The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology--theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought--during the High Middle Ages (1250-1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today--intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception--were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand's cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period. Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought. This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us 'forms'. On Durand's view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new 'form'. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand's causal theory of content against salient objections to it.

The present dissertation concerns cognitive psychology--theories about the nature and mechanism of perception and thought--during the High Middle Ages (1250-1350). Many of the issues at the heart of philosophy of mind today--intentionality, mental representation, the active/passive nature of perception--were also the subject of intense investigation during this period. I provide an analysis of these debates with a special focus on Durand of St.-Pourçain, a contemporary of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Durand was widely recognized as a leading philosopher until the advent of the early modern period, yet his views have been largely neglected in the last century. The aim of my dissertation, then, is to provide a new understanding of Durand's cognitive psychology and to establish a better picture of developments in cognitive psychology during the period. Most philosophers in the High Middle Ages held, in one form or another, the thesis that most forms of cognition (thought, perception) involve the reception of the form of the object into the mind. Such forms in the mind explain what a given episode of cognition is about, its content. According to what has been called the conformality theory of content, the content of our mental states is fixed by this form in the mind. Durand rejects this thesis, and one of the primary theses that I pursue is that Durand replaces the conformality theory of content with a causal theory of content, according to which the content of our mental states is fixed by its cause. When I think about Felix and not Graycat, this is to be explained not by the fact that I have in my mind the form of Felix and not Graycat, but rather by the fact that Felix and not Graycat caused my thought. This is both a controversial interpretation and, indeed, a controversial theory. It is a controversial interpretation because Durand seems to reject the thesis that objects are the causes of our mental states. In the first half of the present dissertation, I argue that Durand does not reject this thesis but he rejects another nearby thesis: that objects as causes give to us 'forms'. On Durand's view, an object causes a mental state even though it does not give to us a new 'form'. In the second half of the dissertation I defend Durand's causal theory of content against salient objections to it.

Nesta investigação tenho por fim estudar a translatio da lexicografia conceitual que parte do verbo grego ser (einai) chegando ao verbo latino ser (esse) à luz do de Hebdomadibus de Boécio. Neste percurso me deparo com a embriologia da doutrina dos transcendentais, na qual ser, bem e um são convertíveis ou coextensivos, como também me deparo com uma metafísica do bem, herdada pela Escolástica, pela qual tento especular Boécio em seu exercício filosófico, que consiste em tentar esclarecer o modo pelo qual as substâncias são boas nisto que são, contudo não são bens substanciais. / The aim of this study is the translatio of the conceptual lexicography following the Greek verb be (einai) through the Latin verb be (esse) in light of Boethius de Hebdomadibus. Throughout this journey I find myself facing the embriology of the doctrine of transcendentals, in which being, goodness and one are convertible or co-extensive, and I also face a metaphysics of goodness, inherited by the Scholastics, through which I then try to speculate Boethius in his philosophical endeavour, consisting in trying to clarify how substances are good in that they are, though they are not substantial goods.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T13:56:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 adrianaandradedesouza.pdf: 786976 bytes, checksum: 1786e04c5379bbcb5d4ffe6872499136 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-13T15:45:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 adrianaandradedesouza.pdf: 786976 bytes, checksum: 1786e04c5379bbcb5d4ffe6872499136 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-13T15:45:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 adrianaandradedesouza.pdf: 786976 bytes, checksum: 1786e04c5379bbcb5d4ffe6872499136 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-19 / O tema central deste trabalho, “Entre o um e o dois: Mestre Eckhart e o aberto da Abgeschiedenheit” baseia-se na compreensão de que o pensamento eckhartiano acerca do desprendimento (Abgeschiedenheit) oscila entre três dimensões. Uma destas dimensões se refere ao que se poderia chamar uma “pedagogia” da conversão, na qual está em jogo a necessidade do esforço do homem em desapropriar-se de si mesmo. Outra dimensão do desprendimento seria a compreensão da busca da identidade com Deus como um “em si”, ou seja, como dádiva previamente dada, assim expressa nas palavras de Eckhart: “o fundo da alma e o fundo de Deus são um fundo.” A partir desse permanecer em si, o desprendimento ainda se descobre em uma dimensão vivida, ou seja, trata-se de um permanecer “em si”, no próprio da ação sem porquê, tal como é expresso na célebre frase eckhartiana: “frutificar a dádiva é a única gratidão para com a dádiva.” Assim compreendido, o desprendimento revelase como uma negação da negação, que é pura afirmação sem porquê, a que neste trabalho chamamos o aberto da Abgeschiedenheit. O “sem-porquê” é a dinâmica de retração na qual a Deidade se mantém ao criar o mundo. O próprio do pensamento de Eckhart é que essa dinâmica se estende imediatamente à existência humana, pelo ser uno de homem e Deus no fundo. Tornar-se interior no fundo da alma significa, para o homem, desprender-se da perspectiva de dualidade própria do seu ser criado, para tornar própria a pureza que não é, nas palavras de Eckhart, “nem no mundo, nem fora do mundo.” Ou seja, aquela pureza do fundo da Deidade da qual é próprio um brotar-se em si mesmo – sem nenhum porquê. O “semporquê”, em Eckhart, é essa idéia que diz não ser o desprendimento somente uma interiorização extática, mas plenitude efetiva, bem exercitada – muito mais do que só de dentro. Para nós, este é o modo como Eckhart une um dos grandes temas dos místicos renanos, a saber, o fundo sem fundo da Deidade e a abertura sem porquê, ao tema maior do nascimento de Deus na alma – nascimento que implica uma reciprocidade, porque a alma só é verdadeiramente bem-aventurada quando em retorno ela “gera Deus”. Esse “gerar” é o cumprimento da perspectiva da Deidade na existência humana, é o “sem-porquê” vivido. É o caminho do distinto à pura indistinção de Deus (da Abgeschiedenheit) em seu brotar-se em si mesmo – o caminho de volta para dentro da vida vivida. / The central theme of this work, "Between the one and the two: Meister Eckhart and the open of the Abgeschiedenheit", is based on the understanding that Eckhart’s thought about the detachment (Abgeschiedenheit) ranges in three dimensions. One of these dimensions refers to what one might call a "pedagogy" of conversion, in which the need of human effort to evict itself is at stake. Another dimension of the detachment would be the understanding of the search for identity with God as a "per se", ie, as a previously given gift, which is expressed in Eckhart’s words as "the depth of the soul and the depth of God are one depth". From this remaining in oneself, the detachment still finds itself in a live dimension, ie, it refers to remaining "in itself" in the very action without reason, as it is expressed in the famous words of Eckhart: "to make the donation fruitful is the only gratitude for the gift." Understood in this way, the detachment is revealed as a negation of the negation, which is pure assertion without reason, and in this work is named the open of the Abgeschiedenheit. The "no why" is the dynamics of contraction in which the deity remains as it creates the world. The thought of Eckhart is properly that this dynamics is immediately extended to human existence, by the being one as man and God in the depth. To become interior in the depth of the soul means to man, to loosen up from the prospect of a created being’s own duality, in order to make proper the purity that, in the words of Eckhart, is "neither in the world nor out of the world ". That is, the purity of the depth of the Deity to whom is proper to spring in itself - without any reason. The "no why" in Eckhart, is this idea that says the detachment is not only an ecstatic internalization, but effective plenitude, well-exercised - much more than just the inside. For us, this is how Eckhart takes one of the major themes of the Rhineland mystics, namely the depth with no depth of the Deity, and without reason, and links it to the major theme of the birth of God in the soul - a birth that involves reciprocity, because the soul is only truly blessed when in return it "creates God." This "generating" is the fulfillment of view of the Deity in human existence, it is the lived "why not". Is the path from the separate to the pure indistinctness of God (the Abgeschiedenheit) in its spring in itself - the way back into the lived life.

No description available.

This thesis investigates whether beliefs acquired by way of prophecy are safe. By ‘prophecy’ I have in mind the presentation of the prophetic method as found in the Guide of the Perplexed, which was Moses Maimonides’ philosophical masterpiece. And by ‘safe’ I have in mind the work by Timothy Williamson on the safety condition for knowledge. Both authors have proven to be dominant forces on these respective topics. The significance of this investigation derives from the centrality of prophecy to the three monotheistic religions. My main goal in this thesis is to identify those safety risks associated with the prophetic method. In this manner I aim to undermine any presumption in favor of prophetic beliefs as a whole being safe. Importantly, this general conclusion does not entail of a specific prophetic belief p that p is unsafe. Additionally, the scope of these results is restricted to the model of prophecy found in the Guide. The thesis begins with a critical elucidation of Williamson’s extensive work on the safety condition for knowledge. Particular attention is paid to those issues related to method individuation and Williamson’s cumulative conception of bases. Matters concerning these two topics inform the reading of Maimonides on prophecy found in the second chapter. In particular, I argue that Maimonides should be read as defending a cumulative conception of prophecy. As I emphasize several times during the chapter, the epistemology of prophecy cannot be reduced to the epistemology of testimony since prophecy for Maimonides does not involve the transfer of a proposition from God to the prophet. The third chapter is devoted to identifying those elements of the prophetic method that involve room for error. I argue that while all belief-forming methods in a fallibilist epistemology contain room for error, some are riskier than others. Prophecy should be considered one of the riskier sort. The fourth and final chapter shifts attention to non-standard semantics for ‘knows,’ David Lewis’s in particular. I argue that the interaction between such semantics and the laws governing prophecy in Jewish law is problematic. In particular, I demonstrate that such semantics destabilize the prophetic phenomenon. As such, we must either choose invariantism and gain stability, or choose non-standard semantics for ‘knows’ and live with this lack of stability.

This thesis offers an interpretation of Al-Farabi’s Book of Religion, in which the tenth- century philosopher addresses more directly than in any of his other works the relationship between human and divine wisdom. Believing Farabi to be a philosopher in the full sense of the term, I attempt to approach his writing in the spirit of his own approach to the writings of Plato and Aristotle. I argue that the discussions of religion, philosophy, and political science found in the text constitute a single teaching, through which Farabi addresses some of the most fundamental questions facing man as both a political and spiritual animal. / text

O período presente entre o começo do século XIV e ano de 1418 é indispensável para a compreensão do cenário religioso-político medieval e para a compreensão das bases do mesmo pensamento na Idade Moderna. Neste período temos a mudança da sede da Igreja Católica de Roma pra Avignon, o retorno da mesma para Roma, a divisão da Igreja em dois grupos, cada um liderado por um papa, o Cisma do Ocidente, cisma esse que dura por décadas. Temos a ampliação do pensamento herético, a conversa entre grupos heterodoxos, e tentativas de conciliação que nem sempre eram absolutas e levavam até mesmo a renúncia do cargo pontifical. Neste período viveu John Wycliffe, professor de teologia em Oxford, tendo produzido uma série de obras em latim e outra ainda maior em inglês. Divulgando seus ideias para o povo e criando seu próprio grupo, os Lolardos. Esse pensador, dialogando com os grandes pensadores católicos e revendo pensamentos de outras heresias anteriores, cria a premissa da impossibilidade de uma igreja que fosse ao mesmo tempo autenticamente cristã e institucionalizada ou poderosa, em sua obra The Wicket. Através de uma argumentação racional e humanista, Wycliffe formulou, de certa forma, a base para a reforma protestante, ao mesmo tempo que precisou ser descartado pela mesma, após seu crescimento nos círculos de poder e institucionalização. A melhor compreensão deste peculiar autor e de sua obra permite não somente compreender melhor o mundo da baixa Idade Média, suas disputas religiosas e políticas, como também aprofundar o conhecimento sobre as bases do pensamento moderno. Além de lançar bases para a própria problematização da estrutura do poder religioso em si, seja ele católico ou não. / The Late Middle Ages, specially the period between 1305 and 1418 is indispensable to understand the political an religious though not only of the medieval people, but for the comprehension of the modern ages. In this small period of time much religious turbulence took place in Western Europe. The capital of the Catholic Church moved to Avignon and then returned to Roma, the Church slipt in two different factions in the Great Western Schism and each group was leaded by a different pope, both of them considering themselves as the sumo pontifce and the only true connection between God and men in earth. The Schism lasts for decades and each pope define the other as the antichrist. In this period the heretical though grown up and the attempts of reconciliations of the groups not always become effective, in matter of fact once even a pope renounced his post. John Wycliffe, professor of Theology in Oxford University, lived in this time. He produced a great number of papers in Latin and a even more great number of papers in middle English. His ideas continued with his followers the Lollards. This great thinker created important dialogues with the other heretical thinkers, being one of the most important pre-reformist theologian and creating the bases of the protestant reform. But the also created the idea that the true Christian church would never be institutionalized neither it could be powerful. In his sermon The Wicket, using humanistic reason, he united the words of Jesus in the Gospels to prove that would be impossible to create a strong institutionalized church. So, this particular paper was also put aside because it was not interesting for the newly created institutionalized church of the 16th century Studding this thinker and his works, specially the Wicket is very important to better understand not only the medieval church, but the institutionalized church of all times.

Orientador: Francisco Benjamin de Souza Netto / Tese não autorizada para disponibilização na Internet / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-01T15:19:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pereira_ RosalieHelenaDeSouza_D.pdf: 3595627 bytes, checksum: b670287f49cf2c8c70f66e7ffb3307df (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Nossa tese apresenta um ângulo da leitura aristotélica que, no Comentário sobre A República, Averróis faz dessa obra de Platão. Nessa leitura evidencia-se a transformação do filósofo-rei platônico no phrónimos aristotélico. Nossa interpretação se baseia na versão latina dessa obra de Averróis, realizada no século XV por Elia del Medigo. No Livro II desse tratado, há uma passagem em que é dito que o soberano deve ser "sábio segundo a ciência prática e, com isso, ter o mérito da virtude cogitativa". Distinguem-se, nessa frase, a ética de Aristóteles como ciência prática e a virtude cogitativa (phrónesis), essencial para o desempenho virtuoso do soberano. Isso corrobora o que Averróis afirma no Comentário Médio à Ética Nicomaquéia: "a prudência e a arte de governar as cidades são um único campo de investigação (subiecto)". Desse modo, a arte de governar tem dois lados, o teórico e o prático, ou seja, a ética e a política. Depois de apresentarmos a primeira parte, essencial para a contextualização histórica da obra, nossa análise se debruça sobre um estudo da "virtude cogitativa" e a identifica com a prudência ou sabedoria prática, a phrónesis aristotélica. Em razão da metodologia adotada por Averróis e das críticas que ele tece à sociedade de seu tempo, esse tratado configura-se mais como uma obra original que propriamente um comentário nos moldes tradicionais de seus comentários à obra de Aristóteles / Abstract: Our thesis presents a view of the Aristotelic reading which in the Comentary on the Republic Averroes forms of this work by Plato. In this reading the transformation of the Platonic philosopherking into the Aristotelian phrónimos becomes evident. Our interpretation is based on the Latin version of this work by Averroes, accomplished in the XVth century by Elia del Medigo. In Book II of this treatise, there is a passage in which he says that the sovereign should be "wise according to practical science, and with this, have the merit of cogitative virtue". We note, in this phrase, Aristotle¿s ethics as practical science and the cogitative virtue (phrónesis) which is essential for the sovereign¿s virtuous fulfillment. This corroborates what Averroes affirms in the Middle Commentary on Aristotle¿s Nicomachea that "prudence and the art of governing cities are a unique area of investigation (subiecto)". Thus, the art of governing has two sides, the theoretical and the practical, or, the ethical and the political. After presenting the first part, essential for the historical contextualization of the work, our analysis covers the study of "cogitative virtue", and identifies it with prudence or practical knowledge, the Aristotelian phrónesis. By reason of the methodology adopted by Averroes, and of the crititiques that he makes about the society of his time, this treatise is shaped more like an original work than a commentary on the traditional examples of his commentaries on Aristotelic works / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriano Martins Soler.pdf: 951415 bytes, checksum: 38157557b0356bd234445a4288a2bc1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-09-04 / Secretaria da Educação do Estado de São Paulo / The theory of knowledge in Aquinas is an interest target of many researchers of the period. Its importance is singular, among other things, due to the disruption that it causes between the established doctrine about knowledge itself, the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination and some orders, that until that moment, remained faithful to (Augustinian s). This dissertation aims, from the articles five and six from question 84 inserted in the first part of the Summa of theology of Thomas Aquinas, return to this issue that is far from being exhaustedly explored given its richness and complexity. Therefore, we present, at first, the historical context in which the Summa of Theology was written, as well as what it is in its shape and utility. Subsequently, we turn our attention to its first part. In it, Thomas refers to God and to what proceeds from him, better said, the work of the creation and its action in the world, to then, be able to focus on the group of questions regarding human knowledge, ie, questions 84 - 89 Next, we turn our attention to the question 84 and its articles, exposing its structure and systematize, to finally be able to concentrate on the axioms of articles five and six. In them, we realized Thomas skillfully taking advantage of auctoritates technique to harmonize Augustinian and Aristotle thinking regarding the theory studied in this paper / A teoria do conhecimento em Tomás de Aquino é alvo de interesse de vários pesquisadores do período. Sua importância é singular, dentre outras coisas, devido à ruptura que causa entre a doutrina estabelecida acerca do conhecimento, qual seja, a doutrina agostiniana da iluminação divina e algumas ordens, até então, fiéis a ela. Esta dissertação de mestrado tem como objetivo, a partir dos artigos cinco e seis da questão 84 inseridos na primeira parte da Suma de Teologia de Tomás de Aquino, retomar esse tema que está longe de ser esgotado dado sua riqueza e complexidade. Para tanto, apresentamos, em um primeiro momento, o contexto histórico em que a Suma de Teologia fora escrita, bem como, o que ela é em seu formato e utilidade. Posteriormente, voltamos nossa atenção para sua primeira parte. Nela, Tomás refere-se a Deus e a o que dele procede, ou seja, à obra da criação e à sua ação no mundo, para, então, concentrarmo-nos no bloco de questões que tratam do conhecimento humano, isto é, das questões 84 - 89. Em seguida, voltamos nossa atenção para a questão 84 e seus artigos, expondo sua estrutura e sistematização, para, finalmente, atermo-nos aos axiomas dos artigos cinco e seis. Neles, pudemos perceber Tomás valendo-se habilmente da técnica das auctoritates para harmonizar o pensamento de Agostinho com o de Aristóteles no tocante á teoria em estudo nesse trabalho