The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.

Cognitive impairment is prevalent among older adults population. It brings restriction to older adults’ lives and bring huge burden to the society. Mind-body exercise has characteristics from both physical exercise and intellectual experience. Moreover, it has potential cognitive benefits to reduce the incidence even reverse cognitive impairment. Using meta-analysis to analyze findings form published research on mind-body exercise, this study will explore whether practicing mind-body exercise is beneficial for the management of cognitive impairment.

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Descartes and Malebranche often seem to argue that the self (or I) is identical to an immaterial thinking substance distinct from the body. But there are also many passages where they insist that the body is part of the self. This means that Descartes and Malebranche have a problem, since they seem to endorse three mutually inconsistent propositions: (1) I am an immaterial thinking thing. (2) Immaterial things don't have bodily parts. (3) I include my body as part of myself. I call this puzzle the self-body problem. It is a problem about understanding how we - the immaterial thinking subjects who engage in the self-reflective project of the Meditations - can incorporate our bodies into ourselves. I argue that Descartes and Malebranche have an elegant solution to this inconsistency. On my interpretation, the Cartesian self is not identical to an immaterial thinking substance. Rather, the Cartesian self is a variably constituted being that has different parts at different times and in different possible situations. Sometimes the self exists with both an immaterial thinking part and a bodily part. Other times it exists with only an immaterial part. The immaterial part is essential to the self, the bodily part is not. When Descartes and Malebranche say that I am immaterial, what they really mean is that I essentially have an immaterial part. But that is consistent with the claim that my body is part of myself. / Philosophy

This interdisciplinary dissertation is a study of the ways in which we sensually embody and experience ow world. It is a metaphilosophical account that begins within orporeality; indeed, it is suggested that this isthe place where the philosophic urge is argued, elaborated, and reflected upon. While many studies of embodiment tend to focus upon "the body" as object, cultural artefact, or text for cultural inscription, the approach used in this dissertation is with the incarnation (the making flesh) of interaction in particular socio-physical milieux. The shift is thus from investigation of bodies to bodying, from noun form to transitive verb of incorporealization. This shift is felt necessary in order to better understand the so-called dualisms of traditional Western philosophic thought: mindbody, self-other, self-world, nature-culture, etc., and Tantric inspired Eastern philosophies of self-all relationality. It will be suggested, taking the lead from Leder (1990), that these apparent dualisms are not so much "add-ons" to philosophies of being, but arise in the experiential body itself. This dissertation endeavours to rethink certain "givens" of everyday life, such as perception of time and space, place, enacted memory, having empathic feelings for others, and so on, from within bodily experience and occidental-oriental philosophies of being. Certain neurological disorders are examined for their way of deconstructing elements required to construct a meaningful incarnated life-world. The process of embodiment is not only what the body is, but what it does. My construction of what is necessary for embodiment studies therefore considers bodily praxes (cultural and individual), as well as the sensual, sensate experiences arising in the body. The image of a ball game is evoked in various ways throughout the dissertation not only because it well describes the dense layers of interaction and an emergent sense of bodiliness, but it also illustrates reciprocity and situatedness. This thesis is intended to contribute to the health sciences as well as cultural studies. It draws upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, J. J. Gibson's ecological psychology, neurological studies and case histories, and the Eastern tradition of Tantrism in its Mahayanist Buddhist and Taoist forms.

<p> </p><p> </p><p>The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.</p><p> </p>

Purpose: An experimental study to examine the effects of CardioWaves interval training (IT) and continuous training (CT) on resting blood pressure, resting heart rate, and mind-body wellness. Methods: Fifty-two normotensive (blood pressure <120/80 mmHg), pre-hypertensive (120-139/80-89 mmHg), and hypertensive (>140/90 mmHg) participants were randomly assigned and equally divided between the IT and CT groups. Both groups participated in the assigned exercise protocol thirty minutes per day, four days per week for eight weeks. Resting blood pressure, resting heart rate, and mind-body wellness were measured pre- and post-intervention. Results: A total of 47 participants (15 females and 32 males) were included in the analysis. The IT group had a non-significant trend of reduced systolic blood pressure (SBP) and increased diastolic blood pressure (DBP) while the CT group had a statistically significant decrease in awake SBP (p=0.01) and total SBP (p=0.01) and a non-significant decrease in DBP. With both groups combined, the female participants had a statistically significant decrease in awake SBP (p=0.002), asleep SBP (p=0.01), total SBP (p=0.003), awake DBP (p=0.02), and total DBP (p=0.05). The male participants had an increase in SBP and DBP with total DBP showing a statistically significant increase (p=0.05). Neither group had consistent change in resting heart rate. Both groups showed improved mind-body wellness. Conclusion: IT and CT reduced resting blood pressure, with CT having a greater effect. Resting heart rate did not change in either group. Additionally, both IT and CT improved mind-body wellness.

Thesis advisor: Ronald K. Tacelli / Aquinas’ hylomorphism faces a mind–body problem, similar to that faced by Cartesianism. This claim runs contrary to virtually all contemporary Thomism, according to which Aquinas’ view on the relation between soul and body completely sidesteps any mind–body problem, by having a conceptual frame that is non-mechanistic and non-Cartesian, and by emphasizing the oneness of the human being. Typically, these arguments for Thomas’ hylomorphism omit his view that the human soul is not only the substantial form of the body, but also an efficient cause of bodily motion. In this dissertation, I argue that the human soul’s role as efficient cause is integral to Aquinas’ philosophy of nature and his ethics, so that it should not be omitted by Thomists, and that it cannot be denied without undermining Thomism fatally. Because Thomism must treat the human soul as an efficient cause, it does face a mind–body problem, however. Aquinas, I argue, was aware that his psychology raises such a difficulty, and provides some possible solutions to it, grounded on his doctrine of instrumental causality. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Il est courant de faire remonter l’origine du «problème corps-esprit» à Descartes et à sa distinction radicale des substances pensante et étendue. La question est bien connue : comment l’esprit, n’étant pas corporel, pourrait-il agir sur le corps et le mouvoir, et comment le corps pourrait-il agir en retour sur l’esprit, en causant ses sentiments et ses passions ? Si Descartes ne voyait là aucune difficulté qui aurait mérité d’abandonner la distinction des substances, ou au contraire la thèse d’une interaction causale réelle entre l’esprit et le corps, tel n’aura pas été le cas de ses lecteurs et interprètes. Ces derniers n’ont eu de cesse de faire valoir l’incohérence de son «dualisme interactionniste», souvent invoquée pour rendre compte de l’abandon, à l’âge classique, des relations causales entre l’esprit et le corps, et à l’époque contemporaine, du dualisme des substances au profit d’une ontologie physicaliste. Dans ce travail, nous revenons sur les difficultés engendrées par le cartésianisme concernant les rapports de l’esprit et du corps, en combinant trois perspectives qui associent réceptions classiques et contemporaines : celle des premiers objecteurs de Descartes ; celle de ses successeurs cartésiens, en s’intéressant à leur traitement de la difficulté liée à l’interaction âme-corps ; et celle des philosophes de l’esprit contemporains, dans le cadre de leur réflexion autour du Mind-body problem. Les problèmes philosophiques ainsi mis au jour sont utilisés pour relire les thèses de Descartes et proposer une nouvelle évaluation des doctrines sur la base des phénomènes psychophysiques qu’elles permettent ou non d’expliquer. / It is common to trace back the origin of the “mind-body problem” to Descartes and to his radical distinction between extended and thinking substance. The question is well known: how can the immaterial mind act on the body and move it, and how can the body, in turn, act on the mind by causing its feelings and passions? While Descartes did not regard this as the source of any difficulties that might have necessitated the rejection of the distinction between substances or, inversely, of the theory of real causal interaction between mind and body, his readers and interpreters did. They constantly insisted on the inconsistency of his “interactionist dualism,” which is often invoked as a reason for discarding the theory of causal relation between mind and body in the classical period, and for replacing substance dualism with a physicalist ontology in the contemporary period.In this work, we return to the difficulties generated by Cartesian philosophy about the relationship between mind and body from three interrelated perspectives, which combine classical and contemporary receptions of Descartes: that of the first objectors to Descartes; that of his successors, with special consideration of their treatment of the difficulties involved in explaining mind-body interaction; and that of contemporary philosophers of mind, whose reflections on the mind-body problem are examined. Our approach to the philosophical issues thus brought to light allows us to revisit Descartes’s theses, and to propose a new evaluation of the doctrines on the basis of the psychophysical phenomena that they are capable of accounting for or not.

In an attempt to address the disregard for holistic practices in much of Western culture and education, I present yoga as an alternative learning strategy to banking instruction often used in current educational practices. Specifically, I examine Hatha yoga in its content and methodology as a platform from which K-5 students can learn to engage in strategies of mindfulness practices to counter underlying causes of cognitive and behavioral problems seen in many public schools. Drawing from research based in the field of somatics and feminist/critical pedagogy, I articulate a yoga curriculum that supports bodily knowing and encourages the cultivation of self-/social awareness and empathy. I organize my findings into two separate curriculums: one for students in the grades K-2 and another for grades 3-5. Each curriculum is further divided into three units to include learning objectives, themed activities, lists of skills and concepts, and specific notes for instructors that take into consideration the motor and cognitive developmental patterns of students at each grade level. By establishing a curriculum consistent with current curricular standards in California, my hope is that policy-makers, administrators, educators, and parents alike will take into consideration the importance of embodied knowledge in the classroom and further advocate for its role in public schools.