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High altitude warfare: the Kargil Conflict and the futureAcosta, Marcus P. 06 1900 (has links)
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The unique combination of thin air, freezing temperatures, and mountainous terrain that forms the high altitude environment has resisted advances in military technology for centuries. The emergence of precision warfare has altered the nature of warfare on most of the world's surface, yet has not significantly changed the conduct of ground combat at high altitude. The tactics that lead to victory on the high altitude battlefield have remained constant over time. This thesis examines the impact of the high altitude environment on soldiers, their weapons, and military operations, and identifies the lessons of the 1999 Kargil Conflict that are relevant to future high altitude combat. Combat at altitudes approaching 18,000 feet (5,485 m) above sea level between India and Pakistan at Kargil illustrates the timeless nature of high altitude warfare. U.S. combat experiences in the mountains of Afghanistan in 2002 parallel those of the combatants at Kargil despite the overwhelming technological advantage of U.S. forces. Trained and wellequipped light infantry is the only force capable of decisive maneuver in mountainous terrain. Heavy volumes of responsive firepower, in concert with bold maneuver, determine victory. Artillery, rather than air power, remains the preferred source of firepower to support ground maneuver. / Captain, United States Army
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High altitude warfare : the Kargil Conflict and the future /Acosta, Marcus P. January 2003 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June, 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Peter Lavoy, Douglas Porch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-83). Also available online.
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The Evolution of Mountain Warfare in Southern AppalachiaWilder, Lucas 01 May 2014 (has links)
War ranged in the mountains during the four years of the American Civil War. Campaigns intended to capture the Cumberland Gap and the vital railroad line leading out of Knoxville, Tennessee became a prerogative. However, these campaigns evolved from large infantry units to mobile mounted units that allowed them to operate in the mountainous region of Southern Appalachia. First commanders in the area experimented with using the common infantry units, as they would in any military campaign, but they soon found that large infantry units ate out the surrounding communities. Commanders found that mounted units could quickly move through the mountains and to their destination, thereby living off the land for a shorter amount of time and accomplishing their missions more successfully.
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Taktik vid strid i bergsterräng : En jämförelse mellan USA och Sovjets taktik i AfghanistanKarlsson, Johan January 2009 (has links)
<p>I och med det svenska bidraget till NATO missionen i Afghanistan samt den nyupprättade bergsplutonen på Arméns JägarBataljon i Arvidsjaur så har frågor kring taktik i bergsterräng även blivit aktuellt för Sverige. Då svenska utbildningarna och doktriner i huvudsak saknar problematiseringen kring att strida eller verka i bergsterräng så kan man där av ställa sig frågan hur ska vi få kunskap om detta? Detta arbete syftar därför till att jämföra den av USA använda taktiken i Afghanistans bergsterräng och den Sovjet har använt sig av. Frågan som arbetet försöker besvara är dels vad skillnaden har varit mellan taktiken hos stormakterna samt vad som varit den största framgångsfaktorn och begränsningen i respektive lands konflikt. Arbetet bygger på ett underlag främst från litteratur samt artiklar om operationer genomförda i Afghanistan.</p><p>Arbetets resultat kan sammanfattas med att de faktorer som mest har påverkat dessa länders lösande av uppgift har varit hur ledarskapet har varit inom deras förband, och då främst hur i vilken utsträckning dessa har använt sig av uppdragstaktik. Flexibilitet, samordning av den indirekta elden och valet av understödsförmågor har även dessa varit viktiga faktorer som påverkat lösandet av uppgiften.</p> / <p>Due to the Swedish contribution to the by NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the newly established Mountain Platoon at the Swedish Army Ranger Batalion in Arvidsjaur have the question about mountain warfare started to be of interest for Sweden. Because of the lack of discussion of mountain warfare and how to act in the mountain terrain in the Swedish military doctrine and education the question is how to get knowledge of this? The purpose of this paper is to compare the tactics used by the U.S. and the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan. The question this paper is trying to answer is what the different between the two countries tactics and what have been the most important factor for success and the biggest limitation in the countries tactics in the conflict. The basis for the comparison was received from literature and articles about operations conducted in Afghanistan.</p><p>The results of the essay can be summarized in that the most prominent factor have been the leadership used by the units, and mainly to what extent they have used mission type tactics, Flexibility, coordination of the indirect fire and what support they have chosen to use have also been an important factor that affected the outcome.</p>
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Taktik vid strid i bergsterräng : En jämförelse mellan USA och Sovjets taktik i AfghanistanKarlsson, Johan January 2009 (has links)
I och med det svenska bidraget till NATO missionen i Afghanistan samt den nyupprättade bergsplutonen på Arméns JägarBataljon i Arvidsjaur så har frågor kring taktik i bergsterräng även blivit aktuellt för Sverige. Då svenska utbildningarna och doktriner i huvudsak saknar problematiseringen kring att strida eller verka i bergsterräng så kan man där av ställa sig frågan hur ska vi få kunskap om detta? Detta arbete syftar därför till att jämföra den av USA använda taktiken i Afghanistans bergsterräng och den Sovjet har använt sig av. Frågan som arbetet försöker besvara är dels vad skillnaden har varit mellan taktiken hos stormakterna samt vad som varit den största framgångsfaktorn och begränsningen i respektive lands konflikt. Arbetet bygger på ett underlag främst från litteratur samt artiklar om operationer genomförda i Afghanistan. Arbetets resultat kan sammanfattas med att de faktorer som mest har påverkat dessa länders lösande av uppgift har varit hur ledarskapet har varit inom deras förband, och då främst hur i vilken utsträckning dessa har använt sig av uppdragstaktik. Flexibilitet, samordning av den indirekta elden och valet av understödsförmågor har även dessa varit viktiga faktorer som påverkat lösandet av uppgiften. / Due to the Swedish contribution to the by NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the newly established Mountain Platoon at the Swedish Army Ranger Batalion in Arvidsjaur have the question about mountain warfare started to be of interest for Sweden. Because of the lack of discussion of mountain warfare and how to act in the mountain terrain in the Swedish military doctrine and education the question is how to get knowledge of this? The purpose of this paper is to compare the tactics used by the U.S. and the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan. The question this paper is trying to answer is what the different between the two countries tactics and what have been the most important factor for success and the biggest limitation in the countries tactics in the conflict. The basis for the comparison was received from literature and articles about operations conducted in Afghanistan. The results of the essay can be summarized in that the most prominent factor have been the leadership used by the units, and mainly to what extent they have used mission type tactics, Flexibility, coordination of the indirect fire and what support they have chosen to use have also been an important factor that affected the outcome.
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“Infantry would not do:” Appalachia, the environment, and the evolution of mountain warfare during the American Civil WarWilder, Lucas Michael 13 May 2022 (has links) (PDF)
Union General Ambrose E. Burnside launched his invasion of East Tennessee in the summer of 1863. The corps he used consisted of half-infantry and half-mounted units to utilize their speed to overcome mountain obstacles. The successful campaign and the capture of the agriculturally rich region of East Tennessee and its vital East Tennessee & Virginia Railroad deprived the Confederacy of resources, ultimately contributing to Confederate defeat. The American Civil War saw commanders plunge into the mountains of Appalachia and encounter a terrain and a people with which many were unacquainted. This dissertation argues that their tactics and strategies for dealing with the mountainous terrain and its people stemmed from their past education about mountain warfare. Confederate and Union commanders of the American Civil War came from military and non-military backgrounds, but each encountered literature that described the region and, in the case of books on military philosophy, how to conduct a war within mountainous terrain. Cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point read the works of Baron de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, who used their respective experiences in the Napoleonic Wars to illustrate proper tactics. Those works and other military theorists greatly influenced young cadets who became Civil War commanders. They used their studies of European commanders to guide them through tactics and strategies best suited for mountain warfare. Union commanders utilized mobile fighting units to overcome the natural obstacles of the environment and strike at a significantly rich agricultural region to the Confederacy, which aided in its defeat.
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