While naturalistic theories have come to dominate the philosophical landscape, there is still little consensus on what “naturalism” means. I trace the origins of contemporary naturalism to a view, called the “fundamental naturalistic impulse,” that originates in Quine’s turn against Carnap and which I take to be necessary for naturalism. In light of this impulse, some “substantively naturalistic” theories are examined: a weak version of non-supernaturalism, Railton’s a posteriori reduction of moral terms, and “Canberra plan” conceptual analyses of moral property terms. I suggest that if we take the fundamental naturalistic impulse seriously, then there is no need to differentiate substantive versions of naturalism over and above methodological versions. Substantive thesis in ontology or semantics can be had on account of one’s methodological commitments. This not only cuts against the distinction between methodological and substantive naturalisms, but also demonstrates just how far method can reach.

This paper examines the popular philosophical theory of moral relativism. Traditionally, the theory argues that communities have their own conceptual frameworks of morality that are inaccessible to those outside of the community. Thus, one community cannot give another community a moral reason to change a practice. In this paper, I will examine David Velleman’s version of the theory presented in his book Foundations for Moral Relativism. This version posits that the drive towards mutual interpretability is a universal drive among human communities. From this drive stem all the practices and moral values of communities. However, Velleman does not believe that this implies that communities can understand each others’ conceptual frameworks. In this way, his account remains a normal version of moral relativism. I will argue that there are some cases in which a person can understand a different community’s conceptual framework enough to provide a reason for that community to change a practice. Importantly, my argument will not say that the reasons for change are moral reasons. They will be practical reasons based on the normative fact that human communities should strive towards mutual interpretability. Thus, my account will also maintain the crucial tenets of moral relativism. If accomplished, this argument will add a great power to the theory.

Alasdair MacIntyre argues in favor of a historicist Thomism in ethics and political philosophy. In his theory, sociological categories take up much of the space traditionally occupied by metaphysics. This peculiar feature of MacIntyre's Thomism, and its merits and demerits, is already a subject that has been taken up by many critics. In this thesis, these criticisms are supplemented and unified by identifying what is perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with MacIntyre's ethics: his version of Thomism is problematic because it treats epistemology as first philosophy. This misstep compromises MacIntyre's ability to provide a defense of moral objectivity, while also undermining his theory's usefulness in deriving moral rules. The result is an ethics of doubtful coherence. If Thomism is to offer a viable alternative to Enlightenment morality and Nietzschean genealogy, it must defend the priority of metaphysics with respect to epistemology.

Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of normative virtue ethics. The virtue ethical literature, however, does not contain much information on the meta-ethical roots of virtue theories. The present paper seeks to address this deficiency by examining the neo-Aristotelianism of Rosalind Hursthouse in an effort to ascertain what meta-ethical commitments are most consistent with her theory; these commitments are shown to be cognitivism, objectivism, and (in some form) naturalism. These positions are then put into dialogue with Moore’s seminal metaethical arguments against naturalism and agent-relative value. Ultimately I show that the literature on normative virtue ethics is rich enough to provide powerful responses to Moorean criticisms.

In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further research.

Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit dem Wesen normativer Gründe – d.h. mit Gründen, die für oder gegen etwas sprechen (und somit für die Frage relevant sind, was jemand alles in allem tun sollte). Die einschlägige Forschungsliteratur unterscheidet dabei zwischen praktischen Gründen, die sich auf Handlungen und handlungsleitende Einstellungen (wie Wünsche oder Absichten) beziehen, und epistemischen Gründen, die sich auf doxastische Einstellungen wie z.B. Überzeugungen beziehen. Die zentrale Frage dieser Dissertation lautet: Welche Implikationen ergeben sich aus einer plausiblen Theorie epistemischer Gründe für die Frage, ob – und wenn ja, in welchem Sinne – praktische Gründe existieren? Die Dissertation leistet damit einen Beitrag zu einer einheitlichen Theorie normativer Gründe. Vertreten werden zwei zentrale Thesen: Erstens, der sogenannte Konstitutivismus – demzufolge normative Tatsachen letztlich durch deskriptive Tatsachen über das Wesen von Akteurschaft erklärbar sind – liefert eine überzeugende Theorie epistemischer Gründe. Zweitens, die Wahrheit des epistemischen Konstitutivismus impliziert, dass in Bezug auf praktische Gründe entweder eine Irrtumstheorie oder der praktische Konstitutivismus gilt – mit anderen Worten, dass praktische Gründe konstitutivistisch erklärbar sein müssen, sofern diese überhaupt existieren. Aus diesen beiden Thesen folgt unmittelbar, dass eine der gegenwärtig populärsten Theorien in der philosophischen Debatte über Normativität, der sogenannte Quietismus – demzufolge normative Gründe zwar existieren, ihre Existenz aber prinzipiell nicht gehaltvoll erklärbar ist –, falsch sein muss. Darüber hinaus liefert die Arbeit einen konstruktiven Vorschlag, wie der praktische Konstitutivismus (insbesondere mit Blick auf moralische Gründe) unter Verweis auf die soziale Natur von Akteurschaft entwickelt und gegen eine Irrtumstheorie verteidigt werden kann. / This thesis is about the nature of normative reasons – i.e., reasons that count in favor of or against something (and thus bear on the question of what one ought to do, all things considered). The extant literature distinguishes between practical reasons, which concern actions and action-guiding attitudes (like desires or intentions), and epistemic reasons, which concern doxastic attitudes like beliefs. The central question of this thesis is: How does a plausible theory of epistemic reasons constrain answers to the question of whether – and if so, in what sense – there are practical reasons? It is thus a contribution to a unified theory of normative reasons. I argue for two central claims: First, a so-called constitutivist view, according to which normative facts are ultimately explicable in terms of descriptive facts about the nature of agency, provides a plausible theory of epistemic reasons. Second, the truth of epistemic constitutivism entails that, regarding practical reasons, either an error theory or practical constitutivism is true – in other words, that practical reasons must be explicable in constitutivist terms, if there are practical reasons at all. It follows from these two claims that quietism – one of the currently most popular views about practical normativity, according to which normative reasons exist, but are not explicable in any meaningful way – must be false. Moreover, this thesis offers a constructive proposal for fleshing out a version of practical constitutivism (specifically with respect to moral reasons) and considers how it can be defended against the error theory.

Text in English / Summary: This work aims at establishing Jung's importance as a Nietzsche commentator. Although Jung's work is generally unacknowledged by the mainstream of Nietzsche scholarship, a number of philosophers have joined him in recognizing the relevance of Iranian religious lore to Nietzsche; the visionary nature of Nietzsche's experiences of Zarathustra; and the link between these experiences and his criticism of ethics. Jung sees Nietzsche as something of a kindred spirit, "and refers to that philosopher again and again throughout his writings. In his seminar on Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra, Jung analyzes that work much as he would a patient's dream. While this approach allows Jung to project his own views onto Nietzsche, it also succeeds in restoring essential aspects of Nietzsche's thought which other, less foolhardy commentators fail to capture. Nietzsche and Jung both speak of going "beyond good and evil" (jenseits von Gut und Bose) as an integral part of their respective conceptions of human fulfillment. The notion that we ought to try to transcend the distinction between good and evil, rather than obstinately cling to the good, potentially constitutes an immense, fundamental challenge to our ordinary beliefs about ethics. At the same time, Jung's elaboration of this into a more general form of nonduality suggests a solution to that most basic problem of ethics--which Nietzsche raised most forcefully--namely that of how ethical standards might be justified without falling prey to such basic obstacles as the "is/ought" problem. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

In view of the latest corporate collapses globally, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to investigate and to theorise how managers make decisions when faced with an ethical dilemma.Philosophers over the years have proposed different moral theories. For example, Kantian’s Categorical Imperative (O’Neil 2001, Peters, 1971) suggests that there are laws that should apply universally. However, its principles are too abstract to guide action, in that it does not provide a detailed set of instructions for following them. Others such as Baier, (2001) suggest that people behave to satisfy their own self-interest. The literature review shows that there is no consensus to define what constitutes ethical behaviour. Kohlberg (1981) divides childhood moral development into six stages. He theorises that greater moral development will be related to the highest social responsibility of an individual. Lagon (2000), Seabright and Moberg (1998), Logsdon and Yuthas (1997) extrapolate Kohlberg’s model to incorporate into organisational and individual moral development.Based on the literature review, research questions were developed. The research methodology is qualitative, based on the realism paradigm using a case research design (Yin 1994). Face to face interviews were conducted with fourteen participants using critical incidents and the findings were triangulated using a semi-structured focus group.The research data analysis is based on grounded theory proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The findings confirm that there is no single theory or approach to business ethics. The findings indicate that a person’s ethical behaviour changes when his/her self-interest is affected. Whilst participants believed that business and ethics can be reconciled, most agreed that they can only be reconciled if the individual’s interest or business profit is not affected. Based on the findings, a new model is proposed in an attempt to theorise an individual’s business ethical behaviour and his/her ethical decision making process.This research also identifies important areas that require further research. These are:• Conflicts between personal values and business values• Should ethics be taught? And if so how?• Should an ethical programme be developed and incorporated in a company’s strategic plan?

In view of the latest corporate collapses globally, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to investigate and to theorise how managers make decisions when faced with an ethical dilemma.Philosophers over the years have proposed different moral theories. For example, Kantian’s Categorical Imperative (O’Neil 2001, Peters, 1971) suggests that there are laws that should apply universally. However, its principles are too abstract to guide action, in that it does not provide a detailed set of instructions for following them. Others such as Baier, (2001) suggest that people behave to satisfy their own self-interest. The literature review shows that there is no consensus to define what constitutes ethical behaviour. Kohlberg (1981) divides childhood moral development into six stages. He theorises that greater moral development will be related to the highest social responsibility of an individual. Lagon (2000), Seabright and Moberg (1998), Logsdon and Yuthas (1997) extrapolate Kohlberg’s model to incorporate into organisational and individual moral development.Based on the literature review, research questions were developed. The research methodology is qualitative, based on the realism paradigm using a case research design (Yin 1994). Face to face interviews were conducted with fourteen participants using critical incidents and the findings were triangulated using a semi-structured focus group.The research data analysis is based on grounded theory proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The findings confirm that there is no single theory or approach to business ethics. The findings indicate that a person’s ethical behaviour changes when his/her self-interest is affected. Whilst participants believed that business and ethics can be reconciled, most agreed that they can only be reconciled if the individual’s interest or business profit is not affected. Based on the findings, a new model is proposed in an attempt to theorise an individual’s business ethical behaviour and his/her ethical decision making process.This research also identifies important areas that require further research. These are:• Conflicts between personal values and business values• Should ethics be taught? And if so how?• Should an ethical programme be developed and incorporated in a company’s strategic plan?

In view of the latest corporate collapses globally, the purpose of this thesis is an attempt to investigate and to theorise how managers make decisions when faced with an ethical dilemma.Philosophers over the years have proposed different moral theories. For example, Kantian’s Categorical Imperative (O’Neil 2001, Peters, 1971) suggests that there are laws that should apply universally. However, its principles are too abstract to guide action, in that it does not provide a detailed set of instructions for following them. Others such as Baier, (2001) suggest that people behave to satisfy their own self-interest. The literature review shows that there is no consensus to define what constitutes ethical behaviour. Kohlberg (1981) divides childhood moral development into six stages. He theorises that greater moral development will be related to the highest social responsibility of an individual. Lagon (2000), Seabright and Moberg (1998), Logsdon and Yuthas (1997) extrapolate Kohlberg’s model to incorporate into organisational and individual moral development.Based on the literature review, research questions were developed. The research methodology is qualitative, based on the realism paradigm using a case research design (Yin 1994). Face to face interviews were conducted with fourteen participants using critical incidents and the findings were triangulated using a semi-structured focus group.The research data analysis is based on grounded theory proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The findings confirm that there is no single theory or approach to business ethics. The findings indicate that a person’s ethical behaviour changes when his/her self-interest is affected. Whilst participants believed that business and ethics can be reconciled, most agreed that they can only be reconciled if the individual’s interest or business profit is not affected. Based on the findings, a new model is proposed in an attempt to theorise an individual’s business ethical behaviour and his/her ethical decision making process.This research also identifies important areas that require further research. These are:• Conflicts between personal values and business values• Should ethics be taught? And if so how?• Should an ethical programme be developed and incorporated in a company’s strategic plan?