Union General Ambrose E. Burnside launched his invasion of East Tennessee in the summer of 1863. The corps he used consisted of half-infantry and half-mounted units to utilize their speed to overcome mountain obstacles. The successful campaign and the capture of the agriculturally rich region of East Tennessee and its vital East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad deprived the Confederacy of resources, ultimately contributing to Confederate defeat. The American Civil War saw commanders plunge into the mountains of Appalachia and encounter a terrain and a people with which many were unacquainted. This dissertation argues that their tactics and strategies for dealing with the mountainous terrain and its people stemmed from their past education about mountain warfare. Confederate and Union commanders of the American Civil War came from military and non-military backgrounds, but each encountered literature that described the region and, in the case of books on military philosophy, how to conduct a war within mountainous terrain. Cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point read the works of Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, who used their respective experiences in the Napoleonic Wars to illustrate proper tactics. Those works and other military theorists greatly influenced young cadets who became Civil War commanders. They used their studies of European commanders to guide them through tactics and strategies best suited for mountain warfare. Union commanders utilized mobile fighting units to overcome the natural obstacles of the environment and strike at a significantly rich agricultural region to the Confederacy, which aided in its defeat.

After Germany’s humiliating World War II defeat, numerous German generals published memoirs claiming that their country’s brilliant military leadership had been undermined by the Führer’s erratic decision making. The author of three highly acclaimed books on the era, Stephen Fritz upends this characterization of Hitler as an ill-informed fantasist and demonstrates the ways in which his strategy was coherent and even competent. That Hitler saw World War II as the only way to retrieve Germany’s fortunes and build an expansionist Thousand-Year Reich is uncontroversial. But while his generals did sometimes object to Hitler’s tactics and operational direction, they often made the same errors in judgment and were in agreement regarding larger strategic and political goals. A necessary volume for understanding the influence of World War I on Hitler’s thinking, this work is also an eye-opening reappraisal of major events like the invasion of Russia and the battle for Normandy. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1286/thumbnail.jpg

My work seeks to understand the origins of national identity as it pertains to the Anzacs of Australia and New Zealand, their service at the Battle of Gallipoli, and its use in the establishment of a white, male creation myth in both nations following the end of World War One. I furthermore plan to examine how this Anzac myth excluded and even erased the place of marginalized communities in the birth of Australia and New Zealand as modern nations. In other words, my thesis explores both the insiders and the outsiders of the Anzac myth. My cutting-edge research aims to build upon the small but growing scholarship about these "forgotten" Anzacs and their role in the construction of nationhood. Much has been written about white male Anzacs, and by writing this thesis, I hope to contribute to bridging this disparity in the scholarly literature. Not only will I highlight the roles of women and people of color in greater detail, but I will also analyze how the formation of the Anzac myth systematically excluded them in the first place. The work also explores the ramifications and implications of this exclusion in Australia and New Zealand as increasingly multicultural nations. In sum, it brings together three threads of research: the formation of national identity in these nations, the paradox of the public's reverence of the failed military campaign of Gallipoli, and the exclusion of the "forgotten" women Anzacs and people of color.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The use of military force to suppress internal unrest has been an integral part of South African history. The European colonisation of South Africa from 1652 was facilitated by the use of force. Boer commandos and British military regiments and volunteer units enforced the peace in outlying areas and fought against the indigenous population as did other colonial powers such as France in North Africa and Germany in German South West Africa, to name but a few. The period 1912 to 1945 is no exception, but with the difference that military force was used to suppress uprisings of white citizens as well. White industrial workers experienced this military suppression in 1907, 1913, 1914 and 1922 when they went on strike. Job insecurity and wages were the main causes of the strikes and militant actions from the strikers forced the government to use military force when the police failed to maintain law and order. Public reaction to the use of force was strong and the government, particularly Gen. J.C. Smuts, was severely criticised resulting in a defeat in the 1924 election. Over the period 1921 to 1932 indigenous populations in South Africa and South West Africa such as the Israelites (1921), the Bondelswarts (1922), the Rehoboth Basters (1925) and the Ukuambi (1932), were suppressed through punitive expeditions by the police and military forces of the Union of South Africa. The indigenous populations were a.o. grieved by the government’s implementation of branding laws, enforced indentured labour, dog and hut tax. The government’s prevailing racial policy of that time, manifested in a master and servant attitude towards the indigenous populations, exacerbated an existing grievance of restrictive political rights. The government reacted quickly and economically in suppressing any indigenous population’s protests involving militant action. Although the use of aeroplanes was criticised, it was a force multiplier and greatly assisted the small number of police and military forces deployed in minimising casualties on both sides. The government also had to suppress militant Afrikaner uprisings during the First and Second World Wars. In 1914 and 1915, prominent Afrikaner leaders and veterans of the Anglo-Boer War reacted militantly against the government’s participation in the First World War. Gen. L. Botha and Gen. Smuts were the architects of their suppression through quick mobilisation of the Active Citizen Force, using mostly Afrikaans speaking volunteers. The period between the two world wars saw the growth of the Afrikaners on a political, social and limited economical level. This gave rise to further dispute on political and social levels when the government once again opted to fight alongside Britain in the Second World War. Old animosities between the Afrikaners and British were relived and militant elements within Afrikaner society mobilised to impede this participation. The government resorted to using the Union Defence Forces and SA Police to facilitate internment, for spying and to guard strategic objectives in an effort to prevent sabotage and other serious damage to the war effort. Smuts received severe criticism from mostly Afrikaners who were against participation in the war, and the general public who had to suffer under the conditions of martial law. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die gebruik van militêre mag in die onderdrukking van interne onrus is ‘n algemene verskynsel in die geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika. Sedert 1652 het die Europese koloniale besetting van Suid-Afrika gepaard gegaan met geweld. Boerekommando’s en Britse militêre regimente en vrywilligereenhede het die vrede in verafgeleë gebiede gehandhaaf en die plaaslike bevolkings onderwerp, net soos ander koloniale moondhede, byvoorbeeld, Frankryk in Noord-Afrika en Duitsland in Duits-Suidwes-Afrika gedoen het. Die periode van 1912 tot 1945 was geen uitsondering nie, maar met die verskil dat opstande ook onder die blanke bevolking onderdruk is. In 1907, 1913, 1914 en 1922 het die blanke industriële werkers sodanige onderdrukking ervaar. Werksonsekerheid en loongeskille was die dryfkrag agter die stakings en die stakers se militante optrede het die regering gedwing om militêre mag te gebruik om die opstande te onderdruk, nadat die polisie se pogings om wet en orde te handhaaf, misluk het. Die publiek was sterk gekant teen sulke hardhandige optrede en Genl. J.C. Smuts het veral onder kritiek deurgeloop, wat tot sy politieke nederlaag gelei het. Opstandige inheemse bevolkings in Suid-Afrika en Suidwes-Afrika soos die Israeliete (1921), die Bondelswarts (1922), die Rehoboth Basters (1925) en die Ukuambi (1932) het deurgeloop onder strafekspidisies van elemente van die Unie van Suid-Afrika se polisie en weermag. Die inheemse bevolking is gegrief deur die regering se implimentering van brandmerkwette, geforseerde kontrakarbeid, hut- en hondebelasting. Die regering se rassebeleid van die tyd het ‘n meester-en-onderdaan-houding teenoor die inheemse bevolkings geskep, wat die teer kwessie van beperkte politieke regte vererger het. Opstande deur inheemse bevolkings wat militant van aard was, is op ‘n vinnige en ekonomiese manier onderdruk, dog het skerp kritiek uitgelok. Die benutting van vliegtuie om die opstande te onderdruk was ‘n magsvermenigvuldiger wat die klein polisie- en weermag gehelp het om verliese tydens die onderdukking van opstande aan beide kante te beperk. Die regering het ook opstande van Afrikanergroepe tydens die Eerste en Tweede Wêreldoorlog onderdruk. In 1914-1915 het prominente Afrikanerleiers en veterane van die Anglo-Boereoorlog militant opgeruk teen die regering in verset oor die regering se deelname aan die Eerste Wêreldoorlog. Genl. L. Botha en Genl. Smuts was die argitekte van die vinnige onderdrukking van die opstande deur die Aktiewe Burgermag op te roep en hoofsaaklik Afrikaanssprekende vrywilligers te gebruik. Die periode tussen die twee Wêreldoorloë is gekenmerk deur die groei van die Afrikaner op politieke, sosiale en in ‘n beperkte mate, ook ekonomiese gebied. Hieruit het verdere onenigheid op politieke en sosiale vlak onstaan toe die regering weer besluit het aand die kant van Brittanje tot die Tweede Wêreldoorlog toe te tree. Ou vyandighede tussen Afrikaans- en Engelssprekendes het herleef en militante elemente binne die Afrikanersamelewing het gemobiliseer om die deelname te belemmer. Die regering het die Unieverdedigingsmag en die SA Polisie gebruik vir internering, spioenering en die beveiliging van strategiese doelwitte teen sabotasie en ander aktiwiteite wat die oorlogsdeelname sou belemmer. Smuts het die meeste kritiek ontvang van Afrikaners wat gekant was teen die oorlog, asook die publiek in die algemeen wat gebuk gegaan het onder krygswet.

As World War II neared its end in Europe, the Allied powers faced a difficult situation with the occupied nation of Austria. Considering the complicated Austrian relationship with Nazism, the Allies had to decide how the nation would be liberated, occupied, and rehabilitated. Almost instantaneously, the United States, Great Britain, and France became at odds with a vengeful Soviet Union seeking to build a defensive shield of Communist European client states that included Austria. This study will show that as the head of the American Legal Division, Col. Eberhard P. Deutsch, United States Army, was instrumental in the reformation of occupied Austria’s legal system. It will also address the alleged role he played in the modification of the Second Control Agreement of 1946, the summer quadripartite conference that allowed the Austrian government greater opportunities for self-determination.

The tenth-century German bishop was more than just a spiritual leader, he was also a territorial lord with secular power. These bishops also lived in an environment where violence was sometimes a way of life. His culture contained a social dynamic that saw violence as a tool for defending and maintaining honor and as a mechanism for dispute resolution. Therefore, some bishops behaved violently, either to defend their diocese from threats or to serve their own political intrigues. In some instances bishops were said to be more skilled in warfare than secular lords. However, while some clergy participated in warfare and violence, others sought to limit it through application of canon law and peacemaking. With some clergy participating in violence and others decreeing that it be banned, there were mixed messages regarding clerical violence in this era. The bishop's role in warfare and violence, especially in Germany, has only been partially addressed by modern scholars. This deficit is part of an overall shortage of medieval German military scholarship. Furthermore, the historiography on bishops in the central Middle Ages (c. 900-1200) has generally covered two narratives: the bishop as a territorial lord or his role as a church reformer. This leaves a gap in scholarship that describes how an individual bishop justified or rationalized clerical participation in violence and warfare, including his own. This paper addresses that need by reporting how one German bishop, Thietmar of Merseburg (b. 975, 1009-18), reflected on and portrayed clerical violence and warfare in his Chronicon. Thietmar's attitudes towards violence were as complex as the times in which he lived, and were influenced by his secularism and religiosity. When it came to his justifications for clerical violence and warfare, Thietmar was more concerned about the clergyman's ability to perform as a military leader, and whether or not the violent actions were justified on their own merits. While he sometimes conveyed unease with some acts of clerical violence, and at times was careful to note distinctions between secular and spiritual realms, nevertheless he did not criticize a member of the clergy for violence on the basis of his religious station nor spiritual beliefs. Indeed, Thietmar was a torn individual, struggling with his religious convictions while living in a world where violence was habitual, and where he saw it as his duty to protect his flock. In this regard Thietmar should be considered a realist.

This dissertation argues that the origins of civil defense are to be found in pre-World War II Britain and that a driving force of this early civil defense scheme was fear of poison gas. Later iterations of civil defense, such as the Cold War system in America, built on already existing regimes that had proven their worth during WWII. This dissertation demonstrates not only that WWII civil defense served as a blueprint for later civil defense schemes, but also that poison gas anxiety served as a particular tool for the implementation and success of civil defense. The dissertation is organized thematically, exploring the role of civilians and volunteers in the civil defense scheme, as well as demonstrating the vital importance of physical manifestations of civil defense, such as gas masks and air raid shelters, in ensuring the success of the scheme. By the start of World War II, many civilians had already been training in civil defense procedures for several years, learning how to put out fires, recognize bombs, warn against gas, decontaminate buildings, rescue survivors, and perform first aid. The British government had come to the conclusion, long before the threat became realized, that the civilian population was a likely target for air attacks and that measures were required to protect them. World War I (WWI) saw the first aerial attacks targeted specifically at civilians, suggesting a future where such attacks would occur more frequently and deliberately. Poison gas, used in WWI, seemed a particularly horrifying threat that presented significant problems. Civil defense was born out of this need to protect the civil population from attack by bombs or poison gas. For the next five years of war civil defense worked to maintain British morale and to protect civilian lives. This was the first real scheme of civil defense, instituted by the British government specifically for the protection of its civilian population.

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