Mental time travel (MTT) refers to an individual’s ability to mentally travel through subjective time, autonoetically re-experiencing past events under the form of autobiographical memories (past MTT), and pre-experiencing events as future autobiographical representations (future MTT). MTT can occur voluntarily, whereby a past/future autobiographical event is subjectively experienced as an intended occurrence, or involuntarily, wherein such an event is subjectively experienced as an unintended outcome of which the individual is aware. Studies investigating MTT’s characteristics in dysphoria and depression show that dysphoric and depressed individuals produce more overgeneral and negative MTT events when compared to control groups. However, existing research has been limited to past and voluntary MTT events, with few studies investigating involuntary MTT and future MTT in dysphoria and depression. The overarching aim of the present research was to compare the phenomenological characteristics of MTT in dysphoric individuals vs. normal mood individuals (Study 1), and in clinically depressed individuals vs. never-depressed individuals (Study 2), with the purpose of furthering existing knowledge on MTT and its relation with dysphoria and Major Depressive Disorder. This aim was addressed by conducting two studies, using a 2 x (2 x 2) mixed-factorial design, with temporality (past vs. future events) and type of retrieval (voluntary vs. involuntary events) as within-subjects independent variables, and participant group as a between-subjects variable. In Study 1, Portuguese university students were categorised into a dysphoric (n=17) or a normal mood group (n=39) depending on their score on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-IA) – cutoff point (≥ 10). In Study 2, clinically diagnosed depressed patients (n=32) were recruited from a Portuguese hospital and matched for age and gender with never-depressed control participants (n=32) recruited from the community. The dependent variables tested were: level of spatiotemporal specificity, self-relevance, mood and physical impact, valence, and visual perspective of the MTT events produced. A diary methodology was used in both studies, with an open-ended time period that lasted for a minimum of two weeks, for participants to record their MTT events and grade them on the above mentioned variables using Likert-type ratings. Between seven and fourteen MTT events were produced for each of the four MTT conditions (past voluntary, past involuntary, future voluntary, future involuntary). Results showed that when compared to their respective control groups, depressed, but not dysphoric participants, exhibited a clear influence of mood on several of the phenomenological characteristics of MTT. In Study 1 there were no statistically significant differences in the specificity, negative valence, and mood/physical impact of the MTT events produced by dysphoric and normal mood participants. On the contrary, in Study 2, results partially supported a lower specificity and fully supported a greater negativity and mood/physical impact of MTT events in depressed individuals compared with never-depressed participants. Both studies supported the greater self-relevance of voluntary MTT events and partially supported the hypothesised effect of type of retrieval in specificity. These were the first studies to directly compare past and future, voluntary and involuntary MTT events in dysphoric and depressed individuals, addressing existing gaps in the literature. The key limitation is the relatively small sample size of both studies, however each participant was comprehensively assessed for at least two weeks, providing a rich set of reliable data. Despite limitations, this thesis provides novel pilot findings that help understand the similarities and differences between involuntary and voluntary, past and future MTT, as well as providing new information regarding the possible role of MTT in dysphoria and depression.

Vi ställs dagligen inför väldigt många val och beroende på vilka val vi väljer att göra kommer dessa till stor del att påverka hur vi lever vårt liv och även hur tillfreds vi kommer att vara med livet. Vi baserar många av våra val på känslomässiga förutsägelser som är våra antaganden om hur framtida händelser kommer att påverka oss känslomässigt. Våra känslomässiga förutsägelser är dessvärre ofta påverkade av olika bias som gör att vi missbedömer hur starkt och under hur lång tid vi kommer att reagera känslomässigt på kommande händelser, vilket i sin tur påverkar vilka val vi kommer att göra. Den här uppsatsen kommer att undersöka hur våra känslomässiga förutsägelser påverkar vårt subjektiva välbefinnande och även hur förståelse för detta skulle kunna användas i psykologisk coachning i form av interventioner för att hjälpa människor att göra fler val som leder till ett ökat subjektivt välbefinnande.

This dissertation addresses three novel aspects of children’s future thinking: First is a study of 3- to 5-year-olds’ capacity to think about the future across two different conceptual domains. Specifically, children had to think ahead to meet either a future physiological need (desire for food) or psychological need (avoiding boredom). Most future thinking tasks only require children to plan in one domain, this despite that future thinking is presumably domain general in humans. Children were better at addressing a future need for food than a future need for toys, with even 3-year-olds succeeding above chance. This study also served as an opportunity to replicate the results of a previous similar task (Atance et al., 2015) and improve the task by removing unnecessary components (social, pretense). Second is a study of 3- to 5-year-olds’ spontaneous talk (as a proxy for spontaneous thought) about the future and past within the context of a behavioural future thinking task. Spontaneous or involuntary thought about the past and future are ubiquitous in adult cognition. Few developmental studies have investigated past spontaneous thought, and none have investigated future spontaneous thought. Children of all ages spontaneously spoke about the future and past and some children even spontaneously solved the future thinking task. Further, children who spontaneously spoke more about the past and future were more likely to correctly answer an explicit test question. Third is an attempt at addressing a limitation in all existing behavioural future thinking tasks: That is, tasks used to assess the development of future thinking do not require children to think ahead about a future state of the world that differs from the present. Children could potentially be solving behavioural future thinking tasks without having to represent the future. However, representing a future that differs from the present is argued to be core to adaptive future thinking in humans. To overcome this limitation, we modified an existing task so that children could not succeed based on their representation of how the world currently is but, rather, how it will be at a future point in time. Four- to 7-year-olds all remembered the information required to solve the modified task; however, only 7-year-olds made a future-oriented decision more often than chance. With the task modification removed (so the correct answer for the present and future matched), even 4-year-olds succeeded above chance. These findings challenge the current accounts that suggest by age 4, children can reliably succeed in future thinking tasks. Taken together, this research program contributes new insights to the development of future thinking in early childhood and suggests directions for novel research.

The main objective of this master thesis is to clarify the nested structure in time consciousness, depending on mental time travel and episodic memory. Time consciousness, mental time travel and episodic memory are connected, and function depending on each other. Mental time travel ability enables us to imagine personal future events. Episodic memory allows us to travel mentally into both past and future. Similarity between remembering the past and imagining the future indicates that episodic memory system contribute to future-directed personal mental time travel competence, and justifies the relation between episodic memory and mental time travel into both past and future. Episodic memory requires autonoetic consciousness, which can be applied to mental time travel competence, and mental time travel is a function of episodic memory. Distinguishing humans and non-humans is a method to understand the role of episodic memory and mental time travel in time consciousness. Episodic memory and mental time travel indicate to a higher-level time consciousness in humans, because mental time travel, episodic memory, autonoetic consciousness and recursive language are unique to humans, while non-humans show future-directed acts, possess episodic-like memory, and communicate with limited ways. Time consciousness is derived from the notion of autonoetic consciousness and it is a sort of temporal consciousness which enables us to be conscious of ourselves who travels in time and aware of ourselves along the temporal line. Non-humans have a rudimentary form of time consciousness, even they are deprived of autonoetic consciousness.

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Yes / Objectives To examine the impact of memory accessibility on episodic future thinking. Design Single-case study of neurological patient HCM and an age-matched comparison group of neurologically Healthy Controls. Methods We administered a full battery of tests assessing general intelligence, memory, and executive functioning. To assess autobiographical memory, the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1990. The Autobiographical Memory Interview. Bury St. Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company) was administered. The Past Episodic and Future Episodic sections of Dalla Barba's Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993, Cogn. Neuropsychol., 1, 1) and a specifically tailored Mental Time Travel Questionnaire were administered to assess future thinking in HCM and age-matched controls. Results HCM presented with a deficit in forming new memories (anterograde amnesia) and recalling events from before the onset of neurological impairment (retrograde amnesia). HCM's autobiographical memory impairments are characterized by a paucity of memories from Recent Life. In comparison with controls, two features of his future thoughts are apparent: Reduced episodic future thinking and outdated content of his episodic future thoughts. Conclusions This article suggests neuropsychologists should look beyond popular conceptualizations of the past–future relation in amnesia via focussing on reduced future thinking. Investigating both the quantity and quality of future thoughts produced by amnesic patients may lead to developments in understanding the complex nature of future thinking disorders resulting from memory impairments. / Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds

No description available.

Adults can mentally relive experiences from their past and anticipate possible future events, a process called mental time travel (MTT). Recently, several theorists have argued that the ability to mentally travel through time may not emerge until 3- to 5-years of age. This proposal is based on evidence from a wide range of research, including investigations into children’s recall, planning and differentiation of the times of events in the past and the future. However, as yet there has been no dedicated effort to find out how and when MTT develops. The current series of studies brought together a wide range of resources with the aim of designing a series of novel paradigms to measure aspects of MTT development between 3- and 5-years of age. The first of these novel approaches asked children to report events that occurred to them “yesterday” and would occur to them “tomorrow”, revealing that by 4- to 5-years of age most children could accurately do so. Another series of studies examined children’s ability to anticipate a different, future situation, finding that only by 4- to 5-years did children’s behaviour reflect differences in an anticipated future environment. Subsequent studies focusing on children’s discrimination of past and future also suggested that by 4- to 5-years children could distinguish the different causal impact of past and future events on the present. Another task revealed that during the preschool years children become better at differentiating the times of events from throughout their own lifespan. These new data provide support for the claim that the ability to mentally travel into one’s own past and future emerges during the preschool years. This thesis describes the first directed investigation into the development of MTT as a whole, bringing together much of the empirical and theoretical literature for the first time. The tasks designed are new approaches to investigating MTT and represent a starting point for future research. This thesis also introduces and discusses theories for the development of MTT, aiming to stimulate discussion not just of when it emerges, but how, and what processes may underlie the transition.

Adults can mentally relive experiences from their past and anticipate possible future events, a process called mental time travel (MTT). Recently, several theorists have argued that the ability to mentally travel through time may not emerge until 3- to 5-years of age. This proposal is based on evidence from a wide range of research, including investigations into children’s recall, planning and differentiation of the times of events in the past and the future. However, as yet there has been no dedicated effort to find out how and when MTT develops. The current series of studies brought together a wide range of resources with the aim of designing a series of novel paradigms to measure aspects of MTT development between 3- and 5-years of age. The first of these novel approaches asked children to report events that occurred to them “yesterday” and would occur to them “tomorrow”, revealing that by 4- to 5-years of age most children could accurately do so. Another series of studies examined children’s ability to anticipate a different, future situation, finding that only by 4- to 5-years did children’s behaviour reflect differences in an anticipated future environment. Subsequent studies focusing on children’s discrimination of past and future also suggested that by 4- to 5-years children could distinguish the different causal impact of past and future events on the present. Another task revealed that during the preschool years children become better at differentiating the times of events from throughout their own lifespan. These new data provide support for the claim that the ability to mentally travel into one’s own past and future emerges during the preschool years. This thesis describes the first directed investigation into the development of MTT as a whole, bringing together much of the empirical and theoretical literature for the first time. The tasks designed are new approaches to investigating MTT and represent a starting point for future research. This thesis also introduces and discusses theories for the development of MTT, aiming to stimulate discussion not just of when it emerges, but how, and what processes may underlie the transition.