<p>Denna undersökning syftar till att undersöka nationella skillnader i moralutveckling och innehåll i moraliskt resonemang. Studien omfattar 445 svenska och 148 amerikanska ungdomar i åldern 14-19 år. De svenska fpp är hämtade från högstadium och gymnasium i Stockholmsområdet, och de amerikanska från två katolska privatskolor i New York. Dessa tog del av ett moralfrågeformulär av Gibbs (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982; Socio-moral Reflection Measure; SRM) som är en reviderad version av Kohlbergs intervjumetod för bedömning av en individs moralutveckling och kvalitativa, moraliska synsätt i frågor rörande moral. Vid analysen förelåg inga nationella skillnader i moralutvecklingsnivå. Resultaten visade ej heller på skillnader mellan svenska och amerikanska ungdomars sätt att resonera kring moraliska frågor, utom i två fall, som kan tänkas visa på ett typiskt svenskt och ett typiskt amerikanskt sätt att tänka och försvara etiska ställningstaganden. Resultatet diskuteras utifrån (nämnda) teorier inom ämnesområdet.</p> / <p>The aim of this study is to investigate whether there are National differences in moral development and content of moral reasoning. The study includes 445 Swedish and 148 North American youths in the age of 14-19 years. The Swedish subjects of the study come from an upper level of compulsory school in the area around Stockholm, and the North American subjects of the study come from two private Catholic schools in New York. The subjects answered Gibbs’ Moral questionnaire (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982; Socio-moral Reflections Measure; SRM), which is a revised version of Kohlberg’s survey method for estimating individual moral development and qualitative moral viewpoints. The analysis showed no Nation-bound differences concerning moral development level between the youths. Neither could any differences between Swedish and North American young peoples’ way of reasoning on moral issues be traced, except in two cases, which possibly show a typical Swedish and a typical North American way of thinking and defending ethical standpoints. The result is discussed in relation to mentioned theories of the subject area.</p>

Denna undersökning syftar till att undersöka nationella skillnader i moralutveckling och innehåll i moraliskt resonemang. Studien omfattar 445 svenska och 148 amerikanska ungdomar i åldern 14-19 år. De svenska fpp är hämtade från högstadium och gymnasium i Stockholmsområdet, och de amerikanska från två katolska privatskolor i New York. Dessa tog del av ett moralfrågeformulär av Gibbs (Gibbs &amp; Widaman, 1982; Socio-moral Reflection Measure; SRM) som är en reviderad version av Kohlbergs intervjumetod för bedömning av en individs moralutveckling och kvalitativa, moraliska synsätt i frågor rörande moral. Vid analysen förelåg inga nationella skillnader i moralutvecklingsnivå. Resultaten visade ej heller på skillnader mellan svenska och amerikanska ungdomars sätt att resonera kring moraliska frågor, utom i två fall, som kan tänkas visa på ett typiskt svenskt och ett typiskt amerikanskt sätt att tänka och försvara etiska ställningstaganden. Resultatet diskuteras utifrån (nämnda) teorier inom ämnesområdet. / The aim of this study is to investigate whether there are National differences in moral development and content of moral reasoning. The study includes 445 Swedish and 148 North American youths in the age of 14-19 years. The Swedish subjects of the study come from an upper level of compulsory school in the area around Stockholm, and the North American subjects of the study come from two private Catholic schools in New York. The subjects answered Gibbs’ Moral questionnaire (Gibbs &amp; Widaman, 1982; Socio-moral Reflections Measure; SRM), which is a revised version of Kohlberg’s survey method for estimating individual moral development and qualitative moral viewpoints. The analysis showed no Nation-bound differences concerning moral development level between the youths. Neither could any differences between Swedish and North American young peoples’ way of reasoning on moral issues be traced, except in two cases, which possibly show a typical Swedish and a typical North American way of thinking and defending ethical standpoints. The result is discussed in relation to mentioned theories of the subject area.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.

This thesis is a critical discussion of political thinker Hannah Arendt’s moral thought, as developed in her works from EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM onwards. Arendt, I argue, sought to respond to the moral challenge she saw posed by the phenomenon of banal evildoing, as revealed in Nazi Germany. Banal evildoers are agents who, under circumstances in which their ordinary moral triggers and guides (conscience, moral habits and norms, the behavior of their peers, etc.) are subverted, commit evil despite having no evil intent. Such subversion of ordinary moral voices would appear to absolve these agents from moral responsibility for their acts, which led most commentators to reject claims to such subversion by Nazi collaborators. Arendt, who sees the phenomenon of banal evildoing as factually substantiated, set out to show that such agents possessed other mental capacities (namely, critical and speculative thinking, reflective judging, and free willing), more appropriate for moral decision-making, on which they could have relied even under Nazi conditions. It is for their disregard of such capacities that banal evildoers can be held morally responsible. In this thesis I critically engage with this Arendtian argument. I show how the Nazi subversion of German agents’ ordinary moral voices was achieved. I then exegetically explicate Arendt’s (unfinished) analysis of the above mental capacities and of their moral role. I then argue for the addition of the capacities of empathetic perception and practical wisdom to this understanding of moral performance. In the course of this analysis I show that in responding to this challenge, Arendt develops a powerful argument regarding the moral dangers of overreliance on mental shortcuts in decision-making, a strong argument regarding the interconnectedness between morality and humanness, and implicitly, a novel conception of selfhood that sees otherness as interrelated and interconnected with selfhood, such that concern for others is part of what constitutes, and therefore is inscribed into, care for the self. I end by critically assessing the applicability of Arendt’s moral analysis to more ordinary decisional circumstances than those of Nazi Germany, and the insight this analysis points to regarding the relationship between moral and political decision-making.