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Proponents of the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) argue that the mind literally extends into the world because mental states literally extend into the world. But the arguments presented in favour of these claims are compatible with a much weaker conclusion, expressed as the Extended Machinery of Mind Thesis (EMMT) that secures only the extension of the enablers of mental states. What is required is a mark of the mental that can settle the constitutive versus enabling issue. Both sides of the debate accept non-derived content as a necessary condition on a state‘s being mental but this cannot settle the constitution versus enabling issue, meaning the debate has stagnated because there are no decisive moves left to make. Thus, the strongest move for the EM theorist to make is to reject non-derived content as the mark of the mental and seek an alternative. Because enactivism rejects the representational view of mind then if it can be made to work as an account of mentality it offers promise with regard to the formation of a new mark of the mental on which a genuinely interesting EMT can be based.

Research on theory of mind (ToM) has been dominated by the traditional False Belief tasks; however, recent work has established a developmental sequence for children’s mental-state understanding. Wellman and Liu (2004) formulated a ToM scale that tests four additional aspects of ToM abilities in the visual realm: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, and Real-Apparent Emotions. Our study extended the scale to include five parallel tasks assessing ToM in the auditory realm. Sixty-six typically developing preschoolers (30 female) between the ages of 3- and 5-years-old were tested using 10 ToM tasks (5 visual, 5 auditory). A 3(age) x 2(modality) x 2(gender) repeated measures ANOVA yielded significant effects for age and gender, where 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated greater mental-state understanding than 3-year-olds and girls passed more tasks than boys. There was no effect of modality nor did any interactions emerge. Like the visual tasks in the theory-of-mind scale, the auditory tasks form a scalable set, with Diverse Desires and Diverse Beliefs occurring earlier in the scale than Knowledge Access, False Belief, and Real-Apparent Emotions. Our new scale provides researchers with five novel tasks to measure the progression of theory-of-mind development in the auditory realm and may be extended to assess preschoolers, such as children with visual impairments and children with autism spectrum disorder, who have shown delays in mental-state understanding when tested using predominantly visual tasks

We often want to explain and predict behavior, both our own and that of others. For various reasons we want to know not only why (in the sense of etiology) someone is doing what he is, but we also have interests in understanding the agent's reasons for which he is acting as he is. Though not uncontroversial, it is common to cite intentional states when offering such explanations. Most philosophers take certain intentional states to be the causes of our actions and to play a role in accounting for the reasons for which one acts. Additionally, most theorists who adopt such a line take the relevant intentional states to be propositional attitudes, most commonly beliefs and desires (or other pro attitudes which relate one to a proposition). In many of our explanations, we do indeed cite beliefs and desires, but we also cite many other psychological states that aren't obviously beliefs or desires. In fact, some of the relevant psychological states don't even appear to be propositional attitudes. In this paper I pursue two lines of questioning, one about the explanations of action and one about intentionality. First, what role is played by these apparently non-propositional attitudes? Such attitudes turn up in Davidson's locus classicus and can be found in the most recent work on action as well, but explications are sparse. Second, are these attitudes in fact non-propositional? Despite appearances to the contrary, one might argue that such states are to be, in some way or other, assimilated to the more familiar propositional attitudes. I resist this line in the second chapter. / text

yes / How well can neurotypical adults’ interpret mental states in people with ASD? ‘Targets’ (ASD and neurotypical) reactions to four events were video-recorded then shown to neurotypical participants whose task was to identify which event the target had experienced. In study 1 participants were more successful for neurotypical than ASD targets. In study 2, participants rated ASD targets equally expressive as neurotypical targets for three of the events, while in study 3 participants gave different verbal descriptions of the reactions of ASD and neurotypical targets. It thus seems people with ASD react differently but not less expressively to events. Because neurotypicals are ineffective in interpreting the behaviour of those with ASD, this could contribute to the social difficulties in ASD.

Yes / It has been proposed that mentalising involves retrodicting as well as predicting behaviour, by inferring previous mental states of a target. This study investigated whether retrodiction is impaired in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Participants watched videos of real people reacting to the researcher behaving in one of four possible ways. Their task was to decide which of these four “scenarios” each person responded to. Participants’ eye movements were recorded. Participants with ASD were poorer than comparison participants at identifying the scenario to which people in the videos were responding. There were no group differences in time spent looking at the eyes or mouth. The findings imply those with ASD are impaired in using mentalising skills for retrodiction.

Thesis (MMus (Music))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study concerns the widespread phenomenon that music is perceived as meaningful to the listener in some sense. The study adopts a style of conceptual clarification and investigation that is current in the analytic philosophy of language, and is further informed by recent research into the fundamental biology of human musicality, which suggests that musicality and language are neurologically related. The problem of musical meaning is approached as a problem of communicative behaviour, and is hence conceptually related to the concept of meaningfulness in the various modalities of linguistic communication. ‘Communication’ is defined in terms of the intended consequences of communicative acts – that is, a communicative act is an attempt on the behalf of the utterer to cause some sort of change in the listener’s mental states. From this premise, meaning in both musical and linguistic acts is defined in terms the mental states elicited in the mind of the listener. Two classes of mental state are identified: cognitive states, which are propositional in nature; and affective states, which are essentially nonpropositional. It is proposed that meaning in both music and language (as well as in other communicative acts) can be explained in terms of the elicitation of these classes of mental states in the minds of competent listeners, and that in any linguistic or musical act, a competent listener will entertain a composite of these mental states that will be perceived as meaning. The mechanisms responsible for the elicitation of these states are discussed, and it is concluded that the causal powers of the communicative act, as it is represented in the mind, are responsible for the elicitation of these mental states. Directly causal means are responsible for affective states: there is a relationship of direct causation between relevant features of the communicative act, as represented in the mind, and affective states. Affective states are nonpropositional, in that they cannot be subjected to deductive or propositional operations in the mind. By virtue of their being non-propositional, such states are also considered to be beyond verbal explication (‘ineffable’). Cognitive states, on the other hand, are propositional in nature. The mechanisms by which they are realised are complex in terms of propositional computation: the relevant propositional features of the communicative act, as represented in the mind of the listener, undergo manipulation by mental processes (for instance, the computational system for linguistic syntax). Cognitive states are expressible in propositional terms, and are hence expressible in language. Whereas linguistic communication is efficacious for the elicitation of cognitive states, musical utterances tend to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Furthermore, whereas the syntax of language aids communication in the facilitation of semantics, the syntactic dimension of music is principally a means of implementing affective states in the listener. Therefore, any explanation of musical meaning must take the syntactical dimension of music into account. It is also argued that there are features of performance common to both language (in its spoken modality) and musical utterances that serve to elicit affective states. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die verskynsel dat musiek deur die meeste luisteraars as betekenisvol ervaar word. ’n Styl van konseptuele verduideliking en ondersoek word gebruik wat eie is aan die analitiese filosofie van taal. Terselfdertyd word die jongste navorsing op die gebied van die fundamentele biologie van menslike musikaliteit in aanmerking geneem, wat suggereer dat taal en musikale vermoë neurologies met mekaar verwant is. Die probleem van betekenis in musiek word as ʼn probleem van kommunikatiewe gedrag benader, en is dus konseptueel verbind aan die konsep van betekenisvolheid in die verskeie modaliteite van kommunikasie deur middel van taal. ‘Kommunikasie’ word in terme van die geïntendeerde uitkomste van kommunikatiewe aksies/dade gedefinieer. Met ander woorde, ʼn kommunikatiewe aksie/daad is ʼn poging deur die spreker om uiteindelik ʼn verandering in die geestesgesteldheid (‘mental state’) van die luisteraar teweeg te bring. Op hierdie basis word twee tipes geestesgesteldheid onderskei: ʼn kognitiewe gesteldheid, wat proposisioneel van aard is, en ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid, wat nie-proposisioneel is. Daar word voorgestel dat betekenis in beide musiek en taal, soos ook in ander vorme van kommunikasie, verduidelik kan word as die belewenis van sodanige geestesgesteldhede aan die kant van die bedrewe luisteraar. Dit impliseer dat die betekenis van enige uiting in taal of musiek as ʼn bepaalde kombinasie van hierdie twee geestesgesteldhede deur die bedrewe luisteraar ervaar word. Die meganismes wat hierdie geestesgesteldhede ontlok word bespreek, en die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat dit die kousale mag van die kommunikatiewe daad is, soos dit in die bewussyn (‘mind’) neerslag vind, wat hierdie twee tipes geestesgesteldheid ontlok. Daar word beweer dat ʼn proses van direkte kousaliteit verantwoordelik is vir ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid: daar is ’n oorsaaklike verhouding tussen die onderskeie kenmerke van die kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn voorgestel word, en die uiteindelike affektiewe geestesgesteldheid. ʼn Affektiewe geestesgesteldheid is nie-proposisioneel omdat dit nie in terme van deduktiewe of proposisionele prosesse in die bewussyn verstaan kan word nie. Omdat dit nie-proposisioneel is word die kenmerke van hierdie affektiewe geestesgesteldheid as onsegbaar (‘ineffable’) deur die luisteraar beleef. Daarteenoor is ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid proposisioneel van aard. Die meganismes wat veroorsaak dat hierdie geestesgesteldheid gerealiseer word is kompleks: die onderskeie kenmerke van die kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn van die luisteraar voorgestel word, ondergaan manipulasie deur denkprosesse wat proposisioneel van aard is (bv., die denkproses wat die sintaktiese dimensie van taal moet verwerk). ʼn Kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid kan in proposisionele terme weergegee en gevolglik in taal verwoord word. Terwyl kommunikasie deur middel van taal effektief is om ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid te ontlok, is musikale uitdrukking veel eerder geskik om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid te ontlok. Verder, terwyl die sintaksis van taal bydra tot verwesenliking van semantiese betekenis, dra die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek eerder daartoe by om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid by die luisteraar te vestig. Dus moet elke verduideliking van musikale betekenis die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek in aanmerking neem. Verder word beweer dat daar algemene kenmerke in sowel taal (in die gesproke modaliteit) as musiek voorkom wat spesifiek ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid tot stand bring.

Using the theoretical approach of discursive psychology, this thesis examines the interactive uses of mental state talk, in particular the term want , in everyday family interaction. In mainstream cognitive psychology mental state terms are examined as words which signify internal referents. How individuals come to competently participate in social interaction is formulated as a problem of how individual, isolated minds come to understand the contents of other minds. This thesis challenges these individualistic notions and examines notions of wanting as interactionally managed participants concerns. The data are taken from two sources; a set of video recordings taken from a series of fly-on-the-wall documentary programmes which each focus on a particular family and videotapes of mealtimes recorded by three families. Recordings were initially transcribed verbatim and sections related to the emerging themes within the thesis were subsequently transcribed using the Jefferson notation system. These transcripts were then analysed, alongside repeated viewings of the video recordings. The thesis considers a range of analytic themes, which are interlinked via one of the primary research questions, which has been to examine how, and to what end, speakers routinely deploy notions of wanting in everyday talk-in-interaction. A major theme has been to highlight inherent problems with work in social cognition which uses experimental tasks to examine children s Theory of Mind and understanding of desires . I argue that the assumptions of this work are a gross simplification of the meaning wanting for both children and adults. A further theme has been to examine the sequential organisation of directives and requests in both adults and children s talk. Finally, I examine speakers practices for rejecting a proposal regarding their actions and for denying a formulation of their motivations by a co-interactant. The conclusions of the thesis show that expressions of wanting are practical expressions which work within a flow of interactional and deontic considerations and that making claims regarding one s own or others wants is entirely a social matter. I argue that rather than being examined for what they may reveal about the mind , mental state terms may be fruitfully examined as interactional matters.