The purpose of this research was to understand the meaning of caring as narrated, lived, moral experience. Forty-five good nurses experienced in the care of patients in surgical, medical and geriatric wards were interviewed. They described their experience of; caring, caring abilities, the worthwhile of caring, the strength related to caring and narrated situations (n=88) in which they had experienced that their caring had made a difference to the patient. Surgical nurses described care and cure as an integrated whole, medical nurses described care as integrated with the patients' social context and geriatric nurses described care as enhancing the autonomy of patients (I). The nurses' narrated, lived, experiences of caring situations revealed ways of intervening and interacting with the patient including caring actions (II). Eighteen good nurses experienced in the care of cancer patients were also interviewed. Their narrated, lived experiences of morally difficult care situations i.e. situations where it had been hard to know what was the right and good thing to do for the patient (n=60), revealed that relationships with their co-workers were very important for their possibility to act according to their moral reasoning and feelings(III). The situations for the nurses were either disclosed as overwhelming or possible to grasp. When narrating about these situations the nurses used different terms about themselves and their co-workers (One, They, I and We). The nurses viewed the patients either as a task to be accomplished or as a valuable unique person. In the latter situations ethical demands were interpreted, judged and acted upon (IV). Interpretations of these nurses' skills in managing morally difficult care situations disclosed two levels; one group of nurses who described positive paradigm cases, liberating maxims and disclosed open minds, while the other group described negative paradigm cases, restrictive maxims and revealed closed minds. The latter nurses were mostly the nurses who disclosed in Paper III that they used the term "one" about themselves and "they" about their co-workers (V).en patients recently cared for at surgical and medical wards were interviewed(IV). They narrated lived experiences of receiving/not receiving the help they needed or wanted when suffering from pain and anxiety/fear. The patients revealed that the most important thing for them to feel cared for in these situations was to be listened to, taken seriously and trusted, if they were not treated in this way the patients revealed that they felt they were in the hands of somebody who was uncaring. The findings are interpreted within the framework of Paul Tillich's philosophy concerning love, power, justice and courage, thereby showing the tension between these phenomena in the narrated, lived, moral experience. Light is also thrown on the dynamics of openness, vulnerability, fallibility, forgiveness, affirmation as well as powerlessness, meaninglessness, insufficiency, dissociation and exclusion. Reflections are made concerning practical wisdom. / <p>S. 1-60: sammanfattning, s. 61-151: 6 uppsatser</p> / digitalisering@umu

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-27T12:40:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wanderley Martins da Cunha.pdf: 2108530 bytes, checksum: 7a7dd015f4b275f4d84cb19ffb58d764 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-27T12:40:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Wanderley Martins da Cunha.pdf: 2108530 bytes, checksum: 7a7dd015f4b275f4d84cb19ffb58d764 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This work, based on the problem of elucidating the foundations and conditions of possibility of moral experience, aims to explore the various historical and conceptual stages of Ricoeur's philosophical itinerary in order to analyze his ethical project, by detecting, with their genesis, how it was structured and some of its implications. In the first part (THE INCHOATION OF ETHICAL REFLECTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILL) ─ within the framework of the realization of his first philosophical project, Ricoeur unravels the horizon of a real ethic, namely, a reflection on concrete moral experience, in which, however, because of its methodological choice, can not penetrate ─ seeks to demonstrate how a tension between the imperative and the optative is already present from the first movements of reflection ethics of Paul Ricoeur, since the philosopher accesses the ethical domain both through the golden path of Kantian respect, in confrontation with the limits of the phenomenological approach to the problem of the constitution of otherness, and through the appropriation of an non-deontological model of Nabertian inspiration based on originating affirmation and in the desire to be. In the second part (THE INFLEXIONS OF ETHICAL REFLECTION IN THE HERMENEUTICAL ITINERARY OF PAUL RICOEUR) ─ it has been found that it will be in the wake of the programmatic content that the philosopher had predicted for a future empirical of the will that steps could be taken in the direction of a concrete morality or of a real ethic, announced but not developed in its philosophy of the will ─, it is intended to demonstrate that, due to the multiple deviations by which the development of the thought of Ricoeur would happen in the years following the publication of Symbolic of Evil, such route was made gradually and not entirely systematically. In the third part (RICOEURIAN ETHICS REFLECTION IN THE HORIZONT OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE CAPABLE MAN), we try to show how Ricoeur's ethical reflections developed in previous decades receive, from the 1990s, "in its Little Ethics", a new formulation that, without denying its foundations, advances ricoeurian thought in the direction of contemporary ethical problems, while at the same time realizing the intention, present since the beginning of the philosophical itinerary of Ricoeur, to construct a "real ethics", this is, a reflection on concrete moral experience / O presente trabalho, tendo como eixo o problema da elucidação dos fundamentos e das condições de possibilidade da experiência moral, objetiva percorrer diferentes etapas históricas e conceituais do itinerário filosófico de Ricoeur em vista de se efetuar uma análise de seu projeto ético, detectando juntamente com sua gênese, o modo como se estruturou e algumas de suas implicações. Na primeira parte (A INCOAÇÃO DA REFLEXÃO ÉTICA NA FILOSOFIA DA VONTADE), ─ tendo-se detectado que, no âmbito da realização de seu primeiro projeto filosófico, Ricoeur deslinda o horizonte de uma ética real, ou seja, de uma reflexão sobre a experiência moral concreta, na qual, no entanto, em função de sua escolha metodológica, não pode penetrar ─, tem-se por objetivo demonstrar como uma tensão entre o imperativo e o optativo já se faz presente desde os primeiros movimentos da reflexão ética de Paul Ricoeur, dado que o filósofo acessa o domínio ético tanto pela via áurea do respeito kantiano, em confrontação com os limites da abordagem fenomenológica acerca do problema da constituição da alteridade, quanto pela via da apropriação de um modelo ético não deontológico de inspiração nabertiana, baseado na afirmação originária e no desejo de ser. Na segunda parte (AS INFLEXÕES DA REFLEXÃO ÉTICA NO ITINERÁRIO HERMENÊUTICO DE PAUL RICOEUR) ─ tendo-se detectado que vai ser na esteira do conteúdo programático que filósofo previra para uma futura empírica da vontade que passos poderão ser dados na direção de uma moral concreta ou de uma ética real, anunciada, mas não desenvolvida em sua filosofia da vontade ─, pretende-se demonstrar que, em razão dos múltiplos desvios pelos quais o desenvolvimento do pensamento de Ricoeur passaria nos anos seguintes à publicação de La Symbolique du mal, tal percurso efetuou-se gradativamente e de modo não inteiramente sistemático. Na terceira parte (INSERÇÃO DA REFLEXÃO ÉTICA RICOEURIANA NO HORIZONTE DA FENOMENOLOGIA DO HOMEM CAPAZ), nos esforçaremos por mostrar como as reflexões éticas de Ricoeur desenvolvidas nas décadas anteriores recebem, a partir dos anos 1990, “em sua Pequena Ética”, uma nova formulação que, sem negar os seus fundamentos, avança o pensamento ricoeuriano na direção das problemáticas éticas contemporâneas, ao mesmo tempo em que realiza o intuito, incoativamente presente no alvorecer do itinerário filosófico de Ricoeur, de se elaborar uma “ética real”, isto é, uma reflexão sobre a experiência moral concreta

This research explores the moral experiences of White, anti-racism educators in Saskatchewan. As members of the dominant group, while at the same time being defenders of the rights of minority groups, the unique positioning of these individuals raises intriguing questions of moral experience. Although there is a large body of research regarding issues of racism, there is very little research focusing on the experiences of individuals working in the field of anti-racism; this research seeks to address this gap in the literature. Using a critical interpretive approach (Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1990) grounded in the assumptions of constructionism, and relying upon Kleinmans (1995; 1999) theory of moral experience, I interviewed 12 self-identified White, anti-racism educators using an open-ended life-history interview followed by a semi-structured interview. The interview questions were inspired by the racism literature reviewed; my own experiences as a White woman negotiating my place in the study of racism; Kleinmans theory of moral experience; and a collection of secondary theories deemed potentially useful to understanding various dimensions of participants experience. Four broad domains of moral experience are identified and explored in this research. First, participants understandings of race, racism, and anti-racism are examined. Veynes (1988) theory regarding the plurality of programs of truths is used to make sense of what might be read as contradictions in participants constructions of these concepts. Second, the experience of actually doing anti-racism education is considered in terms of participants descriptions of their involvements; which they frame alternately as educating Whites, helping the racialized, and changing racist structures. Foucaults (1977, 1978) theory of power and de Certeaus notion of tactics (1984) prove relevant to understanding aspects of participants experiences in this domain. Third, the relationships between Self and various Others (i.e., the White Other, the racialized Other, the anti-racism Other) are explored. Todorovs (1984) typology of the Other is used to make sense of these complex data. Finally, participants descriptions of their experiences of Self (including past, present, and future Selves) are examined. Goffmans (1961) theory of moral career and Turners (1995) theory of liminality are applied to understanding elements of participants varied experiences of Self. In reviewing participants accounts across these broad domains, I argue that their noted success and confidence in navigating a challenging moral landscape might be understood in terms of their skill in moving between dual worlds that operate according to distinct logics of morality. Potential applications for the field of anti-racism are discussed.

This research explores the moral experiences of White, anti-racism educators in Saskatchewan. As members of the dominant group, while at the same time being defenders of the rights of minority groups, the unique positioning of these individuals raises intriguing questions of moral experience. Although there is a large body of research regarding issues of racism, there is very little research focusing on the experiences of individuals working in the field of anti-racism; this research seeks to address this gap in the literature. Using a critical interpretive approach (Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1990) grounded in the assumptions of constructionism, and relying upon Kleinmans (1995; 1999) theory of moral experience, I interviewed 12 self-identified White, anti-racism educators using an open-ended life-history interview followed by a semi-structured interview. The interview questions were inspired by the racism literature reviewed; my own experiences as a White woman negotiating my place in the study of racism; Kleinmans theory of moral experience; and a collection of secondary theories deemed potentially useful to understanding various dimensions of participants experience. Four broad domains of moral experience are identified and explored in this research. First, participants understandings of race, racism, and anti-racism are examined. Veynes (1988) theory regarding the plurality of programs of truths is used to make sense of what might be read as contradictions in participants constructions of these concepts. Second, the experience of actually doing anti-racism education is considered in terms of participants descriptions of their involvements; which they frame alternately as educating Whites, helping the racialized, and changing racist structures. Foucaults (1977, 1978) theory of power and de Certeaus notion of tactics (1984) prove relevant to understanding aspects of participants experiences in this domain. Third, the relationships between Self and various Others (i.e., the White Other, the racialized Other, the anti-racism Other) are explored. Todorovs (1984) typology of the Other is used to make sense of these complex data. Finally, participants descriptions of their experiences of Self (including past, present, and future Selves) are examined. Goffmans (1961) theory of moral career and Turners (1995) theory of liminality are applied to understanding elements of participants varied experiences of Self. In reviewing participants accounts across these broad domains, I argue that their noted success and confidence in navigating a challenging moral landscape might be understood in terms of their skill in moving between dual worlds that operate according to distinct logics of morality. Potential applications for the field of anti-racism are discussed.