy, focusing on three areas: presential knowledge (epistemology), mental considerations (ontology and the problem of universals), and light metaphysics. Chapter I proves, by solid textual evidence, that Suhrawardī's four Peripatetic works and 'Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq' ('The Philosophy of Illumination', his masterpiece and the only Illuminationist work) constitute one and the same Illuminationist project. Chapter II reconstructs Illuminationist presential knowledge, an original epistemology of particulars (without any universals involved) and the epistemological foundation of Illuminationism. Chapters III and IV prove philosophically that universals must all be mental considerations (i.e. things created by the mind), and real things must be particulars; this is Suhrawardī's fundamental criticism of Peripatetic metaphysics. Chapter V reconstructs light metaphysics, a serious metaphysics of particulars (not universals). I conclude that Suhrawardī is an original and serious philosopher, who resorts to mysticism only for sound philosophical reasons, and who should not be taken as a follower of Avicenna; his Illuminationism is a philosophy of particulars rather than universals.

<p>This work aims to shed new light on Augustine of Hippo’s mature dualistic view of the world, the master argument he advanced in support of it, and how it was different from the competing physicalist model that was both prevalent during his time and of which he had earlier been a proponent. Specifically, it aims to understand these topics in light of Augustine’s position on the relation of <i>nonphysical</i> (or <i>incorporeal</i>) objects to space. This topic has yet to be extensively discussed and the secondary claims one finds regarding the matter differ: for some authors claim that Augustine did take nonphysical objects to be located in space and others claim that he did not. I hold that part of the reason for the lack of consensus on this topic is the reliance by each group of authors on limited and distinct sets of direct quotations from Augustine’s writings. In contrast to previous treatments, I approach Augustine’s position by way of his account of <i>spatial location</i> and his account of <i>incorporeal</i> objects. On these grounds, in addition to a more comprehensive set of direct textual data, <i>Chapter 1</i> argues for <i>Modal~SLI</i> or the thesis that <i>pace</i> the affirmative position and <i>beyond</i> the negative one, Augustine was committed to the view that incorporeal objects generally, and God and human souls in particular, not only <i>lack</i> spatial location – they <i>cannot</i> be so located.<i> Chapter 2</i> argues from <i>Modal~SLI</i> in conjunction with further forms of evidence, against <i>spatial readings</i> of Augustine’s notion of <i>presence</i> and for a ca<i>usal account</i> (or <i>CP</i>). The causal account holds that Augustine took presence <i>per se</i> to be a kind of causal relation which does not require or entail spatially located <i>relata</i>. On the basis of <i>CP</i> and <i>Modal~SLI</i> and additional forms of evidence, <i>Chapter 3</i> argues against spatial readings and for a causal analysis of Augustine’s argument from presence to the incorporeality of human souls. <i>Chapter 4</i> argues on these same bases against the spatial reading and for a causal analysis of Augustine’s argument from omnipresence to God’s incorporeality. Additionally, <i>Chapters 3</i> and <i>4</i> contain extensive discussions of the support that Augustine’s provides for the premises in each of the arguments that is their focus. <i>Chapter 5</i>, which is the capstone of this project, draws out the implications of earlier chapters to advance new and more complete models of Augustine’s mature dualistic view of the world, the rational basis upon which he endorsed the dualistic model and rejected the competing physicalist one, and the comparative relations between his mature model and the physicalist one. Among the conclusions it advances are the following: (i) in including both physical and nonphysical objects Augustine’s mature view includes objects that are and must be located in space and objects that are not and cannot be located it space; (ii) in including God and human souls as nonphysical objects it includes them as objects that are not and cannot be located in space; (iii) causal claims (i.e., claims expressing causal relations) were central drivers of Augustine’s personal transition from a physicalist to a dualistic view of the world and were central elements of his impersonal or public case against physicalism and for dualism; and (iv) the dualist and physicalist models were similar in that each included physical objects, objects with spatial location, and God and human souls; but they differed in that unlike the physicalist model, the dualist model also included nonphysical objects, objects without spatial location, and numbered God and human souls as nonphysical objects and hence objects without spatial locations. </p> <br> <p> </p>

The goal of this dissertation is to address the influence of the Greek Fathers on the metaphysics of St. Bonaventure. Specifically, it looks at John of Damascus' and Dionysius' influence on Bonaventure's doctrine of divine ideas. It is argued that the former's influence contributed decisively to shaping the Seraphicus' exemplarism by giving it a distinctively voluntaristic framing. The subject is treated both from a historical and theoretical point of view. Accordingly, attention is not paid exclusively to systematic connections between the different authors but also to the means of historical transmission and interpretation. In this respect, the heritage of the School of St. Victor and of the first Franciscan masters in Paris (Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle) as mediators of the Greek Fathers to Bonaventure is brought forward and explored.

O objetivo da presente pesquisa consiste numa tradução e comentários dos três primeiros capítulos do primeiro tratado do Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina Livro referente à Primeira Filosofia ou Ciência Divina -, de Avicena, que trata do estabelecimento da Metafísica como ciência filosófica a partir da delimitação de seu objeto formal e de sua conveniente denominação. / The objective of this research entails translation and commentaries of three first chapters of first treaty of Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina Book on First Philosophy or Divine Science -, of Avicenne, which is about the establishment of Metaphysic as philosophic science from delimitation of its subject matter and its convenient denomination.

Em diversas passagens, Tomás de Aquino afirma que é impossível o nosso intelecto, unido ao corpo, inteligir algo em ato sem se converter aos fantasmas (conversio ad phantasmata). Segue-se, portanto, que a conversão aos fantasmas [i.e., o direcionamento natural do intelecto para as imagens recebidas pelos sentidos] é a condição de possibilidade da intelecção humana. Agora, se tal intelecção depende da conversão aos fantasmas, e estes, por sua vez, dependem da afecção dos entes materiais sobre os sentidos, conclui-se que o conhecimento intelectual humano só é possível a partir do conhecimento sensível. Se é correta essa simplificação, então, podemos continuar perguntando pela questão que, de fato, interessará aqui, a saber, se é possível o conhecimento dos incorpóreos, dos quais não existem fantasmas (imagens recebidas). Ora, se é indubitável que dos incorpóreos não temos fantasmas, então, como poderíamos inteligilos, uma vez que a intelecção humana depende necessariamente da conversio ad phantasmata? Para dar conta dessa problemática, propomos primeiro explicar porque a conversão aos fantasmas é a conditio sine qua non da intelecção humana. Somente depois disso, consideraremos o objetivo central desta investigação que é explicitar como Tomás de Aquino argumenta a favor da possibilidade do conhecimento de Deus, do qual não temos fantasmas / In several passages, Thomas Aquinas states that it is impossible for our intellect, united to the body, can actually to understand without conversion to the phantasms (conversio ad phantasmata). It follows therefore that the conversion to the phantasms (i.e., the natural direction of the intellect to the images received by the senses) is the condition of possibility of human intellection. Now, if such intellection depends on the conversion to the phantasms, and these, in turn, depend on the affection of the material ones on the senses, it is concluded that the human intellectual knowledge is only possible from sensitive knowledge. If this simplification is correct, then we can keep asking the question that really concern us here, namely, the question of the possibility of knowledge of incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms (received images). While it is no doubt that we have no phantasms of incorporeal things, so how could we to understand them, since human intellection necessarily depends on the conversio ad phantasmata? To resolve this issue, we propose first explain why the conversion to the phantasms is the conditio sine qua non of human intellection. Only after that, we consider the main objective of this research: to explain how Aquinas argues for the possibility of knowledge of God, of which we have no phantasms

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre pensamento e vontade em Averróis, principalmente no que toca a individualidade humana. A discussão movida no século XIII contra o Grande Comentário ao De Anima acusa o comentador de negar ao homem a possibilidade de transcender a existência material, pois a tese da unidade do intelecto material faz da alma humana apenas um receptáculo de formas sensíveis, que se corrompe com a morte do corpo. Em outras palavras, a liberdade e a individualidade do homem estão comprometidas, pois um ser desprovido de intelecto não é um ser dotado de vontade. Para Averróis, o propósito da existência humana é alcançar sua perfeição última, a identificação final com o intelecto agente separado da matéria, que também representa o alcance da felicidade suprema. Esta pode ser alcançada por meio do conhecimento do mundo e de suas causas, em outras palavras, o alcance da felicidade é uma investigação. Para tanto, o homem necessita do estabelecimento de uma relação de conjunção com os intelectos separados da matéria para a realização deste propósito. A aquisição da universalidade destas substâncias separadas é que permitirá ao homem universalizar o conhecimento particular obtido dos seres materiais. E essa atividade parece não ter outro motor que a vontade. Assim, é necessário analisar a estrutura desta relação de conhecimento, entender como é possível ao homem adquirir o conhecimento universal constitui um ponto fundamental na obra de Averróis. Já que este será o ponto de partida pra elaboração de toda uma postura ética que tem na vontade e na aquisição de conhecimento os elementos que constituem a plena realização da natureza humana na existência terrena e a garantia da bem aventurança na vida futura / This work aims to analyze the relation between thought and will in Averroes, particularly with respect to human individuality. The discussion moved in the thirteenth century against the Great Commentary on De Anima accuses the commentator of denying to man the possibility of transcending material existence, because the thesis of the unity of the material intellect makes the human soul just a receptacle of sensitive forms, which is corrupt with the death of the body. In other words, the freedom and individuality of man are compromised because one being devoid of intellect is not a being endowed of will. For Averroes, the purpose of human existence is achieving its ultimate perfection, the final identification with the intellect separated from matter, which also represents the attainment of the supreme happiness. This can be achieved through knowledge of the world and its causes, in other words, the achievement of happiness is an investigation. To this end, man needs the establishment of a relationship of conjunction with the separate intellects from matter to achieving this purpose. The acquisition of the universality of these separate substances will allow the man to universalize the particular knowledge obtained from material beings. And this activity seems to have no other motor than will. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the structure of this knowledge relation, understand how it is possible for man to acquire universal knowledge is a key point in the work of Averroes. Since this will be the starting point for developing a whole ethical position that has in the will and on the acquisition of knowledge elements which constitute the full realization of human nature in earthly existence and the guarantee of beatitude in the hereafter

Habilitationsschrift--Stuttgart. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 228-238).

Habilitationsschrift--Stuttgart. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 228-238).

Ce travail porte sur les évolutions du concept de forme au Moyen Age, plus précisément entre le XIIIème et le XIVème siècle. Il retrace ces évolutions à travers l'étude de problématiques intriquées qui dominent la métaphysique et la philosophie naturelle du Moyen Age tardif: le problème de l'universel, la controverse de la pluralité des formes, la question de l'intensio formarum, le rapport du fluxus formae au mouvement. / This work deals with the evolution of the concept of form during the late Middle Ages (ca. 1250-1350). It tells the story of this evolution through the study of intricated problems typical of late medieval metaphysics and natural philosophy: the problem of universals, the controversy about the plurality of forms, the intensio formarum debates, the problem of fluxus formae related to motion.