Low agricultural productivity is a persistent challenge in developing economies. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I study the concurrent but independently implemented expansion of rural roads and extension in Ethiopia to examine how access to markets and technologies affect agricultural productivity. Using geospatial data combined with large surveys and exploiting the staggered roll-out of the two programs, I show that there are strong complementarities between roads and extension. While ineffective in isolation, access to both a road and extension increases productivity. I find that roads and extension improve productivity by facilitating the take up of agricultural advice and modern inputs. Furthermore, households adjust crop choices and shift across occupations in response to their changing comparative advantages in access to markets and technologies. In the second chapter of the dissertation, co-authored with Samuel Bazzi and Martin Fiszbein, we study the long-run implications of the American frontier experience for culture and politics. We track the frontier throughout the 1790–1890 period and construct a novel, county-level measure of total frontier experience (TFE). Historically, frontier locations had distinctive demographics and greater individualism. Long after the closing of the frontier, counties with greater TFE exhibit more pervasive individualism and opposition to redistribution. We provide suggestive evidence on the roots of frontier culture: selective migration, an adaptive advantage of self-reliance, and perceived opportunities for upward mobility through effort. Overall, our findings shed new light on the frontiers persistent legacy of rugged individualism. In the third chapter of the dissertation, I use plant level census data to examine the effects of two policies designed to support prioritized sub-sectors and regions on the productivity of the Ethiopian manufacturing sector. The first policy, implemented during 1996-2002, was an activist industrial policy favoring import substitution while the second policy, active during 2003-2012, emphasized export promotion. I find that there is severe misallocation in Ethiopian manufacturing sector, but it has subsided over the studied period. The results suggest that the priority sector support policies have exacerbated the misallocation, and the within-sector variations of the policies largely account for the dispersion in revenue productivity.

The rental market in Stockholm is clearly out of function. For an apartment in the city the queue is of several years, and the rent level is far from in comparison with the market demand. The incentives to build rental apartments are almost none. The profitability level of rental housing is not enough compared to building owner-occupied housing. Therefore, in the lack of rental housing and the big excess demand that exists on rental housing, the black market is booming this type of accommodation and people have to pay large amounts to obtain rental housing. The market simulation presented in this thesis is to show us what the rent levels would become in Stockholm if we deregulated the rental housing market in the long run, in the short run, or with subsidies from the state. This will give us an idea of how the rental market could develop in the future, and what consequences it would imply for tenants and landlords. As a basis for this analysis, the demand elasticity is studied. This is based on how demand is affected by changes in disposable income and a rent increase. The demand elasticity is then compared with rental markets similar to Stockholm. The aim of this thesis is to show, with three simulations, how the housing market would react to a deregulation in this case where housing demand exceeds the supply. Also presented in this thesis is what the rent would be if the deregulations where made today. The final results in these simulations are similar to each other and all three indicates an increase of 65-70 percent. This is followed up by stagnation with a rent increase of two percent per year. The difference in these three simulations is how the final percentage is reached, and how they affect the housing demand. Our target is to create pathways and incentives to build and maintain rental units, to stabilize the rental market and most important, to emphasize the human rights to housing. / Hyresmarknaden i Stockholm fungerar inte som den ska. Kötiden för hyresrätter i staden uppgår till åtskilliga år och hyresnivåerna är långt ifrån proportionerliga mot marknadens efterfrågan. Incitamenten till att bygga hyresrätter i dagsläget är nästintill obefintliga, främst på grund av att avkastningsnivån gentemot bostadsrätter inte är nog. Bristen på hyresrätter och det stora efterfrågeöverskottet gör att den svarta marknaden fortsätter att växa. Marknadssimuleringarna som presenteras i detta kandidatarbete visar oss vad som skulle hända med hyresnivåerna i Stockholm vid fri hyressättning. Vi går djupare in på tre scenarion. En kortsiktig avreglering som visar ett tänkbart utfall om hyran släpps fri idag och anpassas till marknadshyra på två till tre år. En långsiktig avreglering som sträcker sig över en sexårsperiod och slutligen en avreglering med statlig subvention. Som en grund för dessa analyser har efterfrågeelasticiteten studerats. Denna elasticitet bygger på hur efterfrågan påverkas av förändringar i disponibel inkomst, hyresökningar, befolkningsökningar och förändringar i utbudet på hyresmarknaden. Resultatet av detta jämförs med hyresmarknader som liknar Stockholms. Målet med kandidatarbetet är att med tre simuleringar visa hur hyresmarknaden i det högt efterfrågade Stockholms stad skulle reagera på en avreglering. De slutliga resultaten i simuleringarna liknar varandra och ökningen hamnar på cirka 65-70 procent. Sedan sker en stagnering i samtliga fall och hyran får en konstant ökning på två procent per år. Det som skiljer simuleringarna åt är vägen till denna hyresökning, och hur de påverkar efterfrågan på hyresmarknaden. Vår önskan är att skapa vägar och incitament till ett upprätthållande och nyskapande av hyreserätter, att stabilisera hyresmarknaden och att underlätta boendesituationen för Stockholms framtida och nuvarande invånare.

This dissertation contains three essays in microeconomics. Using descriptive analyses andcausal inference techniques, it examines the role that institutions play in determining children’s human capital investments, adults’ wages, and whether older workers are independent contractors. Chapter 1 explores how children’s human capital development is affected by the interactions between automatic grade promotion, tuition reduction, and rainfall. An important feature of rural life is that children participate in farming. One consequence of this fact is that when there is increased demand for agricultural labor children are more likely to be kept out of school, lowering their human capital. When policymakers implement reforms an important consideration should be whether children’s labor supply elasticity can be affected—will increased labor demand result in them being more likely to stay out of school. Estimating these interactive effects is generally difficult because of the need for several sources of exogenous variation. This paper interacts quasi-random rainfall shocks as a shifter to the demand for child labor and two education reforms in India—automatic promotion of children to grade 8, and a large reduction in fees at government-run schools—to examine whether the policy changes interact with the demand for child labor and whether the two policy reforms interact with one another. I find that tuition reduction increases children’s elasticity of labor supply. Higher rainfall reduces test scores, but when tuition is lowered, the effect of rainfall on test scores is more negative. There are also interactive effects between social promotion and tuition elimination. For children with the average level of treatment, tuition reduction increases test scores by 7% of a standard deviation. The effect of tuition reduction is lower for children who receive an additional year of automatic promotion, only 4.7% of a standard deviation. These results demonstrate that there are interactions between child labor and education policy, which can potentially undermine any beneficial impact of reforms. Future work should examine the mechanisms behind these findings, to better understand families’ decision-making in response to changing education policy. Chapter 2 studies how firms share rents with workers, and the role of labor market institutionsin determining which workers receive rents. Firms can decide whether to produce some goods and services in-house or purchase them from the market. Increasingly, they are purchasing from the market—using subcontractors, temp agencies, and other outsourced labor. Low-wage workers’ wages decline when they are outsourced, but little is known about how outsourcing affects remaining workers. If firms are rent sharing, outsourcing might increase remaining workers’ earnings because there are more rents or fewer workers to share them with. This paper measures the impact of occupational layoff (OL) outsourcing, where firms outsource some occupations, on the earnings and separations of workers who remain employed by those firms. Using employer-employee data based on German social security records in a dynamic difference-in-differences design, outsourcing increases remaining workers’ long-run earnings by 6% in a sample of 260 OL outsourcing events. Remainers are also more likely to stay at the outsourcing firm—outsourcing decreases the probability of remainers switching firms by 7.5 percentage points. Higher earnings and fewer separations are consistent with remainers receiving additional rents. Earnings gains are larger for workers in the bottom-half of the within-firm earnings distribution. Outsourcing only increases remainers’ earnings in firms with collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). In firms with CBAs, outsourcing increases remainers’ long-term earnings by 6%. In firms without CBAs, outsourcing lowers shortterm earnings by 3%. The results are consistent with a model of wage setting where outsourcing firms with CBAs need to compensate remainers. When there is no CBA, firms do not compensate remainers and can lower their wages. Analyzing the impact of outsourcing on within-firm and overall wage inequality, a typical outsourcing event in the sample lowers the within-firm Gini index by 2.5% as low-wage workers leave the firm and low-wage remainers are compensated. Using Recentered Influence Functions, increasing the share of workers part of an outsourcing event by 10 percentage points (from a baseline of 11.7%) increases the top of the earnings distribution by approximately 1-1.5%, and the overall Gini index by 1%. Remainers are relatively high-wage, and outsourcing increases their earnings. By not accounting for this effect, prior studies likely underestimate the total impact of outsourcing on earnings inequality in Germany. Chapter 3 studies the role that labor market demand shocks play in no just whether workersare employed, but the types of contracts they are employed in, especially as they age. Independent Contracting is an employment relationship where workers have fewer legal protections relative to traditional employment. At the same time, workers in these contracts are generally hired to provide defined tasks, and cannot be controlled by their employer to the same degree as regular employees. However, little is known about why firms decide to use contractors as opposed to regular employees. In a simple framework with uncertainty and fixed costs, contracting occurs when there is a mismatch between worker and firm type—either the worker or firm can do better in the next period, so they agree to a short-term contract. Under this framework, contracting can be driven by market factors. Negative labor demand shocks have an ambiguous predicted effect on the use of contractors as (1) employees become contractors and (2) contractors become unemployed. Which effect dominates is tested using data on two negative labor demand shocks—the China Shock and the Housing Wealth Shock from the Great Recession. In both instances, negative labor demand reduces the probability that workers are independent contractors, conditional on being employed in a given industry and occupation. From a baseline of 6.9% of 18-65 year olds employed as contractors, moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of the China Shock reduces contractor probability by 0.8 percentage points, while moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of the Housing Wealth Shock reduces the probability that a worker is an independent contractor by 3.75 percentage points. These demonstrate that economic downturns reduce the overall share of contractors, suggesting that contracting is mostly used on the margin as a supplement to regular employer-employee relationships, rather than as a replacement for those relationships.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil Engineering, 1981. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Bibliography: leaves 194-197. / by Sergio Rodolfo Jara Diaz. / Ph.D.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil Engineering, 1979. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Includes bibliographical references. / by Rigoberto Omar Romero. / M.S.

This dissertation contains three chapters in the field of development economics and applied microeconomics. The first chapter studies the effect of higher education on an individual’s life outcomes and how the effect evolves over her life cycle. The second chapter examines how a woman-centered, preference-based counseling procedure shapes women’s contraceptive preferences and behavior. The third chapter investigates the impact of construction activities of transportation infrastructure on local economic outcomes. Chapter 1 examines the effect of higher education on an individual’s life outcomes, and how the effect evolves over her life cycle. I use as a natural experiment the most ambitious educational reform in Chinese history, the reinstatement of the National College Entrance Examination (the Gaokao) following the end of the Cultural Revolution. Using Census data in 1990 and 2000, I find discontinuous changes in the likelihood of completing high school and attending college around a cutoff birth date, which are shown to be induced by the policy shock. Through a combination of regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference methods, this chapter finds that cohorts that were more likely to complete high school and obtain a college education as a result of the reform were more likely to have a high-socioeconomic (SES) occupation in their early 30s, and the effect becomes smaller in their 40s. More educated cohorts, and in particular women, tend to marry later. Individuals with higher education were less likely to be ever married in their 40s. Finally, individuals with higher education tend to delay childbearing and migrate more in both their 30s and 40s, plausibly due to greater returns to migration for the more educated. Chapter 2 (with Mahesh Karra) examines how a woman-centered, preference-based approach to family planning counseling shapes women's contraceptive preferences and behavior. By implementing a randomized controlled trial in urban Malawi, we explore how a woman's decision-making may be shaped by: 1) the number and types of contraceptive methods presented to her based on her stated preferences for contraception (targeted counseling); and 2) the presence of her husband / male partner at the time of counseling. Women were subsequently offered free transport and access to family planning methods and services at a clinic for one month. We find that women who received targeted counseling were 15.6 percent less likely to be using their stated ideal contraceptive method at follow-up and were 17.5 percent more likely to exhibit discordance between their stated and ideal method at follow-up. On the other hand, women who were encouraged to invite their husbands to the counseling session were 13.5 percent less likely to change their stated ideal method from counseling to follow-up but 16.6 percent more likely to be using their stated ideal method at follow-up. While both approaches aim to achieve the goal of ``helping women make informed choices on family planning'', neither seems to yield strictly preferred outcomes for women. Chapter 3 investigates how the construction of the three earliest high-speed railway (HSR) lines in mid-Southern China affects economic activity. By formulating a set of counterfactual railway lines following the HSR planbook (MLTRP) issued by the central government, and by utilizing nighttime light data (NTL) from 1992 to 2013, I implement an event-study analysis to quantify how HSR construction transforms the local economic activity as proxied by the NTL. Furthermore, I employ county-level data on economic indicators to pin down the channels at work underlying the effects. I find that: 1) the grid-level NTL significantly increased compared to the counterfactual regions one year after the HSR construction, but there is no significant impact following the operation of the HSR lines; 2) the positive construction impacts can be explained by the provisions of associated local amenities, temporary clearing of households, as well as structural transformation from agricultural towards non-agricultural sectors.

An A/B test is implemented on a SaaS rm's product page to examine the di erence in conversion rates from website visitors who are randomly assigned to two di erent product-landing pages that show di erent prices. To count as a successful conversion the visitors that view a product-landing page have to click on a \Free Trial" button. Half of the group will be assigned the treatment page, which will state higher prices and the other half will be assigned the controlled page, which will state today's current price. The only variant that will di er from the two pages will be the stated price of the product and all other factors will be kept constant. The controlled experiment is executed to get a sense of customers' price sensitivity, hence this thesis contributes to microeconomic research of the private sector, more specically to the ICT industry by using a novel approach with the help of A/B testing on prices. The results showed no statistical signicance difference between the two variations, which can be translated to accepting the null hypothesis; the demand for a particular Software-As-A-Service product will hold unchanged after the proposed price increase. At rst, this could be a surprising result but when looking into the industry, which the rm participates in and their early mover advantages this result could have been assumed.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln, die sich mit Wissen und Informationen in der mikroökonomischen Theorie beschäftigen. In Kapitel 1 untersuchen wir ein Duopolmodell mit Preisdiskriminierung, bei dem die Verbraucher über ihren Datenschutz entscheiden. Wir stellen zwei Datenumgebungen gegenüber und finden für jede ein Gleichgewicht. In einer offenen Datenumgebung geben alle Verbraucher ihre Daten preis. Unternehmen diskriminieren bei der Preisgestaltung, was zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten aufgrund von Abwerbung führt. In einer Umgebung mit exklusiven Daten anonymisieren sich die Verbraucher, die Preise sind einheitlich, und der Markt ist effizient. Wir testen die Gleichgewichte in einem Experiment. In Kapitel 2 untersuchen wir ein Modell einer Organisation, die wissensintensive Produktion betreibt. Der Organisationsdesigner stellt Arbeiter ein, die mit Wissen ausgestattet sind, um Probleme zu lösen, deren Art ex ante unbekannt ist. Der Designer bestimmt, ob die Arbeitnehmer einzeln oder im Team produzieren. Als Team können die Arbeitnehmer kommunizieren und ihr Wissen teilen, während sie bei Einzelarbeit nur ihr eigenes Wissen nutzen können. Wir stellen fest, dass Teamarbeit optimal ist, wenn Spillovers ausreichend hoch sind. Insbesondere dann, wenn Spillovers perfekt oder alle Problemtypen gleich wahrscheinlich sind, sind selbstverwaltete Teams optimal. In Kapitel 3 untersuche ich ein dynamisches Modell mit einem Moral-Hazard-Problem und einem kostspieligen Wissenstransfer. Ein Auftraggeber stellt zwei risikoneutrale, vermögensbeschränkte Agenten ein, die jeweils eine individuelle Aufgabe in einem Projekt übernehmen. Bevor sie sich ihren Aufgaben zuwenden, können die Agenten beschließen, Wissen zu transferieren, das die Produktivität des Empfängers erhöht. Der Auftraggeber kann durch ein gemeinsames Leistungssignal einen Transfer mit oder ohne Verpflichtungsmacht veranlassen. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters that contribute to understanding how knowledge and information is used in microeconomic theory. In Chapter 1, we study a duopoly model of behavior-based pricing where consumers decide on their data privacy. Contrasting two data environments, we find unique equilibria for each. In an open data environment, all consumers reveal their data. Firms price discriminate causing welfare losses due to poaching. In an exclusive data environment, consumers anonymize, prices are uniform, and the market is efficient. We test the predictions in an experiment. In the open data treatment, subjects act as predicted. In the exclusive data treatment, buyers initially share data but anonymize when sellers poach. In Chapter 2, we study a model of an organization engaging in knowledge-intensive production. The organizational designer hires workers endowed with knowledge to solve problems whose types are ex ante unknown. The designer determines whether workers produce individually or as team. As team, workers can communicate and share their knowledge, while when working individually they can only use their own knowledge. We find that teamwork is optimal when spillovers are sufficiently high. Particularly, when spillovers are perfect, or all problem types are equally likely, self-managed teams arise as a special form of teamwork. In Chapter 3, I explore a dynamic model with a moral hazard problem and knowledge transfer. A principal hires two risk-neutral, wealth-constrained agents to each perform an individual task in a project. Before they address their tasks, the agents can decide to transfer knowledge that increases the task-related productivity of the receiver. The transfer is costly for both. I find that the principal can induce a transfer with or without commitment power through a joint performance signal. It is not clear that commitment is always better, even though with commitment the first-best allocation can be achieved.

No description available.

This thesis is a collection of papers investigating micro economic issues concerning household behavior by means of econometric methods. Each of the chapters is self-contained. / Ph. D.