On September 95, 1861, Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith reported to his new command at the Department of East Tennessee. It was a troubled command; Kirby Smith's insufficient army was pressed from the north by Brigadier General George Buell. of the Morgan, and from the west by Major General Don Carlos To save his command from certain defeat at the hands superior Union armies, Kirby Smith was able to convince General Braxton Bragg to move his army by rail to East Tennessee. Through a series of political maneuvers, Kirby Smith obtained a portion of Bragg's army and entered Kentucky on August 14, 1862. Bragg, with the remainder of his army, was to follow. The plan was for the two Confederate armies to bring an indecisive Kentucky into the Confederacy, obtain Kentucky recruits, and combine to defeat Buell (who was of course obligated to defend Kentucky against the invading armies). At the same time, Major Generals Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn were to move eastward from West Tennessee and capture Nashville--the South would be free of Union forces. Kirby Smith moved rapidly northward, defeating a small Union force at Richmond Kentucky on August 30. He continued on to capture Lexington and Frankfort on September 2 and 3. Bragg--with Buell closely behind--marched toward Bowling Green, and on to Munfordville, turning eastward off the Louisville road to Bardstown. Buell marched into Louisville on September 30 unopposed. Not expecting Buell to leave Louisville for several weeks, Kirby Smith and Bragg delayed concentration to carry on the necessary administrative duties of occupying the state. But Buell was able to coordinate his forces and move out of Louisville in only three days. Buell's plan called for a feint to be sent toward Kirby Smith at Lexington to keep the two Confederate armies divided. The main Union army was to move in three parts, toward Bardstown. The plan was successful; the Confederate commanders were confused by the feint and remained divided. The Confederate main force at Bardstown retreated before the three pronged Union attack, taking a stand at Perryville on October 9. During the battle Bragg's army was able to push back a portion of the Union force, but-- finding that they were severely outnumbered—the Confederates left the battlefield the next day. Kirby Smith remained in and around Frankfort, unable to coordinate his army with Bragg's. Finding that Price and Van Dorn had been defeated at Corinth Mississippi, out of provisions, and unable to recruit, Bragg and Kirby Smith decided to abandon Kentucky. The two armies retreated from the state, arriving in East Tennessee the last of October.

The purpose of this study is to examine the causes of belligerency in Kentucky in this period of diplomatic crisis, thus examining the second level of causation for the war as suggested by Brown's study. The test case used is Kentucky which was known as one of the states most anxious for war against Britain, both in Congress and in the state itself. However, this study will not attempt to interpret the role of the state's representatives in the Congress of the United States, since, if Brown is correct in his interpretation, the causes of public belligerency had little to do with the final declaration of war. When a member of Congress is quoted, it is because his statements summarize the feeling of the people in Kentucky. Thus there is little attempt to relate the voting or speeches of various representatives to the causes of belligerent attitudes of Kentuckians, except in ways in which these prominent Kentuckians reflect the backgrounds and attitudes of their less articulate neighbors. The role of the Kentucky Congressmen of the Twelfth Congress in bringing war, a role which has been extensively studied in many other works, thus falls outside the scope of this study.

The purpose of this study is to find the hidden facts of a man who has done much to illuminate Kentucky's greatness and glory. Yet little but his name is known to the youth of the land. As death has fixed the seal of glory on his life, history should assign to him his rank. Much of the data in this sketch has been gathered from source material.

The present work is intended as a survey of events and conditions in Tennessee during the decade from 1860 to 1870 when the entire nation was torn by sectional strife, racial antagonism, and economic and social disorder. The writer can make no pretension of having made a comprehensive or exhaustive study of the sources. That would involve a paper far beyond the scope of the present study. At best I have only scratched the surface; merely opened avenues for future study.

This thesis is an investigation that combines historical research into military records and genealogy in the examination of the brief military career and death in courageous circumstances of George P. Cole. It also considers the policies of the U.S. military as regards battlefield treatment of deaths, immediate burial and subsequent repatriation of the remains. The author draws upon family records, official government reports and the recollections of the friends and superiors of the deceased.

This paper focuses on Native American military service in Euro-American Wars. It analyzes their reasons for fighting and compares those reasons to the reasons of other racial and ethnic groups. This paper explores how certain racial and ethnic groups are marginalized and “otherized” and how they occasionally attempt to assimilate into mainstream society through military service. Irish Americans and African Americans viewed the Civil War in this way, while Native Americans hoped they would be able to improve their individual situations. Native Americans fought for purposes of assimilation and citizenship in World War I, and while they were technically granted citizenship their conditions did not improve. Neither military service or various government policies have allowed Native Americans to fully integrate into mainstream society. Today they still suffer because they are seen as “others” and stereotypes.

This thesis addresses the topic of German espionage in the United States between 1935 and 1945. It examines what the expectations were for Germany's spies in America, their activities, and the success or failure of their operations. In addition, the reaction of the American public to these spies is also studied, as well as the response to what was perceived as a threat to the United States from Nazi Germany.

The British Indian Army, formed from the old presidency armies of the East India Company in 1895, was one of the pillars upon which Britain’s world empire rested. While much has been written on the colonial and global campaigns fought by the Indian Army as a tool of imperial power, comparatively little has been written about the transition of the army from British to Indian control after the end of the Second World War. While independence meant the transition of the force from imperial rule to that of civilian oversight by India’s new national leadership, the Dominion of India inherited thousands of former colonial soldiers, including two generations of British and Indian officers indoctrinated in military and cultural practices developed in the United Kingdom, in colonial India and across the British Empire. The goal of this paper is to examine the legacy of the British Empire on the narrative, ethos, culture, tactics and strategies employed by the Indian Army after 1945, when the army began to transition from British to Indian rule, up to 1973 when the government of India reinstituted the imperial rank of Field Marshal. While other former imperial officers would continue to serve in the army up to the end of the 20th century, the first thirty years after independence were a formative period in the history of the Indian Army, that saw it fight four major wars and see the final departure of white British officers from its ranks. While it became during this time a truly national army, the years after independence were one in which its legacy as an arm of imperial power was debated, and eventually transformed into a key component of military identity in the post-colonial era.

The memory of the battle of Okinawa was shaped by politics. The memory of the battle for Okinawans emphasizes war crimes committed against them and the devastating impact that was inflicted upon their peaceful island. Their emphasis on sole victimization led to other Okinawan narratives being either downplayed or outright denied. To remove American bases off their island, gain recognition for Japanese atrocities plus reparations, the Okinawans portrayed themselves as a peaceful people that were the sole victims of the battle of Okinawa. The United States glossed over the crimes committed by the Japanese on Okinawa and Asia to use Japan as a bulwark against what they perceived as communist aggression in Asia. To solidify this new alliance, the United States promoted reconciliation instead of punishment. In doing so, they willingly forget atrocities committed by the Japanese against Asian nationals. Americans also remember the battle in conjunction with the dropping of two atomic bombs and to justify their morally superior position to the Soviet Union, promote a more complex picture of the decision to use the bombs. This included discussing how Okinawa changed the American leader’s perspectives on a mainland Japan invasion. As a result, has become increasingly difficult to separate Okinawa and the bombs because of their temporal closeness. The Japanese tend to remember the battle as a heroic last stand and emphasize sacrifice to inspire future generations partly out of fear that Japanese youth have gone soft, ultimately demonstrating that Japan has not fully come to terms with her memory of the Second World War.

Gay men and women have existed in the United States and in the armed forces much longer than legally and socially permitted. By World War II, a cultural shift began within the gay communities of the United States as thousands of gay men and women enlisted in the armed forces. Military policies barred gay service members by reinforcing stereotypes that gay men threatened the wellbeing of other soldiers. Such policies fostered the idea that only particular kinds of men could adequately serve. There were two opposing outcomes for the service of returning gay and lesbian veterans. For many hiding their sexuality from public view, they were granted benefits for their service to the country. For others not as lucky, they received nothing and were stripped of their benefits and rank. With the benefits of the new GI Bill, millions of veterans attended schools and bought homes immediately after the war, and the 1950s marked a new era in the course of the United States. But the Cold War’s deep fear of communism and subversives gripped the United States at the highest levels of government and permeated to the rest of society. This thesis examines the experiences of gay men and women in the American military in World War II and the early Cold War. Particularly after World War II, their experiences as veterans were not only limited to their time in service, but extended far into their civilian lives. This research primarily incorporates scholarly sources from 1981 to present with early gay magazines of the 1950s and 1960s and other archival materials available through the ONE National Gay & Lesbian Archives at University of Southern California (USC) in Los Angeles.