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This thesis consists of four essays on applied production analysis, with a focus on technology, productivity and fixed costs. The aim of this thesis is to identify some limitations of recent contributions to production behavior modeling, and to propose improvements. In this dissertation, I compared different empirical specifications and statistical methods which have often been used in production analysis, and pointed out their implications for estimating technology parameters. I studied the causes and cures of endogeneity problems in the context of production analysis. This thesis also addressed the important but neglected issue of fixed costs. This work defined and characterized the fixed cost, and developed empirical strategies to estimate the fixed cost using the standard production database. Empirical evidence suggests that the fixed cost is significant and has profound impacts on producer's behavior in terms of price setting, returns to scale and exports.

The EU transport sector is currently extremely dependent on foreign oil and the import bill for this fuel was in 2011 approximately € 210 billion. The European Commission (EC) claims that this dependency will eventually affect the member states’ economic security and mobility as oil is a finite resource. At the same time, the transport sector needs to reduce its CO2 emissions with 60% until 2050. Therefore in 2013, the EC proposed the “Directive on the Deployment of Alternative Fuels Infrastructure”, which purpose is to create road fuel infrastructure for the alternative fuels electricity, hydrogen and, the main focus of this report, natural gas. The EC believes that infrastructure acts as a major barrier for the adoption of natural gas vehicles (NGV), which in the EU has been extremely limited. The scientific community agrees that infrastructure is an important barrier, but not the sole decider for the market penetration of NGV’s. Empirical evidence claims that in order for large-scale adoption to occur, natural gas needs to be priced at least 40% lower than conventional fuels (gasoline, diesel) and the payback period (the added investment cost of an NGV) must be lower than four years. Historical data shows that if these criteria are not met this will lead to market failure, even if the adequate infrastructure is in place. The two criteria are examined in this report in the four of the largest EU countries: Germany, UK, France and Spain whom together account for a majority of all vehicles registered in 2012. Italy was excluded as it has already has a well-developed NGV fleet. Two car models from different price ranges in NGV, gasoline and diesel versions were studied: the Fiat Punto and the Audi A3 Sportback. Payback periods where calculated based on yearly average annual distances travelled per country, fuel prices, vehicle fuel efficiency and the added investment cost for an NGV compared to gasoline and diesel vehicles. In order to compare fuel prices default energy content values were used to convert CNG into gasoline and diesel equivalents. As the price of CNG is heavily dependent on favorable taxation one needs to question the economic sustainability, and therefore this study also analyses the future price difference between gas and the conventional fuels using a supply and demand model with oligopoly conditions. This model was complemented with the 4 A’s method, which are Availability, Accessibility, Affordability and Acceptability. Results show that the conditions for NGV’s compared to diesel vehicles are optimal in Germany, UK and Spain, as they all have fuel price difference of minimum 40% and payback periods significantly below 4 years. As a majority of all new vehicles registered in the EU are diesel models this will have a strong positive impact on the NGV market. The conditions for the gasoline comparisons are suboptimal, or slightly inconclusive as the payback periods in a few cases are above, or just below four years. As default values have been used during calculations the numbers are sensitive to change and simply too uncertain to draw any solid conclusions. The price differences between CNG and gasoline are within the criteria level of 40%. The price difference analysis between oil and natural gas shows great uncertainty, as there are many factors involved, such as environmental and geopolitical. A potential factor that could decouple prices is “fracking” of domestic EU shale gas resources, but this seems unlikely to happen due to environmental, social and economical reasons. Imported US LNG could have a similar effect but it might be exported east in order to meet the increasing demand from countries in Asia pacific. In conclusion, if the Directive on the Deployment of Alternative Fuels Infrastructure was implemented we would likely see a moderate to high market penetration of NGV’s, mostly due to their comparative advantage towards diesel vehicles. As gasoline meets the fuel price difference criteria this will also have a positive effect on the NGV market albeit limited by questionable payback periods.

This D.Phil. thesis develops a new agent-based simulation model to improve the results of analysis, which solely uses discrete choice modelling, as well as to analyse the effects of a road user charging scheme for the Upper Derwent Valley in the Peak District National Park. The advantages of discrete choice analysis are well known. However, results with these conventional conventional approaches, which conduct analysis solely with discrete choice models, can be biased if interaction and learning effects are significant. The Minority Game, in which agents try to choose the option of the minority side, is an appropriate tool to deal with these problems. The situation in the Upper Derwent Valley can be explained with economic game theories and the Minority Game. The two approaches mutually help to analyse the situation in the Upper Derwent Valley leading to the development of a stochastic Minority Game. The stochastic Minority Game was tested with an online game (questionnaire), which was played 3,886 times by response in all around the world. The practical part of this thesis examines the components of the stochastic Minority Game with the data collected around the Upper Derwent Valley. The main data was collected using a stated preference survey. Overall, 700 questionnaires were distributed and 323 of them were returned (i.e. a return rate of 46.1 %). In the practical part, the agent-based model has four sub modules: 1) Multinomial mixed logit model for mode choice, 2) Binary logit model for parking location choice, 3) Markov queue model for parking network, and 4) the Minority Game for parking congestion and learning. This simulation model produces comprehensive outputs including mode choices, congestion levels, and user utilities. The results show that the road user charging scheme reduces car demand in the Upper Derwent Valley and ensures a reduction in congestion at the parking areas. The model also shows that an exemption will increase the utilities of elderly visitors without substantially sacrificing those of younger visitors. In conclusion, the simulation model demonstrated that oversimplification in conventional approaches solely using discrete choice models gave significant biases when real world problems were analysed.

Thesis (doctoral) - Universität, Frankfurt. / Includes bibliographical references.

Poverty Microeconomics: The Peruvian caseThe microeconomic analysis of poverty in Peru shows the following results. First, poverty is mainly explained by the income of the poor which is not only low, but also highly unstable. Second, poverty is related to the poor’s bad decision making due to incomplete information, intertemporal inconsistency and or lack of self control, mainly in the saving, borrowing, preventive health, fertility and education decisions. Third, poverty depends of the external constraints the poor face in some markets where they are marginalized from automatic decision making, in health insurance, pensions, vaccines, water and sanitation. Fourth, the poor face more and bigger risks than the rest of the population. They have higher probability to fall in poverty traps than higher income groups, because their income is low and unstable and they lack thefinancial and institutional backing to buffer income fluctuations. Fifth, to combat poverty we have to modulate the poor’s decision through information diffusion and the use of mechanisms of behavioral economics such as framing and nudging decisions in health, education, insurance, pensions, etc. to induce good decision making and avoid procrastination. To improve the quality of education, health, nutrition services and social services we have to empower the users as well as strengthen the accountability of the providers. Private sector participation in the provision of social services should be promoted. The promotion of formal firms in the regions of extreme poverty, such as mining firms and related activities has shown proven results as a mechanism of rising and stabilizing the incomes of the poor. / El análisis microeconómico de la pobreza en Perú muestra los siguientes resultados. Primero, la pobreza está principalmente determinada porque los ingresos de los pobres son no solo bajos sino altamente volátiles. Segundo, la pobreza se explica porque la decisiones importantes que toman los pobres, muchas veces, presentan información incompleta, inconsistencia intertemporal y falta de autocontrol, principalmente en las áreas de ahorro y crédito, de salud preventiva, fertilidad y de educación. Tercero, la pobreza depende de las restricciones externas que los pobres enfrentan en algunos mercados en los que participan donde, por lo general, están marginados de la decisiones automáticas y fáciles, las que están al alcance de los sectores de mayores ingresos, como, por ejemplo, el acceso automático a seguros de salud, pensiones de vejez e invalidez, vacunas, agua y desagüe. Cuarto, los pobres están expuestos a más y mayores riesgos que el resto de la población.Ellos tienen mayor probabilidad de caer en trampas de pobreza crónica que las personas de mayores ingresos, porque sus ingreso son bajos y muy volátiles y porque carecen de facilidades financieras e institucionales que las puedan amortiguar sus fluctuaciones de ingreso. Quinto, para combatir la pobreza se requiere, por un lado, actuar tratando de modular las decisiones de los pobres a través difusión de información y de mecanismos prestados de la economía del comportamiento, como el mecanismo de encuadre, para evitar la procrastinación e inducir a «buenas» decisiones en la salud, nutrición, educación, aseguramiento, pensiones, etcétera y, por otro, requiere realizar la enorme tarea de mejorar la calidad y cantidad de la oferta de los servicios de salud, educación, nutrición y programas sociales con la vigilancia de los propios interesados para rendimiento de cuentas y la participación del sector privado, que ha demostrado ser más efectivo que el sector público en el suministro de los servicios sociales. La generación de empleos formales estables en las regiones donde los pobres viven ha probado ser la manera más segura de aumentar y estabilizar sus ingresos.

A assimetria informacional é característica inerente ao mercado financeiro, transparecendo através de problemas de seleção adversa e risco moral. Não é diferente no tocante às operações de crédito bancário. Cientes disso, as instituições bancárias lançam mão de mecanismos de filtragem e monitoramento, bem como da exigência de garantias, para a redução da assimetria informativa. O contrato ocupa papel central nesse processo. Porque é do instrumento contratual a função de mitigar os efeitos deletérios da assimetria informacional, o presente trabalho objetiva avaliar se as cláusulas em contratos usuais de concessão de crédito pelo Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul (BRDE) são de fato desenhadas visando ao incentivo de publicidade de informações e prevenção de ações ocultas. / Informational asymmetry is an inherent characteristic of the financial market that presents itself as problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. It is not different in regard to bank loan operations. Aware of this situation, the banking institutions utilise screening and monitoring mechanisms, as well as collateral exigencies, in order to reduce the informational asymmetry. The contract plays a central role within this process. Because the contractual instrument has the purpose of mitigating the deleterious effects of the informational asymmetry, the present work intends to evaluate if the clauses employed in usual credit concession contracts by the Regional Development Bank of the Far South (BRDE) are indeed designed aiming at incentives to information disclosure and prevention of hidden actions.

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No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Luiz Lucente versão final.pdf: 1003381 bytes, checksum: 9f48844b4ffbdb904885e3438a4534fb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-10 / The theoretical literature regarding banking economics indicates that long-term relationships between a lender and a borrower can reveal information about the firm’s credit rating. Nonetheless, theoretical studies foresee different results from the effect of banking relationship regarding interest rates and the quantity of capital offered to a firm. According to Diamond (1991) and others, if the banking relationship reveals to all creditors the quality of the firm’s credit, therefore effects such as the increase in the loan amount available to the firm and interest rate reduction are expected. On the other hand, if banking relationship only reveals the firm’s credit information to the main supplier, then it could not have the effect from the increased lending amount and interest rate reduction. This paper demonstrates empirically what are effects from public and private information generated by banking relationship in the total quantity of capital (loan) offered to the firm and interest rate charged by financial institutions. We used the length of the relationship between the lender and the borrower as a measure, since it can be found in external bureaus such as Serasa Experian and SCPC (Credit Reporting Agency) or at SISBACEN (Central Bank Information System). We used as private information model measures that indicate late payments of debts from the borrower, which are known exclusively by each creditor. According to the theory, it is expected that public information related to length of the relationship with the bank will result in higher loan amount availability and lower interest rates. Private information regarding late payments will not have effect over the loan amount availability and interest rate, since they are exclusive information from the main creditor. In the empiric test, more than two thousand six hundred and eighty five loans related to working capital products granted to fifty-three companies lent by a financial institution in the state of Espírito Santo, were analyzed. Using the panel data with fixed firm effect econometric model, we found that the length of the relationship with the bank is positively correlated to the availability of capital to a firm and negatively correlated to the banking spread. Both effects are statistically significant at 5.00% level. Similar to the results found by Berger and Udell (1995). The results show that a long-term relationship between firms and financial institutions reduce the information asymmetry, generating benefits for the firms. In order to test the private information effect, we used information of defaults from the firms with the financial institution. Those data were used internally, not disclosed to credit bureaus. The variables tested were number of outstanding installments in the previous month, the sum of outstanding installments, flag in case the late payments had already been made and months since the last late payment. There are no effects of private information on spread and the total availability of capital. Similar to the results found by Sharpe (1990). / A literatura teórica sobre economia bancária aponta que o relacionamento duradouro entre um emprestador e uma firma tomadora pode revelar informações sobre a qualidade de crédito da firma. Entretanto, trabalhos teóricos preveem diferentes resultados do efeito do relacionamento bancário sobre a taxa de juros e volume ofertado do empréstimo. De acordo com Diamond (1991) e outros, se o relacionamento bancário for revelar a todos os credores a qualidade de crédito da firma, espera-se como efeitos o aumento do volume dos empréstimos e redução na taxa de juros. Por outro lado, se o relacionamento bancário revelar as informações de crédito da firma apenas para o fornecedor principal, então se pode não ter os efeitos de aumento do volume e redução na taxa de juros. Este trabalho demonstra empiricamente quais são os efeitos das informações públicas e privadas geradas pelo relacionamento bancário no montante do empréstimo e na taxa de juros cobrada pelas instituições financeiras para as firmas. Usamos como medida de informação pública o tempo de relacionamento entre o banco e tomador, que pode ser encontrado em bureaux externos como Serasa Experian e Serviço Central de Proteção ao Crédito (SCPC) ou no Sistema de Informação do Banco Central (SISBACEN). Usamos como modelo de informação privada medidas que indicam o pagamento do débito em atraso por parte do tomador, o qual é de conhecimento apenas de cada credor. De acordo com a teoria, espera-se que a informação pública de tempo de relacionamento bancário indicará a qualidade do credor e resultará em maior volume de empréstimo e taxa de juros menores. As informações privadas sobre pagamentos em atraso, por ser exclusiva do credor principal, não terão efeitos sobre o montante do empréstimo e sobre a taxa de juros. No teste empírico, foram analisados dois mil setecentos e oitenta e cinco empréstimos do produto capital de giro concedidos a cinquenta e três empresas, fornecidos por uma instituição financeira do Estado do Espírito Santo. Utilizando o modelo econométrico dados em painel com efeito fixo de firma, encontramos que o tempo de relacionamento bancário é positivamente correlacionado ao valor do principal do empréstimo e é negativamente correlacionado ao spread bancário. Ambos os efeitos são estatisticamente significantes ao nível de 5,00%. Resultados similares ao encontrado por Berger e Udell (1995). Os resultados mostram que um relacionamento duradouro entre firmas e instituições financeiras reduz a assimetria de informação, gerando benefícios para as firmas. Para testar o feito da informação privada, foram utilizadas informações de atraso das firmas com a instituição financeira. Esses dados foram usados internamente, não divulgados em bureaux de crédito. As variáveis testadas foram número de parcelas pagas em atraso no mês anterior, a soma das parcelas pagas em atraso, flag se já efetuou pagamento em atraso e meses desde o último pagamento em atraso. Não têm efeito as informações privadas sobre o spread e o valor do principal do empréstimo. Resultados similares aos encontrados por Sharpe (1990).

A atividade bancária é intensamente regulada e supervisionada em grande parte do mundo. Atualmente uma das discussões mais importantes que vem sendo travadas no mundo acadêmico reside nos instrumentos de política prudencial: de um lado, o Acordo de Basiléia, que utiliza o requerimento de capital próprio; de outro, os defensores de emissões de dívidas de diversos graus de subordinação. Além de voltar especial atenção aos 25 Princípios para uma Supervisão Eficaz, recentemente divulgado pelo BIS (“Bank for International Settlements”), o objetivo deste trabalho é tentar elaborar um modelo formal que tente compatibilizar as duas formas de políticas prudenciais. / The banking activity is intensely regulated and supervisioned throughout the world. Nowadays, one of the most important discussions that can be found among the prudential policies’ studies concerns the type of prudential instrument that shall be used: Capital requirement as the basis of the Basel Accord, and subordinated debt issues. Our main objective will be to construct a model that can be compatible to both approaches. Besides that, we will pay attention to the Core Principles for an Effective Supervision recently published by the BIS (Bank for International Settlements).

A atividade bancária é intensamente regulada e supervisionada em grande parte do mundo. Atualmente uma das discussões mais importantes que vem sendo travadas no mundo acadêmico reside nos instrumentos de política prudencial: de um lado, o Acordo de Basiléia, que utiliza o requerimento de capital próprio; de outro, os defensores de emissões de dívidas de diversos graus de subordinação. Além de voltar especial atenção aos 25 Princípios para uma Supervisão Eficaz, recentemente divulgado pelo BIS (“Bank for International Settlements”), o objetivo deste trabalho é tentar elaborar um modelo formal que tente compatibilizar as duas formas de políticas prudenciais. / The banking activity is intensely regulated and supervisioned throughout the world. Nowadays, one of the most important discussions that can be found among the prudential policies’ studies concerns the type of prudential instrument that shall be used: Capital requirement as the basis of the Basel Accord, and subordinated debt issues. Our main objective will be to construct a model that can be compatible to both approaches. Besides that, we will pay attention to the Core Principles for an Effective Supervision recently published by the BIS (Bank for International Settlements).