Les états mentaux réfèrent à la qualité de la capacité d’un individu à élaborer mentalement et à s’ouvrir à son expérience subjective dans l’ici et maintenant. Les divers états mentaux varient quant à la disponibilité des ressources représenta-tionnelles et affectives pouvant être activées afin d’organiser l’expérience vécue, ainsi que dans leur utilisation de stratégies défensives et d’autorégulation. La présente thèse avait pour objectifs 1) d’approfondir l’évaluation des états mentaux par le développement et la validation d’un instrument pratique, le Mental States Task (MST), développé afin d’évaluer différentes qualités d’états mentaux et 2) d’investiguer les propriétés psychiques et les répercussions des différents états mentaux. Le premier article avait pour but de valider le MST. La première partie de l’article est consacrée à la validation du MST dans sa version francophone, et la deuxième partie porte sur la traduction et la validation du MST dans sa version anglophone. Les résultats fournissent des indices convaincants de validité et de fidélité, ainsi qu’une valeur prédictive adéquate. Le MST semble représenter de façon conforme autant les états mentaux de bas niveau que de haut niveau selon le continuum de réflexivité. De fait, les états mentaux de bas niveau et de haut niveau ont été respectivement associés à un large spectre de construits négatifs/immatures et positifs/matures. De plus, chaque état mental évalué par le MST semble posséder des propriétés particulières relativement aux processus mentaux et émotionnels utilisés pour traiter l’expérience. Le second article avait pour objectif d’approfondir l’étude de la valeur prédictive du MST par le biais de l’évaluation des coûts psychiques engendrés par les différentes qualités d’états mentaux—coûts présumés dépendant des ressources représentationnelles disponibles et du type de stratégies de régulation utilisées. Les résultats suggèrent que les états mentaux de bas niveau génèrent des coûts énergétiques plus élevés, ayant pour répercussion d’entraîner subséquemment un effet de déplétion du moi. Inversement, les états mentaux de haut niveau engendrent de moindres coûts, protégeant contre un état subséquent de déplétion du moi. Le MST s’est avéré être un outil efficace d’évaluation des répercussions énergétiques occasionnées par les divers états mentaux. / Mental states refer to the quality of one’s capacity to mentally elaborate and open up to his/her subjective experience in the here-and-now moment. Mental states differ relatively to the availability of the representational and affective resources triggered in order to organize the experience, and in the type of defensive and self-regulatory strategies used. The aims of this thesis were 1) to deepen the evaluation of mental states through the creation and validation of a practical measure, the Mental States Task (MST), in order to evaluate differences in quality of mental states, and 2) to investigate the psychic properties and repercussions of the different mental states. The goal of the first article was to validate the MST. The first part of this article was dedicated to the validation of the French version of the MST, and the second part to the translation and validation of its English version. Results provide convincing evidence of validity and reliability, as well as an adequate predictive value with respect to a large range of related concepts, in both its French and English versions. The MST appears to well represent both low- and high-level mental states according to the reflective continuum, which were found to be linked to a large range of negative/immature and positive/mature constructs, respectively. In addition, each mental state measured by the MST appears to have particular characteristics relative to the mental and emotional processes used to deal with the experience. The purpose of the second article was to deepen the investigation of the predictive value of the MST, through the evaluation of the psychic costs generated by the different qualities of mental states—the costs presumably depending on the representational resources available and the regulatory strategies used. Results suggest that using low-level mental states generates higher energetic costs, resulting in a subsequent ego-depletion effect. Conversely, high-level mental states generate fewer costs, protecting from a subsequent ego-depletion effect. The MST appeared to be an efficient tool in the assessment of the energetic repercussions produced by the different mental sates.

This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves. Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.

This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves. Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.

Background: Mental health can be divided into three groups: mental well-being, mental disorder, and mental illness, whereas the last one also includes neuropsychiatric illness. Nature has always been a central part for humanity, and it is well known that it’s a place that induces mental and physical health. Even though studies have shown that the city hustle is bad for brain activity and the mental health, humans mostly gather in the city. Being in the city leads to pondering and is not advantageous for the mental wellbeing. Aim: The aim is to study the experience of the impact of nature on the mental health. Method: A literature-based study was conducted on an analysis of qualitative research. Results: This study showed three main themes and six subthemes. The main themes were a strengthened self, changed feelings and to feel belonging. The subthemes were to handle life with nature as a resource, to be in the present, to feel freedom, to feel peaceful, to feel belonging to nature and to bring people together. Conclusion: Overall, nature has a positive impact on mental health, and it is a place where acceptance is central and gives a positive feeling.

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Two main psychopathology-based approaches to detection of the prodrome have emerged; the Ultra High Risk (UHR) and Basic Symptom approaches. Conversion risk varies between studies using these approaches and in one centre conversion rates are reported to be decreasing year on year. There is a need examine the conversion risk across studies to establish a pooled estimate of risk for instruments designed to detect the prodrome of psychosis. To maximise the detection of those thought to present a risk of psychosis the Lancashire Early Assessment and Detection (LEAD) clinic uses an UHR instrument, the Comprehensive Assessment of at Risk Mental States (CAARMS) and A Basic Symptom instrument, the Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument (SPI-A). The thesis had two broad aims 1) to conduct a systematic review with meta-analysis of the research field to date and identify areas for further research, 2) to establish the accuracy of the LEAD clinic predictions. The meta-analysis involved a systematic search of MEDLINE, EMBASE, PsychINFO and CINHAL identifying studies of psychopathology-based instruments for the detection of the psychosis prodrome. The service evaluation examined for conversion to psychosis in patients examined for Basic Symptoms (SPI-A), attenuated positive symptoms (CAARMS), schizotypy (SPQ-A) and social functioning (SOFAS).The meta-analysis found that both the UHR and Basic Symptom approaches yield similar results. The differences in the positive predictive values (PPV) of the two approaches were not significant (Basic Symptoms, 0.34, UHR 0.25). The service evaluation found over a third (n=58) of referrals to the LEAD clinic to be psychotic at baseline and sixty-four patients to have an at risk mental state (ARMS). Conversion risk for CAARMS was 36.67%. and was 28.57% for SPI-A. The COGDIS criterion of SPI-A was found to be the most predictive with a PPV of 0.43, a sensitivity of 0.80. When patients met a combination of both COGDIS and CAARMS the likelihood ratio increased to 5.25 although the sensitivity was low (0.47).Overall, the findings of the thesis indicate that both the Basic Symptom and UHR approaches are valid for use in routine clinical settings for the assessment of psychosis risk. The thesis found that a combination of both approaches could provide future opportunities research. The SPQ-A schizotypy assessment was found to correlate with the attenuated symptom criterion of CAARMS and evidence suggests that the SPQ-A score increases closer to transition. The SPQ-A could offer opportunities for developing efficient methods of monitoring progression of prodromal symptoms.

Dans ce mémoire, j’explore la construction du sujet en relationnalité en m’appuyant sur un cadre théorique composé de concepts issus à la fois des études littéraires et d’approches psychanalytiques contemporaines. Dans la première partie de mon travail, j'explore la manière dont le travail littéraire peut faciliter l'actualisation de l'altérité à la fois dans le texte et chez le lecteur. Dans la deuxième partie de ce travail, j'illustre cette actualisation possible en en explorant les affects évoqués et produits dans l’histoire « I Only Came to Use the Phone » de Gabriel García Márquez. Dans la troisième partie, j’explore théoriquement l’impact potentiel de la fiction littéraire comme moyen thérapeutique auprès des lectrices/lecteurs « nonnevrotiques ». J’explore la façon dont la lecture d’histoires peut contribuer à l’activation de certaines traces mnésiques qui pourrait renforcer la capacité de symboliser expériences émotionnelles jusque-là non métabolisées ou non représentées. Je soutiens que la lecture et la discussion d’histoires dans des suivis thérapeutiques pourront aider des patientes à co-construire (à l’aide de leur thérapeute) de nouveaux récits qui pourront mener à une certaine transformation de la structure psychique non-névrotique des patients. Dans la dernière partie, j’avance comme hypothèse que le tiers intersubjectif issu de la rencontre d’un couple analytique avec l’histoire « I Only Came to Use the Phone » pourrait nourrir de nouvelles façons de penser, de sentir et d'exprimer des affects en séance, tout en activant des « rêves » dont l’émergence témoigne de la manière dont la lecture d’histoires pourrait potentiellement animer la vie inconsciente des personnes prises avec des états mentaux non représentées. Enfin, je soutiens que la lecture de fiction littéraire pourrait initier chez des personnes avec des états mentaux non représentés un mouvement de transformation, et ce, d’une part, en les aidant à passer d’un « bain mycélien de non-figurabilité » interne au renforcement de leur capacité à (se) représenter ; de l’autre, en leur sortant d’un état d’apathie vers le développement de nouvelles cartographies affectives. / In this thesis, I explore the subject’s construction in relationality, first by presenting a theoretical framework built from concepts drawn both from literary studies and contemporary psychoanalytic approaches. In the first part of the thesis, I explore how the literary work has the potential to facilitate the actualization of otherness both in the text and within the reader. To illustrate this contention, in Part II, I explore the affective tone of the short story, “I Only Came to Use the Phone” by Gabriel García Márquez. In Part III, I elaborate theoretically on the potential benefits of using literature as a therapeutic medium with non-neurotic readers. I explore how the reading of short stories may contribute to the stimulation of the non-neurotic reader’s capacity to memorize and to remember while promoting and strengthening her/his capacity for symbolizing previously unmetabolized or unrepresented emotional experiences. I argue that reading and discussing stories in the context of analytically oriented sessions may lead to the co-construction of subsequent narratives that may be transformational for the reader’s non-neurotic psychic structure. In the fourth and last part, I argue that the intersubjective inbetween space that might emerge from the encounter of an analytic dyad with the story by García Márquez could potentially facilitate the important task of supplying new ways of thinking, feeling and expressing, while simultaneously potentially producing “dream” material that may contribute to the enlivening of the analysand’s non-neurotic conscious and unconscious life. Finally, I contend that the reading of literary fiction may initiate in non-neurotic analysands a transformational movement: first, from an internal “mycelial bath of non-figurability” to the strengthening of their representational capacity; and second, from an emotional apathy to the extension of the analysand’s affective cartographies.

Les travaux de recherche de cette thèse portent sur l'amélioration des capacités sociales d'un système conversationnel en interaction avec un humain. Lorsque le système n'est pas dédié à une tâche particulière, il doit tenir compte de difficultés relevant de l'interaction sociale elle-même. L'humour est un mécanisme naturel dans les interactions sociales. Nous considérons un humour-machine comme une simulation de comportements simplifiés des capacités humoristiques humaines: dérision, blagues, jeux de mots. Les travaux de cette thèse s'appuient sur des théories issues de domaines variés en sociologie, psychologie, neurosciences et linguistique pour l'intégration de cet humour-machine dans un système robotique. Implémentées dans certains systèmes de dialogue, ces capacités humoristiques sont cependant rarement utilisées pour pouvoir choisir les comportements à générer du robot. Dans nos travaux, la mise en œuvre des comportements humoristiques du système en conversation est réalisée en utilisant la théorie des rites d'interaction. L'estimation de la face de l'interlocuteur permet de diriger le comportement du robot dans la conversation casuelle humoristique. Les facteurs expressifs d'une perte ou d'une valorisation de la face sont liés à des états mentaux exprimés dans une situation donnée. Pour réaliser cette estimation de la face, nous étudions, à partir de corpus créés à cet effet, les réactions comportementales, affectives et expressives des participants à différents types d'humour réalisés par le robot et ayant des impacts variables sur celle-ci (l'humour prenant pour cible le robot, le participant ou un autre sujet). Les réactions des participants à l'humour sont établies sur une représentation multi-niveaux d'indices émotionnels, comportementaux et linguistiques, extraits à partir de l'audio.Des règles sont ainsi construites à partir de l'apprentissage automatique de ces indices issus des corpus, concernant l'appréciation de la réaction des participants à l'humour et la mise à jour de l'estimation de la face présentée du participant. Leur implémentation dans un système automatique nous permet de les évaluer. De nombreuses expérimentations ont été menées avec des publics variés : personnes âgées, adultes, adolescents. Enfin, l'utilisation des préférences du participant à l'humour dans la conversation fait émerger des questions éthiques, notamment face au pouvoir persuasif et manipulateur de l'humour. / This doctoral dissertation is about the improvement of social capacities of a conversationnal system to interact with humans. When the system is not dedicated to one particular task, it must take into account the inherent difficulties of social interaction it-self. Humor is a natural mechanism present in social interactions. We consider humour in a robotic system as a simulation of simplified behaviors from human humor : derision, jokes, puns. This work is based on theories issued from various research domains as sociology, psychology, neurosciences and linguistics to enable integration of humor in a robotic system. Implemented in some dialog systems, humorous capacities are however rarely used when programming the robot’s behavior. In our study, the humourous behavior is implemented in the system by using the ritual theory of face-work. The face analysis of the interlocutor can be used to direct the robot’s reactions during a casual humorous talk. In order to evaluate the faces of participants in interaction, we study, using data collections created for this purpose, the participant’s behavior, emotionnal and expressive responses to different types of humor (humorous act targeting the robot, the participant or a neutral subject). Participant's reaction to humor are made upon a multi-level processing of emotionnal, linguistic and behavioral cues.Machine learning is used to extract rules defining appreciation or not and update the participant's face evaluation in regards of the humorous act produced by the robot. An implementation of these rules in an automatic dialog system allows us to evaluate their accuracy. Numerous experiments were carried out on various populations : elderly persons, adults, teenagers. Finally, the use of the participant’s preferences in the conversation raises ethical questions, in particular against the persuasive and manipulative power of humor.

Les avancées de la biologie contemporaine, posent de façon nouvelle des problèmes philosophiques anciens. Ceux des rapports entre le vivant et l'inanimé, entre le corps et l'esprit, l'erreur et la vérité, sont les plus évidents. La philosophie de Spinoza, bien que datant du 17e siècle, apporte à ces problèmes des solutions plus pertinentes que la plupart des philosophies plus récentes, développées dans les siècles qui l'ont suivie. En retour, les acquis actuels des sciences physiques et biologiques, notamment des neurosciences cognitives, permettent de porter un nouveau regard sur certaines notions propres à la philosophie de Spinoza, telles que sa «petite physique», la nature cause de soi, la notion de matière, l'essence des choses, les genres de connaissance, qui acquièrent de ce fait un surcroît d'actualité. / Old philosophical problems are raised in renewed ways by advances in biology of today. Most obvious are the problems of relationship between living and non-living, mind and body, error en truth. Spinoza's philosophy, although from 17th century, offers solutions to these problems more relevant than most more recent philosophies. In return, present knowledge from physical and biological sciences, especially cognitive neurosciences, can provide a new look at some specifically Spinozist notions such as his "little physics", Nature as cause of itself, the notion of matter, the essence of a thing, kinds of knowledge, which gain all the more interest from a present day point of view.